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An Optimal and Just Financial Penalties System for Infringements of Competition 
Law: A Comparative Analysis 
 
Ioannis Lianos, Frédéric Jenny, Florian Wagner von Papp, Evgenia 
Motchenkova, Eric David 
 
Abstract 
 
The report examines optimal financial penalties from an economic and a 
comparative perspective. While emphasis is put on deterrence, we also examine 
some limits to the optimal enforcement theory employed by economists to design 
effective sanctions, in particular the principle of proportionality and the need for the 
penalty to be related to the harm caused and the wrong committed, the legal system 
integrating corrective justice concerns.  
 
The report delves into the tension between over-enforcement and under-
enforcement and that between a more effects-based approach for setting financial 
penalties (sanctions) that would rely on economic methodologies and a case-by-
case analysis to provide an accurate estimate of the harm caused by the 
anticompetitive conduct and a more "forms-based" approach that would rely on the 
use of proxies of percentages of the volume of commerce or the affected sales. The 
latter reduce the administrative costs of the authorities in designing appropriate 
sanctions but are less accurate than effects-based approaches.  
 
The report examines intermediary approaches put forward by the literature and their 
possible application to various competition law infringements (e.g. cartels, abuse of a 
dominant position). The final part of the report proceeds to a detailed comparative 
analysis of the financial penalties (sanctions) regimes for infringements of 
competition Law in the European Union, United States, Germany, United Kingdom, 
France and Chile, taking an empirical and a doctrinal perspective. Specific 
recommendations for the reform of the financial penalties system in Chile are also 
provided. 
Keywords: fines, competition law, antitrust, financial penalties, cartels, deterrence, 
optimal enforcement, justice, proportionality, compliance  
JEL Classification: K21, L40, L49  
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I. Executive summary 
 
The report first examines optimal financial penalties from an economic perspective 
and the emphasis it puts on deterrence. We also examine the limits to the optimal 
enforcement theory employed by economists to design effective sanctions, in 
particular the principle of proportionality and the need for the penalty to be related to 
the harm caused and the wrong committed, as the legal system should also integrate 
corrective justice concerns. The first part of the report also examines the tension 
between over-enforcement and under-enforcement and that between a more effects-
based approach that would rely on economic methodologies and a case by case 
analysis to provide an accurate estimate of the harm caused by the anticompetitive 
conduct and the use of proxies of percentages of the volume of commerce or the 
affected sales, which reduce the administrative costs of the authorities in designing 
appropriate sanctions.  
 
An approach that would emphasize corrective justice and the principle of 
proportionality may insist in setting the fine at a level corresponding to the harm 
caused by the anticompetitive conduct, including the need to take into account 
general and specific deterrence purposes relating to the specific conduct undertaken 
by the parties. Hence, in view of the objective of deterrence, one may not expect an 
exact correlation between the harm and the penalty. Such an effects-based 
approach to fine setting will not rely, in general, on presumptions and proxies based 
on affected sales or volumes of commerce. According to economic theory, fines 
should be at least equal to the expected illegally earned profits divided by the 
probability to be caught, hence they should relate to expected profits originating from 
the violation and not to the profits actually gained that may be higher or lower than 
those expected at decision-making time, should the fines be paid after the period of 
infringement. 
 
However, expected profits are not observable and cannot be computed in each 
individual case. A full-effects based approach may be unattainable in practice in view 
of the great diversity of market configurations. At most, competition authorities may 
estimate the actual extra profits generated by the cartel if they possess the relevant 
information or the damages caused by it (second best effects-based approach). A 
more formalistic approach, relying on presumptions or proxies, such as a percentage 
of the affected sales or volumes of commerce, could at first sight appear to be 
incompatible with the principle of proportionality and corrective justice which, in an 
extreme formulation, would require a case-by-case quantification of expected gains. 
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That said, one should take into account the costs of computing/estimating the 
expected or actual profits of an anticompetitive practice, or the damage caused by it. 
These costs may reduce the administrability of more effects-based approaches in 
setting financial penalties, in particular for fines of modest amount. High 
administrability costs may render the burden to the prosecutor, and indirectly to the 
tax payer, disproportional, in comparison to the level of fines requested. Hence, 
recourse to some presumptions or proxies (and inevitably some degree of formalism) 
that would reduce the costs of estimating the fines may be necessary in instances 
where these administrative costs would cover an important part of the amount of the 
fine imposed. It may make sense to use these methods, if expensive or time 
consuming, only for fines of a significant amount. Where competition authorities are 
to estimate actual profits or harm caused, the authority should be granted a wide 
margin of discretion to take account of the unavoidable uncertainty in determining 
the counterfactual development that would have resulted in the absence of the 
infringement. Given that it is the infringer that alters the course of events, it should be 
the infringer that bears the burden of the uncertainty about the counterfactual 
development created by its actions. 
 
An intermediary approach will use a measure of expected profits as the starting point 
for the analysis. Some authors have put forward a structured effects-based 
approach, suggesting as the starting point for setting the fine a range of the 
percentage of the value of sales to which the infringement relates, on the basis of 
some prior analysis of the profitability condition derivable from the perspective of an 
infringer of competition law. This would look to factors such as the value of the 
Lerner index, the likely detection rate of the infringement, and other economic 
parameters influencing gravity of the infringement (more on this intermediary 
approach at Section II (I). 
 
The next section of the report examines the thorny issue of the harm caused by one 
of the most egregious anticompetitive practices, cartels, and the methods that have 
been put forward by economists and employed in various legal systems to estimate 
that harm. 
 
The report then examines the current legal framework in Chile before making 
recommendations for reform. 
 
The suggestions put forward by the report rely on a detailed comparative analysis of 
the approach followed by five major jurisdictions, in terms of the size of their 
11 
 
economy and their influence in the diffusion of competition law around the world: the 
European Union, the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom and France. We 
examine the historical background and current controversies of each of these 
different systems, before proceeding to a comparative analysis of their position with 
regard to the main aspects usually covered by Guidelines on setting financial 
penalties for infringements of competition law.  
 
In the related complementary report Judicial Scrutiny of Financial Penalties in 
Competition Law: A Comparative Perspective, we examine the role of the different 
actors in the fine-setting process, in particular the judiciary, in order to examine how 
the publication of guidelines on setting fines may affect their interaction. We focus on 
the judicial scrutiny exercised over the decisions imposing a fine and its estimate by 
competition authorities or sentencing judges (in the case of prosecutorial systems, 
such as the US and Chile). We conclude that publishing sentencing guidelines will 
enable FNE to send a strong message to potential cartelists and other competition 
law infringers that anti-competitive conduct will not be tolerated and might give rise to 
substantial financial penalties. Following the findings of the report on the impact of 
fining guidelines on the policy-making and executing discretion of competition 
authorities, we consider that the publication of such guidelines will not affect the 
ability of FNE to request high financial penalties in actions brought against infringers 
in front of the Competition Tribunal (TDLC). It may also have the advantage of 
streamlining appellate scrutiny of the fines so as to accommodate the prosecutorial 
discretion of FNE and the fact that fines are set by an independent and specialised 
trial judge with the necessary expertise as to integrate optimal deterrence. In our 
view, the structure of the Chilean enforcement system offers advantages as to the 
individualization of sanctions, so that they are reasonably related to culpability and 
thus proportional.  
 
We agree that effective deterrence depends, in part on the uniformity and 
predictability of serious and swift punishment and we recognize that when drafting 
sentencing guidelines, a compromise should be made between two competing goals 
of a sentencing system: uniformity and proportionality. The publication of guidelines 
will need to accommodate the aim of uniformity and general deterrence, without 
however compromising the need for flexibility and individualized assessment based 
on the facts of particular cases, inherent in the principle of proportionality. This aim 
can be achieved in the context of Guidelines, in view of the numerous parameters 
individualizing the sanction (linking it to the harm/overcharge) and the need to 
account for specific deterrence.  
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The publication of guidelines will certainly not bind the TDLC, although it will certainly 
inform its decision-making process, as the experience of the Sentencing Guidelines 
in the US shows with trial judges employing the Sentencing Guidelines as an initial 
benchmark, even if these are not mandatory. The publication of guidelines will also 
help put emphasis on the goal of deterrence and the need for optimal sanctions 
against anticompetitive conduct, in particular in view of the judicial scrutiny of the 
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court should, in our view, accommodate the need for 
both general and specific deterrence, in view of the nefarious effects of cartel activity 
and, more generally anticompetitive conduct, to the whole economy and the 
consumers. 
 
We conclude that the design of the sentencing guidelines should include the 
following three steps: 
 
1. Determination of the basic amount of the fine: 
 
a. The FNE should be offered the choice between three options, among 
which it may choose the one leading to the greatest financial penalty: 
 
I. Estimate1 the excess illegal gains from the offense2 (that is 
100% of the overcharge), or  
II. Estimate3 the pecuniary losses to persons other than the 
defendant (100% of these losses) to the extent the loss was 
caused intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, or  
                                                     
1
 An approximate calculation should suffice, allowing to make a reasonable estimate of the probable 
amount. In contrast to damages cases or restitution claims, the deterrent and punitive function of 
damages may accord with a less precise calculation, as long as this is not speculation or 
guesswork, the defendant having being found to infringe competition law. Hence, she should bear 
the risks of any doubt on the exact amount of gains. 
2
 This refers to the total gross gain from the anticompetitive conduct, including the gross gain to the 
defendants and other participants in the anticompetitive conduct. Some authors have put forward 
a structured effects-based approach involving the estimation of expected profits from the 
anticompetitive conduct, on the basis of some percentage range of the values of sales to which 
the infringement relates [see, Heimler, A. and Mehta, K.  (2012) “Violations of Antitrust Provisions: 
The Optimal Level of Fines for Achieving Deterrence”, World Competition 35 (1), 103–119]. This 
will require competition authorities to take into account the value of the Lerner index, or the 
change in the value of the Lerner index or the probability of detection  as a starting point for such 
calculation, the defendant being able to challenge the figure put forward by the authority as not 
being accurate. 
3
 An approximate calculation should suffice, allowing to make a reasonable estimate of the probable 
amount. In contrast to damages cases or restitution claims, the deterrent and punitive function of 
damages may accord with a less precise calculation, as long as this is not speculation or 
guesswork, the defendant having being found to infringe competition law. Hence, she should bear 
the risks of any doubt on the exact amount of losses. 
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III. If the above options would unduly complicate or prolong the 
sentencing process, or would not reflect the harm caused by the 
anticompetitive conduct if this harm may not be quantified in the 
form of pecuniary losses, use a proxy based on a percentage of 
affected sales or volume of commerce (on the basis of e.g. 10-
15% as an overcharge estimate: e.g. in the EU the starting point 
is 30% of affected sales) 
 
b. Apply a multiplier equal to the inverse of the estimated detection 
probability (e.g. 6 if the detection probability is estimated as 1/6).4 
c. In order to take duration into account, the base fine should be multiplied by 
the number of years of participation in the infringement. 
d. Where the fine so calculated exceeds the statutory maximum of 30,000 
[UTA] Annual Tax Units, it should be possible to apply a higher fine 
disgorging the gains where the gains actually made can be calculated. 
 
2. Adjustments to the basic amount5 
 
a. Aggravating circumstances (upward adjustment) 
i. Repeat offenders6 
ii. Refusal to cooperate 
iii. Role of leader in the infringement 
 
b. Mitigating circumstances (downward adjustment) 
i. Sufficient cooperation with authority 
ii. Limited involvement in the infringement 
 
c. Application for leniency (downward adjustment or full immunity) 
 
d. Inability to pay – bankruptcy considerations (downward adjustment) 
 
e. Adjustment according to the legal maximum: it is suggested to replace 
the legal maximum of 30,000 [UTA] Annual Tax Units, which might lead 
                                                     
4
 Cf. section II.B of this report. 
5
Adjustments to the basic amount are proposed on the basis of the structure outlined in the current 
EU Guidelines (2006). 
6
The current EU Commission’s practice is to increase a fine by 50% -100% where the undertaking 
has been found to have been previously involved in one or more similar infringements. 
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to under-deterrence with a percentage of the worldwide turnover of the 
infringing undertakings, for instance, a percentage of 10%, as it is the 
case in the EU, UK, Germany and France. It is suggested for this 
percentage to operate as a maximum fine, not a cap (see our 
discussion of the debate in Germany). However, it is suggested that a 
better way forward would be remove the statutory maximum, or as a 
second best, render it operational only if the FNE makes use of 
proxies, such as 30% of the affected sales, in order to define the base 
fine, instead of estimating the excess illegal gains. Hence, the FNE 
should be free to request fines that are higher than the statutory 
maximum of 30,000 UTA, and for the TDLC to award them, if the FNE 
opts instead to put forward an estimation of the excess illegal gains (as 
is the case in Germany). 
 
3. Additional issues 
 
a. Public antitrust enforcement should be accompanied by the possibility 
of private actions for damages.  
b. Corporate fines should be combined with individual fines as well as 
imprisonment. 
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II. The Challenge of an Optimal Competition law Enforcement: Designing 
Appropriate Sanctions and Incentives 
 
A. The function of competition law enforcement 
 
Law enforcement pursues various objectives: compensation, restitution, punishment 
and prophylaxis (prevention). Competition law is not an exception. Its principal aim is 
to restore competition in the market. However, this objective may be conceived 
broadly as including first the ‘micro’ goals of putting the specific infringement to an 
end, compensating the victims,7 and curing the particular problem as to competition, 
but also the ‘macro’ goal of putting incentives in place ‘so as to minimize the 
recurrence of just such anticompetitive conduct’ (preventive remedies or deterrence). 
Different remedial tools and sanctions may perform these various overlapping 
functions8. 
 
Looking more specifically to these ‘micro-goals’, remedies seek generally to restore 
the plaintiff’s rightful position, that is, the position that the plaintiff would have 
occupied if the defendant had never violated the law or to restore the defendants to 
the defendant’s rightful position, that is, the position that the defendant would have 
occupied absent the violation. Following the imposition of a remedy, the infringer will 
be asked to commit negative acts (a requirement not to act in a certain way) and/or 
positive acts (a requirement to act in a certain way). Curing the competition law 
‘wrong’ committed or providing recovery may also take the form of restitution (which 
involves gain-based recovery) and/or compensation (which involves loss-based 
recovery). Restitution and compensation may thus be considered as the two facets 
of the ‘curing’ function of the remedial process, as opposed to the punishing and 
prophylactic one. These remedies may be either administrative, in the context of 
administrative law enforcement, or civil law remedies imposed by the courts. 
Monetary penalties, such as fines, may also be conceived of as a substitutionary 
remedy compensating the ‘general public’ for the distortion of the competitive 
process. The remedy of disgorging illegal profits is not available, as such, in most 
                                                     
7
 Taking illegal gains away from the law violators and ‘restore those monies to the victims’ constitutes 
a principal goal of competition law remedies. Pitofsky, R. (2002), “Antitrust at the Turn of the 
Twenty-First Century: The Matter of Remedies”, Georgetown Law Journal 91, 169- 170.  
8
 For a detailed analysis of the remedial function of competition law, see Lianos, I. (2012), 
“Competition law remedies: in search of a theory“, in Lianos, I. and Sokol, D. (Eds.), The Global 
Limits of Competition Law (Stanford University Press) 177-204; Lianos, I. (2013) “Competition law 
remedies in Europe: Which Limits for Remedial Discretion?“, in Lianos, I., & Geradin, D. (Eds.), 
Handbook in EU Competition Law (Edward Elgar: Cheltenham), 362-455. 
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competition law regimes.9 As fines are generally assessed with reference to the 
value of sales to which the infringement directly or indirectly relates in the relevant 
geographic market in the EU and the degree of gravity of the infringement multiplied 
by the number of years of the infringement, they may also be considered as 
exercising a partial and implicit disgorgement function. One could finally list 
measures that are accessory to the principal curative remedies because they 
facilitate their enforcement, such as interim measures (which aim to ensure interim 
relief) and periodic penalties (in order to compel the infringers to comply with the 
prohibition and/or the positive requirements-injunctions imposed). 
 
The punishment of the competition law infringer is certainly an objective pursued by 
competition law enforcement. Punishment is certainly the main function of 
fines/penalties imposed in various jurisdictions for the infringement of competition 
law, in view of the ‘aggravating’ circumstances taken into account in their calculation 
for recidivists, instigators or leaders of competition law infringements and 
undertakings obstructing investigations in most competition law systems, as well as 
the specific ‘increase for deterrence’ that some jurisdictions, such as the 
Commission may impose to infringers. The explicit acknowledgment in the European 
Commission’s Guidelines on the methods of setting fines that it will increase the fine 
‘in order to exceed the amount of gains improperly made as a result of the 
infringement where it is possible to estimate that amount’10, or the possibility to 
impose a fine up to twice the pecuniary gain or twice the pecuniary loss attributable 
to the alleged cartel activities (for the entire cartel), including all its members, rather 
than in relation to the specific defendant, according to the US alternative Sentencing 
Guidelines illustrate the point.11 In addition, some competition law systems put in 
place criminal or individual sanctions12. Civil remedies through private enforcement 
aiming to punish may include punitive or exemplary damages13.  
                                                     
9
 Although it remains available in some. See, for instance, in Germany, where the FCO may skim-off 
economic benefits related to the infringement. This is possible both for proceedings concerning 
administrative fines (Section 81(4), (5) GWB post-2005 or Section 81(2) GWB pre-2005 with § 
17(4) of the Act on Administrative Offences (OWiG)) applying to cartels, and for administrative 
proceedings for non-cartel activity (which are dealt with under section 34 GWB). The economic 
benefits to be disgorged not only encompass the net revenue generated because of the infraction, 
but also (the monetary value of) any other benefits such as the improvement of an undertaking’s 
market position. In the United States, see Elhauge, E. (2009) “Disgorgement as an Antitrust 
Remedy”, Antitrust Law Journal 76, 79-95. 
10
 European Commission, Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2) 
of Regulation No 1/2003, [2006] OJ C 210/2, paras 30–31. See also § 81(5) GWB with § 17(4) of 
the German Act on Administrative Offences (OWiG). 
11
 Sentencing Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) applied in appropriate cases involving cartel related 
activity. 
12
 See, in the UK the cartel offence providing additional deterrence in the form of individual sanctions, 
criminal and civil courts having the power to impose disqualification orders on directors of 
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Competition law enforcement may also have a prophylactic (preventive) aim. It seeks 
to ensure that there remain no practices likely to result in distortions of competition 
and infringements in the future. The preventive function is fulfilled in a different way 
than for the curative and punitive ones, which may also indirectly affect the 
incentives of market actors to act in a specific way in the future. First, preventive 
competition law enforcement remedies/sanctions aim directly at specific or general 
deterrence. Specific deterrence can be defined as the impact of the remedy or 
penalty on the incentives of those apprehended (the infringers) to adopt similar 
illegal behaviour in the future. General deterrence focuses on the public at large. 
Second, competition law remedies may have a pure prophylactic function. 
Prophylactic remedies can be distinguished from specific deterrence as they affect 
the ability (and not the incentive) of the infringers to commit equivalent anti-
competitive practices in the future by focusing on specific facilitators of potential 
infringements. These are not illegal practices in themselves, but in the specific 
circumstances of the case, they may facilitate illegal conduct. By prohibiting these 
practices, the decision- maker’s objective is not to deter the potential infringers from 
adopting such conduct, as this is not illegal, but to reduce their ability to commit 
illegal practices. 
 
Specific deterrence is certainly a difficult venture that requires from the courts an 
inherently uncertain prognostic exercise linked to a counterfactual and some 
prospective analysis of the situation in the market with and without the specific 
competition law violations. This is particularly true in complex and dynamically 
evolving markets, where static models cannot easily predict the various incentives of 
the different market actors in the future. Specific deterrence may be achieved with 
administrative remedies, such as declaratory relief, positive injunctions (forward-
looking structural and behavioural remedies aiming not only to cure the competition 
law wrong but also to design the market interactions in such a way that the problem 
does not occur again in the future), civil mandatory injunctions and restitutionary 
damages. General deterrence may be achieved with a wider array of measures, 
such as fines, restitutionary and punitive damages and harsh (in the sense of 
imposing an important burden to the infringer) mandatory remedies (in particular 
                                                                                                                                                                     
undertakings and up to five years imprisonment. In the US, the use of imprisonment and 
individual sanctions is extensive. 
13
 In the US, treble damages are in principle available in antitrust cases. In the UK, exemplary 
damages are in theory available for infringements of the competition rules when it is necessary to 
punish the infringer but their award is discretionary and the courts must exercise their discretion 
with caution: Devenish Nutrition Limited and others v Sanofi-Aventis SA and others [2007] EWHC 
2394 (Ch)., Albion Water Limited v Dŵr Cymru Cyfyngedig [2011] CAT 18, 2 Travel Group PLC 
(in liquidation) v Cardiff City Transport Services Limited [2012] CAT 19. 
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structural remedies or heavy-handed behavioural remedies). The following table 
summarizes the classification of competition law remedies/sanctions according to 
their function. 
 
Table 1: Functions of competition law enforcement and its tools 
 
Function of 
competition 
law 
enforcement 
and its tools 
Curing Punishing Preventing 
Administrativ
e process 
 Termination of 
the 
infringement 
 Behavioural 
remedies 
 Structural 
remedies 
 Fines (to a 
certain extent) 
 Accessory 
remedies 
 Declaratory 
relief 
 Prohibitory 
injunctions 
 Mandatory 
injunctions  
 Compensatory 
damages 
 Restitutionary 
damages 
 
 Fines 
 Exemplary 
(punitive 
damages) 
 Criminal and 
individual 
sanctions 
SPECIFIC 
DETERRENCE 
 Fines 
 Criminal and 
individual 
sanctions 
 Termination of 
the 
infringement 
 Forward 
looking 
structural and 
behavioural 
remedies 
 Mandatory 
injunctions 
 Restitutionary 
damages 
 Exemplary 
(punitive) 
damages 
GENERAL 
DETERRENCE 
 Fines 
 Criminal and 
individual 
sanctions 
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 Structural 
remedies 
 Heavy-handed 
long duration 
behavioural 
remedies 
 Restitutionary 
damages 
 Exemplary 
(punitive) 
damages 
 Harsh 
mandatory 
injunctions 
PROPHYLACTIC 
REMEDIES 
 
It follows that the main purposes of fines/penalties is (i) to punish the competition law 
infringer and (ii) to ensure deterrence. Punishment exercise a retributive function, 
broadly perceived, as it aims to punish the violation of the moral rights of the 
communities affected by the competition law infringement and constitutes a ritual of 
justice. Yet, competition law authorities around the world prefer fines/penalties 
principally for deterrence purposes. We will examine how optimal deterrence may be 
achieved and how effective one may judge a competition law enforcement system is. 
 
B. An effective competition law enforcement system: optimal enforcement 
theory and the aim of deterrence 
 
The assumption which underlies the economic approach to sanction is the same as 
the assumption which underlies the economic model of competition: firms are 
rational profit maximizers and they will engage in an illegal practice if their expected 
benefits of such practices are sufficiently large compared to their expected costs.  
 
Entering a cartel agreement is tempting for firms in an industry because if the cartel 
is successful the increase in profits for the participants may come from two sources. 
First, the participants will be able to increase their price because of the reduced 
competition; second the participants may also enjoy efficiency benefits due to the 
reduced competition (for example if they are able to buy equipment allowing them to 
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have lower costs and that they would not have bought had they not known that they 
were going get certain shares of the market). Therefore the gains from the illicit 
practice may be larger than the surcharge imposed on consumers. Thirdly, cartels 
may exercise distortive effect on price signals (with possible inefficiencies in a 
dynamic perspective because of investments in the wrong market; rent-seeking or 
rent-preservation practices). 
 
However, there are two sorts of costs for consumers associated with a cartel. First 
consumers who keep on buying the product will now have to pay more for each unit 
because of the price increase by the cartel members. This is often called the 
surcharge attributable to the cartel. In addition, some consumers are likely to reduce 
their purchase of the good because of the increase in its price and those consumers 
will lose the benefit that they would have enjoyed from consuming these units that 
they do not consume anymore. This is called the deadweight loss.  
 
If we consider the welfare of society (that is of consumers and producers), the loss 
due to the cartel is only the deadweight loss since the surcharge, which is a cost to 
consumers, is also a profit to producers and those two elements cancel each other 
out. 
 
If the cartel allows the cartel members to improve their efficiency (which is fairly 
unlikely), the net loss to society from a cartel would be the deadweight loss minus 
the efficiency gain for the cartelists. 
 
The goal of law enforcement is to reduce the number of violations of the law. This is 
achieved by catching at least some violators and punishing them, thus increasing the 
ex post cost of the violation for these violators and reducing the expected profitability 
of such violations for would-be violators. The increase in the costs for some violators 
due to law enforcement and therefore the decrease in the ex-ante profitability of the 
violations for would-be violators will, in principle, reduce the number of violations by 
discouraging at least some would-be violators. For example, firms in an industry 
would contemplate engaging in a cartel activity because such a cartel, if successful, 
would allow them to increase their price and their profits. However If the would-be 
cartelists  face a risk of  getting caught  and sanctioned, the expected benefit of their 
cartel activity may be less than the profit they will benefit from due to the increase in 
their price.  If the sanction they can expect is sufficiently large and if the probability of 
their getting caught is sufficiently high, they may be discouraged from cartelizing the 
industry. 
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Law enforcement which results in fewer violations thus reduces the cost to society of 
those violations.  But law enforcement is itself costly since society has to pay the 
competition law authorities and the courts for their law enforcement activity. The 
more intense the law enforcement effort is, the fewer violations there will be but the 
higher is the cost of law enforcement. Conversely, the less intense law enforcement  
is, the lower is the cost to society of law enforcement but the higher is the social cost 
of violations, since there will be more violations if there is less law enforcement. 
 
Thus society has to decide how much law enforcement it wants to choose. From an 
economic point of view, the optimal amount of law enforcement will depend on the 
respective cost of violations to society and the social cost of enforcement. For 
example, it would not make sense for society to spend an enormous amount on law 
enforcement in order to reduce the amount of certain violations, if the avoided 
violations only impose a very small cost on society.  
 
To figure out what level of enforcement would reflect the best possible use of our 
resources (what economists call the optimal amount of enforcement), the deterrence 
approach to law enforcement suggests that what we want is to minimize the sum of 
the costs of violations to society that take place plus the cost of law enforcement 
activities (which discourage some other violations from taking place). In other words 
we want to keep increasing our cost of law enforcement activities as long as the 
additional benefit to society due to the decrease in the number of violation is larger 
than the additional cost on law enforcement. 
 
To make it simple, economists assume that what society chooses is the proportion of 
violators caught or the probability of violators being caught (often denoted by (p)) 
and the severity of the sanction if they are caught (often denoted by f). For example, 
everything else equal, if the budget of the competition authority or the courts is 
increased, this will allow these bodies to investigate more cases and this will 
increase the proportion of violators found guilty.  Similarly, everything else equal, if a 
law is passed which increases the ceiling on sanctions (for example raising the 
ceiling from 10% of the turnover of firms to , say, 15%), this will allow competition 
authorities and courts to increase the amount of the fines they impose at least in 
some cases and will discourage some more cartels. 
 
There are two possible approaches to choosing p and f. 
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If one believes that cartels inflict harm on consumers (in terms of surcharge and in 
terms of deadweight loss) but may in certain cases also lead to a lowering of the cost 
of production or distribution for the cartel members (therefore may also have a 
productive efficiency benefit), the right approach is to set the sanction at a level 
which is larger than the total consumer loss divided by the probability of the cartel 
being caught and sanctioned. In that case the expected gain from the cartel will be 
negative except if the efficiency gain is larger than the deadweight loss. For example 
imagine that a cartel impose a surcharge of 10 per unit sold and that, at the cartel 
price, there are 100 units sold. In that case, the total surcharge imposed by the cartel 
members will be 1000. Assume also that the consumer surplus lost for consumers 
who have given up or reduced their consumption (the deadweight loss) is equal to 
500 and that the violators have a 20% chance of being caught. Our rule says that the 
sanction in such a case should be larger than 1500/.20= 7500. If the cartel members 
face a sanction which is just equal to 7500 if caught, they have an 80% chance of 
not being caught (and increasing their profits by 1000) and a  20% chance of being 
sanctioned  (in which case they make 1000 of extra profit but they have to pay a 
sanction of 7500). Hence, their expected profit if they consider entering into a cartel 
is: (1000x.8-6500x.20)= -500. They can expect (on average) to lose an amount of 
money which is precisely the amount of the deadweight loss they impose on 
consumers. If they are risk neutral (and if they know the probability of being caught 
and the sanction they will get if they are caught), they will refrain from entering a 
cartel except if the efficiency gains they can have because of the cartel is larger than 
the net cost they inflict on consumers (except if there is a net benefit for society). 
 
A second approach is the deterrence approach. In this approach we assume that 
cartels always impose a cost on consumers (in terms of surcharge and deadweight 
loss) and are never a source of efficiency benefits for the cartelists. In that case we 
do not have to bother with the deadweight loss to consumers (which is exceedingly 
difficult to compute in any case). We want to deter all cartels since they all impose a 
cost on society (the overcharge plus the deadweight loss). Cartels will be deterred if 
the sanction is larger than the overcharge divided by the probability of sanction (in 
our example if the sanction is larger than 1000/.20=5,000). If the firms consider 
entering into a cartel agreement they will anticipate that they will have an 80% 
chance of making 1000 and they will have a 20% chance of making 1000 but having 
a sanction of 5000. Thus they will anticipate that their expected profit will be: 
1000x.8+.2 (1000-5000)= 0. If the sanction is larger than 5000 the expected profit 
from cartelisation is negative and no (risk neutral) firm will enter into a cartel 
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agreement. This means, in other words, that for law enforcement to deter cartels, 
violators should expect that crime “does not pay”. 
 
In line with the previous analysis, in Becker (1968) it is concluded that the optimal 
fine should be a multiple of the offender's benefits from crime and negatively related 
to the probability of detection. Also, an OECD report (2002) stresses that “effective 
sanctions against cartels should take into account not only the amount of gain 
realized by the cartel but also the probability that any cartel will be detected and 
prosecuted. Because not all cartels are detected, the financial sanction against one 
that is detected should exceed the gain actually realized by the cartel. 
 
As was mentioned previously, the deterrence approach assumes that the antitrust 
violations considered (cartels) always impose a cost for society (ie. they are per 
se/egregious violations of the competition law). If, on the contrary, cartels may be 
good for society in some cases (ie. If one follows a rule of reason approach for 
cartels) then the deterrence rule may discourage some cartels that are efficient (ie. 
cartels which have efficiency benefits that are several times larger than the 
overcharge they inflict on consumers). As it has been pointed out by some 
commentators, “(f)ines that are higher than the harm caused by a particular type of 
conduct may discourage firms to engage in conduct, which increases total surplus14. 
For instance, Posner (1976) mentions the possibility of firms spending large amounts 
on advertising that neither serves to inform consumers better nor improves the 
product15. If firms could be convinced to limit their advertising expenditure, costs 
would fall. By cooperating in advertising or research, or by merely sharing important 
information, a cartel may be able to reduce costs. In order to sustain these gains, 
Sproul (1993) points out that horizontal price-fixing may serve the purpose of 
preventing firms from competing away the benefits that induce firms to cooperate to 
generate these cost savings16. Finally, Martin (1999) shows that joint profit 
maximisation requires output to be distributed among firms so that marginal costs 
are the same for all firms17. To the extent that the high-cost firm reduces its output 
and accepts a lower market share, the units produced at a lower cost represent an 
efficiency gain. 
 
                                                     
14
 Wehmhörner, N. (2005) “Optimal Fining Policies”, Remedies and Sanctions in Competition Policy 
Conference, Amsterdam Centre for Law and Economics, February 2005.  
15
 Posner, R.A. Antitrust law: An Economic Perspective, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1976) 
cited by Nonthika Wehmhörner (2005). 
16
 Sproul, M.F. (1993) “Antitrust and Prices”, Journal of Political Economy, 101(4) 741-755 cited by 
Wehmhörner, N.  (2005). 
17
 Martin, S. (1999) Industrial Economics, Prentice Hall, New Jersey. 
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However, most competition authorities throughout the world consider that cartels are 
violations per se (or by object) of competition laws and that the economic approach 
to deterrence is applicable to cartel sanctioning. Typical of this position is Werden’s 
(2009) approach: “Cartel activity robs consumers and other market participants of 
the tangible blessings of competition. Cartel activity is never efficient or otherwise 
socially desirable; cartel participants can never gain more than the public loses. 
Cartel activity, therefore, is not like tortious conduct, which is redressed with a 
liability rule focusing on the harm to victims and providing the incentive to take due 
care. Like other property crimes, cartel activity should be prohibited rather than 
merely taxed. As Judge Richard Posner explained of criminal sanctions generally, 
they “are not really prices designed to ration the activity; the purpose so far as 
possible is to extirpate it.18” 
 
It should be noted at this point that the sanctions referred to in the economic 
literature should be understood as the total sanctions that could be inflicted as a 
result of a violation. As we explained in the previous section, the sanctions for 
anticompetitive behaviour could be administrative and/or criminal and/or civil and/or 
individual/personal. What counts in the theory of deterrence is the total cost imposed 
on the violator. Thus economists consider that civil remedies, such as damages, for 
example, may have a deterrent effect (even if their legal aim is to compensate 
victims rather than to punish violators) because they may increase the cost faced by 
violators if they are found out. 
 
The discussion which follows is focused on sanctions imposed on competition law 
violators in proceedings resulting from competition law enforcement efforts initiated 
by competition authorities because these sanctions are often much more important 
than civil sanctions or criminal sanctions (which, with the exception of the US, are 
rarely imposed in other jurisdictions and in any case are not available in Chile). But, 
if in a jurisdiction there is a very active civil enforcement the reasoning should be 
adjusted to take into consideration the combination of civil and other sanctions. As 
Enrico Leonardo Camilli argues: “the coherence of the entire sanctioning system is 
of paramount importance, since all the elements are closely interrelated, and the 
change of one parameter is likely to have effect on all the setting. For that reason 
matters like the private damages and the standing to claim them, the international or 
domestic feature of the infringement, the type and quantity of investigative tool, the 
                                                     
18
 Werden, G. J. (2009) “Sanctioning Cartel Activity: Let the Punishment Fit the Crime”, European 
Competition Journal 5(1); 19-36. 
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availability of criminal sanctions are to be taken into account when the question on 
the optimal fine is addressed”19.  
 
This analysis may be at odds with some legal practice. For instance, the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has held that it is not necessary, for the 
purposes of assessing whether the administrative sanction is effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive, to take account of the possibility and/or the level of a criminal 
sanction which may subsequently be imposed20. However, examples taking a 
different approach also exist. In Devenish Nutrition Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis SA 
(hereinafter Devenish) the English High Court had the opportunity to examine the 
interaction between fines and exemplary damages finding that that there were some 
cumulative factors that made the award of exemplary damages inadequate in this 
case: first, there was no way of limiting the exemplary damages to avoid the danger 
of double counting, second, there was also the serious problem of assessing the 
damages, in particular the fact that the claimants were only part of the class affected 
by the wrongful conduct, and finally, the large scale of the fines imposed by the 
European Commission, which made the need for punitive damages less compelling 
in this case21.  
 
In many countries competition laws only indicate the maximum sanction that could 
be imposed on violators rather than a precise (mandatory) level of sanctions. This 
means that competition authorities and courts have the ability to decide (within limits) 
the amount of sanctions they impose in particular cases. Similarly many competition 
authorities have some discretion when it comes to allocating their resources to the 
initiation of investigations even though the law may impose some constraints on 
them. Thus the policies followed by both the competition authorities and the courts 
(either as reviewers or as triers of facts) in their law enforcement activities contribute 
to the choice of p and f. 
 
More formalized summary of the economics of sanctions 
 
In general, a penalty system consists of a probability of detection and a fine. In case 
of violations of antitrust law, these two parameters are called the rate of law 
enforcement by the antitrust authority (denoted by p) and the penalty imposed on the 
                                                     
19
 Camilli, E.L. (2006) “Optimal Fines in Cartel Cases and the Actual EC Fining Policy” World 
Competition: Law & Economics Review, 29, 575-605. 
20
 Case C-45/08, Spector Photo Group NV and Chris Van Raemdonck v Commissie voor het Bank, 
Financie- en Assurantiewezen (CBFA), [2009] ECR I-12073, para. 77. 
21
 Devenish Nutrition Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis SA [2007] EWHC 2394 (Ch). 
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firm for price-fixing activities and participation in the cartel (denoted by F). Further 
the penalty imposed can be characterized as a product of the penalty base and the 
penalty rate (denoted further in our recommendations at part VII by k). 
 
To illustrate the economic definition of the harm from cartels, we refer to a simple 
diagram shown in Figure 122. 
 
      Figure 1: Negative effects of price-fixing on Consumer Surplus (CS) and 
Social Welfare (SW) 
 
The increase in prices above the competitive price c, induced by a cartel, leads to an 
increase in profits for the firm (π) above competitive level that is denoted by PS 
(Producer Surplus) in the Figure 1. However, at the same time there are social costs 
imposed by this change in prices. These social costs are represented by the area of 
the triangle marked as "Net loss in SW" (Net loss in Total Social Welfare). There is 
obvious damage to the consumers, since they lose part of the consumer surplus as a 
consequence of the price-fixing activities of the firm. In addition, there is a clear 
reduction in total welfare, since due to the increase in price above competitive level 
the reduction of the consumer surplus exceeds the increase in producer surplus. 
Hence, the net effect is always negative and it is necessary to block the cartel in 
order to reduce this damage. 
 
Hence, ideally the optimal fine should extract the entire benefit the firm derives from 
collusion (i.e. the entire excess illegal gains π=PS) in order to block the antitrust 
violation and also, if feasible, compensate for the damage caused to the consumers, 
which is higher than illegal gains and is given by the sum of PS and Net loss in SW 
in Figure 1. In addition, in Becker (1968) it is concluded that the optimal fine should 
be a multiple of the offender's benefits from crime and negatively related to the 
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The figure is constructed for the linear demand and constant marginal cost case. 
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probability of detection (denoted by p). Also, an OECD report (2002) stresses that 
“effective sanctions against cartels should take into account not only the amount of 
gain realized by the cartel but also the probability that any cartel will be detected and 
prosecuted. Because not all cartels are detected, the financial sanction against one 
that is detected should exceed the gain actually realized by the cartel. 
 
It follows from the previous developments that in the economic model of deterrence 
the sanctions imposed on violators which are caught must be larger than their gains 
from the violation as long as the probability of catching them is less than 100%.  
 
A number of economists have tried to estimate the level of fines that cartelists should 
pay if fining policy met the criteria of deterrence and most have come up with a large 
numbers given the importance of the cost imposed on society by cartels and the 
relatively low probability of catching violators. It has been estimated in several 
empirical studies23 that as few as one in six or seven cartels are detected and 
prosecuted, implying the probability of detection roughly between 0.14 and 0.17. 
Indeed, Bryant and Eckard consider this to indicate the maximum probability, given 
that their sample consisted entirely of those cartels that were actually detected. It is 
possible that those cartels that remain undetected are systematically better at 
concealing their cartel, so that the overall probability of detection may actually be 
considerably lower than one in six or seven cartels. This implies a multiple of at least 
six. For example, according to Werden and Simon (1987)24, firms would need assets 
six times higher than annual sales to pay the deterrent fine. This means that most 
firms would be unable to pay the deterrent fine and would go bankrupt if they had to. 
Bankrupting firms which have participated in a cartel may entail large social costs. 
As a consequence, the authors conclude that most price fixers should go to prison 
rather than having their firm pay the deterrent fine. Craycraft and Gallo (1997)25 
analyze the effect of the firm's ability to pay the fine levied and find that all firms in 
their sample of 262 price-fixing firms between 1955 and 1993 were able to pay the 
actual fine imposed. However, only 47, or 18% of the sampled firms would have 
been able to pay the deterrent fine. Finally, Combe and Monnier (2007), under rather 
conservative assumptions, calculated the optimal sanction as being 6.6 times higher 
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See, for example, Bryant, P.G., and Eckard, E.W. (1991) "Price Fixing: The Probability of Getting 
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than the loss of consumer surplus, that is, for a five year cartel this represents more 
than 300% of the turnover26. 
 
It is worth noting that some of these studies were undertaken before leniency 
programs were established. Because of the existence of the leniency program one 
can hope that the probability of detecting cartels has increased significantly which 
means that the optimal amount of fines for cartel offenders is now lower than it used 
to be (see part III of this report for more recent evaluations).  
 
The fact that crime does not pay does not mean that there will be no violations. 
Some risk-seekers may still want to engage into violations on the off-chance that 
they might escape punishment (just like the fact that the expected gain from buying a 
lottery ticket is negative does not deter some people from buying lottery tickets but 
discourages risk averse people from doing so). But the number of violations will 
definitely be smaller than it would have been if the level of sanctions had been such 
that “crime pays”. 
 
There are three major implications of this analysis for competition law enforcers and 
courts. The first implication is that, from an economic point of view, a repressive law 
against cartels should be enforced in such a way as to deter would-be violators from 
engaging in the prohibited practice. The second implication is that firms will not be 
deterred from engaging in cartels and other anticompetitive activity if “crime pays”. 
The third implication is that for crime not to pay, sanctions have to be sufficiently 
high. They have to be a multiple of the profits that the violators derive from their 
illegal practices, if the probability of detecting and sanctioning the violators is less 
than one hundred per cent. And they should be all the higher that the probability of 
detection and sanction is low.   
 
This approach suggest that sanctions should be based on the quantity of the harm 
done by a prohibited practice rather than on the “quality” of the category of the 
practice. Yet, this more effects-based analysis of individual sanctions may not be 
practically achievable, hence as a second best a competition law regime may focus 
on the definition of the categories of practices for which a presumption of harm, for 
instance taking into account aggravating circumstances, or of no harm, with the 
consideration of mitigating circumstances, is established. 
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C. The limits of the economic approach to sanctions 
 
The economic approach which we have previously discussed, assumes that the goal 
of sanctions is to deter would be violators. However, from a legal standpoint, 
sanctions could pursue a number of other goals such as retribution, incapacitation, 
rehabilitation etc. Usually laws, and competition law is no exception, do not clearly 
specify what the goal of law enforcement is supposed to be. These goals are not 
necessarily in conflict with the goal of deterrence pursued by the economic 
approach. Yet, there might be some tension between the expansive approach to 
sanctions advanced by the proponents of the deterrence model and legal concerns 
about proportionality and correlativity in the relation between the harm caused and 
the penalty imposed. Indeed, most lawyers would adhere to the principle that the 
sanction should fit the crime. 
 
The deterrence model and more generally optimal enforcement theory shares with 
economic efficiency theory the belief that the aim of the legal system is to promote 
wealth maximization. This objective should transcend both the liability and the 
remedial stages.27 This duty to act in conformity to the principle of wealth 
maximization may potentially confer an important discretion to competition 
authorities, as it would be possible to impose penalties that would achieve optimal 
deterrence from a wealth maximization perspective, without these penalties being 
necessary from a corrective justice perspective. This may be in opposition to the 
principle of proportionality and corrective justice. 
 
In an economic efficiency inspired legal framework for protective rules, it would also 
be theoretically possible not to adopt a penalty, if its effect would be to jeopardise 
would-be efficient activity by creating over-deterrence, even if the activity in question 
is legally prohibited. For instance, leniency literature has recognized early on that 
cartels have an internal stability problem, which could be exploited to achieve 
deterrence at lower levels of sanction, or even without any need to impose 
penalties28. Leniency programmes, when well administered, may increase the 
probability of detection, by undermining trust among members of the cartel and 
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rewarding whistle-blowers, in view of the fact that usually the best source of 
information on secret cartel activity are companies and individuals involved in the 
commitment of the antitrust violation themselves29. As it has been documented by 
the literature, the presence of leniency programmes alters the deterrence effect of 
penalties and results in the substantial decrease of financial penalties necessary to 
achieve deterrence30. 
 
Deterrence theory also views penalties as mainly a deterrent device directed against 
potential offenders with the view to ensure that the offender (specific deterrence), but 
also any other potential offender (general deterrence), would be given sufficient 
disincentive to be discouraged to engage in this harmful activity in the future.31  
 
1. Designing a system of deterrent sanctions and remedies 
 
In order to achieve deterrence, policy makers may act on the following fronts:  
 
(i) increase the level of fines or sanctions and alter their form so as to 
increase deterrence;  
 
(ii) increase enforcement expenditures and hence the probability of detection;  
 
(iii) impose a liability rule that would maximize social welfare. 
 
It is well accepted that penalties should be sufficient to induce offenders to 
internalize the full social costs of their behaviour (the internalization thesis). This 
assumes that if there is perfect detection and no social cost of imposing punishment, 
the optimal sanction will be equal to the net social (efficiency) loss post violation, 
compared to the situation prior to the violation.32 The penalty should thus be equal to 
the net harm to everyone but the offender.33 For cartels, the optimal penalty is equal 
to the deadweight welfare loss plus the wealth transfer to the cartel from purchasers 
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(i.e. the sum of PS and Net Loss in SW in Figure 1). This penalty only deters those 
instances of the offense in which the deadweight welfare loss exceeds any savings 
in production costs to the cartel. Accordingly, if the enforcement costs are positive 
and the probabilities of detection and punishment are less than perfect, optimal 
penalties should, according to the optimal deterrence model, exceed the social 
(efficiency) cost of the violation so as to correspond to the efficiency loss caused. 
The minimum punishment for deterrence to work will be equal to the expected gain 
from the violation (including interest) multiplied by the inverse of the probability of the 
punishment being effectively imposed. The idea behind is that the penalty must be 
sufficient to render the expected value of the violation equal to zero. By imposing this 
cost, the offence will be deterred. The internalization approach limits theoretically the 
discretion of the authorities to impose penalties, if it will lead to a less satisfactory, 
from an efficiency perspective, equilibrium than that existing prior to the violation. 
 
At the same time, if the aim is to ensure that the offender will be given sufficient 
disincentive to be discouraged from engaging in the activity in the future, the 
expected value of the violation would be negative (pure deterrence thesis). In this 
case, it would make sense to include all possible losses, including those of the 
competitors of the offender that were, for example, foreclosed from the market, as a 
result of the exclusionary practices usually following the creation of a cartel, for the 
long term effects persisting after the practice has been terminated, or those of 
upstream suppliers for lost sales, which, as Hovenkamp observes, are ‘potentially 
unlimited’ losses.34 Of course, increased sanctions and excessive penalties may also 
deter efficient conduct and generate overinvestment in compliance, which might be 
inefficient. However, for the tenants of the pure deterrence thesis, that should not be 
a major issue, because of the future consequence of deterring harmful conduct (and 
therefore its future positive wealth maximization effects).35  Yet, even if one takes the 
pure deterrence view, there might still be a problem such as over-enforcement. The 
marginal cost of sanctions must not be larger than the marginal revenues of 
sanctions. If sanctions have a cost to society and if the cost is a function of the 
amount of the sanction (the costs of collecting of the sanction or those of keeping 
people in prison, for criminal sanctions) then there can be such a thing as over-
enforcement even in the pure deterrence model. 
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2. Are these deterrence-focused perspectives compatible with the legal 
approach focusing on justice and the principle of proportionality? 
 
One may argue that deterrence constitutes an inherent principle to corrective justice. 
One could distinguish between two forms of deterrence: deterrence as wealth 
maximization and deterrence as a moral requirement for corrective justice to work 
effectively. As Gardner forcefully explains, there is a distinction to be made between 
the moral content of corrective justice and the legal principle of corrective justice: 
 
“[the legal principle of corrective justice] is supposed to be efficient at securing 
that people conform to certain […] moral norm of corrective justice […] As well 
as correcting torts that have already been committed, this legal principle is apt 
systematically to deter the commission of torts that have not yet been 
committed”.36 
 
Deterrence has a role to play even for those valuing only the moral principle of 
corrective justice and rejecting efficiency as a normative value (deterrence-based 
corrective justice approach). Preventive sanctions have long been a feature of the 
legal system in most civil law systems, in view of the importance deterrence has as 
an objective of corrective justice. 
 
Some legal experts, such as Justice Scalia in the United States, hold the view that 
the proportionality principle is an inherently retributivist concept, which is 
incompatible with consequentialist goals of punishment (such as the goal of 
deterrence). Others disagree. For example Ian P. Farrell considers that Justice 
Scalia’s analysis is flawed and that “philosophical analysis demonstrates that the 
principle of proportionality is not an inherently retributivist concept, but rather a 
theoretically independent moral conviction to which we are tenaciously attached”37. 
Whatever option is chosen, there may be a possible conflict between the economic 
approach and the legal approach to sanctions for economic violations.  
 
An illustration of this conflict may be found in the 1998 US Supreme Court Judgment 
United States v. Bajakajian, which was not a competition case but is nevertheless 
quite interesting for our purpose38.  In this case, a Mr Bajakijian had attempted to 
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leave the United States with $357,144  in cash without filling the form which must be 
filled by all citizens taking more than $10,000 in US Currency out of the United 
States. The United States’ government argued that it had “an overriding sovereign 
interest in controlling what property leaves and enters the country.” and that full 
forfeiture of the unreported currency ($357,144) supported that interest by serving to 
“dete[r] illicit movements of cash” and aided in providing the Government with 
“valuable information to investigate and detect criminal activities associated with that 
cash.” The Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that it was 
unconstitutional to take $357,144 from a person who failed to report his taking of 
more than $10,000 in US Currency out of the United States. It was the first case in 
which the Supreme Court ruled a fine to violate the Excessive Fines Clause. The 
Supreme Court justified its decision by saying that “(c)omparing the gravity of 
respondent’s crime with the $357,144 forfeiture the Government seeks, we  conclude 
that such a forfeiture would be grossly disproportional to the gravity of his offense. It 
is larger than the $5,000 fine imposed by the district court by many orders of 
magnitude and it bears no articulable correlation to any injury suffered by the 
Government…. For the foregoing reasons, the full forfeiture of respondent‘s currency 
would violate the Excessive Fines Clause”. 
 
In the competition law area, there is a risk that review courts (adhering to the legal 
principle of proportionality and the implicit “retribution approach” or “moral 
acceptability approach” to sanctions) may find sanctions imposed (or requested) by 
competition authorities (adhering to the economic principle of deterrence and the 
implicit “cost minimization approach” to sanctions) disproportional and therefore tend 
to reduce the amount of the sanctions to non-deterring levels.  For instance, the 
principle of proportionality constitutes an important limit to the European 
Commission’s discretion in imposing penalties39. The principle is included in Article 
49(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU providing that ‘the severity of 
penalties must not be disproportionate to the criminal offence’. Proportionality is also 
a general principle of EU law, applying as such to all measures adopted by 
Community institutions. According to settled case law: 
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“by virtue of that principle, the lawfulness of the prohibition of an economic 
activity is subject to the condition that the prohibitory measures are 
appropriate and necessary in order to achieve the objectives legitimately 
pursued by the legislation in question; when there is a choice between several 
appropriate measures recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the 
disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued”.40 
 
This three-part test has, of course, to take into account the margin of discretion of 
the European Commission in adopting appropriate penalties, including its discretion 
in establishing the level of optimal deterrence. Although the principle of 
proportionality does not exist as such in US antitrust law, a constitutional 
proportionality requirement applies to most punitive damages cases as well as to 
other types of remedies.41 
 
There is a second risk, which is that competition laws themselves may impose 
ceilings on the level of sanctions that limit the ability of competition authorities to 
impose deterrent sanctions. Indeed, many competition laws provide for maximum 
sanctions for competition violations expressed either in absolute terms (example: 
“the maximum sanction for bid rigging will be €1,000,000”) or as a proportion of the 
turnover of the violators (example: “the maximum sanction for bid rigging will be 10% 
of the total turnover of the firm”) or as a proportion the affected market (example “the 
maximum sanction for bid rigging will be 10% of the amount of the relevant 
procurement market”).  
 
Table 2: Statutory limits 
Jurisdiction Statutory limits 
 
United States 
 USD $ 100 million (~ €76 million) under the 
Sherman Act, or  
 under the Alternative Sentencing Statute 
fines up to twice the gain derived from the 
criminal conduct or twice the loss suffered by 
the victims 
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European Union  10% cap of the total worldwide turnover 
  
United Kingdom  10% cap of the total worldwide turnover 
  
Germany 
 
 10% of the annual worldwide turnover of the 
undertaking. This has been interpreted by 
German courts not as a cap (as under EU 
law), but as a maximum fine. 
 
France 
 
 10% cap of the highest worldwide pre-tax 
turnover 
 
Brazil 
 
Canada 
 
Chile 
 30% of the gross revenue of the last financial 
year 
 
 $10 million Canadian dollars 
 
 The TDLC can impose fines for fiscal benefit 
up to 30,000 annual tax units (UTA), 
(approximately US$30,000,000) for practices 
consisting in express or tacit agreements 
among competitors, or concerted practices 
between them, that confer them market 
power and consist of fixing sale or purchase 
prices or other marketing conditions, limit 
production, allow them to assign market 
zones or quotas, exclude competitors or 
affect the result of bidding processes. For all 
other competition law infringements, the 
TDLC can impose fines for fiscal benefit up 
to 20,000 annual tax units (UTA). 
  
 
In all those cases the maximum amount of the fine being allowed legally risks being 
considerably lower than the amount which would minimize cost to society. When this 
is the case there is no guarantee that the competition authority will be able to impose 
deterrent sanctions on violators. 
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Yet, there are arguments to support the view that in the case of competition law, the 
deterrence principle should prevail over the retribution principle in the sanctioning 
policy of the competition authority and the courts.  
 
First, one of the principal goals of competition law is economic: the promotion of 
economic efficiency. The underlying reason for the adoption of competition law lies in 
the teaching of economic analysis which suggests that in most cases competition 
promotes economic efficiency. It follows that the enforcement of competition law 
must itself be efficient if competition law is to promote economic efficiency. And the 
deterrence model meets this criterion. It would thus contradict the goal of competition 
law to base its enforcement on the retribution model. Illustrating the view, widely held 
by competition authorities, that deterrence should be the only goal of sanctions with 
respect to cartels, Werden (2009) observes that “(c)artel activity materially differs 
from other property crimes only with respect to the purpose of sanctions. 
Rehabilitation and incapacitation are important purposes for most criminal sanctions, 
but deterrence is the only significant function of sanctions for cartel activity, and the 
specific deterrence of convicted offenders clearly is secondary to the general 
deterrence of potential offenders”42. 
 
Second, most competition laws impose a ceiling on the level of sanctions, which is 
very low compared to the cost imposed on society by cartel offenders and to  what  
the deterrence model would suggest as appropriate sanctions.  As J.A.H. Maks, M.P. 
Schinkel and I.A.M. Bos (2005) argue: “the existence of ceilings on sanctions in 
absolute value (US) or in percentage of turnover (EU) can have perverse effects on 
deterrence. Such ceilings are, in most cases, economically unjustified”43. However, 
the main reason why such ceilings are so low is to ensure that the sanctions against 
antitrust violators remain proportional to the violations (or morally acceptable). Along 
those lines Wils (2006) notes that "(t)he maximum of twice the gross gain as 
foreseen in the US under the Criminal Fines Improvement Act, may reflect the limit of 
what multiplication is considered acceptable from a proportional justice perspective. 
In the EU, Regulation No 1/2003 provides that fines imposed by the European 
Commission cannot exceed 10 % of the total (consolidated) turnover of the company 
concerned in the preceding business year. This ceiling appears to reflect more 
generally concerns with very high fines, not only from the perspective of proportional 
justice but also as to the risk of inability to pay, and the social and economic costs of 
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high fines"44. Lianos has also explained that proportionality requirements limit the 
discretion of competition authorities when adopting remedies or sanctions/penalties. 
According to recital 12 and Article 7, the Commission may impose on infringers 
‘behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement 
committed and necessary to bring the infringement effectively to an end’. Structural 
remedies are subject to a stricter proportionality requirement as they can only be 
imposed ‘either where there is no equally effective behavioural remedy or where any 
equally effective behavioural remedy would be more burdensome for the undertaking 
concerned than the structural remedy’. Fines are dealt in Article 23 and cannot 
exceed 10 percent of the total turnover of the undertaking the preceding business 
year, thus introducing a quantitative measure of proportionality. Below this threshold, 
the mere fact that a fine may be very high will not render the fine disproportionate, 
because the 10% threshold is an abstract safeguard against disproportionality.45 
There is no reason given for the introduction of this differentiation on the qualitative 
or quantitative expression of the proportionality principle, although it may be 
explained by the different forms of judicial scrutiny of fines and remedies, fines being 
subject, because of their punitive dimension, to a stricter judicial control46. 
 
Thus within the ceiling set by the law, deterrence should be the overriding concern in 
the setting of the sanctions and the sanctions should be a function of the expected 
profits by the violators and the probability of the practice being sanctioned. Yet in a 
number of cases antitrust fines are based on the volume of affected commerce, 
rather than on the profits of the colluding firms. As Bageri, Katsoulacos and 
Spagnolo show (2013) fines based on volume of commerce have a number of 
distortive effects47. First, specialized firms active mostly in their core market expect, 
ceteris paribus, lower fines (when caps bind) than more diversified firms active in 
several other markets than the relevant one. Second, if expected fines are not 
sufficient to deter cartels (and we will discuss this issue later on), fine based in 
revenue rather than on collusive profits may push firms to increase cartel prices 
above the monopoly level to reduce the penalty thus exacerbating the 
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anticompetitive harm caused by the cartel. Bageri, Katsoulacos and Spagnolo 
conclude that “(d)evelopments in economics and econometrics make it possible to 
estimate illegal profits from an antitrust infringement with reasonable precision or 
confidence, as regularly done to assess damages and advocate that “it is time to 
change these distortive rules of thumbs that make revenue so central for calculating 
fines, if the only thing the distortions buy for us is saving on the costs of data 
collection and illegal profit estimation”.  This issue raises the need to integrate more 
effects-based approaches in setting fines, which will be examined later in this report. 
 
D. Can there be over-deterrence? Are penalties for cartels excessive? Should 
they be?  
 
The first thing to mention about over-deterrence is whether it should be considered 
to be a problem.  
Over-deterrence of a practice, which may in some cases entail significant  pro-
efficiency benefits (such as a unilateral practice that may be considered, in some 
respects, an abuse of dominance), may be a major problem since such over-
deterrence may entail significant costs in lost efficiency, over and beyond the direct 
cost of the over-enforcement. 
 
Six possible sources of costs due to over-deterrence and/or over-enforcement come 
to mind: 
 
First, there is the possibility that law enforcement may be so intense that beyond 
some level the additional cost of law enforcement will be higher than the cost that the 
additional violations of competition law deterred would have imposed on society. 
Indeed, “excessively high fines may over-deter by discouraging potential investors 
away from markets and practices that could raise the possibility of infringement 
actions”, and this may be welfare reducing in the long run48. 
 
Second there is the possibility, if competition authorities and courts are not infallible, 
that very high sanctions or a very high level of enforcement will lead to costly 
enforcement errors. The possible errors in appraising the behaviour in question may 
dilute the deterrent effect of sanctions and of course harm social welfare by leading 
to wrong enforcement decisions should also be considered.  
Enforcement errors may be of two sorts49:  
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(i) Type I errors: These consist in wrongly concluding that there is an 
infringement. This can lower deterrence because it reduces the cost of 
violating the law. 
 
(ii) Type II errors: These consist in falsely not punishing a potential 
infringement. This may lead to uncorrected inefficient situations and also 
reduce deterrence because it reduces the difference between the 
expected fine from violating the law and not violating it. 
 
As it is explained by Polinsky and Shavell, a positive probability of a Type I error 
reduces deterrence because it lowers the expected fine if an individual violates the 
law, while a positive probability lowers deterrence because it reduces the difference 
between the expected fine from violating the law and not violating it, thus making the 
violation less costly to the individual50. For instance, Type II errors might be dealt by 
increasing prosecutorial resources and thus the probability of detection, in the 
context of public enforcement, or training judges and putting in place specialised 
tribunals, in the context of private enforcement, while Type I errors may be dealt by 
putting in place filters, such as summary judgments, in the context of private 
enforcement or by raising the standard of proof in both public and private 
enforcement or finally by adopting the principle of proportionality for penalties and 
remedies51. As Harold Houba, Evgenia Motchenkova and Quan Wen observe: “(…) 
excessive fines may amplify the possible negative impact of antitrust enforcement, 
which can stem from unobservable legal errors. Hence, the rationale for adopting the 
principle of proportionality is to minimize any potential undesirable impact of the 
antitrust policy”52.  
 
Third, there is the possibility that if sanctions are very high and enforcement very 
intense, firms will spend a disproportionate amount of resources to ensure that their 
employees do not violate the law (for example through compliance programs) 
leading to a reduction in their efficiency because they will refrain from entering into 
efficient horizontal agreements for fear of being sanctioned (see the examples given 
by Posner referred to earlier). 
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Fourth, in jurisdictions where the victims of antitrust violations may be awarded 
damages over and beyond the prejudice they have suffered, raising a risk of “over-
compensation”, there can be a risk that claimants have an incentive to bring dubious 
claims with the hope that they will benefit from a favorable court decision or 
settlement, thus imposing  unjustified costs on the defendants. 
 
Fifth, excessive fines may lead to the insolvency of the undertakings to which they 
have been imposed. This might not necessarily be a problem, as the risk of 
insolvency following the imposition of a fine may have potential deterrence effects. 
Yet, it may also lead to negative welfare effects, if it excludes one of the very few 
competitors in a market characterized by barriers to entry53. 
 
Sixth, excessive fines may affect shareholders, bondholders and other creditors of 
the infringing undertaking, or employees, in case the payment of the financial penalty 
leads to a job cutting exercise in order to limit costs, even if none of the above may 
have been aware of the illegal activity or contributed to it. Furthermore, consumers 
may be harmed if the amount of the fine is passed on to them in the form of higher 
prices. For this reason, individual sanctions have been usually considered as a more 
effective tool of deterrence, in view of the fact that they are targeted to those real 
responsible for the anticompetitive conduct. 
 
However, even though cartels can in very rare cases have pro-efficiency benefits, it 
is quite unlikely that they will have such effects in the vast majority of cases. This is 
why most jurisdictions treat them as per se violations of antitrust laws. Thus the cost 
of type I errors is quite limited for cartels and one may consider that over-deterrence 
is not a problem in this case (although over-enforcement might be). 
 
Furthermore, the risk of insolvency is relatively limited in most cases. Although 
Werden and Simon (1987) noted the possibility that the optimal fine may lead 
several firms to bankruptcy, Craycraft et al. (1997) found that 95 to 100% of all firms 
fined for price fixing 1955-1993 were able to pay their fines and that some of them 
would have been able to pay “Beckerian” fines (that is, multiple fines imposed 
according to the optimal deterrence model)54. 
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Finally, some authors doubt that even in the cartel area there is a serious risk that 
firms may overreact to strong enforcement or that unjustified legal costs may be 
imposed on defendants. Thus, for example, Harrington (2014) states:   
 
“(…) as has been noted by others, there are at least two sources of social 
harm from excessive enforcement. First, firms may avoid legitimate activities 
out of fear that their behavior would be misconstrued as collusive. Second, at 
least in the case of the U.S. where there is an overly active litigation scene, 
customers may pursue unjustified cases with the hope that the prospect of 
legal fees, discovery, and the small chance of having to pay large customer 
damages will induce settlement by innocent suppliers. I’m skeptical of these 
concerns, at least for the U.S. The standards for proving guilt for a Section 1 
violation have always been high. Furthermore, Twombly has raised the bar as 
now discovery can be avoided unless the plaintiff can plead ‘facts that are 
suggestive enough to render a §1 conspiracy plausible’. At present, it is quite 
difficult for a plaintiff to get past the pleading stage without some reasonably 
convincing evidence that there was collusion and it was of the unlawful 
variety”55. 
 
It follows from the previous analytical discussion about the deterrence model that 
there can be over-deterrence and/or over-enforcement if (i) the sanctions are larger 
than the cost to society (e.g. overcharge, harm to innovation, reduction of quality and 
consumer choice) due to the violation divided by the probability of the violators being 
found guilty and (ii) the marginal cost of sanctioning cartels is larger than the 
marginal revenue to society from eliminating them. 
 
Thus when one discusses whether sanctions against antitrust violations are optimal, 
two main questions must be addressed: is there under-enforcement (if the level of 
sanctions is lower than the gains to violators from, for instance, cartelizing divided by 
their (perceived) probability of being caught)? Is there over-enforcement (if we are in 
the optimality zone but the enforcement is so thorough that great costs are incurred 
to catch cartels which impose insignificant costs on consumers). The second 
question has been rarely examined because, as we shall see, most of the evidence 
presented in recent years has suggested that there was significant under-
enforcement (rather than a risk of over-enforcement) in the major jurisdictions 
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(United States and the European Union). However more recent research has argued 
that the level of sanctions in the EU could reach the deterrence level. 
 
E. Are monetary sanctions over-deterrent or under-deterrent? 
 
In Europe, the European Commission has substantially increased the level of 
sanctions for cartels during the first decade of the 2000s as shown in the following 
table56: 
 
Table 3: Fines imposed not adjusted for Court judgments – period 1990-2013 
(last change 5 December 2013) 
 
Year Amount in €57 
1990-1994 539 691 550 
1995-1999 292 838 000 
2000-2004 3 462 664 100 
2005-2009 9 414 012 500 
2010-2013 7 241 181 674 
Total 20 950 387 824 
 
Table 4: Ten highest cartel fines per case (since 1969) (last change 31 March 
2014) 
 
Year Case name Amount in €58 
2012 TV and computer monitor 
tubes 
1 470 515 000 
2008 Car glass 1 189 896 000 
2013 Euro interest rate 
derivatives (EIRD) 
1 042 749 000 
2014 Automotive bearings 953 306 000 
2007 Elevators and escalators 832 422 250 
2010 Airfreight 799 455 000 
2001 Vitamins 790 515 000 
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2008 Candle waxes 676 011 400 
2007/2012 Gas insulated switchgear 
(incl. re-adoption) 
675 445 000 
2013 Yen interest rate 
derivatives (YIRD) 
669 719 000 
 
Table 5: Ten highest cartel fines per undertaking (since 1969) (last updated 31 
March 2014) 
 
Year Undertaking Case Amount in €59 
2008 Saint Gobain Car glass 715 000 000 
2012 Philips TV and computer 
monitor tubes 
705 296 000 (of 
which 391 940 000 
jointly and 
severally with LG 
Electronics) 
2012 LG Electronics TV and computer 
monitor tubes 
687 537 000 (of 
which 391 940 000 
jointly and 
severally with 
Philips) 
2013 Deutsche Bank 
AG 
Euro interest rate 
derivatives (EIRD) 
465 861 000 
2001 F. Hoffman-La 
Roche AG 
Vitamins 462 000 000 
2013 Société Générale Euro interest rate 
derivatives (EIRD) 
445 884 000 
2007 Siemens AG Gas insulated 
switchgear 
396 562 500 
2008 Pilkington Car glass 357 000 000 
2009 E.ON Gas 320 000 000 
2009 GDF Suez Gas 320 000 000 
 
A lively debate has ensued over whether the European sanctions for cartels were 
characteristic of over-enforcement or under-enforcement.  
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Combe and Monnier (2009), for example, studied 64 cartels sanctioned by the EU 
Commission for which they had sufficient data (a large majority were sanctioned 
after 2000) and concluded the following: 
 
"(...) The level of fines compared to the illegal gain made by cartels members 
remains low as at best only half of the fines reach this value. This implies that 
fines regularly fall below the minimum illegal profits of cartels. Thus, fines 
imposed against cartels by the European Commission are suboptimal even 
considering a 100% probability of detection. It means that even if we do not 
consider the fact that some cartels remain undetected, the level of fines is 
insufficient. Hence, these fines cannot deter price fixing if decisions maker are 
risk neutral, as the probability of detection is clearly below 100%. (....) the 
Commission has never imposed a dissuasive fine given the low probability of 
detection and a low price elasticity of demand. For all these reasons, the risk 
of over enforcement is actually nonexistent and should be considered as a 
myth". 
 
The issue of over-deterrence was discussed in the context of the adoption of the EU 
harmonized rules on private actions for damages. An external study prepared for the 
legislative preparations of the European Commission (Renda et al, 2007) included 
some discussion over the adoption of multiple (double) damages in order to enhance 
deterrence. The study found that, under low, medium and high assumptions 
regarding detection for cartel cases, double damages would encourage victims to 
exercise their right to damage compensation with no risk of overdeterrence, as the 
increase would not be sufficient to approximate optimal deterrence, given the low 
detection rate.  
 
Assuming that the loss to society consists of two components (i) the overcharge 
(OC) on the cartelised goods, and (ii) the lost consumers‘ surplus (CS) on the output 
not produced because in order to raise price the cartel restrict output, Renda et al 
(2007) found that assuming the deadweight loss equals either 10% or 50% and EU 
penalties imposed on cartels are between 23% and 79% of the overcharge, the 
yearly welfare impact of EU-wide cartels would be in the range between €13.4 billion 
and €36.6 billion, i.e. between 0.12% and 0.33% of EU GDP in 2006. One should 
also take into account that the benefits of a cartel can be greater than the 
overcharge whenever the cartel agreement leads to some efficiencies (e.g. cost 
reductions) for cartelists. The study found that even if treble damages (or, similarly, 
double damages with prejudgment interest) were awarded in Europe, enhanced 
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private damages actions in addition to fines and settlement awards would still not 
recover the full societal loss from detected and undetected cartels60. The following 
table prepared by Renda et al (2007) takes into account the penalties, damages and 
settlement awards a global cartelist faces from the various competition law 
enforcement systems around the world. The inclusion of these costs has been 
explained by Connor (2007), in view of the benefit-cost calculation a cartelist will face 
ex ante (before engaging in cartel activity)61. This can be represented with the 
following equation: E(C) = E(F) + E(S) + E(R). The expected penalty faced ex ante 
by a cartelist is the sum of expected public penalties (E(F)), expected private 
damage settlements (E(S)) and expected (negative) reputational effects (E(R)). 
Although the later are not included in the following table, these speculative results 
show that the liability/overcharge ratio would still lead to under-deterrence, even 
under the least conservative estimates. Even if the expansion of competition 
legislation across the globe the last decade may challenge some of these findings, 
competition law enforcement in most of these new competition law jurisdictions is still 
weak and presumably does not add much to the global efforts of deterrent 
competition law enforcement.  
 
Table 6: Deterrence for a global cartelist62 
 
Scenario     
Jurisdiction Low Medium High 
Global cartels 
Detection rate 18% 24% 30% 
Conviction rate 75% 75% 75% 
Ex ante probability 
of conviction 
13.5% 18.0% 22.5% 
Public fines US - % 
of overcharge 
10.8% 18.8% 26.8% 
Public fines 
Canada - % of 
11.2% 24.0% 36.6% 
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overcharge 
Combined North 
America 
10.9% 19.2% 27.5% 
EU penalty - % on 
overcharge 
9.2% 20.5% 31.8% 
Combined North 
America and 
Europe 
20.0% 39.6% 59.2% 
Global penalties 1.6% 3.5% 5.4% 
Combined 
penalties 
21.6% 43.1% 64.7% 
Awards/settlements 
North America 
35% 80% 125% 
Awards/settlements 
EU 
29% 85% 145% 
Awards/settlements 
combined 
64% 165% 270% 
Total liability – 
public fines and 
private 
awards/settl. 
86% 209% 335% 
Deterrence w/out 
EU private enf. 
7.6% 22.2% 42.7% 
Deterrence with 
EU private enf. 
11.6% 37,5% 75.3% 
 
 
However the methodology used by Combe and Monnier (2009) has been 
questioned. For example, Allain, Boyer, Kotchoniz, and Ponssard (2013) criticize 
their work on two grounds63. The first concerns the cartel overcharge. The authors 
evaluate the validity of their estimated overcharge by controlling for econometric 
problems such as model error, estimation error and publication bias in the 
determination of representative overcharge estimates. Second, Allain, Boyer, 
Kotchoniz, and Ponssard consider a dynamic framework through which each 
individual firm must recurrently determine if pursuing its participation in the cartel will 
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generate a level of future profits which exceeds those that would arise from deviating 
from the cartel agreement, while taking into consideration the probability of detection 
and the subsequent fine. Combe and Monnier do not include such a dynamic 
framework in their analysis.  
 
Based on these improvements to the methodology of Monnier and Combe (2009), 
Allain, Boyer, Kotchoniz, and Ponssard (2013) estimate that the optimal fine should 
be more than ten times lower than the benchmark suggested by previous studies. 
They conclude:  
 
"The comparison of our benchmarks to the actual level of fines imposed by 
the European Commission in recent cartel cases (from 2005 to 2010) shows 
that, according to the different competitive scenarios, approximately 30% to 
80% of the fines are deterrent, while 50% to 80% are compensatory. These 
empirical results could indicate that recent fines are closer to their deterrence 
and compensation objectives than they used to be. However, a striking 
feature of our results is the dispersion of the fines: some seem to be much too 
high, while others are much too low”. 
 
Katsoulacos and Ulph (2013) build on the work of Allain, Boyer, Kotchoniz, and 
Ponssard and introduce an additional consideration regarding the timing of penalty 
decisions64. They observe that the existing literature, based on the economics of 
crime, assumes that the detection and prosecution of cases takes place immediately 
after the action has come to its natural end. They point out that antitrust violations 
can last for many years and competition authorities sometimes intervene and 
terminate actions before they have come to a natural end. Symmetrically, a 
competition authority may only reach a decision on a case and impose a penalty 
long after the antitrust action has terminated.   
 
Katsoulacos and Ulph then reason that if an anticompetitive action is stopped before 
it has reached its natural end, then the firm will suffer a loss of profits relative to what 
otherwise might have happened and so the penalty does not need to be so high to 
generate the same level of deterrence. However, on the other hand, the revenue 
base on which the penalty will be imposed is smaller than it would otherwise have 
been had the action lasted its natural life and so the penalty rate has to be higher to 
achieve the same level of deterrence. 
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If a decision can be reached and a penalty imposed long after the action has come 
to a natural end then this implies that the probability of effective action ever being 
taken is higher than if the action is taken only when the action has reached its 
natural life – pointing to a lower penalty. However, the fact that the penalty is 
imposed much later means that, discounted back to the present, it represents a 
lower potential cost to the firm contemplating taking the action, and so the penalty 
rate needs to be raised to have the same deterrent effect. 
 
Altogether, using a new European data set to calculate the impact of these additional 
factors, they show that the optimal penalty is approximately 75% of that implied by 
the conventional formula and they support the conclusions of Allain, Boyer, 
Kotchoniz, and Ponssard that existing penalties are within the range supported by 
calculations of optimal penalties.  
 
Finally, Harold Houbay, Evgenia Motchenkova, Quan Wen (2013) using the marginal 
deterrence literature make a related point65. They show that if one takes into 
consideration the legal principles which antitrust sanctions must obey (punishments 
should fit the crime, proportionality, bankruptcy considerations and minimum fines), 
the antitrust authority should not punish maximally overall, but punish in a smarter 
manner such that mild offences are not fined at all. Their results call for a subtle 
reconsideration of the common wisdom in the economics of concerted crime that 
setting the fine equal to the available legal upper bound always increases the 
effectiveness of deterrence. 
 
F. Interaction between fines and private enforcement 
 
1. The function of public and private enforcement of competition law: 
complements or substitutes? 
 
The interaction between fines and private actions for damages is of particular 
interest for all jurisdictions that have made the choice of a dual enforcement system 
for their competition laws. This constitutes the majority of jurisdictions, which 
explains why the topic of the interaction between public and private enforcement, in 
particular with regard to cartels, has been, very early on, a matter of concern for the 
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International Competition Network66. After conducting a survey of the legal 
framework and practice in a number of jurisdictions, the ICN Report noted that 
private antitrust enforcement, when this results from individual actions for damages, 
“mainly fulfils a compensatory function”, as “the plaintiff resorts to private antitrust 
enforcement to assert his rights as an individual”, “on his own initiative and according 
to his own priorities”67. From this perspective, private enforcement may appear 
complementary to public enforcement whose principal aim is not the compensation 
of the injured parties from the competition law infringement, but deterrence68. Both 
public enforcement and private enforcement (in particular through collective actions 
for damages) may have a deterrent function, as in combination with public 
enforcement, private enforcement can help to raise the deterrent effect of antitrust 
enforcement for companies and so prevent anticompetitive practices. The relation 
between the two different forms of enforcement in this case would be either 
complementary, if additional deterrence is always good, or competitive, if there can 
only be an optimum level of deterrence, in which case more deterrence through 
private enforcement should lead to less deterrence through public enforcement, if the 
authorities want to avoid over-deterrence, assuming that the latter result would be 
suboptimal for total welfare69. Furthermore, private enforcement complements public 
enforcement because it fulfils a relief function when competition authorities have to 
concentrate their relatively limited resources on cases which are of general 
significance for competition, and hence, in the absence of public enforcement, 
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enforcement will always be complements. 
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private parties are offered the possibility of using private enforcement in order to 
protect their legitimate rights70.  
 
2. Public and private remedies and the need for “equalization” 
 
The interaction between the administrative and the civil remedial process, in 
particular damages for infringements of competition law, has been a subject of 
controversy. Some authors have argued that the potential accumulation of remedies 
that might result from the dual enforcement system may be “problematic” and may 
demand “a formal mechanism for coordination or equalization”71. Discussing the EU 
example, Kloub advances a retributive equivalence theory measuring the optimal 
enforceability of a right in the following manner: 
 
“A right is enforceable if the total damage inflicted by the violator (D) equals 
the amount of compensation (C) and monetary punishment (P). In short: D = 
C + P […]; therefore, an optimal enforcement system should strive to impose 
sanctions (in the form of compensation and monetary punishment) that equal 
the total damage inflicted by a violation (in the context of antitrust violations 
this includes both the actual damage caused to victims and the damage 
caused to society as a whole in the form of deadweight loss)72. 
 
Although the author distinguishes retributive equivalence from deterrence, which is 
“prospective looking and is viewed from the perspective of the violator or other 
potential violators” (thus specific and general deterrence), he claims that “post-
violation enforceability of antitrust rules must be based principally on retributive 
equivalence” and that enforcement in excess of D is deemed to be over-
enforcement73. Over-enforcement may lead to “specific effects”, such as misallocate 
resources in the context of the particular violation, or general effects, leading to over-
deterrence and consequently to negative chilling competition effects. If over-
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enforcement is possible, then the enforcement system should contain “an equalizing 
mechanism to ensure that the amount of monetary punishment and compensation 
imposed for individual violations does not exceed the total damage (damage to the 
victims, ie. wealth transfer; and damage to society, ie. deadweight loss) caused by 
the violation”74. 
 
Optimal enforceability defined, one should take into account that this goal may be 
achieved “either by monetary punishment (public enforcement) or compensation 
(private enforcement) alone, or by their combination”75. There are several arguments 
for a mixed system of enforcement, instead of a purely public or private one, a topic 
that has already been examined extensively in the literature76. Because of the risk of 
over-enforcement should public and private enforcement be combined to produce 
remedies that exceed the total damage (private enforcement being uncontrollable to 
a large extent as it is decentralized and results from the individual or collective 
initiative of the claimants), there is a need for an equalizing mechanism or, simply 
put, coordination between the two. From this perspective, although public and private 
enforcement are complements, they also compete as to the share of the total 
damage they effectively retribute, hence the need to examine the competitive 
relationship between the two and the procedures put in place in EU competition law 
to achieve an “optimal” coordination between these two forms of competition law 
enforcement. However, in view of the fact that public and private enforcement are 
also complements, their mutual interaction requires a greater degree of 
interoperability between them, which calls for rules designed to facilitate the exercise 
of each of these two forms of enforcement, to render them more cost-effective and to 
achieve the largest synergies possible. 
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3. The “optimal” combination of public and private enforcement 
 
A possible way to increase the levels of enforcement in times of limited public 
resources is to allow for the private enforcement of competition law, thus contracting 
out part of the task of enforcement to private parties77. Following up the work of 
Becker (1968), Becker and Stigler (1974) argued for a pure private model of 
enforcement, advancing the view that the public system has perverse incentives 
because of the likelihood of corruption, unless the system is organized in such a way 
that private individuals and firms would investigate violations, apprehend violators 
and conduct legal proceedings to redress violations. If successful, the private 
enforcer will be entitled to retain the proceeds paid by the convicted violator, the 
unsuccessful enforcer being required to reimburse the defendant’s legal expenses78. 
Landes and Posner (1975) have criticized this approach arguing that competitive 
private enforcement will unambiguously lead to over-enforcement relative to what is 
optimal public enforcement79. Assuming that an optimal enforcement system relies 
on the joint operation of sanctions and the probability of detection, in public 
enforcement, it is possible to reduce the cost of deterrence by imposing a higher fine 
and lowering the probability of detection. With regard to private enforcement, 
however, raising the fine would incentivize more enforcement, and would thus raise 
the probability of detection, leading to over-enforcement. This result may be 
explained by a misalignment of the private and the social incentives to bring suit80. 
Private parties may have a greater motive to impose liability than what is socially 
desirable. According to Landes and Posner’s model, private monopolistic enforcers 
will also over-enforce in comparison to the social optimum, as they do not internalize 
the full cost of enforcement (e..g. the administrative cost of providing the judicial 
forum), although the level of enforcement will be lower than in the context of a 
competitive private enforcement. 
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Polinsky (1980) took into account the variable of enforcement cost and found that, in 
a large range of circumstances, private enforcement may lead to less enforcement: 
the reason is that firms are willing to invest in enforcement only if their revenue from 
the proceeds of the sanctions/damages is as large as their enforcement costs, while 
under public enforcement, the public enforcer aims to deter as many potential 
violators as it is possible, which results to a fine revenue that is less than the 
enforcement costs81. Furthermore, when the harm is spread over a large population 
and involves small amounts of money, it is possible that the cost of distribution will 
exceed the benefits for each of the victims of the violation. According to Rosenberg 
and Sullivan (2005) this leads the claimants to invest less in litigation, as they 
possess only a “fractional ownership interest in prosecuting the common causes of 
action”82. In contrast, the defender benefits from efficiencies in the litigation scale. 
Indeed, irrespective of the litigated amount, “the defendant will treat any common 
issues as a single litigation unit, making a substantial investment to maximize the 
aggregate return from reduced liability and then spreading the cost of that 
investment across many separate actions it confronts or expects to confront”83. In 
comparison, the plaintiffs are atomized and do not benefit from similar litigation 
efficiencies. For the same reason the defendant also benefits from an asymmetric 
bargaining power in subsequent settlement discussions with each of the plaintiffs, 
thus creating an incentive for the defendant to settle the case84. Optimizing 
deterrence thus requires the aggregation of the plaintiffs’ case in order to provide 
both parties an equivalent opportunity to exploit available litigation scale efficiencies 
and to correct this “systemic bias” which undermines the deterrence function of 
private enforcement85. 
 
Regardless of the higher cost of public enforcement, the public enforcer has the 
advantage of being able to choose both the level of sanctions and the enforcement 
resources invested in detection. This is not possible in the context of private 
enforcement, as courts will calculate the damages by reference to the harm inflicted 
rather than by reference to the infringer’s gain and will be responsive rather than pro-
active in enforcing the law, as they cannot act proprio motu. Thus, the choice of 
public over private enforcement (monopolistic or competitive) will depend on the 
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level of the proceeds (damages/sanctions), public enforcement being superior for 
higher proceeds. The advantage of public over private enforcement nevertheless 
depends on the assumption that public enforcers are motivated by the public interest 
and have the adequate resources to enforce the law when optimal. These 
assumptions may not always prove correct, as public enforcers are also prone to 
under-performance, either because of budgetary and resource constraints, or 
because of political interference or, finally, because of a mismatch between 
bureaucratic incentives and the public interest. 
 
Assuming that the optimal enforcement system will require some mix of public and 
private enforcement, what should then be the factors to take into account in order to 
fine-tune the system?  
 
The cost of information over the occurrence of harmful acts may be an important 
consideration. One may distinguish here between available information and the cost 
of acquiring additional information. Private enforcers have usually superior 
information from public enforcers on the commission of harmful acts and in any case 
on the harm inflicted to them. In contrast, public enforcers have an informational 
advantage when the likely social costs and benefits of the action are uncertain and 
require a case-by-case analysis or some form of analysis by experts. In this case, 
centralised enforcement might provide economies of scale in hiring the necessary 
expertise. With regard to the acquisition of additional information, Segal and 
Whinston (2007) note that the cost might be higher for public enforcers in view of the 
fact that public enforcement is financed by taxation86. Hence any additional 
enforcement cost will increase taxation and will affect economic activity, unless 
public enforcement is financed by the proceeds of the penalties imposed. 
Nevertheless, public enforcers dispose of a wider information base than private 
enforcers, as they can be seized by complaints, and they may dispose of more 
effective tools to collect information, in view of their wide-reaching investigative and 
sanctioning powers (e.g. leniency programmes and self-reporting of the harmful acts 
by the infringers, effective control of the level of sanctions).  
 
The objectives of public and private enforcers may also diverge. According to optimal 
enforcement theory, public enforcers aim to deter harmful activities, while private 
enforcers focus more on compensation, rather than deterrence, without this however 
denying the possible deterrent effect of private enforcement. One may distinguish 
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here between standalone and follow on damages actions87. With regard to 
standalone actions, deterrence may be achieved, more effectively as it was 
previously explained, through public enforcement, although private enforcement 
might provide a “hedge” to the risk of under-enforcement, because of under-funding 
or ideological opposition to a more active public enforcement. The pursuit of public 
interest and the superior expertise of public enforcers constitute additional 
advantages of public enforcement. Follow-on actions may produce some deterrent 
effect, in particular if that leads to add damages to the other monetary sanctions 
imposed by public enforcement. However, they may also lead to over-deterrence, to 
the duplication of enforcement efforts and to a strategic use of private litigation with 
the purpose to harass a rival, thus suppressing productive business activities88. 
Follow-on damages may also jeopardize the effectiveness of public enforcement, in 
particular if public enforcers place greater reliance on leniency and self-reporting in 
order to uncover harmful activity. The attractiveness of leniency programmes may be 
affected by the likelihood that leniency applicants will be confronted to follow-on 
private damages litigation.  
 
As it has been observed by Segal and Whinston (2007), a public agency may also 
more easily pre-commit to a strategy of deterrence by committing resources, 
developing a reputation for aggressive enforcement and adopting guidelines setting 
priorities89. In contrast, pre-commitment is extremely difficult in the context of private 
enforcement, as the cost of developing a reputation for suing offenders will exceed 
the benefits, unless the plaintiff firm is frequently harmed, in which case investment 
on aggressive litigation might pay off. 
 
Private enforcement may also give rise to enforcement externalities when many 
parties have standing to sue for the same action, leading to inefficient duplication of 
litigation efforts and a possible free rider problem, if the litigation efforts of one of the 
parties produce positive externalities on the litigation efforts of another (e.g. assisting 
with additional evidence). 
 
In view of the findings for the literature, it has been alleged that a pure public 
enforcement system might achieve more effectively deterrence than a mixed public 
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and private enforcement system90. This may be right with regard to private 
enforcement pursuing a pure deterrence objective. However, private enforcement, in 
particular actions for damages, may also aim to guarantee restitution to the victims of 
the competition law violation. If the principal objective pursued by the enforcement 
system is corrective justice, then private enforcement system may well be a superior 
(more effective) option than public enforcement91. First, private parties dispose of 
superior information on the magnitude of the harm suffered. Second, the proceeds 
go to the victims having suffered harm rather than to the public purse, as it is the 
case for fines and disgorgement in the context of public enforcement. Wils (2009) 
observes the following: 
 
“(i)f […] public antitrust enforcement is the superior instrument to pursue the 
objectives of clarification and development of the law and of deterrence and 
punishment, whereas private actions for damages are superior for the pursuit 
of corrective justice through compensation, then the optimal antitrust 
enforcement system would appear to be a system in which public antitrust 
enforcement aims at clarification and development of the law and at 
deterrence and punishment, while private actions for damages aim at 
compensation”92. 
 
Consequently, any effort of coordination of public and private enforcement should 
integrate the “separate tasks approach, under which public antitrust enforcement and 
private actions for damages are each assigned the tasks they are best at”93. 
 
G. Interaction between fines and leniency 
 
Leniency programmes, “a generic term to describe a system of partial or total 
exoneration from the penalties that would otherwise be applicable to a cartel 
member which reports its cartel membership to a competition enforcement agency” 
(also called immunity and amnesty in various jurisdictions), have spread across the 
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globe94. In the U.S., “corporate amnesty” and “corporate leniency” are used 
interchangeably to mean complete immunity from criminal conviction and from fines 
for the anticompetitive conduct”, while in Europe, the term “leniency” is preferred to 
refer to any reduction of fines of up to 100% (ICN, 2014). The interaction of leniency 
programmes and fines is relatively straightforward, as in essence these programmes 
provide a lenient treatment to the infringers providing useful information to the 
competition authorities in order to uncover cartels. One may also add the existence 
of settlement programmes, a sort of plea bargaining mechanism similar to leniency in 
its effects, but which does not originate from self-reporting, as leniency does, but 
intervenes once an investigation has been launched by the competition authority, 
thus following some already undergoing prosecutorial effort. The aims of these two 
tools of plea bargaining are also different: leniency aims to uncover information not 
available to the authorities, while settlements seek to reduce enforcement costs. 
Both tools, if well designed, increase deterrence. Leniency takes advantage of the 
internal stability problem of cartels in order to deter cartel formation and cartel 
detection at a lower enforcement cost95. Settlements free competition authorities’ 
resources, thus increasing prosecution rates and detection. Yet, for leniency and 
settlements to increase deterrence, it is important that penalties are already set at a 
very high level. Although the literature concludes that the introduction of a leniency 
program makes it more difficult for firms to support collusion, it is also recognized 
that to the extent that leniency programs reduce expected fines, they may reduce 
deterrence. A similar argument was made for settlements in view of the reduction of 
the costs to infringers relative to the level of penalties that they would otherwise 
expect96. The literature has also put forward the possibility that cartels may make 
strategic use of generous leniency programmes, by explicitly including leniency 
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applications in their collusive strategy in order to obtain the benefits of reduced 
fines97. According to Wils,   
 
“(s)uccessful cartels tend to be sophisticated organisations, capable of 
learning. It is thus safe to assume that cartel participants will try to adapt their 
organisation to leniency policies, not only so as to minimise the destabilising 
effect, but also, where possible, to exploit leniency policies to facilitate the 
creation and maintenance of cartels. This raises the question whether there 
could be features of leniency programmes that risk being exploited to 
perverse effects”98. 
 
Competition authorities should be cautious not to compromise the deterrent effects 
of their anti-cartel policies with generous leniency programmes, without increasing 
before adopting a leniency programme the level of the financial penalties they 
impose to infringing undertakings. 
 
H. Interaction between fines and other punitive measures 
 
In many jurisdictions it is possible that criminal sanctions may be added to fines. In 
principle such accumulation of punitive sanctions will not be an issue, and may 
increase deterrence, in view of the different targets of the sanction. Fines often target 
only the undertakings found to infringe competition law (e.g. EU), while sanctions 
aim at individuals, often company managers and CEOs. These may take different 
forms: criminal sanctions, such as imprisonment or civil sanctions, such as 
disqualification orders on directors of undertakings. Imprisonment is regarded as a 
very strong means of deterring anti-competitive conduct. It is possible, for individual 
sanctions to benefit from the leniency programme in some jurisdictions (e.g. US, 
UK). For instance, in the UK, it is possible for individuals to benefit from leniency and 
receive full immunity from criminal prosecution. The first individual applying for 
leniency in a personal capacity may be granted a “no-action letter”. 
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Disqualification orders for directors involved in cartel activity or abuse of dominance 
may be for a maximum period of 15 years99. Such requests usually take the form of 
an application to the High court in England and Wales, who will decide whether the 
CDO should be granted. The director must either have contributed to the breach of 
competition law, had reasonable grounds to suspect that the conduct of the 
undertaking constituted a breach, or ought to have known that such conduct 
constituted a breach. It is “immaterial whether the person knew that the conduct of 
the undertaking constituted a breach”100.  
 
We have previously discussed the interaction between fines and punitive damages in 
a single injured party action for damages cases. Some English courts have 
expressed concerns over the compatibility of such accumulation to the principle of ne 
bis in idem101, which should preclude, according to them, the award of exemplary or 
punitive damages in an action for damages following a fining decision by the 
European Commission, even if the fine has been reduced or commuted to nil under 
the EU leniency programme. Yet, in other cases, the courts seem to have opened 
the theoretical possibility of imposing exemplary damages on top of fines imposed in 
the context of public enforcement, although this may be limited to the specific facts of 
the case, in which no fine was effectively imposed following a statutory immunity that 
did not relate to the policy objective of deterrence, as immunity resulting from 
leniency generally does102. Even if punitive (exemplary) damages were granted in 
this case, the court however exercised caution as their calculation. These should be 
awarded only where compensation is inadequate to punish the defendant for his 
outrageous conduct and should bear relation to the compensatory damages 
awarded, the CAT rejecting any reference to the rules for setting fines by the OFT, 
despite the punitive and deterrent purpose of exemplary damages103.  
 
                                                     
99
 Stephan, A. (2011) “Disqualification Orders for Directors Involved in Cartels”, CCP Working Paper 
11-8. 
100
 For more information on disqualification orders, see OFT510 (now adopted by the CMA), Director 
Disqualification Orders in Competition Cases  (2010, re-published March 12, 2014). 
101
 Devenish Nutrition Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis SA [2007] EWHC 2394 (Ch), para. 40, noting that “(t)his 
principle is a reflection of the common principle that a person is not to be punished twice for the 
same wrong (or the principle against double jeopardy)” and “a fundamental principle” of EU law. 
The High Court cited the jurisprudence of the General Court in Case T-329/01, Archer Daniels 
Midland Co. v Commission [2006] ECR II-3255, which held that “the principle of ne bis in idem 
prohibits the same person from being sanctioned more than once for the same unlawful conduct 
in order to protect one and the same legal interest. The application of that principle is subject to 
three cumulative conditions: the identity of the facts, the unity of offender and the unity of legal 
interest protected." 
102
 2 Travel Group PLC (in liquidation) v Cardiff City Transport Services Limited [2012] CAT 19. 
103
 2 Travel Group PLC (in liquidation) v Cardiff City Transport Services Limited [2012] CAT 19, paras 
595-596. 
60 
 
The situation may be different for collective actions. Recognizing the difficulties that 
arise from collective actions, if exemplary damages are available, the UK 
Government has proposed in its Consultation response document for Private Actions 
in Competition Law to prohibit exemplary damages in collective action cases104. 
Should legislation be adopted on this issue that will lessen the tensions between 
public enforcement and exemplary damages, the two specializing in two different 
forms of deterrence: general deterrence for public enforcement and specific 
deterrence with regard to actions for exemplary damages? Punitive damages are 
also taken out of the picture of collective redress at the European level in the recent 
Communication of the European Commission on collective actions. The Commission 
clearly indicates that: 
 
“Collective damages actions should aim to secure compensation of damage 
that is found to be caused by an infringement. The punishment and 
deterrence functions should be exercised by public enforcement. There is no 
need for EU initiatives on collective redress to go beyond the goal of 
compensation: Punitive damages should not be part of a European collective 
redress system”105. 
 
Member States should remain free, however, to adopt punitive/exemplary damages 
for single redress follow on actions. 
 
I. Effects-based approach versus formalism 
 
An approach that would emphasize corrective justice and the principle of 
proportionality may insist in setting the fine at a level corresponding to the harm 
caused by the anticompetitive conduct, including the need to take into account 
general and specific deterrence purposes relating to the specific conduct undertaken 
by the parties. Hence, in view of the objective of deterrence, one may not expect an 
exact correlation between the harm and the penalty. Such effects-based approach to 
fine setting will not rely, in general, on presumptions and proxies based on affected 
sales or volumes of commerce. According to economic theory, fines should be at 
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least equal to the expected illegally earned profits divided by the probability to be 
caught, hence they should relate to “the ex ante extra profits originating from the 
violation and not to the extra profits actually gained that may be higher or lower than 
those expected at decision-making time”, should the fines be paid after the period of 
infringement106. However, in contrast to actual profits, expected profits are not 
observable and cannot be computed in each individual case. A full-effects based 
approach may be unattainable in practice in view of the great diversity of market 
configurations. At most, competition authorities may estimate the actual extra profits 
generated by the cartel if they dispose of the relevant information or the damages 
caused by it (second best effects-based approach). A more formalistic approach, 
relying on presumptions or proxies, such as a percentage of the affected sales or 
volumes of commerce, may not also be perfectly compatible with the principle of 
proportionality and corrective justice which, in an extreme formulation, would require 
a case-by-case quantification of expected gains. That said, one should take into 
account the costs of computing/estimating the expected or actual profits of an 
anticompetitive practice, or the damage caused by it. These costs may reduce the 
administrability of more effects-based approaches in setting financial penalties, in 
particular for fines of modest amount. High administrability costs may render the 
burden to the prosecutor, and indirectly to the tax payer, disproportional, in 
comparison to the level of fines requested. Hence, recourse to some presumptions 
or proxies (and inevitably some degree of formalism) that would reduce the costs of 
estimating the fines may be necessary in instances where these administrative costs 
would cover an important part of the amount of the fine imposed.  
 
However, as fine levels increase, “they may eclipse the costs of more precisely 
estimating damages” and that “(f)rom an economic perspective, the administrative 
costs of more rigorous calculations are increasingly justifiable as the potential fine 
value rises, because these calculations can prevent costly errors when fines are 
underestimated or overestimated”107. It may make sense to use these methods, if 
expensive or time consuming, only for fines of a significant amount. 
 
The earlier finding that there is a large dispersion in the cartel overcharges, which we 
mentioned in reporting the Oxera study and which also explains the findings of  
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Allain, Boyer, Kotchoniz, and Ponssard that some sanctions seem to be much too 
high while others are much too low, suggests two comments. 
 
First, the legal presumptions that cartels lead to an overcharge or that cartels lead to 
a predetermined cartel overcharge (of say 10%) are not economically justified. As we 
saw, in 7% of the cases it appears that cartels do not lead to any over-charge.  
 
Such presumptions are, however, occasionally relied on by courts or legislators, for 
example in the case of Hungary, whose competition law introduced a (rebuttable) 
presumption that a cartel overcharge is 10%. Such presumptions could be used as a 
procedural device to shift the burden of proof in civil matters but in no way should 
they be considered non rebuttable presumptions. 
 
Second, given the variability in the overcharge of cartels, a case by case analysis is 
necessary to establish what the appropriate level of sanctions should be and to avoid 
both over-deterrence and under-deterrence. One of the crucial questions then is 
whether Competition Authorities and Courts can have the necessary data and 
methodology to assess the optimal level of fines. It is sometimes argued that Courts 
usually do not have the means to undertake a case by case analysis of the 
overcharge of cartels.  
 
Alberto Heimler & Kirtikumar Mehta (2012) suggest that competition and courts 
cannot be expected  to do a detailed calculation of the optimal sanction in each case 
but should be able to arrive at a general  estimate, thus offering a structured effects-
based approach108. 
 
The authors argue that a measure of ‘ex ante’ extra profits provides the conceptually 
correct starting point and they suggest how this may be calculated by making a few 
assumptions: 
 
(a) a 15% permanent increase in prices as a result of the cartel (which is at the 
upper end of the overcharge scale observed to date in the various studies 
referred to above);  
 
(b) a demand price elasticity between 0.5 and 1.2; (the authors note that if 
prevailing market demand is more elastic, then cheating would undermine any 
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cartel that is formed, and if the market demand is much less elastic, then the 
market coverage of the cartel is likely to be much reduced; in other words this 
range is the range that would encourage participants to coordinate their 
conduct and aim at joint profit maximization); 
 
(c) a Lerner index values (i.e. margin divided by the price) between 0.3 and 0.8; 
 
The authors also take into consideration the fact that the violators know that the 
violation can be discovered several years after the illegal cartel practice has been 
implemented. Future sanctions are discounted by the violators who also believe that 
the probability of an infringement being discovered decreases with time since proofs 
decay over time. Heimler and Mehta assume a discount factor for the sanction equal 
to 5% and a decay rate of the proofs of 5% per annum together with a probability of 
sanction of 20% (a rate higher than the 13% rate of detection suggested in previous 
studies to take into account the recent and growing effectiveness of leniency 
programs in the detection of cartels). 
 
Given these estimates, the authors show that the range of optimal penalties for 
different values of the price elasticity of demand and the value of the Lerner Index 
goes from less than 1% to 15% of the parties’ turnover depending on the value of the 
price elasticity of demand and of the Lerner Index. 
 
Table 7: Deterrent Sanction in the Case of Cartels 
 
 Value of the Lerner Index 
Elasticities 0,3 0,5 0,8 
0.5 15.04% 13.12% 10.2% 
0.8 13.09% 9.82% 4.9% 
1.2 10.08% 4.83% ˂1% 
 
Furthermore Heimler and Mehta observe that: “(….) the possibility of private action 
implies that deterrence is achieved with a fine reduced by a factor equal to the 
expected extra profits multiplied by the percentage of expected profits probably 
accepted as settlement of a damage claim. The probability of a follow-on action is 
increasing rapidly and it can be assumed to be equal to one. The share of expected 
extra profits to be granted as a damage claim can be assumed to be in the order of 
magnitude of 25% (an order of magnitude derived from Connor’s estimates of global 
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settlements in Staff Paper #03-12 (Department of Agricultural Economics, Purdue 
University, November 2003). 
 
Under those assumptions regarding private enforcement the deterrent sanctions in 
cases of cartels must be adjusted as follows: 
 
Table 8: Deterrent Sanctions in the Case of cartels Adjusted for Private 
Enforcement 
 
 Value of the Lerner Index 
Elasticities 0.3 0.5 0.8 
0.5 12.26% 10.69% 8.31% 
0.8 10.67% 8.01% 4.00% 
1.2 8.19% 3.97% ˂1% 
 
The tables provided by Heimler and Mehta have the advantage of providing an 
educated guess of what deterrent sanctions could be, depending on two variables 
which are usually relatively easy to assess in the course of the investigation of 
cartels. 
 
The authors make similar suggestions for exclusionary abuses for infringements 
relating to the abuse of a dominant position. They suggest that estimates over the 
expected extra profits in relation to sales achieved by the dominant firm may be 
obtained by “examining the determinants of profits as a proportion of total revenue of 
a dominant firm facing a fringe of price take competitors”109. In this case, they 
assume that the expected profits originating from the abuse are equal to a part of the 
extra profits associated with dominance, in view of the exclusion of competitors and 
would be entrants from the contestable part of the dominant firm’s market share110. 
They also acknowledge that, because of fixed costs, linked to the economies of 
scale that most usually generate dominance, profits as a proportion of sales of a 
dominant firm are less than its margin over price (e.g. Lerner index). They actually 
estimate that the expected profits over revenue are approximately half of the Lerner 
index itself. According to them, super-dominant firms have not much to gain by 
eliminating the little competition they face from the fringe, hence, the change in the 
Lerner index is higher the lower the degree of dominance. This implies that the 
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sanction should be higher the lower the degree of dominance of the infringer and 
inversely lower the higher the degree of dominance of the violating firm. In view of 
the higher probability of detection for exclusionary abuses, which they estimate for 
most cases as high as 70% (at least 50% where the dominant firm is a relatively 
small entity and virtually 100% for super-dominant large firms), they find that the 
range of sanctions in the case of abuse of dominance should be “much lower” than 
in the case of cartels111. A further reason for lower fines advanced is that dominant 
companies have a better ability to raise prices and have greater incentives to pass 
on the fine to consumers. They suggest a range of 3.5%-8.3% of the value of sales 
to which the infringement relates multiplied by the number of years the infringement 
has lasted. This range is adjusted to a range of 2.7%-6.3% in the presence of 
extensive private enforcement (follow on actions for damages), on the assumption 
that 25% of the expected extra profits are granted as a damage claim (or settlement 
of a damage claim). 
 
Such structured effects-based approach presents some advantages, in terms of 
administrabiity concerns, with regard to the full effects-based approach in setting 
fines, and advantages in terms of accuracy in relation to more formalistic approaches 
relying on presumptions and proxies, such as a percentage of affected sales or 
affected commerce. They may also increase the predictability of fines, which has 
both advantages and disadvantages. 
 
J. Optimal deterrence and predictability of fines 
The adoption of detailed guidelines with clearly defined steps may increase the 
predictability of the fines, in the sense that it may limit to a certain degree the 
discretion of competition authorities or Courts. Individuals will have less incomplete 
knowledge of the true magnitude of penalties, thus enabling them to perform a 
cost/benefit calculation and identify situations where there might be a net benefit 
from the breach of competition law rules. This raises the issue of the relation 
between predictability of fines and optimal deterrence. Views diverge. Wils (2006) 
put forward three reasons why predictability of fines might reduce the deterrence 
effect112. First, if the executives of the undertaking planning to infringe competition 
law are risk-averse, predictable fines may reduce deterrence, as it will limit the risks 
associated with engaging in anti-competitive activity and being sanctioned. Second, 
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highly predictable fines may induce companies which would otherwise have been 
law-abiding to conclude that it is in their interest to infringe. Third, uncertainty as to 
the amount of potential fines and different fines and the possibility that fines may be 
different for each cartel member depending on their role in the cartel increases the 
variation in costs between the different cartel members, thereby making the cartel 
more unstable and thus incentivizing the cartel members to cheat. Uncertainty as to 
the proceeds of the cartel, in the presence of a differentiated penalties policy, will 
make it more difficult for colluding parties to reach agreement on who should bear 
the risks and for what reward113. Others have put forward that in combination with a 
leniency programme, predictable fines may enhance deterrence in view of the 
incentives created through the leniency programme by the immunity granted whistle-
blowers. In a recent report by London Economics, commissioned by the OFT, it was 
stated: 
 
“(t)heoretically, there appear to be more arguments against than for 
predictability of fines. In practice, however, the two main jurisdictions (US and 
EU) have strived to make their fining decisions more transparent and more 
predictable. It enhances leniency which […] can have a powerful effect on 
deterrence. On balance, predictability may be an advantage if fine levels are 
on average very high but a disadvantage otherwise”114. 
 
K. General presentation of the fine-setting process 
 
In the following sections we perform a brief comparative analysis of the current 
European and US penalty schemes for violations of competition law, in view of the 
impact the EU and US models had on the penalties setting policies in other 
jurisdictions. We then sketch the different steps in the analysis. 
 
1. Summary of the current EU fining Guidelines 
 
It is determined in the European Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines (2006) 
that the fines must be in proportion to their intended effect in terms of prevention, in 
proportion to the potential consequences of the prohibited practices in terms of the 
advantage to the offender and damage to competition, and in proportion to fines 
imposed on other companies involved in the same infringement. For these reasons, 
in determining the level of the fine, the turnover involved in the infringement, in 
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principle, is taken into account. In addition, attention is also paid to the importance of 
the offender in the national economy. In this regard, in determining the upper bound 
on the fine, the total annual turnover of the undertaking is taken into account. 
 
The general algorithm for setting the fine for competition law violations in Europe is 
as follows. The first step consists to determine the base fine. Usually, the base fine 
depends on the type of offence, its gravity, and duration and is set by European 
Commission. Next, the fine can be changed if there are any aggravating or 
attenuating circumstances. Finally, the legal upper bound on fines in Europe, which 
states that the fine cannot exceed 10% of the overall annual turnover, is taken into 
account. 
 
The most recent EU 2006 Guidelines revise those adopted in 1998, with a view to 
increasing the deterrent effect of fines. Council Regulation 1/2003 provides that 
companies may be fined up to 10% of their total annual turnover. Within this limit, the 
revised Guidelines provide that fines may be based on up to 30% of the company’s 
annual sales to which the infringement relates. In particular, the basic amount of the 
fine will be related to a proportion of the value of sales, depending on the degree of 
gravity of the infringement, multiplied by the number of years of infringement (i.e. 
duration, d). 
 
To summarize, the total fine (F) should be put within the limit of 10% of the overall 
annual turnover (T) of the organization under investigation: Fmax=0,1T. Where T is 
calculated as total annual turnover in all the markets where firm operates, not only 
markets corrupted by cartel agreement.  
 
At the same time, turnover involved in the crime (infringement) is given by t. Further, 
the base fine fb will be determined on the basis of t and the type of infringement, such 
that this base fine f b is in the range [Fmin, 0.3t].115 Moreover, a part of the fine – the 
so called “entry fee”- will be imposed in hardcore cartel cases, and may be imposed 
in other cases, irrespective of the duration of the infringement. 
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Further, the calculated base fine will be adjusted according attenuating and 
aggravating circumstances, legal maximum and bankruptcy considerations will also 
be taken into account. Firms, which apply for leniency and satisfy the requirements 
of the leniency program, will get complete or partial exemption from fines depending 
on the timing of application. 
 
2. Summary of the current US Sentencing Guidelines 
 
In the US, cartels are prosecuted as criminal offences, and sentences are imposed 
by a non-specialized court. According to the US Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) both 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary penalties may be imposed: fines on firms and 
individuals, as well as imprisonment of individuals involved in the cartel. With regards 
to fines on firms, the process of their assessment begins with the calculation of a 
base fine. To determine the base fine, a percentage of the volume of affected 
commerce, that is, of total sales from the relevant market (t), is taken into account. 
The USSG suggests that 20% of the volume of affected commerce can be used as a 
good proxy (f b=0.2t). This volume of affected commerce covers the entire duration of 
the infringement.  
 
Once the amount of the base fine has been calculated, aggravating and mitigating 
elements are taken into consideration. However, the final fine for undertakings must 
not exceed a maximum statutory limit which is the greatest of 100 million USD or 
twice the gross pecuniary gains the violators derived from the cartel or twice the 
gross pecuniary loss caused to the victims ( i.e. Fmax = max {100 million, 2π, 
2LossCS}). 
 
As USSG (2013) chapter 2 indicates, “the purpose for specifying a percent of the 
volume of commerce is to avoid the time and expense that would be required for the 
court to determine the actual gain or loss”. Further, they provide the following 
motivation:  
 
“tying the offense level to the scale or scope of the offense is important in 
order to ensure that the sanction is in fact punitive and that there is an 
incentive to desist from a violation once it has begun. The offense levels are 
not based directly on the damage caused or profit made by the defendant 
because damages are difficult and time consuming to establish. The volume 
of commerce is an acceptable and more readily measurable substitute”. 
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Most other OECD countries follow the lead of the US and EU on one or both 
dimensions. For example, in the UK the starting point for calculating antitrust fines is 
a fraction of the relevant turnover, i.e. affected commerce; the cap on fines is set at 
10% of the undertaking’s global turnover, exactly as is the case in the EU. 
 
3. The different steps of the fines setting process 
 
The main steps in the fine-setting process across jurisdictions may be described as 
following:  
 
a. The base fine 
 
The base level of the financial penalty is determined in relation to the value of the 
infringer’s turnover in the affected market as a rough proxy indication of the potential 
gains deriving from the cartel, the type (and gravity) of the infringement and 
eventually its duration.  
 
Usually the determination of the fine takes as a starting point the level of the 
infringing company’s turnover, which relates directly to the infringement in question. 
The concept has been interpreted differently in each jurisdiction. Some jurisdictions 
take a narrow approach and refer to additional characteristics, such as the product-
related turnover of the infringer or the total turnover of the infringing company in the 
specific jurisdiction or the world-wide consolidated turnover of the group of 
companies to which the infringing company belongs. Even these concepts are 
Base fine 
Adjustments (including aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances) 
Limits (maxima and minima) 
Leniency and Settlements 
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interpreted differently from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For instance, the global 
turnover refers to the overall consolidated turnover realised by the infringer and its 
subsidiaries worldwide in the relevant business year, which might be the last year of 
the infringement or the year before the finding of the infringement). In other 
jurisdictions, the global turnover taken into account is the “highest worldwide 
turnover, net of tax, achieved in one of the financial years ended after the financial 
year preceding that in which the practices were implemented” (France). The global 
turnover may also be relevant for the general purpose of deterrence and in order to 
increase the fine, in addition to the determination of the basic fine (e.g. EU 
Guidelines). 
 
Other competition law regimes refer to broader criteria, such as the value of sales 
related to the infringement (e.g. EU) or to the volume of the affected commerce (e.g. 
US). The fine is determined starting a percentage of this specific measure. Other 
concepts frequently referred to are the relevant turnover, the value of affected sales 
and/or the value of affected commerce. The combination of the value of sales to 
which the infringement relates and of the duration of the infringement is thought to 
provide “an appropriate proxy to reflect the economic importance of the infringement 
as well as the relative weight of each undertaking in the infringement”116. According 
to the US Guidelines, the volume of commerce indicated the volume of sales done 
by the company in goods or services that were affected by the violation. Sales of the 
cartelised products between cartel members are generally excluded from 
consideration. Captive sales, that is sales which are used by the undertaking in the 
production of a downstream product, may also be considered, as long as, depending 
on the facts of the case, they amount to sales indirectly related to the infringement 
and there is no double counting. 
 
With regard to the duration of the infringement, there are some slight differences as 
well. In some jurisdictions (e.g. under the 2006 Guidelines in the EU, although actual 
practice varies) the base fine is based on one year of turnover (which is the last 
business year for which figures are available) and the duration of the infringement is 
accounted for but multiplying the base fine by the length of the period of the 
infringement. Other jurisdictions (e.g. Germany) consider the duration in the base 
fine, because the affected commerce, for instance, is taken as the turnover of the 
company over the period of the infringement.  
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The competition law regimes then factor in the probability of detection and/or 
deterrence considerations. For instance, in the EU, depending on the gravity of the 
infringement, the base fine can be up to 30% of relevant turnover. The base amount 
for hardcore cartels will be set at the upper end of the 30% limit. The basic amount 
will be multiplied for each undertaking by the number of years of its participation in 
the cartel. In addition, the 2006 EU Guidelines provide for an “entry fee”, that is an 
additional penalty of 15 to 25% of one year turnover for the most serious 
infringements (e.g. price fixing, market allocation and sharing, output limitation). 
Some jurisdictions choose a different starting point. For instance, the previous OFT 
Guidelines on setting financial penalties retained a percentage of 10% of the relevant 
turnover of the undertaking. The most recent 2012 Guidelines increased the relevant 
turnover band to 30% brining in line the OFT practice with that of the EU Guidelines. 
In the US, the base fine for bid-rigging, price-fixing or market allocation agreements 
among competitors is commonly set at 20% of the volume of the affected commerce, 
which corresponds, as we have previously explained, to the company’s turnover in 
the affected markets over the duration of the infringement117. To this figure, the DOJ 
establishes a “culpability score”, taking into account a number of qualitative factors, 
such as firm size, the nature of the offence, past history of violations, obstruction of 
justice, degree of involvement in the conspiracy and the level of cooperation with the 
DOJ, which indicates the minimum and the maximum “multipliers” to apply to the 
base fine in order to calculate the fine range. Consequently, the base fine may vary 
from 20 to 40% of the volume of the affected commerce. 
 
b. Aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
 
The base fine may be adjusted further by the consideration of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances or of any estimates of any benefit made or likely to be 
made by the infringing undertaking118, including its size and financial position. For 
instance, in the EU repeat offenders face a 10% increase on the base fine for each 
previous offence. Recidivism may take into account previous infringements of EU 
competition law discovered by national competition authorities119. The Commission 
also increases the adjusted fine to reflect the large size of undertakings. Ring 
leadership may be an aggravating factor, which in the EU may result in up to 50% 
increase of the fine. In the US, aggravating circumstances consist in the prior history 
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of the infringing undertaking (e,g. increasing the culpability score by two, if the 
offender committed an infringement for similar misconduct the last five years). Also, 
in the US, further three points are added to the culpability score if the infringer wilfully 
obstructed or impeded, aided abetted or encouraged an obstruction of justice. Non-
compliance to procedural obligations (such as false or incomplete information, lack 
of disclosure, late provision of requested information) may also be subject to further 
sanctions. Intent and premeditation constitute aggravating factors in certain 
jurisdictions (e.g. Germany). 
 
Cooperation with the authorities may, on the contrary, operate as a mitigating factor 
resulting in lower fines at the end of the process in both the EU and the US. In the 
US, an effective compliance and ethics programme may constitute a mitigating 
circumstance for which points may be subtracted from the culpability score if the 
compliance programme is effective (see our discussion previously). The immediate 
termination of the infringement, the limited participation or a minor role or a passive 
role in the infringement can also be considered as mitigating factors (e.g. EU, 
Germany). In some jurisdictions restitution (e.g. Canada) or compensation (e.g. 
Netherlands) to victims have also been considered as mitigating circumstances. 
Some of these factors, in particular the extensive cooperation with the authority, are 
taken into account in the context of leniency policies, rather than as a mitigating 
factor adjusting the base fine.  
 
Inability to pay is indirectly considered with the provisions setting maximum fines at a 
certain percentage of the turnover. It is often considered by most competition 
authorities. This can either be done through the consideration of the proportionality 
principle, or by examining if the imposition of the fine will lead to drive the infringing 
undertaking from the market, thus reducing competition. According to the US 
Guidelines, the fine may also be reduced to the extent that its imposition would 
otherwise impair the infringing corporation’s ability to make restitution to victims. 
Other jurisdictions provide facilities for the payment of the fine, such as a debtor 
warrant or a deferred payment (e.g. Germany). 
 
c. Limits (Maxima and Minima) 
 
Several jurisdictions have instituted maximum statutory limits, providing for a 
maximum amount of fines against undertakings. The maximum amount of fines may 
take the form of a specific monetary amount (e.g. Chile) or be a percentage of 
turnover (e.g. European Union, Germany, France) or similar measure. Other 
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jurisdictions use the profits gained from the infringement or losses caused to the 
victims (e.g. US where the maximum fine for a corporation is the greatest of 100 
million USD or twice the pecuniary gains the conspirators derived from the crime or 
twice the gross pecuniary loss caused to the victims of the cartel. Combinations 
between the different measures is also possible. For an illustration of various 
maxima limits, see Table 2 above. Although none of the examined jurisdictions 
provides for a minimum limit, this is theoretically possible. 
 
d. Leniency and settlements 
 
The last step in the process involves the consideration of leniency and settlements, 
which might lead to a reduction of the financial penalty imposed. 
 
III. The harm caused by cartels 
 
A. Aggregate harm of cartels and the development of presumptions 
 
There is a rich body of recent empirical literature on the subject of the aggregate 
harm of cartels to society. John Connor has constructed the most exhaustive data 
base on cartels throughout the world and in his joint work with Lande has examined 
the design of optimal presumptions of harm for cartels120. In doing so, in conformity 
with the economic theory of deterrence, Connor has estimated both the average 
overcharge of cartels and the probability of such cartels being caught. 
 
In their seminal 2006 paper on the size of cartel overcharge in the US and the EU, 
Connor and Lande argued that in the United States, cartels overcharged an average 
of 18% to 37% of their total sales, depending upon the data set and methodology 
employed in the analysis and whether mean or median figures are used. With 
respect to European cartels, the overcharge was found to be in the 28% to 54% 
range. Finally, the authors looked at cartels that had effects solely within a single 
European country and found that overcharges averaged between 16% and 48%. 
The authors then compared these overcharges with the level of criminal or 
administrative fines imposed on those cartels and found that, on average, the cartel 
overcharges were significantly larger than the criminal fines in either the European 
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Union or the United States. They concluded that since in those jurisdictions the cartel 
fines did not even cover the overcharge of the cartels, the United States and - 
especially - the European Union should increase their penalties for hard core 
collusion substantially. 
 
Connor (2006) also assessed the antitrust fines and private penalties imposed on the 
participants of 260 international cartels discovered during 1990–2005, using four 
indicators of enforcement effectiveness121. Among other things, he found that  
median government antitrust fines average less than 10% of affected commerce, but 
rises to about 35% in the case of multi-continental conspiracies; that civil settlements 
in jurisdictions where they are permitted are typically 6 to 12% of sales; and  that 
global cartels prosecuted in Europe and North America typically paid less than single 
damages. 
 
In its most recent paper (2014), J. M. Connor surveys more than 700 published 
economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of 
overcharges of hard-core cartels122. His primary findings are the following:  
 
“(1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all 
time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges 
reached their zenith in 1891-1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 
6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-
membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) 
convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices than 
unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower mark-ups than 
price-fixing cartels; (8) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price 
changes are 60% to 80% higher than the whole episode; and (9) laboratory 
and natural market data find that the Cartel Monopoly Index (CMI) varies from 
11% to 95%.”   
 
He finally concludes that "historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring 
cartels are likely to be too low".  
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The work by Connor and Lande has inspired a number of authors to undertake 
studies refining their methodology in order to assess the level of overcharges from 
cartels. One such study was prepared for the European Commission by Oxera and a 
multi-jurisdictional team of lawyers and economists in December 2009123. Oxera 
removed from the Connor data set a large number of observations based on a 
number of criteria, in particular focusing only on estimates obtained from peer-
reviewed academic articles and chapters in published books. It also refined the 
sample of cartels examined by Connor, by considering only cartels that started after 
1960 (thus taking into account only more recent cartels), for which an estimate of the 
average overcharge was available (rather than only an estimate of the highest or 
lowest overcharge), for which the relevant background study explicitly explained the 
method for calculating the average overcharge estimate. 
 
In the distribution of cartel overcharges across this adjusted data set of 114 
observations (out of more than 1,000 initially), the overcharge range with the 
greatest number of observations is 10–20%. Oxera found that in this data set the 
median overcharge was 18% of the cartel price, which is not far from the 20% found 
by Connor and Lande. However, since the variation in observed overcharges is 
large, the authors considered the distribution of overcharges and not only the median 
or average.  
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Figure 3: Distribution of cartel overcharges in empirical studies of past cartels: 
indicative results from new sample selected by Oxera, based on Connor and 
Lande (2008)124 
 
In 93% of the past cartel cases in the sample, the overcharge as a percentage of the 
cartel price was above zero. This supports the theory that, in most cases, the cartel 
overcharge can be expected to be positive, although it also indicates that there is a 
small but significant proportion of cartels (7%) where there is no overcharge.  
 
In another study, Posner (2001) presents the overcharges for 12 cartel cases, with a 
median value of 28% of the cartel price.  Elsewhere, Levenstein and Suslow (2006), 
based on their review of 16 cartel case studies, find that ‘virtually every cartel case 
study surveyed reports that the cartel was able to raise prices immediately following 
cartel formation’.  
 
A 2002 OECD study (OECD Competition Committee Report on the Nature and 
Impact of Hard Core Cartels and Sanctions against Cartels under National 
Competition Laws) based on a limited survey of 14 cartel cases conducted by its 
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members between 1996 and 2000 finds that the median overcharge was between 15 
and 20%.  The OECD report adds: “At the very least it seems clear that the gain from 
cartel agreements can vary significantly from case to case, and sometimes it can be 
very high. Moreover, since the actual loss to consumers includes more than just the 
gain transferred to the cartel (….), the total harm from cartels – is significant indeed”. 
Werden (2003) reviews 13 other studies, and arrives at a median overcharge of 15% 
of the cartel price. Conducting a meta-analysis of cartel overcharge estimates, Boyer 
and Kotchoni (2014) found a mean and median overcharge estimate of 15.76% and 
16.43%. 
 
Altogether these studies are highly consistent with one other on several points. In 
only 7% of the cases there is no overcharge. In more than 90% of the cases cartels 
result in an overcharge. The median overcharge by cartels is between 10 and 20% 
of the cartel price. However there is a wide distribution of results across cartels and 
hence a case by case study is in order. 
 
This literature has given rise to presumptions of cartel overcharge used in the 
context of either setting financial penalties in the context of public enforcement or in 
order to compute damages in the context of private enforcement.  
 
In the context of private enforcement, the nature of the presumption is causal, as its 
aim is to facilitate the burden of proof of the claimants in damages cases against 
cartelists, in order to establish that they have been harmed as a result of a specific 
cartel (hence this relates to the individual harm of the specific cartel to the claimant). 
The claimant is not expected to bring forward concrete evidence of harm and 
overcharge, in order to establish the causal link between the cartel and the harm 
suffered, in case a cartel has been found, but may rely on a rebuttable presumption 
of harm/overcharge. This presumption is built on the high likelihood that a cartel 
leads to overcharges, in more than 9 out of 10 cases, on the basis of the empirical 
analysis available. 
 
For instance, the recent Draft Directive voted by the European Parliament on certain 
rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of 
competition law sets up a causal presumption for cartels in order to “remedy the 
information asymmetry and some of the difficulties associated with quantifying 
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antitrust harm, and to ensure the effectiveness of claims for damages”125. As it is 
explained in the relevant Recital of the Directive, 
 
“it is appropriate to presume that in the case of a cartel infringement, such 
infringement resulted in harm, in particular via a price effect. Depending on the 
facts of the case this means that the cartel has resulted in a rise in price, or 
prevented a lowering of prices which would otherwise have occurred but for the 
infringement. This presumption should not cover the concrete amount of 
harm”126. 
 
Accordingly, the Draft Directive requires Member States to establish a presumption 
that cartel infringements cause harm, also recognizing to the infringer the right to 
rebut this presumption127. We should note however, that as we mentioned earlier, 
this presumption is not economically justified since 7% ¨of cartels seem not to lead to 
an overcharge. If it is used as a device to simplify the work of antitrust authorities or 
courts, it should remain a rebuttable presumption.  
 
In the context of public enforcement, competition authorities most often make use of 
presumptions of harm, again on the basis of the empirical evidence on the average 
overcharge of cartels. For instance, the United States Sentencing Guidelines 
recommends a basic fine of 10% of the affected volume of commerce to a firm 
convicted of cartel collusion, plus another 10% for the harms “inflicted upon 
consumers who are unable or for other reasons do not buy the product at the higher 
price”. This generates a fine of 20% of the affected volume of commerce, subject to 
further adjustments for aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The Sentencing 
Commission, which adopted the Sentencing Guidelines in 1987 explained the choice 
of this 20% by the fact that it doubled the figure representing the average overcharge 
of cartels (10%) in order to account for losses, including customers who are priced 
out of the market (counterfactual customers). In the EU, the basic fine is set in a 
range up to 30% of the relevant turnover over the duration of the infringement, 
presumably also taking into account empirical evidence that the median overcharge 
of cartels is between 15-20%, with more than 40% of the population of cartels in 
these studies having an overcharge of more than 30%, on top of the need to factor in 
deterrence. 
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By being a step in the fine-setting process, such presumption entails the risk that it 
will be sued mechanically without taking into account the real harm that the specific 
cartel may have caused. As cartels are considered anticompetitive by their object in 
the EU or per se prohibited in the US, there is no effort made by the Competition 
authorities to determine the harm of the cartel when establishing the existence of the 
competition law infringement, with the result that this information is unavailable at the 
stage of setting the fine. The use of presumptions facilitates the work of competition 
authorities at this stage, to the price, however, of accuracy and a better linkage 
between the harm caused (including the need for general and specific deterrence) 
and the sanction, as would have implied the reference to the principle of 
proportionality of sanctions. This preference for a formalistic approach explains also 
the institution of statutory maximum fines. The attraction of this form-based approach 
consists in saving the administrative costs and human resources that would have 
been required for the assessment of the harm of the cartel. As it is rightly explained 
by Harrington (2014)  
 
“(European Commission’s) fines are tied to revenue in the affected markets and 
not to incremental profits or customer losses, so the penalty does not scale up 
with the overcharge. If we take these estimates on face value, the only cartels 
that will form are those with abnormally high overcharges which are the ones 
imposing the largest losses on consumers. The problem here resides in the 
penalty formula not being proportional to the additional profits from colluding. […] 
That is the case in the U.S. as well. Though U.S. Sentencing Guidelines have a 
maximum of “not more than the greater of twice the gross gain or twice the gross 
loss,” apparently that sort of calculation is not standard practice when the U.S. 
Department of Justice sets a fine That cartel profits are not taken account of in 
setting or negotiating fines is a criticism of both the competition authority and the 
body that sets their budget. One defense of this practice is that it is too costly to 
calculate those profits. That does not seem credible. There are many plaintiffs 
who perform exactly that exercise for much smaller markets involving much 
smaller sums. If a plaintiff can engage in a cost effective calculation of the impact 
of collusion on profits when hundreds of thousands of dollars of claims are at 
stake then a competition authority should be able to do so when millions of 
dollars of fines are at stake. A second defense is that a competition authority has 
limited resources and it is better for it to use those resources to develop 
additional cases. That is a valid point but then the argument should be made to 
increase the competition authority’s budget so they can engage in the proper 
setting of fines. We must remember that the ultimate goal is not to convict and 
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penalize cartels but rather to deter their formation, and that requires tying 
penalties to illicit profits. This point is worth emphasizing as competition 
authorities may attach too much weight to disabling cartels relative to deterring 
cartels”128. 
 
B. The need for an effects-based approach: assessing the individual harm of 
cartels 
 
Various methods to estimate cartel overcharge have been advanced in the literature, 
and they are frequently used for the computation of the quantum of damages 
following a competition law infringement129. The European Commission Staff has 
also prepared a practical guide quantifying harm in actions for damages cases, 
which provides a detailed and non-technical analysis of the different methodologies 
employed in economic research to quantify harm130. We summarize the different 
methodologies available: 
 
(i) Comparator-based approaches: before and after approaches (time-series) 
or approaches comparing prices in the cartelized market with those in 
‘similar’ uncartelised markets in other geographic regions (cross-sectional 
approaches, the yardstick method) or difference in differences 
approaches. These approaches involve the estimation of the correlation 
between the pre-cartel prices in the cartelized or similar markets and the 
post-cartel prices in these markets, cross-sectional econometrics, time-
series econometrics and panel data regression;  
 
(ii) Financial cost-based approaches: which construct a “but for” cartel price 
“bottom up”, by measuring the relevant costs and comparing the average 
of marginal unit costs plus a reasonable mark-up with actual prices. This 
also involves some form of quantitative methods (bottom-up costing, 
valuation);  
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(iii) Market-structure based approaches: these involve the use of simulation 
models in order to estimate the losses incurred, using different models of 
oligopolistic behaviour (Cournot, Bertrand) to predict the Lerner index of 
market power or to estimate a demand and cost function that account for 
dynamic market conditions131. 
 
One of the main differences between the evaluation of fines and that of damages is 
that, first, courts have in general a broad discretion and are free to choose which 
methodology is best suited to the facts of the case, while the discretion of the 
Commission is limited with regard to the method of evaluation of fines (self-limitation 
through the joint effect of the guidelines on the method of setting fines (above) and 
the principle of legitimate expectations, as well as limitations through the operation of 
the proportionality principle e.g. final amount of the fine shall not, in any event, 
exceed 10 % of the total turnover in the preceding business year of the undertaking 
or association of undertakings participating in the infringement, Second, fines 
generally aim at deterrence, while damages are perceived in Europe as mostly 
inspired by the principle of compensation, although, of course, the right to 
compensation may also have a deterrent effect132. Thirdly, the calculation of 
damages for cartel infringements provides also the possibility to take into account of 
potential positive effects of cartels to consumers (efficiency gains), “like for instance, 
lower transportation costs or higher supply reliability”, which if significant would “have 
to be balanced against the potential negative effects to customers” in order to 
calculate the factual damages133. This is of course impossible in the context of 
calculating fines, because of the principle of deterrence. It follows, that the potential 
scope of intervention of econometric techniques will be more limited in the 
calculation of fines, should the Commission move to a more economics approach.  
 
There are various examples of an individual assessment of the amount of 
overcharge, in particular in the context of private enforcement for damages, as in 
both US and EU law cartels are prohibited per se or by their object, hence there is no 
need to establish the existence and the likely amount of consumer harm in order to 
apply Section 1 of the Sherman Act or Article 101 TFEU. 
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The recent German Cement cartel case and the judicial scrutiny exercised by the 
Higher Regional Court Düsseldorf (OLG), which has specialized chambers for 
antitrust matters, to the decision of the Federal Cartel Office to impose a fine for 
additional turnover related to a cartel in the cement industry (making use of the 
possibility offered to the FCO by German law to order the disgorgement of benefits) 
illustrates the different approaches that EU and national courts may take with regard 
to the assessment of evidence of a cartel overcharge134. In the cement cartel case, 
the Court reviewed the fines both under the law applicable in 2003 (when the 
decision of the FCO was adopted, which provided for disgorgement of profits-related 
fines of up to three times the additional proceeds obtained through a cartel). As the 
fines aimed to skim-off additional earnings related to the infringement, the economic 
evidence presented at the Court resembled to that usually submitted for the 
evaluation of antitrust damages. The OLG appointed an expert and quantified the 
additional turnover based on the econometric assessment submitted by the expert. 
With regard to the standard of proof, the OLG has a broad discretion to choose the 
best suited methodology so that the results are conclusive and economically 
reasonable. With the help of the expert, the Court identified the appropriate 
methodologies: among the different ones available for the evaluation of damages, 
the expert ruled out comparator-based geographical yardstick methods, as there 
were significant differences in market characteristics between the different regions 
and countries. The expert suggested instead a during-and-after time series 
approach, which involved the choice of an appropriate reference period (the period 
not influenced by the cartel). The Court followed the expert’s suggestions on the 
design of the empirical method for the estimation of additional turnover. The court 
expert then proceeded to the application step, carrying out the analysis using data 
submitted by the parties, before performing robustness checks, allowing the various 
parties (the FCO, the defendants, the public prosecutor) to put forward additional 
questions and criticisms135. These were extensively discussed in the judgment, 
although the OLG did not perform a control of the external validity of the evidence. 
The Court did not explain why it relied only on the time series method, but included 
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some discussion of why it did not follow the regional yardstick analysis (essentially, 
because the prices in the other regional markets were either certainly or at least 
probably also affected by cartels). This may be owed to the fact that the Federal 
Court of Justice (BGH) had indicated in an earlier case that yardstick approaches 
(i.e. the comparison to the development of comparable markets) was generally a 
superior approach compared to model-based approaches.136 The BGH later 
essentially upheld the OLG Düsseldorf’s judgment in the Cement case. 
 
 
C. The practice of the Chilean competition authority 
 
According to Article 26, paragraph 3 of the Chilean Competition Act, as amended by 
Statue No. 20.361, for the estimation of the fine to be imposed the Competition 
Tribunal (TDLC) should “consider the economic benefit gained as a result of the 
infringement, the seriousness of the conduct and recidivism, but also –and 
fundamentally– the damage to competition”137. FNE has proceeded in various 
instances to a case by case analysis of the effects of the cartel and the amount of 
the cartel overcharge or the excess profits gained by the cartel. In contrast to US, 
EU, UK, German and French competition law, it is thus possible to rely on an 
individual case by case analysis, rather than on proxies or presumptions, when 
assessing the compatibility of a collusive conduct to competition law or at the stage 
of setting fines or evaluating damages. Note however, that nothing precludes those 
authorities from conduction a case by case analysis. This constraint imposed by the 
Chilean competition law regime when assessing the compatibility of cartel conduct to 
competition law (in the sense that must be applied to cartel activity) may become an 
advantage if the information is used to design optimal cartel sanctions that take into 
account the amount of the overcharge and integrate the optimal enforcement 
theory’s focus on deterrence, in view of the low probability of detection of cartels in 
Chile. Indeed, it is only since 2009 that the agency has had, as part of its anti-cartel 
toolkit, intrusive investigative powers (including dawn raid and wiretapping authority) 
and a leniency programme. The leniency programme has enabled so far the 
discovery of one cartel in the Whirlpool/ Tecumseh do Brasil Ltda investigation in 
2012, which represents the first time in Chile a leniency application has resulted in 
the successful prosecution of a cartel. The high standard of proof for cartels, in view 
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of the requirement to prove market power, may also lower the probability of detection 
of cartels in Chile, thus inviting for a more drastic consideration of deterrence at the 
stage of setting fines with the inclusion of a “deterrent factor”, as it is the case in the 
context of the EU Commission’s Guidelines in setting fines for competition law 
infringements.  
 
We examine three cases in which the Chilean competition authority has evaluated 
excess gains of cartel activity. The cases presented below in a chronological order 
include: (a) Retail pharmacy chains, (b) commercialization of low power, hermetic 
compressors for the manufacturing of refrigerators and, (c) poultry meat production. 
We then comment on the practice followed. 
 
1. Case studies 
 
(a) In the Retail pharmacy chains case, initiated in the FNE filed a complaint against 
the 3 main retail pharmacies: Farmacias Ahumada, Cruz Verde and Salcobrand 
accusing them of concerted action resulting in the price increase of around 200 
drugs between December 2007 and March 2008. The FNE estimated the excess 
gain as overprice charged for each drug multiplied by the quantities sold for the 
entire period of collusion.  
According to the information obtained during investigation the excess gain amounted 
to:  
 
Pharmacy Chain Gain (in 
UTA) 
Farmacias Ahumada   16,856  
Cruz Verde  29,009  
Salcobrand  14,472  
Total  60,338  
 
The above estimation is just a proxy, considering that it does not take into 
consideration the loss of those consumers that could not afford to buy the product 
due to its elevated price in addition to not accounting for dynamic inefficiencies. 
Furthermore, it does not account for the perpetrating effect in the market. In fact, the 
coordination between the three retail pharmacy chains shifted the equilibrium price 
upwards, which meant that, to date, long after the detection and conviction of the 
cartel, prices remain high. Until December of the 2008, the last month with available 
data, considering this perpetrating effect the gains obtained amounted to: 
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Pharmacy Chain Gain (in 
UTA) 
Farmacias Ahumada   20,191  
Cruz Verde  32,055  
Salcobrand  16,719  
Total  68,965  
 
The total gains obtained by the three pharmacies, even only considering the period 
with available data, exceeded the then maximum fine established by the Chilean 
Competition Law, set at UTA 20,000. 
 
(b) In the commercialization of low power, hermetic compressors for the 
manufacturing of refrigerators case, initiated in 2010, the FNE filed a complaint 
against Whirlpool S.A. and Tecumseh Do Brasil Ltda., the main providers of low 
power, hermetic compressors for the manufacturing of refrigerators, who participated 
in an international cartel that went back to 2004. 
 
As part of the trial, the FNE submitted to the Competition Tribunal an economic 
report that justified the amount of fine requested on the basis of the estimation of the 
excess gains obtained by the cartel.  
 
The estimation of excess gains required the determination of the duration of the 
cartel as well as the overcharge charged during the price-fixing period. Tecumseh 
fully collaborated with information and data, as opposed to Whirlpool, who delivered 
inexact and incomprehensive data, impossible to be used for the analysis. As a 
result, the FNE relied exclusively on the Tecumseh data and used extrapolation to 
draw results on Whirlpool.  
 
The duration of the cartel was determined by qualitative information obtained by 
Tecumseh, according to which the cartel dated back to the beginning of 2004 and 
terminated around February of 2009.  
 
For the determination of a counterfactual, it was assumed that after the termination 
of the agreement the two firms returned gradually towards more competitive levels 
until December 2009 by which time the market had fully returned to competitive 
conditions. Excess gains were then estimated using the profit margin of December 
2009 as a counterfactual. The use of profit margins instead of prices for the 
estimation of excess gains addressed the defence argument that associated the high 
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prices during the period of the collusion to the rising cost of commodities such as 
iron that were essential inputs for the production of compressors. The excess profits 
were then estimated as the real profits obtained by the two firms minus the profits 
that would have been obtained had margins been at the level of December 2009.    
 
Overall, it is estimated that margins were varying between 100% and 140%, during 
collusion, far in excess of the 33% observed in December 2009. According to the 
above, Tecumseh gained the sum of CLP 4.4 billion, or approximately USD 8.5 
million.  
 
Excess profits for Whirlpool were estimated by means of proportionality using the 
average market share of Whirlpool for the period of 2004-2009 which was at 58%. 
This brought excess profits at CLP 7.2 billion or USD 14 million. The FNE then 
requested a fine equal to the excess gain obtained by the cartel, amounting to 
approximately UTA 15,000.  
 
The Competition Tribunal ruled against Whirlpool and set the fine of UTA 10,500, 
lower than the gains directly accountable to the cartel, as calculated by the FNE138. 
 
(c) The third case relates to a complaint filed by FNE before the Competition Tribunal 
(TDLC) in 2011, accusing the three main poultry meat producers in Chile (i.e., 
“Agrosuper”, “Ariztía” and “Don Pollo”) of cartelization. The cartel was implemented 
and monitored by the Poultry Meat Producers’ Trade Association (APA – Asociación 
de Productores Avícolas de Chile A.G.). 
 
The FNE claimed that the agreement –which was operating for at least 10 years-, 
was overseen and coordinated through the Trade Association and aimed to reduce 
the production of poultry meat in the Chilean market by controlling the quantity of 
meat offered and by assigning market shares to each party.  
 
Taking into account the severity of their actions, the duration of the conduct, the 
market power the agreement conferred to the companies involved and the product 
(poultry meat is an essential product for lower income consumers), the FNE asked 
for the maximum penalty established in the act to be applied to each company 
cartelized – that is, 30,000 UTA (around USD 26 mil.) each. Additionally, the FNE 
asked for a penalty of 20,000 UTA and the dissolution of the Trade Association, due 
to its central role in coordinating and maintaining the cartel. 
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This is the first time that the FNE made use of the recently acquired powers of dawn 
raids and hence constitutes a milestone in the history of persecution of cartels in 
Chile. The case is being litigated before the Competition Tribunal and is expected to 
be sentenced within 2014. 
 
The estimation of harm of the cartel was commissioned to two academics of the 
University of Chile, Andrés Gomes-Lobo and José Luis Lima. The authors estimated 
the real present value of the direct harm using the following formula: 
 
𝐷𝑖 = ∑ (1 + 𝜌)
(𝜏−𝑡) (𝑝𝑖𝑡
1 −𝑝𝑖𝑡
0 )𝑞𝑖𝑡
1
𝑈𝐹𝑡
𝑇𝑖
𝑡=1      (1) 
 
Where: 
 
𝑝𝑖𝑡
1  is the observed wholesale price charged by company 𝑖 in month 𝑡 
𝑝𝑖𝑡
0  is the wholesale price in the absence of collusion for company 𝑖 in month 𝑡 
𝑞𝑖𝑡
1  is the observed quantity sold by company 𝑖 in month 𝑡 
𝜌 is the monthly discount rate that allows to bring the economic harm at month 𝑡 to 
its current value 
𝑇𝑖 is the last month of information 
𝑈𝐹𝑡 is the average value of UF
139 in month 𝑡 
 
The estimation of this formula presented two difficulties, the first and most obvious 
was the estimation of the counterfactual, 𝑝𝑖𝑡
0 . In addition, the data available to the 
FNE covered the period of January 2006 until December 2010. However, the 
agreement between poultry meat producers goes back 1996. The authors of the 
report decided to estimate backwards up to 1996 using the following formula: 
 
𝐷𝑖
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 =  {𝑠𝑝̅̅ ̅𝑖 ∙ 𝑞𝑖 ̅̅ ̅ ∙ (1 + 𝜌)
(𝜏−(𝑠𝑖−1)) ∙ (1 +
1
𝜃
) ∙ [1 −
1
(1+𝜃)(𝑠𝑖−1)
]} + {∑ (1 + 𝜌)(𝜏−𝑡) ∙ 𝑠𝑝𝑖 ∙
𝑇𝑖
𝑡=𝑠𝑖
𝑞𝑖𝑡} (2) 
 
The first bracket on the right hand side of equation (2) expresses the backward 
estimation of harm from 1996 until 2005 as a function of average overprice 𝑠𝑝̅̅ ̅𝑖 
charged during the observed period multiplied by the average quantities sold during 
the observed period and adjusted by 𝜃 =
1+𝑔
1+𝜌
− 1, with 𝑔 being a parameter that 
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reflects the average growth rate of sales during the unobserved period. According to 
the information provided by the Trade Association 𝑔 = 4.0%. In addition the authors 
considered 𝜌 = 3.17%, which is the average annual interest rate of 10-year Bonds 
offered by the Central Bank between 2002 and 2011.  
 
For the estimation of total damages (2), the only term that remains unknown is the 
counterfactual, 𝑝𝑖𝑡
0 . Three different methodologies were used in order to estimate 
overprice, i) the comparison of domestic prices with prices observed in the USA and 
Brazil (using purchasing power parity), ii) comparison of domestic prices with prices 
of exports, and iii) use of simulation to forecast the competitive outcome, whereby 
the firms are involved in a Cournot type competition with homogeneous products. 
 
The results of the statistical analysis show that domestic prices were 33%-45% 
higher than the prices in Brazil or the USA in purchasing power parity. In comparison 
to the export price, domestic prices were between 28%-67% higher140. Finally the 
simulation model, estimates an overprice that varies between 12.9% and 15.9% 
assuming price elasticity of -0.93 and between 15.9% and 17.9% assuming a price 
elasticity of -1.393141. 
 
The estimation of damages uses the most conservative of the estimations of 
overprice; namely the result of the simulation models assuming price elasticity of -
0.93. The results show that even with the most conservative estimation of 
overprices, damages were as high as USD 850 million, far exceeding the maximum 
fines established in the Chilean competition law.  
 
2. Comments 
 
Generally, the approach employed for fine imposition by the Chilean competition 
authority in the three cases analysed below is valid and roughly follows the logic 
close to the structure of the current EU antitrust guidelines on the method of setting 
fines.  
 
In the first two cases Chilean competition authority starts by assessing the gravity of 
the violation. This is done by estimating excess illegal gains for each member of the 
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agreement. In the second and third case also duration of the cartel agreement has 
been taken into account. Then the fine imposed on each firm aims to extract the 
entire excess illegal gain obtained during the period of the violation. However, the 
final imposed fines were adjusted downwards due to the existence of the maximum 
fine established by the Chilean Competition Law or due to proportionality 
considerations. 
 
In the first case (Retail Pharmacies) excess illegal gains for each member of the 
cartel agreement were estimated as price-overcharge for each product multiplied by 
the quantities sold for the entire period of collusion. This approach seems to be 
supported by the economic theory (see section 2 below). However, existing 
sentencing guidelines in the two leading jurisdictions (EU and US) tend to avoid this 
method due to time and expense considerations that would be required to determine 
the actual overcharges in all the cases. 
 
The method employed in the second case (Whirlpool-Tecumseh) seems to be the 
closest to the best current practices. In section 1.2 below, we will provide detailed 
explanations. 
 
In the third case (Poultry Meat Producers) the method employed for estimation of 
illegal gains was quite precise, but very specific to the case. Hence, it will be difficult 
to extend to general setting, since the rules of the fining guidelines should ideally be 
applicable ex-ante to all cases. 
 
Next, we will move to more detailed analysis of each of the three cases. 
 
a. Retail Pharmacies case 
 
The retail pharmacies case suggests several comments in light of our previous 
discussion: 
 
First, it appears that the FNE requested fines are a function of the direct estimate of 
the illicit profit by the pharmacies due to their collusion.  
 
The calculus of the overcharge avoids the biases referred to by Allain, Boyer, 
Kotchoniz, and Ponssard  (2013) when they criticize Connor for calculating biased 
and inflated estimates of average illicit surcharges and the distortive effect of 
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sanctions based on total revenue mentioned by Bageri, Katsoulacos and Spagnolo 
(2013). 
 
Second to assess the harm of the collusion, the FNE takes into consideration the 
illegal profit of the pharmacists rather than the welfare losses due to the collusion. 
The welfare losses due to the collusion are greater than the illegal gains of the 
pharmacists since the consumers who were discouraged from consuming because 
of the higher price also experienced a decrease in their consumer surplus. The 
(legal) reason for which competition authorities usually do not include the consumer 
loss of the consumers which have been discouraged from buying in their 
computation of the harm of cartels (ie. the deadwright loss) is that the amount that 
would have been bought had the collusion not been in effect but was not bought 
because of the increase in price due to collusion is usually not easy to assess and 
could be considered too speculative for courts to consider.  
 
Third, the pharmacy case is a good example of the issues raised by Katsoulacos and 
Ulph (2013). It seems on the one hand that the collusion took place between 
December 2007 and March 2008 and had an effect that lasted longer than the 
duration of the collusive practice since it seems that the collusion “shifted the 
equilibrium price upwards”. It is often quite difficult to know when a market gets back 
to a competitive equilibrium level after a collusion has been uncovered. Furthermore, 
the decision to sanction the cartel became final with the decision of the Supreme 
Court on September 2012, more than four years after the collusion ended.  
 
Any comparison between the calculated harm and the sanction would have two 
biases. The gains of the cartel would be underestimated since the cartel lasted 
probably longer than December 2008 (the last month for which data was available). 
The severity of the sanction imposed on the pharmacists would be overestimated 
since this sanction intervened several years after the end of the period during which 
data were available to estimate the harm to consumers.  
 
This means that had the pharmacists made a rational calculation in December 2007 
to know whether they would violate the law, they would have taken into consideration 
more profits than the recorded profits and they would have discounted the sanction 
given that the sanction would only intervene several years after their collusion.  
 
In turn this means that a sanction equal to their recorded profits divided by the 
probability of their collusion being sanctioned underestimates the optimal sanction. 
91 
 
Fourth, there is a cap on the amount of the sanction that can be imposed on the 
colluding firms and it appears that globally the amount of extra profit which the 
pharmacists were able to have due to their collusion is lower than the amount of the 
fine they received. As mentioned in the review of the literature, the existence of a 
cap on sanctions can prevent the sanction from being deterrent.  
 
In the case of the pharmacists it is clear that ex post profits from the collusion are 
greater than the sanctions imposed. Furthermore the profits from the collusion may 
also be an underestimate of the ex ante profits that the pharmacists expected (if they 
expected that the market would not get back to a competitive equilibrium 
immediately after December 2008) and the sanction is an overestimate of the ex 
ante cost of the sanction since it was imposed only in 2012 and therefore several 
years after the pharmacists benefitted from a large part of the illicit profits. 
 
Even if the probability of detection and sanction is equal to one (and we can guess 
that it is lower than one), the fine imposed on the pharmacists does not seem to be 
deterrent. 
 
One should add, however, that if there were additional sanctions on the cartel 
participants, (such as, for example, the negative publicity they got from being 
sanctioned for collusion) or follow on actions for damages, they should be taken into 
consideration to know whether the enforcement against their collusion was deterrent.   
 
Finally we should keep in mind that general deterrence is based on the ex ante 
perceptions of the would-be violators (both in terms of anticipated profits and in 
terms of risk of punishment) rather than on ex post data.  
 
b. Whirlpool-Tecumseh case 
 
The cartel agreement consisted of two companies (Whirlpool S.A. and Tecumseh Do 
Brasil Ltda.). It lasted for a period of roughly 6 years (beginning of 2004 – February 
of 2009). Tecumseh Do BrasilLtda came forward, cooperated with the authority, 
applied for Leniency and as a result was exempted from the fine.  
 
The amount of fine imposed on the second member of the cartel (Whirlpool S.A.), 
which did not cooperate with the authority, was justified on the basis of estimation of 
the excess illegal gains obtained by the cartel and duration of the cartel. Excess 
gains seem to be correctly estimated through comparison to counterfactual profit 
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margin (profit margin of December 2009, when the market had fully returned to 
competitive equilibrium). The excess profits were then estimated as the real profits 
obtained by the firms minus the profits that would have been obtained had margins 
been at the level of December 2009. The Chilean competition authority then 
requested a fine equal to the excess gain obtained by the cartel, amounting to 
approximately USD 14 million. After the appeal before the Supreme Court the fine 
has been reduced to about USD 4.9 million. It was argued that a lower fine also met 
the deterrence and retribution objectives of fines in competition law, which could 
have been related to the application of proportionality principle that states that the 
fine should not be in excess of the minimum fine that achieves the same level of 
deterrence.142 
 
This case again raises the issue of the duration of cartels. It is well known that once 
a price agreement is terminated, the market does not get back to the competitive 
equilibrium immediately. The FNE rightly determined that the end of the effect of the 
cartel was when the market had returned to competitive conditions.  
 
The FNE was also right to focus on profit margins rather than on prices. When a 
cartel lasts a number of years it is quite possible that variation in cost conditions may 
have an impact on prices independently of the level of competition. The profit margin 
is a good indicator of the market power exercised by the cartel members and of the 
loss of surplus of consumers due to the exercise of this market power. 
 
The methodology used by the FNE to assess the profit margin of Whirlpool assumes 
that Whirlpool had the same costs and the same prices than Tecumseh. If the 
compressor for refrigerators are standardized and undifferentiated, the assumption is 
not problematic. If there are sharp differences in product design or in production 
technology between the two manufacturers, the assumptions may not reflect the 
reality. However, given the lack of cooperation of Whirlpool, and the fact that, since 
the producers had formed a cartel, we can assume that their compressors must have 
been close substitutes, the fact that the NFE resorted to this pragmatic approach is 
                                                     
142
 Similar interpretation of proportionality principle can be found in e.g. Burca, de, G. (1993) "The 
Principle of Proportionality and its Application in EC Law," Yearbook of European Law 13, 105; Usher, 
J.A. (1998) General Principles of EC Law, European Law Series, Longman; Jacobs, F.G. (1999) 
"Recent Developments in the Principle of Proportionality in EC Law" in: Ellis, E., The Principle of 
Proportionality in the Laws in Europe, Hart Publishing, United Kingdom, Tridimas, T. (2006) The 
General Principles of EC Law, Oxford EC Law Library, Oxford University Press; Sullivan, E. and R.S. 
Frase (2008) Proportionality Principles in American Law: Controlling Excessive Government Actions, 
Oxford University Press; Fish, M. (2008) "An Eye for an Eye: Proportionality as a Moral Principle of 
Punishment," Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 28, 57-71; or Sauter, W. (2013) "Proportionality in EU 
law: a balancing act?" TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2013-003. 
93 
 
entirely justified. Whirlpool could have chosen to cooperate if it considered the 
implicit assumptions of the FNE to be wrong. 
 
The reason for which the Supreme Court decreased the fine to UTA 5,000, and 
argued that a lower fine also met the deterrence and retribution objectives of fines in 
competition law is not clear. Unless one assumes that Whirlpool was likely to be 
sued for compensation by its clients (in which case the amount of damage likely to 
be awarded should be added to the fine to assess the sanction imposed on 
Whirlpool), or had faced very high legal fees, or had registered a large loss in 
reputation due to the publicity on the case, it seems that the sanction of Whirlpool is 
roughly a third of its extra profit due to the collusion.  If that is indeed the case, the 
message sent to would be violators is that they can expect, if they are caught, to be 
fined a third of the illicit gains that they will have secured thanks to their collusion. 
This would mean that collusion would be profitable even if they had a 100% chance 
of being caught. From an economic standpoint even some risk averse firms would 
find it in their interest to enter into collusion. It is also difficult to see how such a fine 
meet the retribution goal.  
 
Altogether, this case seems typical of the conflict we discussed when we stated: “In 
the competition law area, there is thus a risk that review courts (adhering to the legal 
principle of proportionality and the implicit “retribution approach” or “moral 
acceptability approach” to sanctions) may find sanctions imposed (or requested)  by 
competition authorities (adhering to the economic principle of deterrence and the 
implicit “cost minimization approach” to sanctions) disproportional and therefore tend 
to reduce the amount of the sanctions to  non-deterring levels”. 
 
The method employed in this second case seems to closer to the current practices in 
the EU and the US and can even be considered as a relatively advanced approach. 
Here, similarly to algorithms proposed in the USSG (2013) and EU guidelines 
(2006),143 the illegal gains are estimated, multiplied by duration of an infringement 
and then the fine is set equal to the calculated amount. However, there are some 
caveats with this approach. This approach is only appropriate for ex-post fine 
imposition, in case it is certain that cartel is discovered. However, as has been noted 
in Posner (2001) or Cooter and Ulen (2007), taking into account that the rate of law 
enforcement is generally lower than 1 (i.e. only fraction of the companies can be 
investigated), the ex-ante expected fine, which is generally described in the 
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Note that in the EU and the US illegal gains or harm are approximated by the percentage of 
affected commerce. 
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sentencing guidelines, will still be below the total gains from cartel. Better practice, 
which has been employed in e.g. Germany, Switzerland, or New Zealand, implies 
setting the fine equal to a multiple of illegal gains (e.g. up to three times the 
additional profit obtained as a result of the violation).144 
c. Poultry Meat Producers case 
 
The formula proposed for estimation of the harm in expression (1) gives the real 
present value of the illegal profits due to collusion. Hence, it does not directly 
estimate direct harm (or damages) as indicated in the description of the formula. 
Even in simple linear demand models harm (or loss in total (consumer) welfare) will 
generally be expressed as a non-linear function of cartel overcharge. 
 
As we mentioned earlier the FNE rightly focuses on the illegal profit due to the 
collusion. The assumption that if there had been no collusion, there would have been 
a Cournot oligopololy with undifferentiated products (and therefore a price level 
above the competitive level) is realistic given the concentration of supply and the 
transparency of the market. Thus the overcharge is the difference between the 
observed prices and what would have been the oligopolistic price.  
 
The computation of the total damage due to the cartel (which lasted from 1996 to 
2011) rightly takes into account the discount factor. 
 
It is interesting to compare the estimates in this case with the assumptions that 
Heimler & Mehta (2012) suggest to the courts which do not have the means to do 
detailed calculations. They posit a price elasticity of demand between 0.5 and 1.2. 
Here we are told that the estimate of the price elasticity of demand is between 0.93 
and 1.393 which is for the most part in the range posited by Heimler and Mehta. 
They also posit a 15% permanent price increase due to the collusion. Here we are 
told that the estimate of the surcharge when using the simulation model is between 
13% and 18% depending on the value of the elasticity chosen. These values are 
also close to the general hypothesis proposed by Heimler and Mehta and therefore 
their methodology seems to be applicable to the case. In order to see what 
percentage of the total turnover of the firms over the period should the sanction 
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 According to the OECD (2002): "It is widely agreed that an effective sanction against a cartel 
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(2002), a range of fines between two and three times the illegal profits is reported. 
95 
 
amount to, one would need two additional data, the Lerner index before the increase 
in price and the probability of sanction.   
 
This case shows, once more, that caps on fines can have the effect of preventing the 
enforcement mechanism from being deterrent. The level of extra profit generated by 
the colluding firms (appropriately discounted) is clearly much more important than 
the maximum amount of sanction that the court can impose. The disparity is all the 
more important that the cartel lasted a large number of years and that the cap does 
not seem to allow for the fact that some cartels lasted more than a decade. If the 
firms have the perception that they can reap the benefit from their cartels for many 
years before being caught (which suggests a low probability of detection and 
sanction) and that when caught their sanction is going to be limited to the cap 
resulting from the law, they may well have an incentive to enter into a cartel 
agreement.  
 
d. Overall Assessment 
 
As we have already stressed above, the approaches employed for fine imposition by 
the Chilean competition authority in the three cases analyzed are valid and roughly 
follow the logic of the current EU antitrust guidelines on the method of setting fines. 
The approaches of the second and the third case seem more advanced and could 
be utilized for developing antitrust sentencing guidelines together with the lessons 
from current practice in the US, EU and several OECD countries, which have been 
described above. As has been mentioned above, basing fines on carefully estimated 
excess illegal gains and adjusting these gains (denoted in the report by π) by a 
proper multiplier (e.g. 3π, as it has been done in Germany, Switzerland, or New 
Zealand), which takes into account the expected rate of law enforcement, will 
increase the deterrent effect and at the same time will not have any price distortions. 
This structure is superior to fines based on volume of affected commerce or turnover 
(sales) as the latter cause substantial price distortions.145 On the other hand, the 
methods employed in the second and third case still miss a number of factors (such 
as aggravating and attenuating circumstances, proportionality and bankruptcy 
considerations) which should also be taken into account while calculating the fine. 
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In particular, fines based on revenue may give incentives to increase cartel price as they do not 
target price reducing incentives directly, but rather target sales reducing incentives. This may lead to 
increase in prices even above monopoly level. See also Bageri, V., Katsoulacos, Y. and Spagnolo, G. 
(2013) "The Distortive Effects of Antitrust Fines Based on Revenue" The Economic Journal, 123 
(572), 545-557 and Katsoulacos, Y., E. Motchenkova and D. Ulph (2014), “Penalizing Cartels: The 
Case for Basing Penalties on Price Overcharge”, mimeo (May 2014) for more detailed intuition. 
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None of the three cases described above mention individual fines or imprisonment 
possibilities. These tools appear to be very effective according to the US experience 
and, perhaps, could be included in the new guidelines.146 
 
Further, discussion of the more strict treatment of repeat offenders, which is 
standard in the EU and the US, should also be included. 
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See e.g. USSG (2013) or ADM cartel case literature Eichenwald, K. (2000) The Informant: a True 
Story, Brodway Books, Lieber J.B, (2000) Rats in the Grain: The Dirty Tricks and Trials of Archer 
Daniels Midland, the Supermarket to the World, Basic Books; Connor, J. (2001) “Our Customers Are 
Our Enemies”: The Lysine Cartel of 1992–1995," Review of Industrial Organization, 18(1), 5-21;  
Connor, J. (2003) “Private International Cartels: Effectiveness, Welfare, and Anticartel Enforcement” 
Purdue University, College of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Economics, Working Papers 03-
12. 
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IV. The Chilean Competition Act’s legislative intent regarding fines  
 
The best way to find out Competition Act’s legislative intent regarding fines is to 
return to the discussions that led to its modifications. Below, we highlight some 
passages of the bills that later became amendments to the Competition Act.  
 
 
A. The History of Statute No. 19.911 (issued on October 2003) 
 
Statute No. 19.911 amended the existing competition agencies and Courts, by 
creating the TDLC and substantively transforming the structure of the FNE, as it is 
known today. Along with it, Act 19.911 amended the system of penalties. Therefore, 
the presidential message (motivation) of the bill included some reference to the 
justification on fines introduced: 
 
“Finally, a Tribunal strengthened with clear guidelines, should have 
adequate sanctioning powers which can effectively meet the objective 
of inhibiting anti-competitive behaviour in the strict constitutional 
framework. Therefore, it is proposed to replace the existing criminal 
penalties with higher fines and liability for the executives involved in 
actions contrary to free competition”147. 
----- 
“[…] For these reasons, it is advisable to maintain a comprehensive 
behavioural standard with basic examples, so the members of the 
body [TDLC] would be able to hear and decide causes according to 
the case, deciding which behaviours constitutes a breach of 
competition law. 
 
However, this approach is inconsistent with the existence of a 
criminal offense, in which the type specification is an essential 
requirement, failure of which is a violation of the constitutional 
guarantee provided by the final paragraph of section 3 of Article 19 of 
our Constitution. 
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 President of the Republic message on Bill 132-346 (May 17
th
, 2002), which establish the “Tribunal 
de Defensa de la Libre Competencia”. On: Library of National Congress (“Biblioteca del Congreso 
Nacional, “BCN”), History of the Statue No. 19.911, p. 8. Available at: 
http://www.leychile.cl/Navegar/scripts/obtienearchivo?id=recursoslegales/10221.3/2472/1/HL1991
1.pdf  
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As a counterpart to the elimination of criminal penalties –which has 
rarely given rise to criminal proceedings and is estimated to have 
failed to deter misconduct against free competition–, it is proposed to 
increase fines and hold managers or directors of companies who 
commit them jointly and severally liable for payment. 
 
Thus, we estimate that eliminating criminal penalties, far from 
suggesting a softening against violations of competition law, will more 
effectively deter potential offenders”148. 
 
B. The History of Statute No. 20.361 (issued on July 2009) 
 
Statute No. 20.361 amended the Competition Act some years after the creation of 
the TDLC and the institutional changes introduced by Statute No. 19.911. Among 
other changes and adjustments, Statute No. 20.361 increased fines for certain 
violations of competition law. The justification given in the Presidential bill about this 
increase illustrates the legislator’s aim and goals. 
 
“[…] Moreover, the abolition of criminal sanctions for those who violate 
competition law has led economic agents –as rational subjects–, to take 
real risks of being sanctioned, but in the absence of rules determining 
fines, they may still incur such conduct under the hope of not being 
discovered or, if investigation is initiated, arguing general principles of 
tort system to apply this fines to their minimum or, as was not provided 
on the Statute No. 19,911, engage in behaviours that cause great harm 
to others, which are difficult to identify and, therefore, which have no 
incentives to deduct civil claims, without being such damages negatively 
weighted by the TDLC when applying fines”149. 
 ------------------------ 
“Under the foreseeable greater efficiency in investigative work of the 
National Economic Prosecutor’s Office, because of the new powers 
given to it and the introduction of "leniency", the office should be able to 
discover behaviours that cause great damage to the country's market 
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th
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N°1/2005 Ministry of Economy, Building and Reconstruction, 2005, about Tribunal de Defensa de 
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system. This makes it desirable to increase the fines that Courts are 
able to apply against the facts, acts or agreements that prevent, restrict 
or hinder free competition, deterring such practices and giving an 
additional incentive for the subject who is able to benefit of leniency 
rules. Thus, letter c) of the second paragraph of Article 26 Competition 
Act is amended, increasing the maximum fines to be applied by the 
Court from 20,000 to 30,000 [UTA] Annual Tax Units. 
  
Incorporation of damage as a circumstance to determine the fines 
 
In accordance with this, for the estimation of the fine to be imposed the 
Tribunal will consider the economic benefit gained as a result of the 
infringement, the seriousness of the conduct and recidivism, but also –
and fundamentally– the damage to competition; so third paragraph of 
Article 26 of the Competition Act is amended”150.  
 
The following is the current wording of the third paragraph of Article 26: 
  
“To determine the fines, the following circumstances, among others, will be 
considered: the economic benefit obtained as a result of the violation, the 
severity of the conduct, the reoffending nature of the offender, and, for the 
purposes of lowering the fine, the collaboration the latter provided to the Fiscalía 
before or during the investigation”. 
 
The current wording does not include any reference to the damage to competition 
and/or general or specific deterrence. 
 
C. Literature and other sources 
 
Currently, the national literature usually emphasizes the importance of deterring 
infringements of competition, particularly regarding collusion and other concerted 
practices. As a summary of some recent discussions and suggestions, it may be 
useful to consider some sections of the report that a special Advisory Committee to 
the President of the Republic issued in July 2012, suggesting some amendments to 
the Chilean competition law. 
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“Regarding sanctions established by the TDLC, these are essentially 
fines and other administrative sanctions. In the case of monetary fines, 
the maximum amount was recently raised by the amendment made in 
2009, leaving this in 30,000 UTA for collusion. Notwithstanding this 
adjustment in the amount of monetary sanctions, it is important to 
empathize that –in general– this maximum does not appear to be a 
constraint on the decisions TDLC and Supreme Court, since the 
average of the penalties imposed have remained substantially below 
the maximum allowed by law. However, the increase in the amount of 
the maximum fine established in the recent legislation amendment on 
competition (2009) is a signal from lawmakers to the TDLC and the 
Supreme Court to increase the sanctions for violations to the 
Competition Act151.  
 ---------------------- 
“Regarding sanctions to companies and corporations, an idea that 
raised a significant level of agreement in the Commission is the use of 
a scale indicator in determining the fine set by the TDLC to the firm(s) 
accused of anticompetitive actions. This is because there are practical 
difficulties associated with obtaining an accurate and timely estimation 
of "injury" in the traditional economic sense”. 
 
“It is recommended to adopt the practice used in many countries and 
set the fine as a percentage of sales of the company during the period 
of the anti-competitive conduct, adding a “deterrent factor” 152.   
     ----------------------- 
“Some members of the Commission justified the existence of criminal 
sanctions for anti-competitive practices, arguing that fines and 
administrative sanctions are not an effective deterrent, a result that 
could only be achieved by the threat of a potential loss of liberty. 
Moreover, it was argued that the risk of deprivation of liberty would 
enhance the effectiveness of the mechanism of "leniency" as a tool to 
dismantle collusion”153. 
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 Presidential Advisory Committee on Competition Law. Final Report (July 2012), p. 10.  Available 
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 Ibíd., p. 16. 
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“On the other hand, other members of the Commission rejected the 
explicit incorporation of criminal sanctions within the scope of 
competition law. This position was based on the recent revision and 
refinement of an institutional framework that seeks to make the 
analysis and evaluation of situations related to competition in 
specialized courts […]”154.  
 
 
One may thus conclude from the above that the legislator’s goal was to establish a 
system of effective and deterrent financial penalties against competition law 
infringements. 
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 Ibíd., p. 17. 
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V. Recommendations 
 
We first proceed in summarizing the main recommendations of the existing literature 
on the determination of optimal antitrust fines and the optimal design of leniency 
programmes, before delving into our suggestions for the design of Guidelines on the 
setting of fines. 
 
A. Summary of the recent theoretical recommendations in the literature on 
determination of optimal antitrust fines and optimal design of leniency 
programme 
 
A literature review indicates the following recommendations for policy makers: 
 
 
- With regard to the base from which to calculate the fine, there are two options: 
to use profits as determined on a case-by-case basis as a base or to use 
proxies such as a proportion of the affected commerce or the value of sales. 
The former, profit-based, approach may reflect the economic harm more 
precisely, provided that the relevant data are available. The latter, turnover-
based, approach may over- or underestimate the true economic harm, but has 
the advantage of greatly enhancing administrability and avoiding under-
deterrence in cases in which the infringement causes real economic harm that 
is difficult to quantify, such as harm of cartels in declining industries that aim 
at preventing future losses, harm to innovation, or similar harm to competition. 
All jurisdictions surveyed in this report have chosen the latter approach of 
using turnover-based proxies. Nevertheless, some economic literature has 
suggested to move away from the volume of affected commerce (revenue or 
sales) as a base of the penalty to penalties based on profits (or overcharges) 
and a unique emphasis on a formalistic approach. This concern was also 
raised by the Antitrust Modernization Commission (AMC) (2007) in the US, 
which recommended to the Sentencing Commission to reconsider whether 
reliance on a proxy, such as a specific percentage of affected commerce, 
turnover/sales etc, is consistent with the principle that punishment should be 
calculated based on the actual harm in individual cases. The AMC recognized 
that “because general deterrence of antitrust violations does not require an 
exact correlation of expected harm and penalty, the Sentencing Commission 
103 
 
determined that reliance on a proxy amount would be appropriate”155. 
However, the AMC noted that the “development of economic learning and 
estimation techniques over the past fifteen years may have made proving gain 
or loss in an antitrust case less difficult than it was when the Sentencing 
Commission created the proxy”156. It is widely argued in the theoretical 
literature on antitrust that illegal gains and overcharges are more precise 
measures of gravity of violation.157 Also basing penalties on profits does not 
impose price distortions, while revenue based penalties are distortionary. In 
particular, fines based on revenue may give incentives to increase the cartel 
price as they give incentives not to reduce price, but to reduce sales. This 
may lead to an increase in prices even above monopoly level. See also 
Bageri, Katsoulacos, Spagnolo (2013) and Katsoulacos, Motchenkova and 
Ulph (2014) for more detailed intuition.  
 
- We believe that the suggestion to move towards a more effects-based 
approach in designing financial penalties has its disadvantages in the many 
competition cases in which it is difficult to quantify the exact harm. The 
German experience with “additional turnover”-based fines has not been an 
encouraging one: resources invested into the determination of the additional 
turnover could likely be put to better use elsewhere in a capacity-constrained 
competition authority. The greater precision of the case-by-case analysis of 
profits comes at a cost. On the other hand, the profit-based approach 
suggested in the economic literature may be more easily achievable in Chile, 
in view of the obligation imposed by Art 3rd (a) of the Decree Law No. 211 of 
1973 (DL211) that any competitors’ agreements aiming at fixing prices, 
limiting output or allocating markets may be subject to the sanctions 
established by law, if abusing the market power conferred upon them by such 
agreements, thus requiring that current or potential effects on markets be 
shown for sanctioning cartel conducts. 
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Sorgard, L.  (2014) “Fine schedule with heterogeneous cartels: Are the wrong cartels deterred?” 
Institute for Research in Economics and Business Administration, Norway, mimeo. 
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- Increasing or abolishing legal upper bounds (or maximum fines) is another 
recommendation suggested in a number of leading contributions in antitrust 
enforcement literature. Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007), Bos and Schinkel 
(2007), Wils (2007) and Harrington (2010) point out that the current inspection 
efforts and the existing upper bounds on fines, at least in the EU and several 
OECD countries, are insufficient to deter all cartels. In a number of related 
empirical studies, Connor and Lande (2005, 2006, 2008, 2012) also argue 
that the existing US and EU penalties for cartel violations are too low resulting 
in high cartel overcharges. This suggests that the existing legal upper bounds 
(or maximum fines) are not high enough to deter cartel formation and, hence, 
should be adjusted upwards, above the current F max=0,1T. One solution short 
of abolishing the legal maximum for the fine entirely would be to use a 
turnover-based approximation of the fine within the legal limit, but to permit 
fines that exceed the legal maximum where profits are shown to exceed this 
maximum. This would correspond to the German solution (§ 81(5) GWB with 
§ 17(4) OWiG) and would be similar to the European solution in so far as the 
European Guidelines allow a higher proportion than 30 per cent of the value 
of sales where this is necessary to deprive the infringer of the gains 
improperly made. 
 
- Deterrence: Specific and general deterrence constitute the primary objectives 
of all financial penalties systems for the infringement of competition law that 
we have examined for the purposes of this report.  In view of the objective of 
deterrence, one may not expect an exact correlation between the harm and 
the penalty. According to economic theory, fines should be at least equal to 
the expected illegally earned profits divided by the probability to be caught, 
hence they should relate to expected profits originating from the violation and 
not to the profits actually gained that may be higher or lower than those 
expected at decision-making time, should the fines be paid after the period of 
infringement. The implementation of the principle of deterrence may involve 
reliance on presumptions and proxies based on a percentage of affected 
sales or volumes of commerce as a starting point for the calculation of the 
base fine, which although they do not correspond to the illicit gains of the 
competition law infringement or the damages caused, they integrate the need 
for general or specific deterrence. It is also possible to rely on a multiplier of 
the base fine equal to the inverse of the estimated detection probability, thus 
incorporating deterrence considerations in the calculation of financial 
penalties. 
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- Imposing an entry fee (i.e. fixed fine in addition to proportional component) 
has been proposed in the EU (2006) guidelines and has been analyzed 
theoretically in Motchenkova (2008). This fee is imposed in order to deter 
companies from ever entering into seriously illegal conduct. In most serious 
cartel cases the Commission may add to the amount of the base fine a sum 
equal to 15% to 25% of the yearly relevant sales, whatever the duration of the 
infringement. In other words, the mere fact that a company enters into a cartel 
could “cost” it at least 15 to 25% of its yearly turnover in the relevant product. 
This will significantly increase deterrence. 
 
- Increasing penalty rates can also be an effective instrument to increase 
deterrence and to reduce the gravity of the offence in cartel cases. This 
instrument, in case fines are based on illegal gains or overcharges, reduces 
the optimal cartel price and, hence, also reduces the harm to consumers. 
More detailed analysis of these issues can be found in Katsoulacos and Ulph 
(2013), Houba, Motchenkova and Wen (2010), and Katsoulacos, 
Motchenkova and Ulph (2014). 
 
- The fining guidelines should also be accompanied by properly designed 
leniency programmes. The most up to date recommendations on the design 
of leniency programs is a mix of the design implemented in the EU and the 
US: 
 
o Full immunity should be available only for strictly first reporting firm.158 
o While it has been suggested with good theoretical arguments that there 
should be no fine reductions for subsequent reporters,159 in practice 
there may be a need to reward further applicants in order to acquire a 
better evidence basis. In these cases, a reduction for the second or 
later applicants should be made contingent on strict criteria concerning 
the “added value” of the evidence these applicants must produce.  
o Ex-post availability of leniency (i.e. complete immunity can be granted 
even if the firm reports after the investigation has started).160 
o Repeat offenders are also allowed to obtain full immunity.161 
                                                     
158
 See e.g. Spagnolo, G. (2004, revised 2008) "Divide et Impera: Optimal leniency programs," CEPR 
Discussion paper series, working paper number 4840; Harrington, J. (2008) "Optimal Corporate 
Leniency Programs," Journal of Industrial Economics 56(2), 215-246., or Houba, H., Motchenkova E., 
and Wen, Q. (2010).   
159
 Spagnolo, G. (2004, revised 2008). 
160
 See Motta, M. and Polo, M. (2003) "Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution," International 
Journal of Industrial Organization 21, 347-379 
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B. Suggested Design of Fining Guidelines 
 
Publishing sentencing guidelines will enable Fiscalia to send a strong message to 
potential cartelists and other competition law infringers that anti-competitive conduct 
will not be tolerated and might give rise to substantial financial penalties. Following 
the findings of the report on the impact of fining guidelines on the policy-making and 
executing discretion of competition authorities, we consider that the publication of 
such guidelines will not affect the ability of Fiscalia to request high financial penalties 
in actions brought against infringers in front of the TDLC. It may also have the 
advantage of streamlining appellate scrutiny of the fines so as to accommodate the 
prosecutorial discretion of Fiscalia and the fact that fines are set by an independent 
and specialised trial judge with the necessary expertise as to integrate optimal 
deterrence. In our view, the structure of the Chilean enforcement system offers 
advantages as to the individualization of sanctions, so that they are reasonably 
related to culpability and thus proportional. Yet, the current statutory maximum of 
30,000 [UTA] Annual Tax Units for any fines imposed greatly jeopardizes the 
effectiveness of the Chilean system of competition law enforcement. It is our view 
that this ceiling should be eliminated or at least revised to reflect current international 
practice, which is to set the maximum fine to 10% of the total turnover of the 
undertaking in the preceding business year. Should the ceiling be lifted to this level, 
there would be a greater need for guidelines in view of the fact that, on balance, 
enhanced predictability of fines may be an advantage if the fine levels are on 
average very high. 
 
Effective deterrence “depends, in part on the uniformity and predictability of serious 
and swift punishment”162. As has been explained by Justice Breyer (in some of his 
extra-judicial writing), when drafting sentencing guidelines, a compromise should be 
made between two competing goals of a sentencing system: uniformity and 
proportionality163. The publication of guidelines will need to accommodate the aim of 
uniformity and general deterrence, without however compromising the need for 
flexibility and individualized assessment based on the facts of particular cases, 
inherent in the principle of proportionality. This aim can be achieved in the context of 
Guidelines, in view of the numerous parameters individualizing the sanction (linking it 
                                                                                                                                                                     
161
 See Chen, Z. and Rey, P.  (2013) "On the Design of Leniency Programs" Journal of Law and 
Economics, 56(4) 917 – 957. Wils, W.P.J. (2008) Efficiency and Justice in European Antitrust 
Enforcement, Hart Publishing or Houba, H., Motchenkova E., and Wen, Q. (2010).  
162
 Thide, F. (2013) “Judicial Policy Nullification of the antitrust Sentencing Guideline”, Boston College 
Law Review 54(2), 861, 887. 
163
 Breyer, S. (1988) “The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the key compromises upon which they 
rest”, Hofstra Law Review 17(1) 1-50.. 
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to the harm/overcharge) and the need to account for specific deterrence164. The 
publication of guidelines will certainly not bind the TDLC, although it will certainly 
inform its decision-making process, as the experience of the Sentencing Guidelines 
in the US shows with trial judges employing the Sentencing Guidelines as an initial 
benchmark, even if these are not mandatory. The publication of guidelines will also 
help put emphasis on the goal of deterrence and the need for optimal sanctions 
against anticompetitive conduct, in particular in view of the judicial scrutiny of the 
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court should, in our view, accommodate the need for 
both general and specific deterrence, in view of the nefarious effects of cartel activity 
and, more generally anticompetitive conduct, to the whole economy and the 
consumers. 
 
The design of the sentencing guidelines should include the following three steps: 
estimate the base fine, integrate mitigating and aggravating circumstances adjusting 
the basic amount and applying the legal maximum should this exist, interaction with 
leniency and private enforcement. We do not provide more detail as to the different 
mitigating and aggravating factors that should be incorporated in the Guidelines, as 
we believe that these should take into account the local circumstances of regular 
business behaviour and the existing regulatory framework in other areas of law. We 
have provided, however, in our comparative analysis ample details on how these 
circumstances have been interpreted by five major competition law regimes. We 
think this analysis may be a source of inspiration for Fiscalia.  
 
The drafting team considered the balance to be achieved between administrability 
and accuracy in the design of guidelines.  
 
We took into account recent theoretical contributions by Bageri, Katsoulacos and 
Spagnolo (2013), Katsoulacos and Ulph (2013), Katsoulacos, Motchenkova and 
Ulph (2014) that show the superiority of the profit based fines over revenue (or sales) 
based proxies. We also recognized that the Chilean legislator has amended Article 
26, paragraph 3 of the Competition Act to request, for the estimation of the fine to be 
imposed, the Tribunal to consider “the economic benefit gained as a result of the 
infringement, the seriousness of the conduct and recidivism, but also –and 
fundamentally– the damage to competition. We believe that there is value to 
integrate as much as possible an effects-based analysis in the determination of fines 
(Harrington, 2014) and rely on proxies only when the costs and delays of using more 
                                                     
164
 See, for instance, the discussion in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 263-265 (2005) (Breyer 
delivering the opinion in part),  
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accurate calculations is high in view of the volume of affected sales. This choice 
reflects also the fact that when the volume of affected sales is relatively large, 
rigorous analyses will provide more accurate estimates, when the economists have 
sufficient reliable data and information to proceed with their estimation techniques. A 
mixed-methods approach that would fit the circumstances of each case, the 
availability of data, the costs of accurate estimation of expected profits and the 
amount of the fine requested, may provide the necessary degree of flexibility to 
accommodate both the requirements of optimal and just financial penalties. We 
consider that the competition authority should be offered the choice between three 
options among which it may choose the one leading to the greatest financial penalty 
of either (i), (ii) or (iii): 
 
I. Estimate the excess illegal gains from the offense (that is 100% of the 
overcharge)165, or  
II. Estimate the pecuniary losses to a person other than the defendant (100% 
of these losses) to the extent the loss was caused intentionally, knowingly, 
or recklessly, or  
III. If the above options would unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing 
process, or would not reflect the harm caused by the anticompetitive 
conduct if this harm may not be quantified in the form of pecuniary 
losses,166 use a proxy based on a percentage of affected sales (on the 
basis of e.g. 10-15% as an overcharge estimate) 
 
Finally, we take into account that the adversarial process followed in the 
determination of the financial penalties by the TDLC, a specialised tribunal, will 
inevitably favour the use of the most accurate method possible for estimating fines, 
as the defendants will certainly challenge the accuracy of a fine requested on the 
sole basis of a proxy of a percentage of affected commerce. For this reason, in our 
view, it is inevitable for the FNE (unless it reaches a settlement with the defendants) 
to estimate the excess illegal gains from the offense and/or the pecuniary losses 
during the adversarial process in front of the TDLC.  Our proposal is influenced by 
the approach followed in US (and German) law, regarding financial penalties, when 
the use of a proxy does not adequately reflect seriousness of the offense in light of 
the pecuniary gain or loss it caused. The Guidelines should provide the choice to the 
                                                     
165
 This may be done with the integration of a structured effects-based approach, similar to that 
suggested by Heimler and Mehta [see our commentary, Section II(I) above], as a starting point for 
the analysis, the defendant being able to challenge these estimations with further evidence. 
166
 For instance, the harm relates to otehr parameters of competition than price, such as quality, 
innovation, variety, consumer choice, which is sometimes difficult to quantify in the form of 
pecuniary losses. 
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FNE to proceed with either (i), (ii) or (iii). Yet, we also agree with some 
commentators that “as fine levels increase, they may eclipse the costs of more 
precisely estimating damages” and that “(f)rom an economic perspective, the 
administrative costs of more rigorous calculations are increasingly justifiable as the 
potential fine value rises, because these calculations can prevent costly errors when 
fines are underestimated or overestimated”167. Hence, it may make sense to use 
these methods, if expensive or time consuming, only for fines of a significant 
amount. Yet, this is a decision to be made on a case by case basis by the FNE, 
depending on nature of the offense and the data available (e.g. aggregate sales or 
profit data for the entire group of customers allegedly impacted by the 
anticompetitive conduct or customer transaction data), some of which it is easy, 
quick and inexpensive to collect, while for other more difficult, expensive and time 
consuming168. In any case, such data are frequently used by courts in the context of 
private enforcement for the quantification of damages and could be of assistance 
also when determining the level of the financial penalty169. 
 
The three steps in the fine-setting process should be set as following: 
 
1. Determination of the basic amount of the fine: 
 
a. The FNE should be offered the choice between three options, 
among which it may choose the one leading to the greatest 
financial penalty: 
 
i. Estimate170 the excess illegal gains from the offense171 (that 
is 100% of the overcharge), or  
                                                     
167
 Kauper, R. and Langenfeld J. (2011) The Potential Role of Civil Antitrust Damage Analysis in 
Determining Financial Penalties in Criminal Antitrust Cases, George Mason L. Rev 18(4) 953-986, 
962. 
168
 Ibid. 968, noting however that computer programs can often readily calculate revenues, quantities, 
and prices from customer transactions datasets, in particular if the data is available in user-
friendly electronic format and accurate enough. 
169
 Idem. 
170
 An approximate calculation should suffice, allowing to make a reasonable estimate of the probable 
amount. In contrast to damages cases or restitution claims, the deterrent and punitive function of 
financial penalties may accord with a less precise calculation, as long as this is not speculation or 
guesswork, the defendant having being found to infringe competition law. Hence, she should bear 
the risks of any doubt on the exact amount of gains. Some authors have put forward a structured 
effects-based approach involving the estimation of expected profits from the anticompetitive 
conduct, on the basis of some percentage range of the values of sales to which the infringement 
relates [see, Heimler, A. and Mehta, K.  (2012) “Violations of Antitrust Provisions: The Optimal 
Level of Fines for Achieving Deterrence”, World Competition 35 (1), 103–119]. This will require 
competition authorities to take into account the value of the Lerner index, or the change in the 
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ii. Estimate172 the pecuniary losses to a person other than the 
defendant (100% of these losses) to the extent the loss was 
caused intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, or  
iii. If the above options would unduly complicate or prolong the 
sentencing process, or would not reflect the harm caused by 
the anticompetitive conduct if this harm may not be 
quantified in the form of pecuniary losses, use a proxy based 
on a percentage of affected sales (on the basis of e.g. 10-
15% as an overcharge estimate: e.g. in the EU the starting 
point is 30% of affected sales) 
 
b. Apply a multiplier equal to the inverse of the estimated detection 
probability (e.g. 6 if the detection probability is estimated as 
1/6).173 We consider that Article 26 of the Chilean Competition 
(Decree Law 211) should be revised so as to include among the 
circumstances considered to determine the fines, which are now 
the following ones: the economic benefit obtained as a result of 
the violation, the severity of the conduct, the reoffending nature 
of the offender, and, for the purposes of lowering the fine, the 
collaboration the latter provided to the Fiscalía before or during 
the investigation, also the following two: damage to competition 
and specific and general deterrence. The new formulation of the 
text should also provide the possibility to incorporate deterrence 
by multiplying the base fine with a multiplier equal to the inverse 
of the estimated detection probability of the competition law 
infringement (e.g. 6 if the detection probability is estimated as 
1/6, as it is the case for cartels174. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
value of the Lerner index or the probability of detection as a starting point for such calculation, the 
defendant being able to challenge the figure put forward by the authority as not being accurate. 
171
 This refers to the total gross gain from the anticompetitive conduct, including the gross gain to the 
defendants and other participants in the anticompetitive conduct. 
172
 An approximate calculation should suffice, allowing to make a reasonable estimate of the probable 
amount. In contrast to damages cases or restitution claims, the deterrent and punitive function of 
financial penalties may accord with a less precise calculation, as long as this is not speculation or 
guesswork, the defendant having being found to infringe competition law. Hence, she should bear 
the risks of any doubt on the exact amount of losses. 
173
 Cf. section II.B of this report. 
174
 For exclusionary abuses of a dominant position the probability of detection depends on the 
importance of the dominant position of the undertaking and hence the multiplier may vary (for 
instance, the probability of detection for most cases of exclusionary abuse of a dominant position is 
estimated as high as 70% - at least 50% where the dominant firm is a relatively small entity and 
virtually 100% for super-dominant large firms with a market share of more than 80-90% (see Heimler, 
A. and Mehta, K.  (2012) “Violations of Antitrust Provisions: The Optimal Level of Fines for Achieving 
Deterrence”, World Competition 35 (1), 103–119, 115-116). However, we consider that in order to 
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c. In order to take duration into account, the base fine should be 
multiplied by the number of years of participation in the 
infringement. 
d. The current statutory maximum of 30,000 [UTA] Annual Tax 
Units should be eliminated as it has proven too low and under-
deterrent in at least two cartel cases (pharmacies and poultry). 
Ideally, there should be no statutory maximum (including the 
one of 20,000 UTA for all other infringements) where the gains 
actually made or the damage to competition can be calculated. 
As a second best, the statutory maximum should change from 
its current form as a fixed amount to a proportion of the total 
turnover of the undertaking (e.g. 10% of the total turnover). 
 
2. Adjustments to the basic amount175 
 
a. Aggravating circumstances (upward adjustment) 
i. Repeat offenders176 
ii. Refusal to cooperate 
iii. Role of leader in the infringement 
 
b. Mitigating circumstances (downward adjustment) 
 
i. Sufficient cooperation with authority 
ii. Limited involvement in the infringement 
iii. [Effective corporate compliance 
programmes]177 
 
c. Application for leniency (downward adjustment or 
full immunity) 
                                                                                                                                                                     
induce large dominant undertakings to comply with competition law - in view of the general deterrence 
objective- the fines should be significant, hence the suggestion to keep a multiplier of 2 for all types of 
exclusionary abuses of a dominant position. 
175
Adjustments to the basic amount are proposed on the basis of the structure outlined in the current 
EU Guidelines (2006). As for the adjustments in percentage, we do not provide specific 
recommendations as this is at the discretion of the competition authorities and courts. One should 
take into account the fact that aggravating circumstances should not be as high as to eliminate the 
benefit of applying for leniency for the second or third applicant, in order to maintain the incentives to 
apply for leniency. For more specific percentages, see the practice of the French Competition 
Authority, in Appendix 5. 
176
The current EU Commission’s practice is to increase a fine by 50% -100% where the undertaking 
has been found to have been previously involved in one or more similar infringements. 
177
 More on this issue, see Appendix 1. 
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d. Inability to pay – bankruptcy considerations 
(downward adjustment) 
 
e. Adjustment according to the legal maximum: it is 
suggested to eliminate or replace the legal maxima 
of 20,000 and 30,000 [UTA] Annual Tax Units, 
which might lead to under-deterrence. As a first 
best, the legal maximum should be eliminated if it 
is possible to calculate the gains actually made or 
the damage to competition. As a second best, the 
current legal maximum should be replaced by a 
percentage of the worldwide turnover of the 
infringing undertakings, for instance, a percentage 
of 10%, as it is the case in the EU, UK, Germany 
and France. It is suggested for this percentage to 
operate as a maximum fine, not a cap (see our 
discussion of the debate in Germany in Appendix 
2). 
 
3. Additional issues 
 
a. Public antitrust enforcement should be 
accompanied by the possibility of private actions 
for damages. 
 
b. Corporate fines should be combined with individual 
fines as well as imprisonment. 
 
 
 
Summary of specific recommendations 
 
1. It is surprising that in none of the Chilean cases analysed, the 
fine requested by the FNE or that established by the TDLC or 
the Supreme Court, systematically incorporated deterrence by 
multiplying the base fine with a multiplier equal to the inverse of 
the estimated detection probability. General and specific 
deterrence constitutes one of the main objectives of competition 
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law enforcement in all jurisdictions examined and the principle of 
deterrence is systematically integrated in the calculation either 
of the base fine (by relying on a minimum percentage of affected 
sales as a starting point of the calculation, e.g. 30%) and/or by 
applying multipliers representing the inverse of the estimated 
detection probability. This is considered as a crucial reform so 
as to enhance the effectiveness of Chilean competition law. 
More concretely, it is suggested to include an explicit reference 
to general and specific deterrence in the text of Article 26 of the 
Decree Law 211, along with other factors usually taken into 
account, such as the economic benefit obtained as a result of 
the violation, the severity of the conduct, the reoffending nature 
of the offender. 
 
2. The current text of Decree Law 211 lists among the factors to be 
taken into account in the calculation of damages only the 
following ones: the economic benefit obtained as a result of the 
violation, the severity of the conduct, the reoffending nature of 
the offender… In view of the high administrative costs and the 
possible under-deterrent effect of such calculation (which is 
often quite resource intensive and may not be possible for the 
lack of data), it is suggested to revise this section of Article 26 of 
the Decree Law 211 in order to add “damage to competition” to 
the existing factors, on top of the reference to “general and 
specific deterrence” that we propose at point 1. 
 
3. For the same reason, and in order to limit administrative costs 
when this is possible, it is suggested to include an option for the 
FNE to rely on proxies, such as a percentage of the affected 
sales as a starting point for the calculation of the base fine, in 
particular for lower fines. As we have explained in the report, 
there should be some balance achieved between, from one 
side, the need to ensure proportionality and, from the other side, 
the necessity to limit administrative costs, as well as the need to 
ensure general and specific deterrence. Article 26 of the Decree 
Law should be revised accordingly so as to provide FNE the 
discretion to choose among three options in order to estimate 
the base fine: 
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a. Estimate the excess illegal gains from the offense (that is 
100% of the overcharge), or  
b. Estimate the pecuniary losses to a person other than the 
defendant (100% of these losses) to the extent the loss 
was caused intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, or  
c. If the above options would unduly complicate or prolong 
the sentencing process, or would not reflect the harm 
caused by the anticompetitive conduct if this harm may 
not be quantified in the form of pecuniary losses, use a 
proxy based on a percentage of affected sales (on the 
basis of e.g. 10-15% as an overcharge estimate: e.g. in 
the EU the starting point is 30% of affected sales) 
 
4. In view of the emphasis put on general and specific deterrence,  
Article 26 of the Decree Law 211 should be amended in order to 
eliminate the current legal maxima of 20,000 UTAs and 30,000 
UTAs for cartel behaviour referred to in Article 3(a) of the 
Decree Law 211 (“express or tacit agreements among 
competitors, or concerted practices between them, that confer 
them market power and consist of fixing sale or purchase prices 
or other marketing conditions, limit production, allow them to 
assign market zones or quotas, exclude competitors or affect 
the result of bidding processes). Indeed fines have proven too 
low in at least two cases (pharmacies and Poultry). Ideally there 
should be no legal maximum where it is possible to calculate the 
illicit gains or the competition law damage. As a second best, 
the legal maximum should change from its current form (a fixed 
amount) to a percentage of the worldwide turnover of the 
infringing undertakings, for instance, a percentage of 10%, as it 
is the case in the EU, UK, Germany and France. 
 
5. Should the above reforms be implemented, it might be 
necessary to include among the factors taken account in Article 
26 for the purposes of lowering the fine, its inability to pay. 
Appendix 3 provides information as to the criteria usually taken 
into account in the various jurisdictions examined in order to 
evaluate this factor. 
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6. The lack of consistency observed in the fines applied in different 
decisions, and the excessive judicial scrutiny exercised by the 
Supreme Court, which has modified them in several occasions, 
without taking into account the need for deterrence, constitutes 
a significant weakness of the system. It is suggested that the 
economic prosecutor, the FNE, should establish guidelines, 
providing for a detailed methodology for the calculation of 
financial penalties for competition law infringement. The 
guidelines should include information on the way the basic 
amount will be set (including information on the deterrence 
multiplier(s) and/or the percentage of affected sales that will 
constitute the starting point of the calculation), as well as 
information on aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
Although the guidelines will not be binding for the TDLC and the 
Supreme Court, they will inevitably lead to the establishment of  
more coherent financial penalties framework, the role of the 
Supreme Court being merely to verify that the principles of the 
guidelines have been followed, or that any departure from them 
is fully justified by the specific characteristics of the case. 
 
7. Regarding the basic amount of the fine, the FNE should aim to 
ascertain the excess gains or at least the damage to 
competition, although it would make no sense, due to 
administrative costs, to do this systematically for the cases 
which involve low fines. FNE should enjoy some discretion to 
decide whether to use a form-based approach relying on the 
proxy of the percentage of affected sales as the starting point for 
the calculation or to opt for a more effects-based approach, 
which will require the estimation of the illicit gains or damage to 
competition.  
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Appendix 1: A Comparative Perspective 
 
Although the design of an optimal financial penalties system depends on the 
economic circumstances prevailing in a jurisdiction and the institutional capabilities 
of the authorities in charge of competition law enforcement, we believe that a 
comparative analysis of the way other competition law regimes have proceeded in 
setting financial penalties for competition law infringements may provide useful 
insights. This is particularly the case, in view of the absence of any authoritative 
international source on this matter. Indeed, the Recommendation of the OECD 
Council concerning effective action against hard core cartels (1998) observed that 
“hard core cartels are the most egregious violations of competition law and that they 
injure consumers in many countries by raising prices and restricting supply, thus 
making goods and services completely unavailable to some purchasers and 
unnecessarily expensive for others”, and recommended Member countries of the 
OECD to provide for “effective sanctions, of a kind and at a level adequate to deter 
firms and individuals from participating in such cartels; and enforcement procedures 
and institutions with powers adequate to detect and remedy hard core cartels, 
including powers to obtain documents and information and to impose penalties for 
non-compliance”178. Yet, the Recommendation of the Council did not offer clear 
guidance on the way the fine-setting process should be structured. In 2002, the 
OECD adopted a more lengthy report noting that “the principal purpose of sanctions 
in cartel cases is deterrence” and proceeding to a comparative analysis of the 
sanctions for cartel activity available in the OECD Member States179. Yet again, the 
report did not provide a detailed account of how this fine-setting process should look 
like.  
 
                                                     
178
 OECD (1998), Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core 
Cartels (Adopted by the Council at its 921st Session on 25 March 1998), C(98)35/FINAL, available at 
http://acts.oecd.org/Instruments/ShowInstrumentView.aspx?InstrumentID=193  
179
 OECD (2002), Fighting Hard Core Cartels: Harm, Effective Sanctions and Leniency Programmes, 
available at http://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/2474442.pdf; See also, OECD (2003) Cartels 
Sanctions Against Individuals, available at http://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/34306028.pdf .  
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The cartel working group of the ICN has published a report in 2008 on Setting of 
Fines for Cartels in ICN jurisdictions, which also took a comparative approach 
describing the different national experiences and guidelines, although it also stayed 
short in providing recommendations for a model/optimal fine-setting system and 
methodology180. ECA’s, the European Competition Authorities’ Association, Working 
Group on Sanctions also published in May 2008 Principles for Convergence on 
Pecuniary sanctions imposed on undertakings for infringements of antitrust law 
reflecting the general principles shared by the European Competition Authorities for 
the determination of pecuniary sanctions181. All these documents may be consulted 
in the process of preparing guidelines. 
 
A. European Union182 
 
1. Historical Background 
 
The fining practice of the European Commission can be divided into four periods.  
 
 In the first period (1962 until 1979), fines did not exceed 2 per cent of 
the fined undertaking’s turnover.  
 
 In the second period (1979-1998), the Commission, with the Court’s 
approval, increased fines beyond this 2 per cent level to improve 
deterrence, but the average fine stayed low by today’s standards. 
Between 1990 and 1994, the average fine per undertaking was still 
only approximately €2 million, and between 1995 and 1999, the 
average fine was still only approximately €6 million.  
 
                                                     
180
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http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc351.pdf. 
181
 ECA Working Group on Sanctions, Pecuniary Sanctions Imposed on Undertakings for 
Infringements of Antitrust Law. Principles for Convergence (May 2008), available at 
http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/eca_principles_uk.pdf. 
182
  For literature on the fining policy and practice in the European Union generally, and under the 
2006 Fining Guidelines in particular, see, e.g., Veljanovski, C. (2007) Cartel Fines in Europe. 
World Competition. 30(1), 65-86; Veljanovski, C. (2011) Deterrence, Recidivism, & European 
Cartel Fines. Journal of Competition Law & Economics. 7(4) 871-915; Völcker, S. (2007) Rough 
Justice? An Analysis of the European Commission’s New Fining Guidelines. Common Market 
L.Rev. 44, 1285-1320; Wils, W. (2007) The European Commission's 2006 Guidelines on Antitrust 
Fines: A Legal and Economic Analysis. World Competition 30(2) 197-230; Khan, N. (2012) Kerse 
& Khan on EU Antitrust Procedure. Ch. 7. 6th Ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell. 
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 In 1998, the Commission adopted the first generation of Fining 
Guidelines. Average fines per undertaking increased to €20 million 
between 2000 and 2004.  
 
 In 2006, the Commission adopted the second generation of Fining 
Guidelines. Average fines per undertaking increased to €40 million 
between 2005 and 2009, and further to €50 million since 2010.  
 
In the first two periods (1962-1998), the Commission’s discretion was only guided by 
the statutory regime, according to which it is necessary to consider the gravity and 
duration of the infringement, and whether the infringement is committed negligently 
or intentionally (below I.). In the latter two periods, the Commission published 
Guidelines on the Setting of Fines that resulted in a certain self-binding effect, 
limiting the Commission’s discretion. The first set of Fining Guidelines was published 
in 1998 (below II.). The current set of Fining Guidelines was published in 2006 
(below, “DESCRIPTION OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM”). 
 
a. The first two periods (1962-1979; 1979-1998) 
 
In the first two periods, fines were only constrained by the statutory provisions in 
Article 15 Regulation 17 of 1962,183 the provision that was essentially the equivalent 
                                                     
183
 Article 15 of Regulation 17 of 1962 provided:  
Article 15 - Fines 
1. The Commission may by decision impose on undertakings or associations of 
undertakings fines of from 100 to 5000 units of account where, intentionally or negligently:  
(a) they supply incorrect or misleading information in an application pursuant to Article 2 
or in a notification pursuant to Articles 4 or 5 ; or 
(b) they supply incorrect information in response to a request made pursuant to Article 11 
(3) or (5) or to Article 12, or do not supply information within the time limit fixed by a decision 
taken under Article 11 (5) ; or 
(c) they produce the required books or other business records in incomplete form during 
investigations under Article 13 or 14, or refuse to submit to an investigation ordered by 
decision issued in implementation of Article 14 (3). 
2. The Commission may by decision impose on undertakings or associations of 
undertakings fines of from 1000 to 1 000 000 units of account, or a sum in excess thereof but 
not exceeding 10 % of the turnover in the preceding business year of each of the 
undertakings participating in the infringement where, either intentionally or negligently:  
(a) they infringe Article 85 (1) or Article 86 of the Treaty; or 
(b) they commit a breach of any obligation imposed pursuant to Article 8 (1). 
In fixing the amount of the fine, regard shall be had both to the gravity and to the duration of 
the infringement. 
3. Article 10 (3) to (6) shall apply.  
4. Decisions taken pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not be of a criminal law nature. 
5. The fines provided for in paragraph 2 (a) shall not be imposed in respect of acts 
taking place:  
(a) after notification to the Commission and before its decision in application of Article 85 
(3) of the Treaty, provided they fall within the limits of the activity described in the notification; 
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of today’s Article 23 Regulation 1/2003.184 Accordingly, in these first two phases the 
main principles in the setting of the fine for substantive competition law infringements 
                                                                                                                                                                     
(b) before notification and in the course of agreements, decisions or concerted practices 
in existence at the date of entry into force of this Regulation, provided that notification was 
effected within the time limits specified in Article 5 (1) and Article 7 (2). 
6. Paragraph 5 shall not have effect where the Commission has informed the 
undertakings concerned that after preliminary examination it is of opinion that Article 85 (1) of 
the Treaty applies and that application of Article 85 (3) is not justified. 
184
 Article 23 of Regulation 1/2003 provides:  
Article 23 – Fines 
1. The Commission may by decision impose on undertakings and associations of 
undertakings fines not exceeding 1 % of the total turnover in the preceding business year 
where, intentionally or negligently: 
(a) they supply incorrect or misleading information in response to a request made 
pursuant to Article 17 or Article 18(2); 
(b) in response to a request made by decision adopted pursuant to Article 17 or Article 
18(3), they supply incorrect, incomplete or misleading information or do not supply information 
within the required time-limit; 
(c) they produce the required books or other records related to the business in 
incomplete form during inspections under Article 20 or refuse to submit to inspections ordered 
by a decision adopted pursuant to Article 20(4); 
(d) in response to a question asked in accordance with Article 20(2)(e), 
- they give an incorrect or misleading answer, 
- they fail to rectify within a time-limit set by the Commission an incorrect, incomplete or 
misleading answer given by a member of staff, or 
- they fail or refuse to provide a complete answer on facts relating to the subject-matter 
and purpose of an inspection ordered by a decision adopted pursuant to Article 20(4); 
(e) seals affixed in accordance with Article 20(2)(d) by officials or other accompanying 
persons authorised by the Commission have been broken. 
2. The Commission may by decision impose fines on undertakings and associations of 
undertakings where, either intentionally or negligently: 
(a) they infringe Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty; or 
(b) they contravene a decision ordering interim measures under Article 8; or 
(c) they fail to comply with a commitment made binding by a decision pursuant to Article 
9. 
For each undertaking and association of undertakings participating in the infringement, the 
fine shall not exceed 10 % of its total turnover in the preceding business year. 
Where the infringement of an association relates to the activities of its members, the fine shall 
not exceed 10 % of the sum of the total turnover of each member active on the market 
affected by the infringement of the association. 
3. In fixing the amount of the fine, regard shall be had both to the gravity and to the 
duration of the infringement. 
4. When a fine is imposed on an association of undertakings taking account of the 
turnover of its members and the association is not solvent, the association is obliged to call 
for contributions from its members to cover the amount of the fine. 
Where such contributions have not been made to the association within a time-limit fixed by 
the Commission, the Commission may require payment of the fine directly by any of the 
undertakings whose representatives were members of the decision-making bodies concerned 
of the association. 
After the Commission has required payment under the second subparagraph, where 
necessary to ensure full payment of the fine, the Commission may require payment of the 
balance by any of the members of the association which were active on the market on which 
the infringement occurred. 
However, the Commission shall not require payment under the second or the third 
subparagraph from undertakings which show that they have not implemented the infringing 
decision of the association and either were not aware of its existence or have actively 
distanced themselves from it before the Commission started investigating the case. 
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were, pursuant to Article 15(2) Regulation 17 of 1962, (1) that the fines must not 
exceed 10 per cent of the annual turnover of each undertaking, (2) that they must 
take into account the gravity and duration of the infringement, and (3) whether the 
infringement was intentional or only negligent. In the first period, lasting up to the late 
1970s, the level of fines imposed stayed below 2 per cent of the turnover.185 
 
The second period can be said to start in the late 1970s, when the Commission 
started to increase its fine level considerably. In Pioneer Hi-Fi Equipment,186 the 
Commission imposed for the first time fines that exceeded 2 per cent of the turnover 
of the undertakings, and reached levels up to 4 per cent of the turnover.187 The 
Commission argued that a policy of higher fines was adequate and necessary 
because: 
 
many undertakings carry on conduct which they know to be contrary to 
Community law because the profit which they derive from their unlawful 
conduct exceeds the fines imposed hitherto. Conduct of that kind can only be 
deterred by fines which are heavier than in the past.188 
 
The Court of Justice approved of the Commission’s considerations, and stated that: 
 
in assessing the gravity of an infringement for the purpose of fixing the 
amount of the fine, the Commission must take into consideration not only the 
particular circumstances of the case but also the context in which the 
infringement occurs and must ensure that its action has the necessary 
deterrent effect, especially as regards those types of infringement which are 
particularly harmful to the attainment of the objectives of the Community.189 
 
The Court explicitly approved of the Commission’s reasoning that the persistence of 
infringing conduct could be an indication that the fines were not sufficiently deterrent, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
The financial liability of each undertaking in respect of the payment of the fine shall not 
exceed 10 % of its total turnover in the preceding business year. 
5. Decisions taken pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not be of a criminal law nature. 
185
 Cf. Judgment of the Court of 7 June 1983, Joined Cases 100 to 103/80 (SA Musique Diffusion 
Française and others v Commission of the European Communities) [1983] ECR 1825 at para. 103. 
186
 Commission Decision No 80/256 of 14 December 1979 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of 
the EEC Treaty (IV/29.595 — Pioneer Hi-fi Equipment), [1980] Official Journal L 60. 
187
 Cf. Judgment of the Court of 7 June 1983, Joined Cases 100 to 103/80 (SA Musique Diffusion 
Française and others v Commission of the European Communities) [1983] ECR 1825 at para. 103. 
188
 See the Commission’s argument in Judgment of the Court of 7 June 1983, Joined cases 100 to 
103/80 (SA Musique Diffusion Française and Others v Commission of the European Communities) 
[1983] ECR 1825 at para. 104. 
189
 Ibid., at para. 106. 
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and that the Commission could therefore raise the level of fines to “reinforce their 
deterrent effect”.190 The Court did not accept the appellants’ argument that the 
Commission was estopped by its previous practice from increasing the level of fines 
for the future: “[o]n the contrary, the proper application of the Community competition 
rules requires that the Commission may at any time adjust the level of fines to the 
needs of that policy.”191 
 
Nevertheless, fines even in the second of these two initial periods stayed relatively 
low compared to the levels reached after the introduction of Fining Guidelines in 
1998. It appears that in cases predating the 1998 Fining Guidelines, it was the usual 
– though not invariable – practice of the Commission to set the fines no higher than 
at 10 per cent of the turnover achieved with the relevant product on the relevant 
geopgraphic market.192 It has been noted that “[u]ntil the late 1980s, few fines had 
exceeded €1 million”.193 All of the ten highest cartel fines per undertaking since 1969 
have been imposed after 2000.194 As will be explained in greater detail below, 
average fines per undertaking rose from around €2 million per undertaking in the 
period 1990-1994, to approximately €6 million per undertaking in 1995-1999, and 
then steeply to some €20 million per undertaking in 2000-2004, €40 million in 2005-
2009, and €50 million since 2009.  
 
b. Fining Guidelines 1998 
 
In 1998, the Commission adopted its first set of Fining Guidelines.195  
 
i. Summary of the 1998 Fining Guidelines 
 
                                                     
190
 Ibid., at para. 108.  
191
 Ibid., at para. 109. 
192
 See the discussion in Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 28 June 2005, Joined Cases C-
189/02 P, C-205/02 P and C-213/02 P, Dansk Rørindustri and others v Commission [2005] ECR I-
5425 paras 156-197, especially at paras 157-158, 176, 180-181. 
193
 See Khan, supra note 18282, at § 7-053. A fine of more than €1 million per undertaking had first 
been imposed in European Sugar Industry (on Tirlemontoise), but it was reduced on appeal in Suiker 
Unie v Commission. Until the end of 1989 (inclusive), fines of more than €1 million were imposed in 
Pioneer, Flat Glass Benelux, Peroxide Products, John Deere, Polypropylene, Meldoc, Hilti, British 
Sugar, British Plaster Board, Flat Glass, PVC, LdPE (later annulled on appeal), and Welded Steel 
Mesh. 
194
 See European Commission, Cartel Statistics, Section 1.6, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf, reproduced below. 
195
  Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines Imposed pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation 17 and 
Article 65(5) of the ECSC Treaty, [1998] Official Journal C 9/3 (the “1998 Fining Guidelines”). On 
these Guidelines, see Wils, W. (1998) The Commission’s New Method for Calculating Fines in 
Antitrust Cases. European Law Review 23(3), 252-263. 
133 
 
Under these Guidelines, the first step was to categorize the gravity of an 
infringement as “minor” (usually vertical agreements, limited market impact, limited 
geographic scope), “serious” (usually horizontal agreements, but also some abuses 
of dominant positions, wider market impact, wider geographic scope), or “very 
serious” (generally horizontal hardcore agreements, clear-cut abuses of a dominant 
position). The fine level (before adjustments) was between ECU 1,000 and ECU 1 
million for minor infringements; between ECU 1 million and ECU 20 million for 
serious infringements; and above ECU 20 million for very serious infringements. 
Within these categories, the “effective economic capacity of offenders to cause 
significant damage to other operators” was to be taken into account, also allowing for 
a differentiation according to the specific weights of the offending conduct of each of 
several offenders participating in the same infringement.196 
 
This fine level was to be adjusted for the duration of the infringement in the following 
way: where the duration was “short” (usually shorter than 1 year), there was no 
adjustment; where the duration was “medium” (usually between 1 and 5 years), the 
fine would be increased by 50%; where the duration was “long” (longer than 5 
years), the fine would be increased by 10% for each year. This factoring in of the 
duration was said to result in a “considerable strengthening of the previous 
practice”;197 the 2006 Fining Guidelines led to a further strengthening of this 
aspect.198 
 
This basic amount – taking into account the gravity (minor/serious/very serious) and 
the duration (short/medium/long) – was then to be adjusted for aggravating or 
attenuating circumstances.199 
                                                     
196
 1998 Fining Guidelines, section 1.A., paras 4 and 6. Cf. Judgment of the Court of First Instance 
(Fourth Chamber), 9 July 2003, Case T-224/00 (Archer Daniel Midland v Commission) [2003] ECR II-
2597 at paras 187-196, where the Court of First Instance stated that, while the 1998 Fining Guidelines 
did not clearly state that the overall or relative turnover were to be factored in, they did not prohibit 
these factors to be taken into account, and concluding with respect to the relevant turnover: “[T]he 
proportion of turnover derived from the goods in respect of which the infringement was committed is 
likely to give a fair indication of the scale of the infringement on the relevant market. In particular, as 
the Court of First Instance has emphasised, the turnover in products which have been the subject of a 
restrictive practice constitutes an objective criterion which gives a proper measure of the harm which 
that practice causes to normal competition.” Case T-151/94 British Steel v Commission [1999] ECR II-
629, paragraph 643, upheld in, Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), 18 May 2006, Case C-397/03 
P, Archer Daniel Midland v Commission [2006] ECR I-4429 at paras 88-96). 
197
 1998 Fining Guidelines, section 1.B. 
198
 See infra, text accompanying notes 469-472. 
199
 1998 Fining Guidelines, section 2 and 3. Section 2 mentions, in a non-exhaustive list of 
aggravating circumstances: recidivism, refusal to cooperate or obstruction of investigations, 
leadership or being the instigator, retaliation against other undertakings to enforce the infringement, 
and the need to increase the penalty in order to skim off the gains improperly made as a result of the 
infringement. Section 3 mentioned, in a non-exhaustive list of attenuating circumstances, “passive or 
‘follow-my-leader’ role”, non-implementation, termination as soon as the Commission intervenes, 
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Finally, the 1998 Fining Guidelines applied the cap of 10% of the undertaking’s 
annual worldwide turnover in the preceding accounting year, and took account of 
“certain objective factors such as a specific economic context, any economic or 
financial benefit derived by the offenders [...], the specific characteristics of the 
undertakings in question and their real ability to pay in a specific social context”.200  
 
ii. Legal Challenges to the 1998 Fining Guidelines 
 
- Dansk Rørindustri (Pre-Insulated Pipes) 
 
The Commission applied the 1998 Fining Guidelines, inter alia, in the Pre-Insulated 
Pipes cartel decision of 21 October 1998. The undertakings concerned appealed the 
Commission decision, among other things, on the basis that the application of the 
1998 Fining Guidelines to cartel conduct that took place before the Fining Guidelines 
had been published infringed the undertakings’ legitimate expectations and the 
principle of non-retroactivity, and that the method of setting the fine in the 1998 
Fining Guidelines was incompatible with Article 15(2) of Regulation 17 of 1962.  
 
The Court of First Instance rejected these arguments, and in Dansk Rørindustri, the 
Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice affirmed.201 The Court reasoned that the 
principle of legitimate expectations was not infringed by the change in the method of 
calculation, because the Commission had wide discretion in setting the fine within 
the statutory limit of 10 per cent of the annual worldwide turnover of the undertaking. 
It pointed to its 1983 judgment in Musique Diffusion Française to show that it must 
have been clear to the parties that the Commission is free to modify its fining 
practice “if that is necessary to ensure to the implementation of the Community 
competition rules”.202  
 
The undertakings also submitted the argument that the undertakings had legitimate 
expectations as to the pre-existing fining practice of calculating the fine because they 
                                                                                                                                                                     
“existence of reasonable doubt ... as to whether the restrictive conduct does indeed constitute an 
infringement”; “infringements committed as a result of negligence or unintentionally”, and effective 
cooperation outside the scope of the Leniency Notice. The reference to “unintentional” infringements 
beside negligent infringements is slightly puzzling, because fines under Article 15 Regulation 17 of 
1962 (and under Article 23 Regulation 1/2003) can only be imposed for intentional or negligent 
infringements. The 2006 Guidelines (infra 211) now only mention negligence as a mitigating factor, 
para. 29. 
200
 1998 Fining Guidelines, section 5 (a) and (b). 
201
 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 28 June 2005, Joined Cases C-189/02 P, C-205/02 P 
and C-213/02 P, Dansk Rørindustri & Others v Commission, [2005] ECR I-5425 paras 156-233. 
202
 Ibid., at paras 169-175, quotation in para. 169. 
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had relied on this practice when applying for leniency and cooperating under the 
leniency programme. The Court rejected this argument as well, arguing that the only 
legitimate expectation to be formed under the leniency programme was as to the 
percentage of the reduction of the fine for the cooperation, not to the level of the 
fines.203  
 
The Court also rejected the plea alleging an infringement of the principle of non-
retroactivity. In this context, it explained the effect of Guidelines in the following way:  
 
[A]lthough those measures may not be regarded as rules of law which the 
administration is always bound to observe, they nevertheless form rules of 
practice from which the administration may not depart in an individual case 
without giving reasons that are compatible with the principle of equal 
treatment.  
 
[...] 
 
In adopting such rules of conduct and announcing by publishing them that 
they will henceforth apply to the cases to which they relate, the institution in 
question imposes a limit on the exercise of its discretion and cannot depart 
from those rules under pain of being found, where appropriate, to be in breach 
of the general principles of law, such as equal treatment or the protection of 
legitimate expcetations. It cannot therefore be precluded that, on certain 
conditions and depending on their content, such rules of conduct, which are of 
general application, may produce legal effects.204 
 
The Court then, again, relied on Musique Diffusion Française to show that the 
change of the fining practice within the legal limit established in Article 15 of 
Regulation 17 of 1962 was reasonably foreseeable for the undertakings and 
therefore did not infringe the principle of non-retroactivity.205 
 
The Court further considered the method for setting the fines in the 1998 Fining 
Guidelines to be compatible with the statutory requirements that the fine be based on 
the gravity and duration of the infringement and the turnover of the undertakigns 
                                                     
203
 Ibid., at paras 182-197, in particular paras 188 and 191. 
204
 Ibid., at paras 209, 211. See also Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), 18 May 2006, Case C-
397/03 P, Archer Daniel Midland v. Commission [2006] ECR I-4429 at para. 91; Judgment of the 
Court (Second Chamber), 8 December 2011, Case C-272/09 P (KME Germany v Commission) [2011] 
ECR I-12789 para. 100. 
205
 Dansk Rørindustri, supra note 192, at paras 198-233, in particular paras 227-232. 
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concerned. With regard to the total and relevant turnover to be taken into account to 
determine the gravity of the infringement, the Court explained that  
 
it is permissible, for the purpose of fixing the fine, to have regard both to the 
total turnover of the undertaking, which gives an indication, albeit approximate 
and imperfect, of the size of the undertaking and of its economic power, and 
to the proportion of that turnover accounted for by the goods in respect of 
which the infringement was committed, which gives an indication of the scale 
of the infringement. On the other hand, it follows that it is important not to 
confer on one or the other of those figures an importance disproportionate in 
relation to the other factors and, consequently, that the fixing of an 
appropriate fine cannot be the result of a simple calculation based on the total 
turnover. That is particularly the case where the goods concerned account for 
only a small part of that figure (see Musique Diffusion française and Others v 
Commission, paragraph 121, and Case 322/81 Michelin v Commission [1983] 
ECR 3461, paragraph 111).206 
 
The Court considered the 1998 Fining Guidelines to give the Commission sufficient 
flexibility to take account of all the relevant factors for determining the fine.207 In 
particular, the Court rejected the argument by the applicants that the absolute 
brackets led to a basic amount of the fine that exceeded, for small and medium sized 
enterprises, the 10% of the total annual turnover threshold even before the duration 
and aggravating circumstances were taken into account, so that for these 
undertakings the fine was predetermined entirely by the basic amount and was no 
longer specific to the offence and the offender.208  
                                                     
206
 Ibid., at para. 243. See also Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), 18 May 2006, Case C-397/03 
P, Archer Daniel Midland v Commission [2006] ECR I-4429 at para. 100. 
207
 Dansk Rørindustri, supra note 192, at paras 238-269, in particular 266-267. 
208
 Ibid., at paras 272-289, 322-323, 346. From a comparative perspective, it should be noted that 
exactly this argument prevailed before the German Federal Court of Justice in the Grauzement 
judgment, so that in Germany the 10% total worldwide annual turnover threshold is interpreted not as 
a cap (as it is under EU law), but as the maximum fine. See the description in the National Report on 
Germany. It may be that the European Courts are opening up to this line of argument as well in the 
context of the 2006 Fining Guidelines. See Judgment of the General Court, 16 June 2011, Case T-
211/08, Putters International v Commission [2011] ECR II-3729 where the General Court stated (at 
para. 75) that:  
In the context of the 2006 Guidelines, the application of the 10% ceiling laid down in Article 
23[2] of Regulation No 1/2003 is now the rule rather than the exception for any undertaking 
which operates mainly on a single market and has participated in a cartel for over a year. In 
that case, any distinction on the basis of gravity or mitigating circumstances will as a matter of 
course no longer be capable of impacting on a fine which has been capped in order to be 
brought below the 10% ceiling. The failure to draw a distinction with regard to the final fine 
that results presents a difficulty in terms of the principle that penalties must be specific to the 
offender and to the offence, which is inherent in the new methodology. It may require the 
Court to exercise fully its unlimited jurisdiction in those specific cases where the application of 
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The Court further rejected the argument that the Commission is obliged (rather than 
merely authorized) to take into account the undertaking’s ability to pay. The Court 
accepted that the 
 
Court of First Instance correctly held at that paragraph [scil.: paragraph 308 of 
the LR AF 1998 v Commission judgment] that the Commission is not required, 
when determining the amount of the fine, to take into account the poor 
financial situation of an undertaking concerned, since recognition of such an 
obligation would be tantamount to giving an unjustified competitive advantage 
to undertakings least well adapted to the market conditions (see, to that effect, 
Joined Cases 96/82 to 102/82, 104/82, 105/82, 108/82 and 110/82 IAZ v 
Commission [1983] ECR 3369, paragraphs 54 and 55).209 
 
- Archer Daniel Midland 
 
In Archer Daniel Midland the applicants complained, among other things, that the 
fine imposed under the 1998 Fining Guidelines reached 115 per cent of the relevant 
turnover in the final year of the infringement, and that this breached the principle of 
proportionality. The Court rejected this argument by pointing out that the danger of 
disproportionality was precisely the reason for the cap of 10 per cent of the total 
turnover; fines below this level were not to be considered disproportionate merely 
because of their high level.210  
 
2. Description of the Current System 
a. Overview Fining Guidelines 2006 
 
In 2006, the Commission revised the fining guidelines to their current version.211 The 
2006 Fining Guidelines are to be applied “in all cases where a statement of 
objections is notified after their date of publication in the Official journal [...].”212 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
the 2006 Guidelines alone does not enable an appropriate distinction to be drawn. In the 
present case, however, the Court finds that this is not the case (see also, in that regard, 
paragraphs 81 et seq. below). 
209
 Ibid, at para. 327. 
210
 Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), 18 May 2006, Case C-397/03 P, Archer Daniel Midland v 
Commission [2006] ECR I-4429 at 100-106. 
211
 Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation 
1/2003, [2006] Official Journal C 210/2 (the “2006 Fining Guidelines”). See, e.g., Völcker, supra n.182 
at 1285-1320; Wils, supra n.130 at Ch. 4; Khan, supra n.182 at paras 7-055 to 7-250. 
212
 Para. 38 of the 2006 Fining Guidelines. 
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At an abstract level, the setting of the fine under the 2006 Fining Guidelines 
proceeds in a similar steps as the 1998 Fining Guidelines: In a first step, a basic 
amount is calculated,213 which is then, in a second step, adjusted, primarily 
according to aggravating or mitigating circumstances,214 but also to ensure a 
deterrent effect.215 Subsequently, the statutory cap of 10% of the turnover will be 
applied if necessary,216 and, if applicable, any reductions under the leniency 
programme217 and/or the settlement procedure218 will be applied. Finally, the 
Commission may take account of the undertaking’s inability to pay the fine.219 
 
Despite this apparent similarity to the 1998 Fining Guidelines, however, the 2006 
Fining Guidelines differ significantly, first, in the way in which the basic amount is 
calculated – namely, the value of sales is now (again) the starting point –, and 
secondly in the way in which the duration is taken into account –, namely, by 
multiplying the basic amount by the number of years of duration, rather than merely 
adjusting the basic amount. The 2006 Fining Guidelines now also quantify the 
adjustment for recidivism, which may be “up to 100%” of the basic amount for each 
previous infringement sufficiently similar to the one being fined (although it should be 
noted from the outset that the actual increases for recidivism are much lower). The 
General Court has considered the 2006 Fining Guidelines to be “a fundamental 
change in the methodology for setting fines”.220 
 
b. Fining Practice 
 
                                                     
213
 Paras 10, 12-26 of the 2006 Fining Guidelines.  
214
 Paras 11, 27 with 28 and 29, respectively, of the 2006 Fining Guidelines.  
215
 Paras 30 (specific increase for undertakings with a particularly large turnover outside the relevant 
value of sales) and 31 (increase to skim off gains improperly made as a result of the infringement) of 
the 2006 Fining Guidelines. 
216
 Paras 32, 33 of the 2006 Fining Guidelines. 
217
 Para. 34 of the 2006 Fining Guidelines in combination with the Leniency Notice.  
218
 The settlement procedure was only introduced in 2008, so that the 2006 Fining Guidelines do not 
mention this possibility. Commission Regulation (EC) No 622/2008 of 30 June 2008 amending 
Regulation (EC) No 773/2004, as regards the conduct of settlement procedures in cartel cases, 
[2008] Official Journal L 171/3; Commission Notice on the conduct of settlement procedures in view of 
the adoption of Decisions pursuant to Article 7 and Article 23 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 in 
cartel cases, [2008] Official Journal C 167/1. 
219
 Para. 35 of the 2006 Fining Guidelines. See also the Information Note by Mr. Joaquín Almunia, 
Vice-President of the Commission, and by Mr. Janusz Lewandowski, Member of the Commission, 
Inability to Pay under paragraph 35 of the 2006 Fining Guidelines and Payment Conditions Pre- and 
Post-Decision Finding an Infringement and Imposing Fines, SEC(2010) 737/2 of 12 June 2010. See 
below Section VI. 
220
 Judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber), 16 June 2011, Case T-199/08, Ziegler SA v 
Commission, [2011] ECR II-3507, para. 91, upheld on appeal, Judgment of the Court 11 July 2013, 
Case C-439/11 P, Ziegler SA v Commission [2013] ECR I-000 (but see ibid., para. 111, adding that 
this fact did not justify the conclusion the General Court drew at para. 92 that the Commission’s 
obligation under the 2006 Fining Guidelines to state reasons was therefore more onerous).  
139 
 
As mentioned previously, the introduction of the 1998 Fining Guidelines and the 
2006 Fining Guidelines have led to a considerable increase in the fines imposed by 
the Commission.  
 
The amount of total fines imposed (adjusted for Court judgments) in 5-year brackets 
since 1990 is illustrated in Figure 4 below. 
 
 
Figure 4: Fines for infringements of Article 101 TFEU imposed by the European 
Commission 1990-2014, adjusted for Court Judgments; source: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf (last updated 2 
April 2014)  
 
This increase in the total amount of fines is nearly exclusively due to an increase of 
the average fine per undertaking, rather than an increased number of fined 
undertakings. The number of fined undertakings has remained relatively stable221 
despite the increased number of cartel cases since the introduction of the Leniency 
Programmes.222  
 
Average fines per undertaking have now reached approximately €50 million. Dividing 
the total fines imposed on cartels, as represented in Figure 4 (above), by the number 
                                                     
221
 Between 1990 and 1994 (inclusive), cartel fines were imposed on 185 undertakings/associations; 
between 1995 and 1999 (inclusive), 45 undertakings/associations were fined for cartel participation; 
between 2000 and 2004 (inclusive), 157 undertakings/associations were fined for cartel participation; 
between 2005 and 2009 (inclusive), 205 undertakings/associations were fined for cartel participation; 
between 2010 and 2014 (inclusive until 2 April 2014), 167 undertakings/associations were fined for 
cartel participation. Source: European Commission, Cartel Statistics, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf, section 1.8. 
222
 In each of the periods 1990-1994 and 1995-1999, the Commission issued 10 cartel decisions. In 
the period 2000-2004, 30 cartel decisions were issued, in the period 2005-2009, 34 cartel decisions 
were issued, and in the current period since 2010, 25 decisions have been issued so far (as of 2 April 
2014). See European Commission, Cartel Statistics, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf, Section 1.10. 
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of fined undertakings (or associations) in the relevant periods223 yields the following 
average cartel fines per undertaking for the respective periods:224  
 
1990-1994:   €1,860,986.76 
1995-1999:   €6,021,411.11 
2000-2004:   €20,110,501.34 
2005-2009:   €39,913,422.74 
++2010-2014++:  €50,398,536.40 
 
The change from the average fine in the period 2000-2004 to the average fine in the 
periods 2005-2009 and 2010-2014 seems to bear out Veljanovski’s prediction that 
fines under the 2006 Fining Guidelines were likely to double compared to the 1998 
Fining Guidelines.225  
 
The ten highest cartel fines per undertaking since 1969, as of 31 March 2014, are 
listed in Figure 5.  
 
 
 
Figure 5: Ten highest cartel fines per undertaking since 1969, adjusted for 
Court decisions, last updated 31 March 2014 (source: European Commission, 
Cartel Statistics, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf, section 1.6) 
                                                     
223
 Supra note 222.  
224
 Note that these numbers do not appear to have been adjusted for inflation.  
225
 Veljanovski, supra n.182 at 81-84. It should be noted, however, that Veljanovski used very strict 
assumptions (30 per cent of the value of sales for all very serious infringements, entry fee of 25 per 
cent), whereas the actual practice to date seems to be to use percentages between 15-20 per cent for 
both the value of sales and the entry fee.  
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In the Yen Interest Rate Derivatives (YIRD) cartel, the Commission would have 
imposed a record-breaking fine of around €2.5 billion on UBS; however, UBS was 
the first leniency applicant and was granted full immunity.226 
 
The method of calculating fines in the 2006 Fining Guidelines is arguably tailored to 
cartel cases. In dominance cases, the application of the value of sales analysis may 
lead to extravagant fines. In the Intel case, the fine amounted to €1.06 billion, even 
though the Commission used only 5 per cent as the relevant percentage of the value 
of sales.227  
 
In conclusion, the average fine per undertaking in the period between 2010 and 2014 
(as of 2 April 2014) was €50 million. The highest fine actually imposed was the fine 
of €1.06 billion imposed in the Intel case. The highest fine ever on one undertaking 
would have been the fine on UBS in the Yen Interest Rate Derivatives cartel, 
calculated to be €2.5 billion; however, UBS received full immunity under the 
Leniency Notice.  
  
                                                     
226
 See Commission, Press Release, 4 December 2013, IP/13/1208, Case COMP/39.861 – Yen 
Interest Rate Derivatives (YIRD); see also MEMO/13/1090 in the same case.  
227
 Commission Decision, 13 May 2009, Case COMP/37.990 – Intel at recital 1786 (appeal pending, 
Case T-286/09). 
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B. United States 
 
1. Historical Background 
 
a. The road to the adoption of Antitrust Sentencing Guidelines 
 
The sanction of antitrust violations in the US has been a recurrent issue in US 
antitrust enforcement, since the adoption of the Sherman act in 1890. The Antitrust 
Division at the DOJ may prosecute Sherman Act violations either criminally or civilly. 
The DOJ benefits from an important prosecutorial discretion and in practice only 
prosecutes “hard core” violations criminally. A “hardcore violation” involves the 
clandestine activity, concealment and clear knowledge on the part of the perpetrators 
of the wrongful nature of their behaviour. In essence, these are currently the 
following categories of horizontal cartel agreements: horizontal price fixing including 
bid rigging, horizontal limitation of output and horizontal allocation/division of 
markets228. Hence, there are no civil or administrative financial penalties in US law 
for monopolization or other illegal agreements cases, the main civil remedy available 
in this instance being antitrust damages229. In order to impose sanctions, DOJ must 
either prove its case in a Federal court or negotiate a plea agreement with the 
accused. Hence, the US system is a fully prosecutorial system of antitrust 
enforcement and sanctioning. The final fine imposed on the undertaking is 
determined by the court. In the context of settlement, the DOJ regularly recommends 
a proposed US Sentencing Guidelines fines range, which judges regularly accept. 
Nearly all convictions for antitrust offences are the result of settlement (plea 
agreements in the US terminology) between the DOJ and the defendant. A 
defendant may seek to reach an agreement with the DOJ at any stage of the 
investigation, under the condition that he admits guilt and cooperates with the DOJ if 
the investigation continues. 
 
Federal district court judges have generally been afforded an important discretion to 
sentence defendants within the broad statutory ranges provided by Congress. 
Despite the possibility for sentencing decisions to be subject to appellate review, this 
                                                     
228
 Pate, R.H. Ass't Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice (Aug. 12, 2003) Vigorous & 
Principled Antitrust Enforcement: Priorities & Goals. Address Before the Antitrust Section of the 
ABA Annual Meeting, available at: http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/201241.htm. See 
also Antitrust Division Manual (updated Mar. 2014) Ch. 3 C.1. 5th Ed. (providing non-binding 
guidance of situations where nominally "hard core" per se cases should not be prosecuted 
criminally), available at: http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/divisionmanual/.  
229
 For a criticism and suggestions for reform, see First, H. (2009) The Case for Antitrust Civil 
Penalties. Antitrust Law Journal. 76, 127. 
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“indeterminate” system of sentencing, in the sense that similarly situated defendants 
may receive dissimilar sentencing decisions based on the judge assigned to their 
case, has been criticized.  
 
Although antitrust violations were subject to antitrust penalties from the enactment of 
the Sherman Act, until 1974, violations of the Sherman Act were a misdemeanour 
(transformed to felony in 1974), offenders being also subject to financial penalties 
(for corporations, the level was set to $5K in 1890, $50K in 1955, $1 million in 1974, 
$10 million in 1990, $100 million in 2004).  In view of the low level of such penalties 
in practice, the Antitrust Division of the department of Justice published Guidelines 
for Sentencing (1977) consisting of base sentences along with aggravating and 
mitigating factors230. Nevertheless, the Antitrust Division had very limited success in 
obtaining prison sentences, the main focus of US antitrust enforcement action in 
view of the important deterrent effect.  
 
In 1984 Congress passed the Sentencing reform Act (1984), which created a 
Sentencing Commission with the mandate to develop sentencing guidelines231, these 
guidelines being made mandatory to sentencing judges232. Hence, once sentencing 
judges applied the Guidelines they were generally confined to the narrow sentencing 
range established by the Commission, something that was criticized at the time233. 
One of the main objectives of Congress was to reduce unwarranted sentencing 
disparities between similarly situated defendants by framing the sentencing judge’s 
discretion within statutory ranges provided for federal crimes. Congress empowered 
the Commission to review and revise the Guidelines based on new data and national 
experience. 
 
The Sentencing Commission implemented the Sentencing Guidelines in 1987 with 
the aim to provide a definite, transparent, uniform and respectful of the principle of 
proportionality process of sentencing individual offenders (including corporations)234. 
The Sentencing Commission also promulgated specific Antitrust Sentencing 
                                                     
230
 Guidelines for Sentencing: Recommendations in Felony Cases under the Sherman Act (24 
February 1977). 
231
 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1987. 
232
 18 U.S.C. §3553 (b) (1) (2006). This was invalidated by the Supreme Court in United States v. 
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
233
 Freed, D. (1992) Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the 
Discretion of Sentencers. Yale L. J. 101, 1681; More on the reaction of the courts: Thide, F. 
(2013) Judicial Policy Nullification of the Antitrust Sentencing Guidelines. Boston College L. Rev. 
54(2), 861. 
234
 US Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements (April 13, 1987), 
reprinted in 52 fed. Reg. 18,046 (may 13, 1987). 
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Guidelines in 1987, which are part of the Sentencing Guidelines235. These were most 
recently revised by the Antitrust Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004 
(“ACPERA”), which increased the maximum penalty for corporations ten-fold (from 
10 million to $100 million fines) and penalties for individuals more than three-fold 
(from 3 years to 10 years imprisonment, and from $350,000 to $1 million in fines).236 
Prior to ACPERA, the Antitrust Division of the DOJ was increasingly relying on the 
so-called “Alternative Fine” statute237 when seeking to impose substantial fines for 
violations of the antitrust laws, especially in the case of international cartels. Under 
the Alternative Fine authority, it is possible for the Antitrust Division at the DOJ to 
request fines of up to twice the gross gain (derived by all conspirators) or loss 
(suffered by all victims) resulting from the violation. Using this legal basis, the DOJ 
had obtained since 1997, fine settlements in excess of $100 million. This option is 
still available to the DOJ, which can choose either to rely ACREPA or on the 
“Alternative Fine” provisions. The later choice is the only one available if the US DOJ 
wants to request financial penalties exceeding $100 million. However, reliance is not 
without potential problems in particular as the standard of proof for the purpose of 
the Alternative Fine provision is the criminal one of beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
the Antitrust Division at the DOJ should prove at a sentencing hearing the actual 
amount of the gross gain or gross loss. The standard of proof for ACREPA purposes 
is the civil one of balance of probabilities. Moreover, § 3571(d) by its terms does not 
apply where it would “unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing process”. The US 
DOJ in on solid ground when seeking fines of up to $100 million, to rely on ACPERA 
(the revised Sentencing Guidelines) and it might have the incentive to limit the 
amount of the fine requested to less than $100 million where application of § 3571(d) 
and the Sentencing Guidelines would yield fines exceeding, but not substantially 
exceeding, $100 million, especially if the defendant appears willing to litigate the fine. 
 
b. The Sentencing Guidelines and the judiciary 
 
                                                     
235
 U.S. Sentencing Commission, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §2R1.1 (rev. Nov. 1, 2013) 
(Antitrust Offenses). 
236
 Antitrust Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004 (“ACPERA”), Pub. L. No. 108-237, tit. II, 
118 Stat. 661, 665 (codified as as amended in 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 note). See also Antitrust Criminal 
Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act fo 2004 Extension Act Pub. L. 111-30, 123 Stat. 1775 
(2009) (extending ACPERA's five-year sunset provision by one year to June 23, 2010); Pub. L. 
No. 111-190, 124 Stat. 1275 (June 9, 2010) (extending ACPERA's sunset provision to June 23, 
2020 and making various other changes). For a comment, see Hausfeld, M., Lehmann, M. & 
Jones, M. (2009) Observations from the Field: ACPERA’s First Five Years. 10 Sedona Conf. J. 
95. 
237
 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d). 
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ACPERA was implemented literally days before the U.S. Supreme Court in United 
States v. Blakely (2004) established that federal judges should enjoy greater 
discretion in sentencing, in comparison to that afforded in the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines238. This trend towards a greater discretion for sentencing courts was 
confirmed in United States v. Booker (2005), where the Supreme Court held that the 
Sentencing Guidelines were not compulsory to sentencing courts but had only an 
advisory character239. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment because they permitted a defendant’s 
maximum possible sentence to be increased based on judicial fact-finding, rather 
than jury determination of the facts. The Supreme Court emphasized in Booker that 
although application of the Federal SG no longer is mandatory, sentencing courts 
still are required “to calculate and consider Guidelines ranges, although they retain 
the ability to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns as well”240. 
Despite, however, this case law of the Supreme Court, until very recently, the lower 
courts have generally continued to embrace the Sentencing Guidelines, noting that 
they are advisory but applying them as if they were mandatory. As it was explained 
by some authors, 
 
“[...] in its decisions since Booker, the Court has been forced to walk a very 
fine line between promoting district court discretion and encouraging 
adherence to the Guidelines. In attempting to accomplish these two 
inconsistent aims, the Court has largely attempted to encourage adherence to 
the Guidelines through oblique methods—such as by mandating certain 
procedures that privilege the Guidelines and permitting less stringent 
appellate review of within-Guidelines sentences—rather than through 
substantive limits on district courts’ discretion”241. 
 
Some recent judgments of the Supreme Court have nevertheless questioned the 
implementation of the Sentencing Guidelines242. For instance, in Pepper the 
                                                     
238
 United States v. Blakely, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
239
 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  
240
 Id.; see also United States v. Hughes, 2005 WL 147059 (4th Cir. Jan. 24, 2005) (holding that 
“consistent with the remedial scheme set forth in Booker, a district court shall first calculate the range 
prescribed by the guidelines. Then, the court shall consider that range as well as other relevant 
factors set forth in the guidelines and those factors set forth in § 3553(a) before imposing the 
sentence.”). 
241
 Byrne, C., Hessick, A. (2014) Critical Review of the Sentencing Commission’s Recent 
Recommendations to “Strengthen the Guidelines’ System”. Houston L. Rev. 51(5) 1335, 1337. 
242
 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 45–47 (2007), where the Court refused to conduct a 
proportionality review when the courts departed from the guideline range for fear of interfering 
with the sentencing court’s discretion; Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, (2007), where the 
Suprenme Court held that district courts have the ability to sentence outside of the Guidelines 
range; Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, (2009). 
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Supreme Court held that “a district court may in appropriate cases impose a non-
Guidelines sentence based on a disagreement with the Commission’s views. That is 
particularly true where, as here, the Commission’s views rest on wholly unconvincing 
policy rationales not reflected in the sentencing statutes Congress enacted”243. 
However, the Court also suggested that district court policy disagreement may not 
always be “appropriate”, thus indicating that courts have not received a full re-
delegation of sentencing policy, the Guidelines remaining “as a substantive 
constraint on the discretion of district court judges, at least in some limited form”244. 
This flexibility enables sentencing courts to sentence outside of the Guidelines based 
on policy disagreements as long as they identify some fact about the defendant’s 
crime or personal background that warranted a non-Guidelines sentence245. Under 
the advisory Guidelines regime, judges are required to balance the sentencing 
factors prescribed by Congress and the Sentencing Reform Act to “make an 
individualized assessment based on the facts presented”246. In any case, judges 
should ground departures from an applicable Guideline provision and their judgment 
is subject to more intensive appellate scrutiny, the more it departs from the 
guidelines for judicial policy reasons or because of disagreements with its goals. For 
instance, some of the Guidelines’ features, such as the assumption of a 10% 
overcharge for cartels and the consequent adoption of a 20% volume of commerce 
proxy in order to define the base fine has been criticized by the Antitrust 
Modernization Commission (AMC) in 2007 for not being compatible with an 
interpretation of the Supreme Court’s Booker judgment as holding that facts not 
proven to the jury or admitted by the defendant may not be used to increase a 
defendant’s sentence, for the cartels that have a lower overcharge than 10%247.  
 
In its 2012 report on the continuing impact of Booker, the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission recommended to Congress the adoption of a number of proposals 
designed to “strengthen the guidelines system” In particular, the Commission 
suggested to Congress, among others, to require heightened appellate scrutiny for 
the substance of sentencing decisions and require district courts to give substantial 
weight to the Guidelines as a factor at sentencing248. The Commission’s 
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 Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229 , 1247 (2011). 
244
 See Byrne & Hessick, supra n.241 at 1341. 
245
 Ibid. 
246
 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50. 
247
Antitrust Modernization Commission (2007) Final Report and Recommendations 299-300, available 
at: http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf. 
248
 U.S. Sentencing Commission Report on the Continuing Impact of United States v. Booker on 
federal Sentencing, part A 1 (2012). For a critical analysis of these proposals, see Byrne & Hessick, 
supra n.241 at 1341. 
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recommendations to Congress are explicitly designed to ensure that the Guidelines 
play a more prominent role in federal sentencing 
 
2. Description of the Current System 
 
a. Overview 
 
The current financial penalties system in the U.S. relies on a delicate balance 
between the action of the Antitrust Division of the US DOJ putting forward criminal 
prosecutions and attaining settlements with defendants, under the shadow of the 
significant fines that may be imposed, should the Antitrust Sentencing Guidelines 
being applied or the Alternative Fine statute, and that of sentencing courts, which 
benefit from an important discretion, in particular post-Booker. The US Antitrust 
Sentencing Guidelines have already been briefly summarized at Part II and will be 
examined thoroughly in Part VI.  
 
b. Fining Practice.  
 
The U.S. Sentencing Commission collects data on the sentencing of organizations 
(and individuals) convicted by the federal courts. This data shows a considerable 
increase in antitrust criminal convictions and financial penalties imposed in recent 
years. 
 
The following statistics provide some further information on fining practice for 
organizations (corporations). 
 
Table 9 Criminal Sanctions for Organizations 
 
Fiscal year Total Fines 
Assessed 
($millions) 
Number of 
Organizations 
Fined 
Average Fine 
($millions) 
2006 $469.8 18 $26.1 
2007 $615.7 12 $51.3 
2008 $695.0 12 $57.9 
2009 $973.7 16 $60.9 
2010 $388.6 11 $30.8 
2011 $380.0 11 $34.5 
2012 $1473.0 33 $44.6 
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2013 $272.2 24 $11.35 
Source: Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Workload Statistics Fiscal Years 
2006-2013 (p.11). The federal government’s fiscal year runs from October 1 to 
September 30th. 
 
On average, the fines imposed since 2006 amount to $39.7 million. To this of course 
one should add fines to individuals and also prison sentences, as well as treble 
damages. 
 
DOJ Antitrust Division Workload Statistics 2013 
 
Sherman Act Violations – highest corporate fines 
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C. Germany 
 
1. Historical Background 
 
The fining system in Germany has undergone several changes since its inception, 
and in particular within the last decade. As will be explained in more detail, for 
infringements committed between 1958 and 2005, the fine mostly depended on the 
determination of the “additional turnover” derived from the infringement; the fine was 
then set at triple this amount. Since 2005, the German legislative framework 
resembles more closely the European framework. However, the interpretation of the 
provision on fines in Germany differs for constitutional reasons from the European 
interpretation despite the similarity of the wording of the provisions. The third part of 
this national report will describe the fining practice. The German law on 
administrative fines has recently also faced a number of other constitutional 
challenges. 
 
In addition to the administrative fines enforcement, Germany prosecutes bid rigging 
both under the general fraud provision (§ 263 Strafgesetzbuch (Criminal Code, 
StGB)) and, since 1998, under a special provision against bid rigging (§ 298 StGB). 
While the data basis is incomplete, approximately 20 persons are sentenced 
annually under the special bid-rigging provision, mostly to criminal fines and/or 
suspended prison sentences, although there is also some anecdotal evidence of 
prison sentences that are not suspended. The following national report will focus on 
the administrative enforcement.249 
 
As will be explained in more detail, for infringements committed between 1958 and 
2005, the fine mostly depended on the determination of the “additional turnover” 
derived from the infringement; the fine was then set at triple this amount. Since 2005, 
the German legislative framework resembles more closely the European framework. 
However, the interpretation of the provision on fines in Germany differs for 
constitutional reasons from the European interpretation despite the similarity of the 
wording of the provisions. The third part of this national report will describe the fining 
practice. The German law on administrative fines has recently also faced a number 
                                                     
249
 For criminal antitrust enforcement in Germany, see Papp, F. (2011) What If All Bid Riggers Went to 
Prison and Nobody Noticed? – Cartel Criminalisation in Germany. 157-182. In Beaton-Wells, C. & 
Ezrachi, A. (eds.). Criminalising Cartels: Critical Studies of an Int’l Regulatory Movement. Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, draft available sub. nom. Criminal Antitrust Law Enforcement in Germany: ‘The Whole 
Point is Lost If You Keep it a Secret! Why Didn’t You Tell the World, Eh?’ at: SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1584887. 
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of other constitutional challenges. We summarize the points examined in the 
following sections: 
 
 The initial legislative scheme in Germany required the determination of the 
“additional turnover” caused by the infringement. In many cases, it was 
difficult to prove the additional turnover.  
 The “additional turnover” scheme was therefore replaced by a scheme 
resembling the European system in 2005, allowing fines on undertakings of 
up to 10% of their annual worldwide turnover.  
 However, the threshold of 10% of the annual worldwide turnover of the 
undertaking has been interpreted by German courts not as a cap (as under 
EU law), but as a maximum fine. A judgment by the Federal Court of Justice 
to this effect has prompted the Bundeskartellamt to revise its Fining 
Guidelines in 2013. 
 The 2013 Fining Guidelines start with a working hypothesis of a “gains and 
harm potential” of 10% of the affected sales over the duration of the 
infringement; this is multiplied by a factor that depends on the global turnover, 
ranging from a factor of 2-3 for undertakings with a global turnover below 
€100 million to a factor of more than 6 for undertakings with a global turnover 
of more than €100 billion. 
 Both under the “additional turnover” scheme governing infringements 
committed before 2005 and the new statutory scheme, fines exceeding €100 
million per undertaking have been imposed and upheld by the courts in cartel 
cases. 
 Additionally, fines on individuals of up to €1 million are possible, and fines in 
the magnitude of €250,000 for individuals are not unusual in cartel cases. 
 Particular problems have arisen with regard to the legal succession in the 
context of corporate restructuring of undertakings.  
 Constitutional challenges, for example against the accrual of pre-judgment 
interest on fines imposed by competition authorities, have so far been 
unsuccessful. 
 
152 
 
a. The “additional turnover” framework (1958-2005) 
 
i. Legal framework 
 
In the original version of the Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (Act 
against Restraints of Competition, “GWB”) of 1957,250 in force since 1 January 1958, 
the fine for intentional infringements of the main competition prohibitions was to be 
set at an amount up to the higher of  
 
(1) Deutschmark (DM) 100,000 (the “absolute amount prong”), or  
(2) three times the additional turnover derived from the infringement (the 
“additional turnover prong”).251  
 
Case law defined the “additional turnover” as the difference between the actual 
turnover and the counterfactual turnover that would have resulted in the absence of 
the infringement.252 
 
While subsequent legislative changes modified certain aspects of the provision, the 
general framework for setting the maximum fine at the higher of a specified absolute 
amount or three times the additional turnover caused by the infringement remained 
in place until 2005 (and possibly beyond for infringements committed before 
2005253). Before the major revision of the framework for setting fines in 2005 (below 
II.), the framework for fines was marginally modified in the following aspects:  
 
 The relevant section was renumbered in 1965254 and 1998.255 
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 GWB of 27 July 1957, BUNDESGESETZBLATT PART I 1957, p. 1081 (cited as GWB 1957). 
251
 § 38(3) no. 1 GWB 1957. § 38(3) no. 2 GWB 1957 provided  that for negligent infringements, the 
fine was the higher of: 
(1) Deutschmark (DM) 30,000, or 
(2) twice the additional turnover derived from the infringement. 
252
 Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice, BGH), 19 June 2007 – KRB 12/07, NJW 2007, 3792, 
WuW/E DE-R 2225, para. 10 – Papiergroßhandel; BGH, 25 April 2005 – KRB 22/04, WuW/E DE-R 
1487, 1488 – steuerfreier Mehrerlös; BGH, 24 April 1991 – KRB 5/90, WuW/E 2718, 2719 – 
Bußgeldbemessung. 
253
 According to German inter-temporal law, where the sanction of an administrative offence has been 
modified in the period between the completion of the commission of the offence and the imposition of 
the sanction, the mildest sanction has to be applied, § 4(3) Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz 
(Administrative Offences Act, OWiG). This means that for infringements that were completed before 
the 2005 amendment went into effect but are fined afterwards, both the old and the new framework 
have to be applied and the lower of the two resulting fines has to be applied.  
254
 § 38(3) GWB 1957 became § 38(4) GWB 1965 (1st Amendment to the GWB of 15 September 
1965, BUNDESGESETZBLATT PART I 1965, p. 1363). 
255
 § 38(4) GWB 1980 became § 81(2) GWB 1998 (6th Amendment to the GWB of 26 August 1998, 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT PART I 1998, p. 2521).  
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 The differentiation between intentional and negligent infringements was 
removed from the text of the GWB in 1973, but remained in place in 
substance.256 
 In 1980, the provision was amended in two aspects: first, the absolute 
amount prong for infringements was raised from DM 100,000 to DM 1 
million, and, second, it was added that the amount of the additional 
turnover could be estimated for the additional-turnover prong.257  
 
The government’s explanatory memorandum for the 1980 amendments stated that 
the amendment was necessary to “sanction severe infringements adequately”.258 It 
was noted that the German Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office, BKartA) had 
already imposed fines amounting to a million DM or more under the additional-
turnover prong, but that the calculation of the additional turnover frequently 
presented difficulties.259 Therefore the fixed-amount prong was raised to DM 1 
million, in order to signal that competition law infringements are not trivial but severe 
offences subject to deterrent sanctions.260 The memorandum also noted that the 
threshold of DM 1 million had already been proposed in 1955, and was then only 
rejected because the highest criminal fine at the time was set at DM 100,000.261 
 
It should be noted that this framework applied to fines for both individuals and 
undertakings. 
 
ii. Application of the additional-turnover framework in practice 
 
Despite the various changes over time, the framework proved inadequate to sanction 
severe infringements, such as hardcore cartels. The absolute amount prong of only 
DM 1 million was wholly inadequate, and the calculation of the additional turnover 
often proved problematic in practice. 
 
                                                     
256
 After the 2nd Amendment of the GWB had come into force, the text of § 38(4) GWB did not any 
longer contain the differentiation in the text of the GWB (2nd Amendment to the GWB of 3 August 
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maximum fine for intentional infringements. 
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Under the additional turnover framework, which is still generally the framework to be 
applied to infringements predating the 2005 reform,262 it first has to be proven to the 
relevant standard of proof (the Court’s “full conviction” as required by criminal 
procedural law to overcome the in dubio pro reo presumption) that there was at least 
some positive additional turnover.263 Only once the existence of some positive 
additional turnover is proven to the full conviction of the Court can the Court go on to 
estimate the amount of this additional turnover. The Bundesgerichtshof (Federal 
Court of Justice, BGH) facilitated this task, however, by establishing an evidential 
presumption for the existence of a positive additional turnover based on the following 
reasoning:264  
- Cartels are generally entered into in order to increase profits.  
- Where a cartel agreement is proven to exist, there is a high probability that 
the participants’ turnover is higher than it would have been in the absence of 
the cartel agreement.  
- The longer the duration and intensity of the cartel, and the greater its 
geographic coverage, the higher this probability will be, and the greater is the 
burden of explanation on a court that wants to argue that the cartel agreement 
did not result in any additional turnover.  
- In the absence of exceptional circumstances indicating that the cartel was 
wholly ineffective, there is an evidential presumption that there was at least 
some positive additional turnover.  
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 Supra note 253. 
263
 BGH, 28 June 2006 – KRB 2/05, WuW/E DE-R 1567, 1569, – Berliner Transportbeton I (for an 
English summary, see Papp, F. (28 June 2005) The German Federal Court of Justice Rules on the 
Standard of Proof for the Existence of a Revenue Surplus from a Cartel Agreement (Transportbeton 
Berlin). Bulletin e-Competitions, Art. N° 467), affirmed and applied in BGH, 26 February 2013 – KRB 
20/12, WuW/E DE-R 3861, para. 77 – Grauzement. 
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 BGH, 28 June 2006 – KRB 2/05, WuW/E DE-R 1567, 1569-1570, – Berliner Transportbeton I (see 
also supra note 263 ); reaffirmed and applied in BGH, 26 February 2013 – KRB 20/12, WuW/E DE-R 
3861 KRB 20/12, WuW/E DE-R 3861, para. 76-77 – Grauzement (see also the judgment of the court 
below: OLG Düsseldorf, 26 June 2009, VI-2a Kart 2 - 6/08 OWi, 
http://www.justiz.nrw.de/nrwe/olgs/duesseldorf/j2009/VI_2a_Kart_2___6_08_OWiurteil20090626.html, 
paras 427 et seq.); BGH, 19 June 2007 – KRB 12/07, NJW 2007, 3792=WuW/E DE-R 2225, – 
Papiergroßhandel at para. 11 (supporting the contested judgment in so far as it applied the evidential 
presumption) and para. 21 (criticizing the contested judgment in so far as it had considered the 
evidential presumption to be rebutted with regard to some specialty (SD) paper; the contested 
judgment had considered the evidential presumption rebutted because price reductions would have 
been unprofitable for the cartelists because such reductions would not have induced customers to 
switch anyway, because customers would otherwise have had to discard remaining stock; the Federal 
Court of Justice criticized that this conclusion would only be possible once the extent of the possible 
reduction was determined, because in the case of a high reduction switching could have become 
profitable for consumers even if old stock would have become unusable). See also the extra-judicial 
statement of the presiding judge of the First Cartel Senate at the OLG Düsseldorf: Jürgen Kühnen, 
Mehrerlös und Vorteilsabschöpfung nach der 7. GWB-Novelle, WuW 2010, 16, 18. 
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Once the existence of some positive additional turnover is established, the Court 
then has to estimate the amount of this additional turnover. In this respect, the 
Federal Court of Justice ostensibly grants the trial courts “wide discretion”.265 The 
trial court may choose the most appropriate method for estimation aimed at coming 
as close as possible to reality.266 The chosen method has to be logically consistent 
and its results have to be possible and reasonable from an economic perspective.267 
 
Nevertheless, the Federal Court of Justice has repeatedly criticized the methods for 
estimation used by trial courts. The Court’s preferred method for estimation is a 
yardstick comparison to separate geographic markets that are unaffected by cartel 
agreements,268 if necessary foreign geographic markets,269 with the necessary 
corrections to take account of structural differences. In some cases, this approach 
may not be available, for example because there is at least a reasonable suspicion 
that these other markets are also affected by cartel agreements.270 Alternatively, a 
yardstick comparison to similar product markets, or before/after comparisons may be 
possible.271 Where these methods do not promise to be the best approximations of 
reality, it may be necessary to resort to economic modelling, which will “usually” 
require expert witnesses.272 In the Papiergroßhandel case, in which sellers of paper 
on the wholesale level had cartelized, the Court suggested that the counterfactual 
market price should be determined by (1) determining the prices which the producers 
charged the sellers on the wholesale level, adding (2) the costs of the wholesale 
level, and (3) an “empirically determined operating margin” in similar sectors; the 
results of this analysis should then be cross-checked against other indicators, such 
as similar product markets (taking account of structural differences) and prices that 
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 BGH, 19 June 2007 – KRB 12/07, NJW 2007, 3792=WuW/E DE-R 2225, para. 12 – 
Papiergroßhandel. 
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 BGH, 28 June 2006 – KRB 2/05, WuW/E DE-R 1567, 1571 – Berliner Transportbeton I; BGH, 25 
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2007 – KRB 12/07, NJW 2007, 3792=WuW/E DE-R 2225, paras. 13, 19 – Papiergroßhandel. 
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 Cf. BGH, 19 June 2007 – KRB 12/07, NJW 2007, 3792=WuW/E DE-R 2225, paras. 19 – 
Papiergroßhandel. 
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 BGH, 19 June 2007 – KRB 12/07, NJW 2007, 3792=WuW/E DE-R 2225, para. 13-14 – 
Papiergroßhandel; BGH, 26 February 2013 – KRB 20/12, WuW/E DE-R 3861, para. 78 – 
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 E.g., BGH, 26 February 2013 – KRB 20/12, WuW/E DE-R 3861, para. 78 – Grauzement 
(approving the contested judgment’s approach of comparing to the prices that had developped after 
the cartel was terminated).  
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 BGH, 19 June 2007 – KRB 12/07, NJW 2007, 3792=WuW/E DE-R 2225, paras. 19-20 – 
Papiergroßhandel. 
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resulted after the cartel was dissolved (again, taking account of developments of the 
market conditions).273  
 
In the Grauzement case, the Higher Regional Court Düsseldorf appointed Lars-
Hendrik Röller, the European Commission’s former Chief Economist, as a court-
appointed expert. He developed an econometric model based on time-series data in 
consultation with the court and the parties.274  
 
b. The 10% turnover threshold as a maximum (2005/2007/2013) 
 
i. The new scheme 
 
In 2005, the legislator sought to align German competition law more closely with 
European law. Originally, the government bill had only proposed to increase the 
absolute amount of € 500,000 to €1 million, and to continue the existing additional-
turnover framework as described above.275 However, Parliament’s Economic 
Committee, after consultation with expert witnesses, considered that (1) German 
undertakings would be subject to a 10% of the turnover cap anyway as soon as the 
European Commission fined the infringement (Article 23 Regulation 1/2003);276 (2) 
“the determination of the additional turnover is beset by substantial uncertainty” and 
this uncertainty prevented the imposition of fines that are sufficiently high to deter 
serious infringements;277 and (3) the absolute amount of €500,000 (or, as proposed, 
€1 million) was “utterly insufficient” to deter serious infringements.278 The Economic 
Committee therefore recommended that the wording of the new § 81(4) GWB should 
be aligned with the European fining system.279  
 
The legislator of the 7th Amendment to the GWB in 2005 followed this 
recommendation and introduced the following formulation into § 81(4) GWB:280  
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 BGH, 19 June 2007 – KRB 12/07, NJW 2007, 3792=WuW/E DE-R 2225, paras. 19-20 – 
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 Government Bill, 12 August 2004, BUNDESTAGS-DRUCKSACHE 15/3640, pp. 17, 67. 
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 7th Amendment to the GWB of 7 July 2005, BUNDESGESETZBLATT PART I 2005, p. 1954. 
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In the cases of paragraph 1, paragraph 2 no. 1, no. 2 lit. a) and no. 5 and 
paragraph 3 [scil.: these provisions enumerate substantive infringements of 
German and European competition law, such as anticompetitive agreements 
or abuses of dominant positions] the administrative offence may be punished 
by a fine of up to €1 million. Beyond sentence 1 a higher fine may be imposed 
on an undertaking or an association of undertakings; the fine must not exceed 
10 percent of the total turnover of such undertaking or association of 
undertakings achieved in the business year preceding the decision of the 
authority. [... .] In fixing the amount of the fine, regard shall be had both to the 
gravity and to the duration of the infringement. 
 
Since this amendment, the absolute amount (now €1 million) is de facto only of 
relevance to individuals who are fined, whereas for undertakings and associations it 
is 10% of their annual turnover that is the relevant threshold. 
 
ii. Ancillary provisions 
 
The 2005 amendment also provided that 
 
(1) the fine “may” deprive the perpetrator of the gains improperly made due to the 
infringement, § 81(5) GWB; this modifies the general principle in the German 
law of administrative offences that the fine “should” deprive the perpetrator of 
these improper gains even if this exceeds the statutory maximum of the fine, § 
17(4) OWiG, in order to relieve the competition authority of the necessity to 
determine the gains; 
(2) a fine imposed on legal persons and partnerships starts to accrue interest two 
weeks after the fining decision is served, § 81(6) GWB at a rate of 5% over 
the base interest rate (this amendment sought to provide a disincentive for 
fined entities to contest the fining decision merely to delay paying the fine in 
order to benefit from the interest in the meantime); 
(3) the Bundeskartellamt was authorized to issue guidelines on the exercise of its 
discretion with regard to fines, § 81(7) GWB. 
 
iii. 10% threshold as a maximum fine, not a mere cap 
 
Several commentators considered that the interpretation of the 10% threshold as a 
cap (as under European law), which the German legislator had intended in 2005, left 
the determination of the fine below this threshold to be insufficiently certain, and that 
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this uncertainty infringed the constitutional guarantee of nulla poena sine lege 
certa.281 If the 10% threshold were a mere cap, a fine of greater than 10% of the 
turnover could result not only in the most serious cases, but even in the case of only 
low to medium range infringements, and in all these cases the fine would be capped 
at the same level, namely 10% of the turnover. This would not comply with the 
general rules on sanctions for criminal and administrative offences, which require 
that the sanction be proportionate to the offence, and that the highest possible fine 
can only be imposed for the most serious case conceivable. 
 
In 2013, the Federal Court of Justice agreed that the 10% threshold would be 
unconstitutional if it were interpreted as a mere cap.282 § 81(4) GWB itself does not 
state that the 10% threshold is a mere cap, so that the provision is not 
unconstitutional because it can be interpreted in a way that leads to a result that 
complies with constitution, namely as a maximum fine. Accordingly, 10% of the 
undertaking’s worldwide annual turnover is the fine to be imposed only for the most 
serious infringement conceivable, whereas a “medium-range” infringement could 
attract a fine of 5% of the worldwide annual turnover etc.283 This judgment led to the 
revision of the Bundeskartellamt’s fining guidelines and the current system. 
 
2. The Current System 
 
a. Overview 
 
§ 81(7) GWB was introduced in 2005 to dispel any lingering doubts as to the 
authority of the Bundeskartellamt to publish fining guidelines.284 The first set of fining 
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 See, e.g., Wolfgang Deselaers, Uferlose Geldbußen bei Kartellverstößen nach der neuen 10% 
Umsatzregel des § 81 Abs. 4 GWB?, WUW 2006, 118, 121-122; Rainer Bechtold, GWB – KOMMENTAR 
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 BGH, 26 February 2013 – KRB 20/12, WuW/E DE-R 3861, para. 50-65 – Grauzement. 
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attacks of commentators who argue that the high level of fines usual in competition cases requires 
that the definition of principles for setting the fines must not be left to the discretion of the competition 
authority, but that these principles need to be defined by the legislator itself. See, e.g., Bechtold, R. 
(2010) GWB – KOMMENTAR. 6th Ed. Munich: C.H. Beck. § 81, para. 34. 
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guidelines was issued in 2006,285 which have since replaced by the 2013 Guidelines 
discussed in this section. 
 
§ 81(4) GWB requires, as does Article 23 Regulation 1/2003 in EU law, that the 
gravity and duration of the infringement have to be taken into account. In addition, 
the prevailing view is that § 17(3) OWiG is also applicable,286 according to which the 
fine has to take account of (1) the nature of the offence and (2) the culpability of the 
offender; furthermore, (3) the financial circumstances of the offender may be taken 
into account as well. 
 
As described above, the Federal Court of Justice in Grauzement accepted the 
constitutionality of this fining regime with the modification that the 10% threshold is a 
maximum fine rather than a mere cap. This allows courts to use the criteria of § 
81(4) GWB and § 17(3) OWiG to pinpoint the appropriate level of the fine on the 
fining range reaching from €5 to 10% of the turnover. 
 
To take account of the principles espoused in the Grauzement decision, the 
Bundeskartellamt revised its 2006 Guidelines in 2013.287  
 
b. Fining Practice 
 
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that under German substantive 
competition law it has never been necessary to prove any market power where 
hardcore cartels are concerned (below I.). This is important for the interpretation of 
the average fines reported below (II. and III.), because fines for undertakings in 
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 Bekanntmachung Nr. 38/2006 über die Festsetzung von Geldbußen nach § 81 Abs. 4 Satz 2 des 
Gesetzes gegen Wettbe- werbsbeschränkungen [GWB] gegen Unternehmen und 
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digest; the German version is much more readable: Bundeskartellamt, Leitlinien für die 
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http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/DE/Leitlinien/Bekanntmachung%20-
%20Bußgeldleitlinien-Juni%202013.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=5).    
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cartels with market power are likely to be much higher than fines for undertakings in 
cartels without market power.288 In Germany, then, there will be many cartels with 
only limited effectiveness, which attract only a relatively low fine. This will reduce the 
amount of the average fine. If one only considered the subset of cartels with market 
power, average fines in Germany would be considerably higher. 
 
It also has to be considered that large cartels whose effects transcend German 
borders, which arguably have higher overcharges and attract higher fines, will more 
likely be taken up by the European Commission. Accordingly, most cases dealt with 
by German authorities are regional or at most national cartels. This arguably 
explains, at least partially, the lower average of fines in Germany compared to those 
imposed by the European Commission and Court. 
 
i. Even cartels without market power are prohibited 
 
While it has always been necessary under German law that a restriction be “capable 
of affecting market conditions”, early case law settled that the likelihood of an 
“appreciable” effect was sufficient, and a likelihood of “substantial” restrictive effects 
need not be shown.289 An “appreciable” restriction in this sense could exist even 
where the combined market shares of the undertakings involved was below 5 per 
cent.290 The more problematic the nature of the infringement was, in particular where 
a restriction of competition was the object of the agreement, the less likely it was that 
an infringement would be denied on the basis of an absence of appreciability. 
Therefore, where hardcore restrictions were concerned, combined market shares as 
low as 0.5 per cent were considered to lead to an “appreciable” restriction.291 
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 See supra note 446: the factor “qualitative effects” for the determination of the fine includes, inter 
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 BGH, 14 Jan. 1960, KRB 12/59, WuW/E BGH 369, 372–373 – Kohlenplatzhandel (no substantial 
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allocation between two grocery stores with a combined market share of some 0.5% was considered 
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see BGH, 23 Feb. 1988, KRB 4/87, WuW/E BGH 2469, 2470 – Brillenfassungen, where an optician 
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Furthermore, the threshold for appreciability will be lower where other factors already 
reduce the intensity of competition in the market.292 
 
Today, the European principles on appreciability of restrictions of competition apply 
to § 1 GWB as well.293 In principle, only agreements that have the object or effect of 
appreciably restricting competition are prohibited. However, in Germany as in the 
European Union it is unambiguously clear that the respective de minimis notices do 
not apply to hardcore restrictions, so that there is no safe harbour of a combined 10 
per cent for horizontal hardcore restrictions.294 The Expedia judgment of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union has even indicated that in the case of object 
restrictions there may not be any need for showing any appreciability of the 
restriction.295 Even though it is questionable whether the Expedia judgment is to be 
understood as removing the appreciability criterion for object restrictions completely, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
had supplied a competitor with a computer program with price lists, and the Federal Court of Justice 
reversed the conviction and remanded for further determinations about the market conditions to 
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it is certainly an indication that for these restrictions the threshold for appreciability is 
much reduced; this would seem to lead to a similar result as the earlier German case 
law described above. 
 
ii. Fines Imposed on Individuals 
 
The statutory maximum fine for individuals is €1 million (§ 81(4) GWB). The 
Bundeskartellamt typically fines one individual for each undertaking fined. Between 
1993 and 2010, the Bundeskartellamt fined 510 individuals and 563 legal persons.296 
The average fine per fined individual in that period was reportedly €56,000.297  
 
Data about the distribution of these fines is sparse, but there are indications that the 
distribution is skewed so that individual fines can be substantially higher, especially 
in cartel cases.  
 
For example, in the recent beer breweries cartel, 14 individuals were fined a total of 
approximately €3.6 million.298 Even if this amount were equally distributed among 
these individuals, the fine for each of these 14 individuals would be approximately 
€257,000. Similarly, individual fines of €250,000 and €200,000 were reported in the 
Papiergroßhandel and Grauzement cases, respectively.299 
 
iii. Fines on undertakings 
 
Between 1993 and 2010, the Bundeskartellamt fined 563 legal persons.300 The 
average fine for each undertaking over this period was €4.6 million.301 It should be 
noted, however, that fines have considerably increased since the turn of the 
millenium, as Figure 6 indicates, so that the average fine today is arguably much 
higher; also, the distribution is very likely significantly skewed, with a large number of 
very small fines but also a number of very high fines.  
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Figure 6: Fines imposed by the Bundeskartellamt (in million €) (source: 
Bundeskartellamt, Tätigkeitsbericht 2011/12, Bundestags-Drucksache 17/3675 
of 29 May 2013, p. 30) 
 
For example, in a recent cartel the Bundeskartellamt imposed overall fines of €280 
million on three undertakings, including a fine of €195.5 million on one undertaking 
(Südzucker), a fine of approximately €75 million on a second undertaking, and a fine 
“in the single-digit millions” on a third (Nordzucker).302 
 
In the Grauzement case, the Bundeskartellamt had initially imposed fines in the 
amount of €661 million, which were later approximately halved by the OLG 
Düsseldorf and further marginally reduced by the Federal Court of Justice.303 Even 
after all reductions on both appeals, these fines included a fine of some €161 million 
on one undertaking (HeidelbergCement AG), a fine of some €66.5 million on a 
second undertaking (Schenk Zement AG) and a fine of some €50 million on a third 
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undertaking (Dyckerhoff AG), as well as some smaller fines of approximately €22.8 
million (Lafarge Zement GmbH), some €13.9 million (Holcim Deutschland AG), and 
some €12 million (ReadyMix, today CEMEX Deutschland AG) on further 
undertakings.  
 
In the Rail track cartel, one undertaking (ThyssenKrupp GfT Gleistechnik GmbH) 
was fined €103 million; overall, fines of €222 million were imposed on 12 
undertakings in this cartel.304 
 
In another recent cartel of beer breweries (already mentioned above 2.), fines of 
approximately €334 million were imposed on 11 undertakings, despite substantial 
reductions for cooperation (up to 50 per cent) and settlements.305 The exact 
distribution of the overall fine over the 11 undertakings is not published, but it is likely 
that some breweries had to pay a much higher fine than the average of €30.36 
million.  
 
In the Kesselhersteller cartel, one undertaking (ALSTOM Power Systems GmbH) 
had originally been fined €91 million under the additional turnover provision; the 
Bundeskartellamt had estimated the additional turnover according to the principles 
established in the Federal Court of Justice’s Papiergroßhandel judgment.306 
Following the submission of a complaint, the Bundeskartellamt reduced this fine to 
€42 million, inter alia, because the undertaking had shown that certain of its costs 
had not been accurately estimated and that the undertaking had made substantial 
restitution for overcharges to its customers; this fining decision became final.307  
 
c. Controversies 
 
i. No nullity for retroactivity 
 
The 7th Amendment to the GWB in 2005 provided that the amendment was to enter 
into force “on 1 July 2005”. Because of various delays, however, the Act was only 
signed into effect on 7 July 2005, and promulgated in the official gazette on 12 July 
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2005. Taken literally, then, the Act provided that the amendments should enter into 
force retroactively. For administrative offences, as for criminal offences, such 
retroactivity is strictly prohibited (nulla poena sine lege). Some argued that therefore 
at least for a transitory period infringements were not subject to a fine; and some 
further argued that this period would have to be taken to be the mildest law.308 The 
Federal Court of Justice rejected this argument in 2013. The Court argued that the 
2005 Act was to be interpreted in such a way that the amendment concerning the 
fining of the administrative offence did not enter into force retroactively.309 
 
ii. Constitutional Complaint against the Execution of a Fine Imposed by the 
European Commission 
 
In ThyssenKrupp Nirosta, the addressee of a fines decision by the Commission 
applied to the Federal Constitutional Court for a preliminary injunction against the 
execution of the fine. It claimed that its fundamental rights before the European 
institutions were so deficient that it could invoke the Solange II principles. The 
Federal Consitutional Court rejected the application for a preliminary injunction, 
because the damage to the diplomatic interests of Germany if the injunction were 
granted and the complaint later turned out not to be well founed would be grave, 
whereas no irreparable harm would result if the fine were executed, even if the 
complaint should later turn out to be well founded.310 
 
iii. Legislative changes and changes in the Guidelines 
 
More generally, the recent legislative changes in the 8th Amendment to the GWB 
and the major revision of the 2013 Fining Guidelines, as well as the recent 
“codification” (in the form of Guidelines) of the Settlement Procedure in Germany are 
bound to lead to further constitutional challenges in the near future.311 
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D. United Kingdom 
 
1. Historical Background 
 
a. The statutory framework 
 
Section 36(1) and (2) of the Competition act 1998 provided the Office of fair Trading 
(OFT) the power to require an undertaking to pay a penalty in respect of an 
infringement of the Chapter I, Chapter II prohibition of the Competition Act 1998, as 
well as EU competition law. The OFT has discretion to impose financial penalties 
where the infringement has been committed intentionally or negligently by the 
undertaking312, up to the level of 10% of the undertaking’s worldwide turnover313. The 
Competition Act 1998 also required the OFT to publish guidance on how it 
determines the appropriate amount of the financial penalty imposed, which the OFT 
has done in several occasions314. Under the previous competition law regimes 
implemented in the UK no conduct was unlawful until after it had been proscribed by 
an order of the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry or after the firm concerned 
had given a legally binding undertaking to the Competition Authority (the Director 
General of Fair Trading at the time) that it would refrain from anti-competitive 
conduct. Therefore no penalties could be levied for previous conduct, no matter how 
damaging to competition. 
 
The CMA may of course make a finding of an infringement of the Competition Act 
even if no penalty is imposed, if it shows a legitimate interest in making such 
decision without imposing penalties. Yet, this requirement of intention or negligence 
has been broadly interpreted by the courts. For instance, the CMA does not have to 
decide if the conduct was committed intentionally or negligently, a cumulative 
qualification being sufficient for the purposes of imposing a financial penalty315. 
According to the CAT, 
 
“As to the meaning of “intentionally” in section 36(3), in our judgment an 
infringement is committed intentionally for the purposes of the Act if the 
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undertaking must have been aware that its conduct was of such a nature as to 
encourage a restriction or distortion of competition:[…]. It is sufficient that the 
undertaking could not have been unaware that its conduct had the object or 
would have the effect of restricting competition, without it being necessary to 
show that the undertaking also knew that it was infringing the Chapter I or 
Chapter II prohibition:[…]. While in some cases the undertaking’s intention will 
be confirmed by internal documents, in our judgment, and in the absence of 
any evidence to the contrary, the fact that certain consequences are plainly 
foreseeable is an element from which the requisite intention may be inferred. 
If, therefore, a dominant undertaking pursues a certain policy which in fact 
has, or would foreseeably have, an anti-competitive effect, it may be 
legitimate to infer that it is acting “intentionally” for the purposes of section 
36(3). 
As to “negligently”, there appears to be little discussion of this concept in the 
case law of the European Community. In our judgment an infringement is 
committed negligently for the purposes of section 36(3) if the undertaking 
ought to have known that its conduct would result in a restriction or distortion 
of competition […]. For the purposes of the present case, however, we do not 
need to decide precisely where the concept of “negligently” shades into the 
concept of “intentionally” for the purposes of section 36(3), nor attempt an 
exhaustive judicial interpretation of either term”316. 
 
One should also consider the limited immunity in relation to “small agreements”, 
other than price fixing, under Section 39 of the Competition act 1998 for 
infringements of Chapter I, or “conduct of minor significance”, under Section 40 of 
the Competition Act 1998, for infringements of Chapter II, which preserve infringers 
to from the effect of financial penalties imposed under Section 36(2) of the 
Competition Act 1998. The concept of “small agreements” refers to agreements 
where the combined turnover of the parties in the preceding calendar year was £20 
million or less317. The concept of “conduct of minor significance” has been 
interpreted as referring to conduct where the perpetrator’s worldwide turnover in the 
preceding calendar year was £50 million or less318. The CMA may however withdraw 
the immunity, if as a result of an investigation, it considers that the conduct is likely to 
infringe the Chapter I and II prohibitions.  
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The OFT published Guidance in 2000 on the methodology for setting financial 
penalties, which were revised in 2004 and most recently in 2012. The Guidance 
explains the steps which the OFT takes in calculating a penalty, setting out an 
approach in different steps. In the 2004 version of the Guidance these consisted in 
taking a percentage of the relevant turnover as a starting point (step 1), adjust for the 
duration of the infringement (step 2), adjust for other factors in order to achieve the 
policy objectives pursued, in particular deterrence (step 3), adjust for aggravating 
and mitigating factors (step 4) and adjust to prevent the maximum penalty being 
exceeded (step 5). Normally the Guidance does not bind the Competition Appeal 
Tribunal (CAT), to which decisions on financial penalties may be appealed319.  
 
b. The impact of the judicial control of the CAT 
 
A crucial development regarding the OFT’s fining policy occurred with the CAT’s 
judgments in the construction cartel cases (nine judgments in the construction bid-
rigging cartel320 and one judgment on the construction recruitment forum cartel321), 
where the CAT slashed fines imposed by the OFT by up to 90%. The OFT had in its 
decisions imposed financial penalties with the view that these should have a 
sufficient deterrent effect. Yet, this led to the charge that the level of these financial 
penalties was excessive. Most of the cases consisted in the practice of“simple” cover 
pricing and compensation payments made by the company providing the cover price 
to the company receiving it in the event that the former won the tender to which the 
cover price related, the OFT considering that the infringements involving 
compensation payments to be more serious than those involving “simple” cover 
pricing The OFT imposed penalties amounting to just under £130 million, the 
individual fines ranged from £173 to almost £18 million, having calculated the 
penalties according to its own Guidance at the time (the 2004 version of it). In 
particular, at step 3, providing for an adjustment of the penalty figure in order to 
achieve deterrence, the OFT was concerned that in some cases the penalty arrived 
at by step 2 was small compared to the undertaking’s total worldwide turnover and in 
order to achieve deterrence, in particular in view of the economic size of the 
undertakings, the OFT increased the penalty, where necessary, to a level equivalent 
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to a specific proportion (0.75% or 1.05%) of the undertaking’s worldwide turnover in 
the year prior to the decision.  
 
The OFT arrived to the figures of 0.75% (for simple cover pricing) and 1.05% (for 
infringements involving compensation payments) under the assumption that the 
undertaking’s turnover in the relevant market represented at least 15% of its total 
worldwide turnover. The OFT then applied the relevant Step 1 starting point 
percentage (5% or 7%, as the case might be) to this assumed 15%, resulting in the 
0.75% or 1.05% figures. This was the so-called “minimum deterrence threshold” 
(“MDT”), which when applied had the effect of dissociating the link between penalty 
for the particular infringement and the actual relevant turnover, the financial penalty 
being instead related to total worldwide turnover. This led to fines after step three 
that were approximately 175% larger than what it should have been had the MDT not 
applied. The parties argued at the CAT that the MDT has been applied too 
mechanistically and produced fines which were unfair. The parties had also 
challenged, among other things, the definition of the relevant turnover by the OFT, 
for instance in the construction recruitment forum case, the reliance by the OFT on 
the gross turnover of the undertakings, instead of using net fees that would have not 
included temporary worker’s wages, in view of the specificity of the recruitment 
industry322.  
 
With regard to the first point, although the CAT recognized the OFT some margin of 
appreciation in considering that the infringements were serious, it also held that 
“cover pricing” was a less serious infringement than bid rigging and in view of the low 
margins in the industry, among other things, which did not support the existence of 
substantial cartel overcharges, the final penalties imposed by the OFT were 
excessive. The CAT contested the OFT’s decision to consider 5% of the relevant 
turnover as the starting point for the base fine under step 1, the OFT Guidance on 
fines setting a maximum of 10%, since the difference between 5% and 10% did not 
adequately reflect the distinction in culpability between cover pricing as practised in 
the construction industry in the relevant period and, say, a multi-partite horizontal 
price fixing or market sharing cartel”, hence “(g)reater head-room is required to 
accommodate the latter type of offence within the range currently provided by Step 1 
of the Guidance”323. A starting point of 3.5% was more appropriate in such cases, 
although the CAT also recognized that the OFT was entitled to choose the same 
starting point for all infringements (cover pricing and compensation payments), if the 
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differences among them could be accommodated at a later stage in the fining 
methodology324. These adjustments under step 3 were even more necessary as the 
definition of the market for the purpose of defining the relevant turnover by the OFT 
was extremely narrow. The CAT also found that the OFT had misapplied its own 
Guidance by taking into account in order to define the relevant turnover the relevant 
market in the last year prior to the adoption of the decision, instead of the turnover in 
the last year of the undertaking’s participation in the infringement, as it was indicated 
in the OFT Guidance.The CAT referred to some case law of the Court of Justice of 
the EU emphasising the importance of taking into account turnover which reflects the 
undertaking’s real economic situation during the period in which the infringement 
was committed, also observing that in case the OFT intended to adopt a different 
policy, they should first have consulted upon and sought approval for the change, 
eventually revising the Guidance. In the construction recruitment forum case, the 
CAT also held that the OFT should not focus mechanistically on the undertaking’s 
audited accounts, if there are more appropriate indicators of actual economic 
performance and activity of the business carried out by the undertaking in question.  
 
More importantly, the CAT challenged the mechanical use of the MDT by the OFT, 
with the aim to treat parties in different cases in a more uniform way, as this 
conflicted with the principle that penalties had to be assessed on a case-by-case 
basis, with regard to the individual circumstances of the parties, and the principle of 
proportionality. The CAT did not oppose to the use of the MDT, as “there is nothing 
in Step 3 which precludes, or is inconsistent with, use of a mechanism to assist the 
OFT in making an appropriate adjustment, provided always that the resulting figures 
are subject to an individual appraisal ensuring a proportionate penalty”325. According 
to the CAT, the choice of the 15% of the turnover was not justified, and in any case 
the bluntness of the method enhanced the risk of disproportionate figures, 
particularly in the case of firms with very substantial activities outside the sector to 
which the infringement related. For the CAT, and contrary to the assumptions behind 
the MDT, profits and cash flow was more important than turnover to take into 
account. More importantly, for the CAT, “there must be a link between culpability and 
the deterrent element in the penalty”, yet the MDT severed this link326.According to 
the CAT, 
 
“(i)t is a cardinal principle that the ultimate penalty imposed must satisfy the 
requirements of proportionality. Whilst deterrence is a relevant consideration 
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when assessing proportionality in this context, so equally is the culpability of 
the offender/seriousness of the offence. If these two considerations pull in 
different directions, a fair balance should be sought. Where a provisional 
penalty at Step 1 is deemed insufficient for the purpose of deterrence (or for 
that matter does not properly reflect the seriousness of the offence) it is 
proper to increase it. But the culpability consideration must not be lost to view, 
and it may well impose some limit on the extent of any increase based purely 
on deterrence. Ultimately the question will be: is the final penalty reasonable 
and proportionate having regard to the twin objectives set out in paragraph 
1.4 of the Guidance? We are not aware that any of the above is 
controversial”327. 
 
Indeed, “determination of the penalty requires a refined consideration and 
assessment of all the relevant circumstances, and the element of deterrence, while 
undoubtedly one of those circumstances, should not lead to the level of penalty 
being calculated according to a mathematical formula”328. For the CAT, a 
mechanistic approach would run “counter to the thrust of the Guidance and ordinary 
penal principles, which require a case-by-case analysis and assessment of the 
appropriate penalty” and also may lead to excessive and disproportionate fines329. 
The OFT “should have taken a step back and ask itself whether in all the 
circumstances a penalty at the proposed level is necessary and proportionate in 
order both to punish the particular undertaking for the specific infringement and to 
deter it and other companies from further breaches of that kind”330, looking “critically 
at the figure produced by the MDT”331. The CAT even made the suggestion for such 
a step, of stepping back, to be formalized in the OFT Guidance, in order to avoid a 
mechanistic application of a formula332. 
 
The jurisprudence of the CAT led the OFT to revise its Guidance in 2012 and 
introduce a new step (new step 4) in order to examine whether the penalty is 
proportionate as part of its overall assessment, after adjustments have been made 
on the basis of aggravating and mitigating factors and also achieves deterrence, 
emphasising the need for flexibility and an assessment of the individual 
circumstances of each case. 
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Following the implementation of the new UK enforcement regime introduced by the 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 on 1 April 2014, the functions of the 
Competition Commission and many of the functions of the OFT were transferred to 
the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), which became the main competition 
law enforcer in the UK (the OFT and the Competition Commission being abolished). 
Hence, the provisions empowering the OFT to impose financial penalties are now 
implemented by the CMA. The CMA has also published on their website all the 
previous guidelines of the OFT, in particular those on financial penalties333 and 
leniency334, thus indicating that they will follow on the same policies. 
 
The legislator also put more emphasis on deterrence, thus tilting the balance 
between deterrence and proportionality to the former. Section 44 of the Enterprise 
and Regulatory Reform Act (ERRA) 2013 amended section 36 (penalties) of the 
Competition Act, by adding after subsection (7), subsection (7A) stating the 
following:  
“In fixing a penalty under this section the CMA must have regard to   
(a) the seriousness of the infringement concerned, and  
(b) the desirability of deterring both the undertaking on whom the penalty is 
imposed and others from (i) entering into agreements which infringe the 
Chapter 1 prohibition or the prohibition in Article [101](1), or  (ii)engaging in 
conduct which infringes the Chapter 2 prohibition or the prohibition in Article 
[102].”  
 
Section 38 of the Competition Act was also reformulated by ERRA 2013 in order to 
impose an obligation to the Competition Appeal Tribunal to “have regard” to the 
guidance published by the CMA, thus indicating the need for the CAT to take, 
probably more into account, the OFT’s policy objectives of general deterrence. It 
remains to be seen if this textual reformulation will have any impact on the deference 
provided by the CAT to the OFT’s determination of financial penalties.  
 
Ensuring general and specific deterrence, while making sure that financial penalties 
are proportionate has been a recurrent theme in the development of an effective 
sanctions system, not only in the context of competition law, but also for all types of 
regulatory offenses. The six principles of regulatory sanctions developed by the 
Macrory report on Regulatory Justice: making Sanctions Effective (2006) recognize 
the complexity of integrating various parameters in the decision to impose variable 
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monetary administrative penalties335. Of particular interest is also one of the 
recommendations of the report to assess carefully the advantages and 
disadvantages of setting an upper limit to variable monetary administrative sanctions 
in underlying legislation, as this would pose undue complexity on the system336. 
Regulators should have flexibility and ability in “capturing the financial benefit 
businesses may have acquired through a regulatory breach”, hence the suggestion 
not to specify an upper limit. These suggestions illustrate the trend towards a more 
flexible, case-by-case approach in determining the level of sanctions, based on the 
harm inflicted by the violation with the addition of tools to take into account the 
objective of general deterrence and the low probability of detection for some 
regulatory offenses. 
 
2. Description of the current system 
 
a. Overview 
 
The OFT Guidance of 2012 indicates that a financial penalty imposed by the OFT 
(now CMA) under section 36 of the Competition Act 1998 will be calculated following 
a six-step approach: 
 
Step 1: calculation of the starting point having regard to the seriousness of the 
infringement and the relevant turnover of the undertaking  
•Step 2: adjustment for duration  
Step 3: adjustment for aggravating or mitigating factors  
Step 4: adjustment for specific deterrence and proportionality  
Step 5: adjustment if the maximum penalty of 10 per cent of the worldwide turnover 
of the undertaking17 
Step 6: adjustment for leniency and/or settlement discounts.  
 
b. Fining Practice 
 
The analysis of the fining practice of the OFT shows that in general the average 
starting amount for fines in the UK is relatively lower, compared to the EU and the 
US, with a 9.3% proportion of the firm sales in the relevant market taken into 
account, as opposed to 21.5%  in the EU and 20% in the US. This percentage 
increases slightly after deterrence is considered to 12.1%, after 
                                                     
335
 Macrory, R. (Nov. 2006) Regulatory Justice: Making Sanctions Effective, Final Report. 29-31. 
336
 Ibid. at 48. 
174 
 
aggravating/mitigating circumstances to 12.7%, before being reduced to 12.6% after 
adjustment for the 10% turnover limit and 9% after leniency. This percentage is 
significantly lower than the average of 15.8% for the EU and 21.5% for the US (after 
leniency). The fact that the financial penalty as a proportion of total turnover is not 
capped in the US, explains of the higher on average financial penalties as a 
proportion of firm sales in the relevant market337. 
 
A closer look to the fining practice indicates that the OFT proceeded to impose a 
significant amount of financial penalties in some horizontal price fixing cartels, most 
notably in the airline passenger fuel surcharges cartel with a total fine to British 
Airways (BA) of the amount of £58.5 million (2012)338 , which was a substantial 
decrease from the staggering £121,5 million requested from BA in the early 
resolution agreement between the OFT and BA in 2007339, the OFT re-calculating 
the fine in view of the CAT’s more restrictive case law after the construction cartel 
cases in 2011. The fine was reassessed following the issue of a Statement of 
Objections in November 2011 also in light of the overall value added to the OFT's 
investigation by BA's co-operation was greater than had been anticipated at the time 
of the original agreement. One may also note the OFT’s fines (for price information 
exchange) against Royal Bank of Scotland, a fine of £ 28.59 million340, but also in 
abuse of dominance cases, such as a fine by the Gas and Electricity Markets 
Authority, a concurrent enforcer of competition law in the UK in the energy sector, 
against National Grid for £41.6 million341 or for vertical price fixing against Imperial 
Tobacco for the amount of £112.4 million approximately342 (see Appendix 1). Some 
significant cases of the OFT led also to significant aggregate financial penalties to 
the participants to the infringement. For instance, in the tobacco case the total fines 
imposed amounted to £225 million343, in the dairy products case to £49.51 million344, 
in the construction industry cartel £129.2 million (after leniency)345. The OFT has 
also proceeded so far to a reduction of fines for leniency purposes. For instance in 
construction recruitment case, the OFT limited the total fine to £39.3 million 
approximately from £173 million before leniency346. 
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In view of the relatively small number of decisions imposing financial penalties for 
infringements of competition law in the UK, we do not include statistics but a table 
with all the decisions imposing fines, which is available at the Appendix 1 [See also, 
Table 10 below]. 
 
Year of 
infringement 
decision 
Number of 
infringement 
decisions 
Post leniency 
and settlement 
fines (£) 
Value of fines 
post-appeal (£)  
2001 1 3,210,000 2,200,000 
 
2002 4 6,515,409 6,187,369 
 
2003 5 48,046,598 37,991,000 
 
2004 2 2,004,626 1,922,835 
 
2005 4 696,897 696,897 
 
2006 3 2,624,267 2,624,267 
 
2007 
                               -
    
                          -
    
                          -
     
2008 
                               -
    
                          -
    
                          -
     
2009 2 168,044,016 71,280,274 
 
2010 1 221,642,290 58,138,327 
 
2011 3 88,275,056 84,348,556 
 
2012 1 58,500,000 58,500,000 
 
2013 3 3,298,633 3,298,633 
 
  
602,857,792 327,188,159 
 
     
Table 10: Competition law infringement decisions in the UK and value of fines 
post leniency and post appeal 
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E. France 
 
1. Historical Background 
 
The antitrust provisions related to antitrust agreements and concerted practices, 
from one hand, and abuses of dominant positions, from the other hand, were 
introduced in France in 1953 and 1963. Only criminal courts could impose antitrust 
sanctions (fines). The French Competition Authority (FCA) only had consultative 
functions (the powers of investigations were in the hand of the Ministry of Economy). 
 
In 1977, the Minister of Economy was empowered of imposing administrative fines 
(up to 5% of the net turnover realized in France during the last financial year for 
undertakings and to 5 million of Francs for other legal entities). 
 
In 1986, the new FCA (the “Competition Council”) has become in charge of the 
decision-making power. Decisions of the FCA could be challenged before the Paris 
Court of appeal.  
 
In 2000, the antitrust provisions were introduced in the French Commercial Code 
(Articles L.420-1 and subsequent for the Legislative Party and R.420-1 and 
subsequent for the Decrees’ Party). 
 
In 2001, the maximum amount of fines was set from 5% of the turnover realized in 
France to 10% of the global turnover. The 2001 Law has introduced a leniency 
program in French Law. The FCA has adopted a Leniency notice in 2006 which was 
revised in 2007 and 2009 in order to give clarifications on the conditions for leniency 
and on the procedure347. The 2001 Law has also introduced the settlement 
procedure in French Law. The FCA has adopted a notice on settlement procedure in 
2011348. 
 
In order to reinforce the separation of the powers of investigations and decision 
within the FCA, the Competition Council has become the Competition Authority in 
2008. Its decisions are still challenged before the Paris Court of appeal. 
 
In parallel with administrative fines, criminal penalties are still provided by the French 
Commercial Code. Under its Article L.420-6, “any individual who takes part with 
                                                     
347
 http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/cpro_clemence_uk_2_mars_2009.pdf. 
348
 http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/notice_antitrust_penalties_16may2011_en.pdf. 
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fraud, personally and decisively, in the design, organization or implementation of 
practices referred  to in articles L.420-1 and L.420-2 shall be sentenced to four 
years’ imprisonment and fined 75,000 Euros”. 
 
Criminal provisions are relatively rare. Criminal offenders are especially prosecuted 
for having been involved in bid rigging and others criminal infringements (i.e. 
corruption). 
 
a. The fining policy of the FCA before the adoption of the 2011 sentencing 
guidelines 
 
A 1992 Law has laid down three criteria which should be used to set the amount of 
the fines: the seriousness of the facts, the damage caused to the economy and the 
position of the convicted person.  
 
Despite this distinction, the FCA has not always reasoned its decisions on each of 
these three criteria. The FCA could invoke anticompetitive effects without identifying 
the seriousness of the facts or the damage caused to the economy. The reasoning 
was therefore general349. Sometimes, the application of these criteria was confusing: 
the impact on prices of collusion was analysed regarding the seriousness of the 
facts, not the damage caused to the economy350. This is also the case concerning 
the duration of the antitrust practices which is considered as a relevant element for 
the assessment the seriousness of the facts and the damage caused to the 
economy351. 
 
The fining policy could be considered as having more of a retributive function than a 
deterrent one taking into account, for instance, social issues352, health issues353 or 
the fact that the victims of the antitrust behaviours were fragile354. The jurisprudence 
of the Paris Court of appeal was especially attentive to the retributive function of the 
fines. 
 
                                                     
349
 See for instance, Decisions N°93-D-40 of 12nd October, 1993. Please note that 93 mean the year 
of the adoption of the decision and 40 mean the number of the decision. 
350
 See for instance, Decisions N°97-D-47 of 11
th
 June, 1997. 
351
 2011 SG, §22 (see for instance, Decision N°13-D-06 of 28
th
 February, 2013, §231). 
352
 The fact that the authors contribute to the local shop has been considered as a mitigating factor: 
Paris Court of appeal, 3
rd
 June, 1993 (challenging decision N°92-D-38 of 9
th
 June, 1992). 
353
 Decision N°2000-D-29 of 5
th
 July, 2000 and decision N°03-D-61 of 17
th
 December, 2003, esp. §79. 
354
 Regarding old people: Paris Court of appeal, 19
th
 September, 2000 (challenging decision N°99-D-
84 of 21
st
 December, 1999). 
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The Paris Court of appeal has full jurisdiction on decisions of the FCA. The Paris 
Court of appeal quite used to review the decisions of the FCA, especially the 
assessment of the criteria used to set the amount of the fines. 
 
 
b. The 2011 sentencing guidelines 
 
After a public consultation, the FCA has adopted its sentencing guidelines (hereafter, 
“SG”) the 16th May of 2011355. The power for the FCA to adopt SG was strongly 
contested by lawyers. The Paris Court of appeal has decided that the FCA was 
empowered to adopt the SG, considered as guidelines which do not alter the legal 
framework356. 
 
The SG does not apply for procedural infringements or failure to comply with the 
merger control regime357. The FCA can decide not to apply the SG (see SG, §7). 
The FCA has decided to depart from the SG method for an infringement of a very 
short duration and without impact358 and when the legal framework and the 
behaviour of the administration have encouraged the infringement359. 
 
The SG aim to introduce a fining policy more: 
(i) deterrent (general deterrence); 
(ii) coherent from a national perspective (cohesion of the fining policy of 
the FCA); 
(iii) coherent from an European perspective (soft harmonization with the 
European Commission policy); and 
(iv) reasoned in order to limit judicial review of the decisions of the FCA360. 
 
2. Description of the Current System 
 
a. Overview 
 
The 2011 Guidelines provide that the FCA will now rely on the direct turnover 
achieved in France by the company concerned on the relevant market during the last 
                                                     
355
 http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/notice_antitrust_penalties_16may2011_en.pdf. 
356
 Paris Court of appeal, 30
th
 January, 2014 (challenging decision N°11-D-17 of 8
th
 December, 2011). 
357
 See, for instance, Decisions N°12-D-12 of 11
th
 May, 2012, N°12-D-15 of 9
th
 July, 2012, N°13-D-01 
of 31
st
 January, 2013 and N°13-D-22 of 20
th
 December, 2013. 
358
 Decision N°13-D-03 of 13
th
 February, 2013, esp. §392. 
359
 Decision N°12-D-26 of 20
th
 December, 2012, esp. §§290-291. 
360
 See SG, §§ 1-19. 
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full year of the infringement, with limited exceptions where the turnover and/or the 
last full year is not the most representative reference (points 33 and seq.). The 
approach is very similar to that of the Commission. The basic amount of the fine is 
constituted by a share of this annual turnover, in principle between 0 and 30 % (and 
even between 15 and 30 % for hardcore horizontal restrictions) reflecting the 
seriousness of the infringement and the importance of the resulting damage to the 
economy361) The Notice then provides that duration is integrated to this amount 
according to a methodology leading to lower fines than that followed by the 
European Commission as the FCA applies a ratio of 1 for the first year, and then of 
0.5 for each additional year. However, in bid-rigging cases, the FCA does not apply 
this method but rather retains a proportion of the total turnover achieved in France by 
the entity concerned or the group to which it belongs. This proportion will be defined 
taking into account the seriousness of the facts and of the harm done to the 
economy362. At this stage, the FCA proceeds to individualize the fine, based on 
mitigating and aggravating circumstances Recidivism may, for example lead to an 
increase by 15 to 50%. An additional individualization occurs with regard to the size, 
the more or less significant economic power the company concerned enjoys, its 
overall resources, the group to which the undertaking belongs363.This enables the 
FAC to tailor the specific deterrence effect of the sanction to the individual 
circumstances of the undertaking. Such factor has the potential to introduce 
significant changes in the final amount of the fine and may lead to impose higher 
fines to companies that are large and diversified, in comparison to smaller 
companies.  After checking that the maximum fine level (10 % of the total annual 
consolidated turnover) is not met, reductions for leniency and settlement are applied 
and the inability to pay is also considered in order to reduce or annul the final 
amount of the fine. The following list summarizes the different steps of the fine-
setting process. 
 
Step1: Turnover of the market concerned multiplied by 0-30% gravity/damage. 
 
Step 2:  The amount after step 1 is multiplied with Duration 1+(0.5 x additional 
years). 
 
Step 3: To this amount (after step 2) is substracted approxinately - 0-50% for each 
mitigatign circumstance. 
 
                                                     
361
 See SG §40. 
362
 See SG, §§ 67-68. 
363
 See SG, §§ 47 seq. 
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Step 4: To this amount (after step 3) is added approximately + 0-50% for each 
aggravating circumstance. 
 
Step 5: The size and diversification of the undertakings is taken into account either 
to substract or to add. 
 
Step 6: Statutory maximum applied (10% of the total annual consolidated turnover). 
 
Step 7: Leniency and settlement. 
 
Step 8: Inability to pay. 
 
b. Fining Practice 
 
A closer look to the fining practice of the FCA indicates that the amount of fines 
imposed on average seems higher than the average of financial penalties in the UK, 
for instance, to compare with an economy with a roughly equal size. The FCA is also 
very actively enforcing competition law, with a significantly higher number of 
decisions imposing fines than the OFT in the UK. Fines for cartel cases tend to be 
significant in some cases. For instance, the FCA imposed in 2011 a fine of €240.2 
million against Procter & Gamble, €92.3 million against Henkel and €35.4 million 
against Colgate Palmolive for their participation to a cartel involving the coordination 
of promotions and product offerings of laundry soap in French retail stores364. 
Equally, a fine of €117.4 million was imposed against Orange & France Telecom and 
€65.7 million against SFR for an abuse of a dominant position for price discrimination 
and foreclosure effect365, while €19 million was imposed against Nestle for an RPM 
and exclusivity clauses competition law infringement366. 
  
                                                     
364
 Decision N°11-1-17 of 8 December 2011. 
365
 Decision N°12-D-24 of 13 December 2012. 
366
 Decision N°12-D-10 of 20 March 2012. 
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Appendix 2: Issues to be addressed in guidelines/statutory regime on fines: a 
Comparative perspective 
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A. Calculating the Basic Amount of the Fine 
 
1. The Relevant Measure 
 
a. EU: Value of Sales 
 
For the calculation of the basic amount, first the value of the undertaking’s sales of 
goods to which the infringement directly or indirectly relates in the relevant 
geographic market within the European Economic Area367 will be determined (“value 
of sales”).368 As the Court noted in Team Relocations, “point 13 of the 2006 
Guidelines pursues the objective of adopting as the starting point for the calculation 
of the fine imposed on an undertaking an amount which reflects the economic 
significance of the infringement and the size of the undertaking’s contribution to it.”369 
 
It is important to note that the “goods to which the infringement directly or indirectly 
relates” are not restricted to those goods in respect of which it can be proved that the 
infringement had an effect,370 and they are also not synonymous with the relevant 
product market:371 Where the price level of products or services that belong to 
                                                     
367
  Where the nature of the infringement requires it, the market share of a wider market may be 
applied to overall sales within the EEA, para. 18 of the 2006 Fining Guidelines. This will be the 
case, for example, for world-wide market allocation cartels, where some participants may not 
have any sales, or only sales not representative for their impact, on markets within the EEA. For 
the corresponding practice under the 1998 Guidelines, see, e.g., Commission decision, 24 
January 2007, Case COMP/F/38.899 – Gas Insulated Switchgear, at recital 481: 
 Given the global character of the cartel arrangements, the worldwide sales figures give 
the most appropriate picture of the participating undertakings’ capacity to cause 
significant damage to other operators in the EEA. This approach is supported by the fact 
that the object of the cartel was, inter alia, to allocate markets on a worldwide level. Thus, 
the worldwide turnover of any given party to the cartel also gives an indication of its 
contribution to the effectiveness of the cartel as a whole or, conversely, of the instability 
which would have affected the cartel had it not participated. In fact, since it is concluded 
that a common understanding existed that the Japanese undertakings would refrain from 
competing on the European market, the Commission would substantially underestimate 
the role of the Japanese participants in the cartel if it were to rely on turnover data 
pertaining only to the EEA. The comparison is made on the basis of the worldwide 
product turnover in the last full year of the infringement for each undertaking. 
368
  Para. 13 of the 2006 Fining Guidelines. 
369
  Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber), 11 July 2013, Case C-444/11 P, Team Relocations v 
Commission [2013] ECR I-000 para. 76. 
370
  Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber), 11 July 2013, Case C-444/11 P, Team Relocations v 
Commission [2013] ECR I-000 paras 76-78. 
371
  It is true that the General Court in Team Relocations stated that “[t]he wording of point 13 
therefore relates to sales in the relevant market” (Judgment of the General Court, 16 June 2011, 
Joined Cases T-204/08 and T-212/08, Team Relocations v Commission [2011] ECR II-3569 para. 
63, pointing to the German language version of para. 6 of the 2006 Fining Guidelines), and the 
Court of Justice upheld the decision on this point (Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber), 11 
July 2013, Case C-444/11 P, Team Relocations v Commission [2013] ECR I-000 paras 80-81). 
However, the argument there was that para. 13 of the Guidelines referred to sales on the entire 
relevant product market, not only to that part of the product market that could be shown to be 
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another product market is influenced by the infringement, for example because the 
products or services that constitute the relevant product market serve as a reference 
point, the turnover with these products or services may be counted into the value of 
sales. 
 
b. US: 20% of the volume of affected commerce, 
 
As we have previously explained, the Sentencing Guidelines (SG) provide guidance 
on fines to organizations (and individuals) in the United States. Regarding Antitrust 
Offenses (bid rigging, price fixing and market allocation), Section 2R1.1.subsection 
(d) provides a special instruction for fines of organizations in order to define the base 
fine: “in lieu of the pecuniary loss”, as it is the case for other offenses without a 
special regime, the sentencing judge should use “20 percent of the volume of 
affected commerce”. This applies only to covert conspiracies that are intended to, 
and serve no purpose other than to, restrict output and raise prices, and that are so 
plainly anticompetitive that they have been recognized as illegal per se, without any 
inquiry in individual cases as to their actual competitive effect. Other antitrust 
offenses are not included, in view of the lack of consensus about their harmfulness. 
The 20 percent reflects the empirical basis of the guidelines at the time of their 
adoption (in 1987) that the average overcharge imposed by a price-fixing conspiracy 
is 10 percent. The Commission doubled the figure representing the average 
overcharge (10%) in order to account for losses, including customers who are priced 
out of the market (counterfactual customers). The Guidelines make the presumption 
of 10% overcharge almost conclusive. This forms one of the core assumptions of the 
antitrust part of the SG and their concern for deterrence although one may put 
forward that the percentage chosen underestimates the average overcharge and it 
should be set at a higher level372. The purpose of specifying a percent of the volume 
of commerce is to avoid the time and expense that would be required for the court to 
determine the actual gain or loss. As it is explained by the SG Commission’s 
commentary, the offense levels are not based directly on the damage caused or 
profit made by the defendant because damages are difficult and time consuming to 
establish, while the volume of commerce is an acceptable and more readily 
measurable substitute. Empirical evidence on pre-guidance practice has also shown 
that fines increased with the volume of commerce. In cases in which the actual 
                                                                                                                                                                     
affected by the infringement. Arguably neither the General Court nor the Court of Justice wanted 
to exclude the possibility, clearly indicated in footnote 1 accompanying para. 13 of the 2006 Fining 
Guidelines, that an infringement could indirectly relate to other product markets than the relevant 
product market to which it relates directly. 
372
 Connor, J.M., Lande, R.H. (2005) How High Do Cartels Raise Prices? Implications for Optimal 
Cartel Fines. Tulane L. Rev 80, 513, 516-518. 
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monopoly overcharge appears to be either substantially more or substantially less 
than 10 percent, this factor should be considered in setting the fine within the 
guideline fine range. The Commission’s commentary also notes that another 
consideration in setting the fine is that the average level of mark-up due to price-
fixing may tend to decline with the volume of commerce involved.  
 
This is not the only possibility offered to assess the base fine. The Antitrust Division 
at the DOJ may also use the Alternative Fine Statute for fining cartel related activities 
occurring after June 22, 2004373. This text provides two additional measures for the 
base fine: (i) the pecuniary gain to the organization from the offense and (ii) the 
pecuniary loss from the offense caused by the organization, to the extent the loss 
was caused intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly as a measure for the base fine. 
The Antitrust Division will thus choose the greatest of either the affected volume of 
commerce, the pecuniary gain to the organization by the offense or the pecuniary 
loss from the offense. Practically, the third alternative is almost always the one 
applied as it leads to the largest fine range, because of the existence of a 
presumption of the pecuniary loss caused by the defendant equal to 20% of the 
affected commerce for the purpose of applying the alternative fine provision of the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act. This leads the Antitrust Division to rely on the 
conspiracy’s volume of commerce (not just that of the individual defendant’s) and 
indicates that notwithstanding the option chosen the affected volume of commerce 
should be determined. 
 
c. Germany: 10% of Domestic Sales connected with the Infringement 
 
The 2013 Guidelines start with a generally assumed “gains and harm potential” of 
10% of the domestic sales of products or services “connected with”374 the 
infringement over its entire duration (the “relevant turnover”).375 Where the 
                                                     
373
  18 U.S. CODE § 3571. 
374
  This is the formulation the English translation of the Guidelines uses; it is likely that this is to be 
interpreted along the same lines as the “related to the infringement” in the 2006 European Fining 
Guidelines. 
375
 Para. 10 of the Guidelines. Note that, in contrast to the EU Guidelines, the duration of the 
infringement is integrated into the determination of the affected sales. Where there were no or 
lower sales due to the nature of the infringement (such as a market allocation or bid-rigging cartel 
for the undertaking submitting cover bids), the affected sales will be estimated with reference to 
the sales that would have been expected in the absence of the infringement (para. 11 of the 
Guidelines and the examples in the explanatory notes accompanying the Guidelines). Where the 
infringement lasted less than 12 months, para. 12 states that the calculation will be based on a 
period of 12 months, and that it is the 12 months prior to the end of the infringement that are 
relevant for the calculation. 
185 
 
infringement evidently had a higher potential for gain and/or harm, the proportion of 
the relevant turnover may exceptionally be set higher than 10%.376 
 
The relevant turnover is then multiplied by a factor that varies with the aggregate 
annual worldwide turnover of the undertaking i.e., the single economic entity, which 
may comprise several legal and/or natural persons; the relevant period is the 
financial year preceding the authority’s decision.377 Where this turnover is below 
€100 million, the factor is 2-3; where it is between €100 million and €1 billion, the 
factor is 3-4; between €1 billion and €10 billion, the factor is 4-5; between €10 billion 
and €100 billion, the factor is 5-6; and above €100 billion, the factor is greater than 6.  
 
Where the product of the relevant turnover multiplied by this factor is greater than the 
maximum statutory fine (10% of the aggregate worldwide turnover for intentional 
infringements or 5% for negligent infringements), the statutory maximum will be the 
relevant upper limit.378 Where the product of the relevant turnover multiplied by the 
factor is below the statutory threshold, this product will – absent special 
circumstances379 – constitute the relevant upper limit.380 
 
d. United Kingdom: the relevant turnover 
 
The starting point for determining the level of financial penalty is generally calculated 
by looking to the relevant (assumed) turnover of the undertaking, as well as the 
seriousness of the infringement381. With regard to the relevant turnover, this is 
defined in the Guidelines as “the turnover of the undertaking in the relevant product 
market and relevant geographic market affected by the infringement in the 
undertaking’s last business year”382. An undertaking’s last business year is the 
financial year preceding the date when the infringement ended. This introduces a 
change with regard to the 2004 Guidelines of the OFT, which took into account the 
year preceding the OFT’s decision. 
 
It has been suggested during the consultation leading to the adoption of the 2012 
Guidelines that a minimum starting point of 25% should be set. However, the 
                                                     
376
  Para. 15 of the Guidelines, and Explanatory Note, Comment 2 accompanying para. 10 of the 
Guidelines. 
377
  Para. 13 of the Guidelines with the accompanying Explanatory Note 4. 
378
  Para. 14 of the Guidelines and accompanying example 2 in the Explanatory Notes. 
379
  Para. 15 of the Guidelines. 
380
  Para. 14 of the Guidelines and accompanying example 1 in the Explanatory Notes. 
381
 OFT (CMA) Guidelines (2012), para. 2.3. The OFT Guidelines on financial penalties are also 
engaging the CMA and are published at the CMA’s website. 
382
  OFT (CMA) Guidelines (2012), para. 2.7. 
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proposal met with strong opposition and such minimum was not finally included in 
the Guidelines. 
 
e. France: affected sales  
 
The basic amount is set from the affected sales made during the ultimate full 
accounting year of participation in the infringement (see SG, §33 and s.)383. When 
bid-rigging is concerned, the FCA considers that a percentage on the global turnover 
is more appropriate than the value of the relevant market384.  
 
2. Whose Sales are Taken into Account?  
 
a. EU: The “Undertaking” and the Single Economic Unit 
 
It is “the undertaking’s” sales that are taken into account. It is “the undertaking” that 
infringes competition law. The concept of undertaking in European competition law 
may comprise two or more legal entities, provided they act as a single “economic 
unit.”385 Such a single economic unit exists where a parent company has exercised 
decisive influence, directly or indirectly, over a subsidiary.386 Where a parent 
company holds a 100%, or nearly 100%, shareholding, the exercise of decisive 
influence is rebuttably presumed.387 Where the presumption applies, the 
Commission may consider the “parent company as jointly and severally liable for 
payment of the fine imposed on its subsidiary, unless the parent company, which has 
the burden of rebutting that presumption, adduces sufficient evidence to show that its 
                                                     
383
 When the ultimate year is not representative, the FCA refers to several years. See, for instance, 
Decision N°12-D-02 of 12
th
 January, 2012, esp. §§176 and 177. 
384
 Decision N°13-D-09 of 17
th
 April, 2013, esp. §149. 
385
  Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber), 26 September 2013, Case C‑179/12 P, Dow Chemical v 
Commission [2013] ECR I-000 paras 52, 57; Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 19 July 
2012, Joined Cases C‑628/10 P and C‑14/11 P, Alliance One International & Another v 
Commission [2012] ECR I-000 para. 42; Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), 20 January 
2011, Case C-90/09 P, General Química SA and Others v Commission [2011] ECR I-1 para. 35; 
Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber), 10 September 2009, Case C‑97/08 P, AKZO Nobel v 
Commission [2009] ECR I-8237 para. 55. 
386
  Alliance One (supra note 385) para. 43:  
Specifically, the conduct of a subsidiary may be imputed to the parent company in particular 
where, although having a separate legal personality, that subsidiary does not decide 
independently upon its own conduct on the market, but carries out, in all material respects, 
the instructions given to it by the parent company, having regard in particular to the economic, 
organisational and legal links between those two legal entities (Case C‑97/08 P Akzo Nobel 
and Others v Commission [2009] ECR I‑8237, paragraph 58; Elf Aquitaine v Commission, 
paragraph 54, and Case C‑520/09 P Arkema v Commission [2011] ECR I‑8901, paragraph 
38). 
387
  Alliance One, supra note 385, paras 46-48; AKZO Nobel, supra note 385, para. 60; General 
Química, supra note 385, paras 39-41. 
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subsidiary acts independently on the market.”388 Where shareholdings are 
substantially below 100%, the presumption does not apply, and the Commission will 
have to adduce evidence for the actual exercise of decisive influence.389 To establish 
actual exercise, the Commission has to consider “the economic, organisational and 
legal links which tie that subsidiary to the parent company, which may vary from 
case to case and cannot therefore be set out in an exhaustive list”.390 
 
While the Commission Decision has to be addressed to specific legal entities, all 
legal entities forming a “single economic unit” and therefore belonging to the same 
“undertaking” are jointly and severally liable. The Commission has discretion whether 
to address the decision to a parent where these requirements for parental liability are 
met.391 Today, the Commission generally exercises this discretion in favour of 
addressing the decision also to the parent or parents. 
 
b. US: Person/Participant to the conspiracy or his principal 
 
According to the SG, the volume of commerce is the one done by the individual 
participant to a conspiracy or his principal in goods or services that were affected by 
the violation. When multiple counts or conspiracies are involved, the volume of 
commerce should be treated cumulatively to determine a single, combined offense 
level. Yet, such definition leaves an area of ambiguity, which is to define what portion 
of the commerce was in fact “affected” by the violation. 
 
c. Germany: The “Undertaking” and the Single Economic Unit 
 
§ 81(4) GWB, introduced by the 7th Amendment in 2005, that established the 10% 
turnover threshold in German law originally did not specify whose turnover was to be 
taken into account; the new § 81(4) GWB merely spoke of the turnover of the 
“undertaking”. This gave rise to a debate whether it one should use the company’s 
turnover, the turnover of the single economic unit, or the turnover of the entire 
corporate group. In 2007, the legislator inserted a clarification that the relevant 
turnover was the worldwide turnover of all the natural and legal persons acting as a 
                                                     
388
  Alliance One, supra note 385, para. 47 (with further references). 
389
  Dow Chemical v Commission, supra note 385, paras 58-70 (discussing when the parents of a 
50:50 joint venture are jointly and severally liable with the joint venture). 
390
  Alliance One, supra note 385, para. 45 (with further references). 
391
  See Alliance One, supra note 385, a case in which the Commission had chosen to forgo sole 
reliance on the “100% presumption” for most addressees and had instead relied on a “dual basis”, 
holding the parents only liable where there was evidence of actual influence. For one addressee, 
however, it had exclusively relied on the “100% presumption”. The Court considered this 
differential treatment of addressees in one and the same case to infringe the principle of equality. 
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single economic unit.392 The Grauzement judgment of the BGH later held that the 
added sentence about the single economic entity was a mere declaratory 
clarification and that the same result had already obtained under § 81(4) GWB in the 
2005 version, which had used the term “undertaking” that was to be interpreted with 
reference to the European concept of an undertaking that could comprise one or 
more legal entities forming a single economic unit.393 
 
d. United Kingdom: The “Undertaking” and the Single Economic Unit 
 
The relevant turnover taken into account is that of the undertaking found to infringe 
competition law. The undertaking in this context may include subsidiary entities as 
well. 
 
e. France: The Undertaking and the Single Economic Unit 
 
Only the sales made by the concerned legal entity are taken into account. A joint 
liability can be found when the parent company control the undertaking. Should a 
decisive influence of the parent company on the subsidiary established, the fact that 
the parent company was not involved in the antitrust practices is irrelevant394.   
 
3. Calculation of Relevant Sales/Turnover 
 
a. EU: Calculation of Relevant Sales 
 
The 2006 Guidelines state that the Commission will “normally take the sales made 
by the undertaking during the last full business year of participation in the 
infringement”395 – before VAT and other directly sales-related taxes – as a basis.396 
While the Commission has in some cases made use of this approximation permitted 
by the Guidelines for reasons of expediency, the Commission has in other cases 
                                                     
392
  Article 1 no. 17 of the Preismissbrauchsnovelle of 18 December 2007, BUNDESGESETZBLATT PART 
I 2007, p. 2966 (the same amendment also added that the turnover may be estimated, and 
specified that the guidelines under § 81(7) GWB may, in particular, provide guidance as to the 
amount of the fine).  
393
  BGH, 26 February 2013 – KRB 20/12, WuW/E DE-R 3861, para. 66-70 – Grauzement. 
394
 Decision N°13-D-12 of 28
th
 May, 2013, esp. §821. 
395
  Para. 13 of the 2006 Fining Guidelines. Paras 15 and 16 elaborate that the Commission will take 
the best available figures, and may make the determination on the basis of partial figures where 
the information are incomplete or unreliable.  
396
  Para. 17 of the 2006 Fining Guidelines. 
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taken into account the actual sales figures over the duration of the cartel where the 
data were easily accessible.397  
 
The value of sales includes the undertaking’s entire EEA-wide turnover of the goods 
to which the infringement relates, without deduction of input costs; the argument that 
the fine should be determined in relation only to the value added has been rejected 
by the Court, at least in the context of the 1998 Fining Guidelines.398  
 
An issue that has recently become extremely controversial and has not been dealt 
with consistently in the Commission practice is the inclusion or exclusion of “captive” 
(or “internal”) sales into the value of sales, that is, the sales by a vertically integrated 
undertaking to its subsidiaries (or parents, respectively). In its earlier practice, the 
Commission had consistently included the value of such captive sales into the value 
of sales. Vertically integrated undertakings challenged this practice as inflating their 
value of sales, arguing that cartel prices had not been applied to internal sales. 
These arguments were rejected by the Commission and the Court, among other 
things, because (1) the value of sales included not only sales that were affected by 
the infringement (see above), and (2) vertically integrated undertakings indirectly 
benefit from the cartel prices being applied to outsiders, because the non-application 
of cartel overcharges to the internal sales means that the subsidiary operating 
                                                     
397
  Commission Decision, 8 December 2010, Case COMP/39.309 – LCD at recital 384:  
The Commission normally takes into account the sales made by an undertaking during the 
last full business year of its participation in the infringement (point 13 of the Guidelines on 
fines). In this case, however, the actual relevant data can be established with relative ease for 
the entire duration of the infringement. Moreover, having regard to the exponential growth of 
the sales over the different years for all undertakings (except Hannstar, whose sales anyway 
fluctuated enormously), in deviation from normal practice and in line with claims submitted by 
some parties, it is appropriate to take the average annual value of sales (based on the actual 
sales over the entire duration of the infringement) as the basis for the 'value of sales' 
calculation. 
From a comparative perspective, it is noteworthy that the German 2013 Fining Guidelines (para. 
11) appear to require the determination of sales generally over the entire duration, although they 
point out that an estimation is permissible.  
398
  Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 8 December 2011, Case C-272/09 P, KME Germany v 
Commission [2011] ECR I-12789 paras 40-57, in particular 53 (“[scil.: A distinction between] net 
and gross turnover [...] would be difficult to apply and would give scope for endless and insoluble 
disputes, including allegations of unequal treatment.”). This case was decided under the 1998 
Fining Guidelines, but took the turnover on the relevant market into account in determining the 
gravity of the infringement, so that its conclusions may be indicative for the practice under the 
2006 Fining Guidelines as well. Indeed, it is said that the Commission’s Airfreight decision (Case 
COMP/39.258, a decision whose non-confidential version is not yet available, and appeals 
against which are currently pending before the General Court) used the argument in the context 
of the 2006 Fining Guidelines; see Khan, supra n.182. 
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downstream has a competitive advantage over its non-vertically integrated 
competitors on the downstream market.399  
 
Despite this approval by the Court of the Commission’s practice to include the 
internal sales into the value of sales, the Commission has excluded these internal 
sales of vertically integrated undertakings in a number of more recent decisions, 
starting with the Flat Glass decision.400 This time the undertakings that were not 
vertically integrated challenged the fining decisions addressed to them, arguing that 
(1) internal sales were to be included in the value of sales of vertically integrated 
undertakings, and (2) if they were not included in the value of sales for the vertically 
integrated undertakings, this was de facto amounting to a reduction in the fine that 
should, for reasons of equal treatment, also be applied to the fines of the 
undertakings that were not vertically integrated. The General Court in its Guardian 
judgment sided with the Commission, and found no error in the Commission’s 
exclusion of the value of the internal sales from the value of sales used for the 
calculation of the fines of the vertically integrated undertakings.401 On appeal to the 
Court of Justice, Advocate General Wathelet has recently argued that the General 
Court erred in upholding the decision of the Commission in so far as it excluded the 
internal sales from the calculation of the value of sales for the vertically integrated 
undertakings.402 It remains to be seen whether the Court agrees with this 
assessment by the Advocate General. 
 
b. US: Calculation of the volume of affected commerce 
 
As it was mentioned above, the SG retain the figure of 20% of the volume of the 
affected commerce as the starting point for setting the base fine. Much debate has 
followed the adoption of the SG on how the volume of commerce may be calculated. 
The SG do not provide much guidance on this issue. The prevailing practice has 
been to use only the volume of US commerce affected by the conspiracy, not that of 
                                                     
399
  See, e.g., Commission Decision, 3 December 2003, 2004/420/EC Case C/38.359 – Electrical & 
Mechanical Carbon & Graphite Products, paras 291-295 (upheld in Judgment of the Court of First 
Instance (Fifth Chamber), 8 October 2008, Case T-68/04, SGL Carbon v Commission [2008] ECR 
II-2511 and Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber), 12 November 2009, Case C-564/08 P, SGL 
Carbon v Commission [2009] ECR I-191*); see already Judgment of the Court, 16 November 
2000, Case C‑248/98 P (KNP BT v Commission), [2000] ECR I‑9641, para. 62. 
400
  Commission Decision, 28 November 2007, C(2007)5791, Case COMP/39.165 – Flat Glass.  
401
 Judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber), 27 September 2012, Case T-82/08 Guardian 
Industries Corp. & Guardian Europe S.à.r.l. v Commission, [2012] ECR II-000 (appeal pending, 
Case C-580/12 P).    
402
  Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, 29 April 2014, Case C-580/12 P, Guardian Industries 
Corp. and Guardian Europe S.à.r.l. v Commission. 
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the defendant403, when calculating that defendant’s SG fine range. So only the 
domestic commerce (sales within the US) affected by the illegal conduct is taken into 
account. Foreign sales have been used more as an aggravating factor requiring an 
increase in the fine. Yet, the factors attaching a sale to domestic commerce are 
unclear404. Potential relevant factors may include from the location and relationships 
between the manufacturing and sales arms of the defendants to the location of bank 
accounts from which money was transferred for the transaction, the location of 
contract negotiations and signing etc. The implementation of the domestic commerce 
criterion is particularly difficult in the context of a conspiracy involving international 
commerce, in view of the restrictive approach followed by the Supreme Court in 
Empagran wirh regard to the interpretation of the Foreign Trade Antitrust 
Improvements Act of 1982 (FTAIA), which defines the jurisdictional boundaries of the 
Sherman Act in cases involving international trade or commerce. As the Supreme 
Court explained in Empagran, US exporters (and firms doing business abroad) are 
not prevented from entering into business arrangements that are anticompetitive, as 
long as those arrangements adversely affect only foreign markets, mainly for 
reasons of comity405. These limits on the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act 
necessarily reduce the potential scope of the “volume of commerce” concept taken 
into account in setting penalties.  
 
The issue of what may be included in domestic commerce has been debated in 
courts, which have increasingly an important role to play in the setting of fines, 
despite the existence of SG, some taking an expansive approach, finding that there 
is a presumption that affected commerce includes all sales during the period of the 
conspiracy, without regard to whether individual sales were made at the target 
price406, while others reject this expansive approach finding that only sales above the 
competitive market price should be included in “volume of affected commerce”407, 
and others prefer a rebuttable presumption that all sales during the period of the 
conspiracy have been affected by the illegal agreement408. 
 
                                                     
403
 Hammond, S.D. Ass't Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice (Nov. 3, 2005) Statement on 
Behalf of the United States Department of Justice, Before the Antitrust Modernization 
Commission Hearings on Criminal Remedies, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/testimony/othertestimony.html.  
404
  For a discussion, see Mutchik, J.H., Casamassina, C.T., Rogers, B.A. (June 2008) The Volume of 
Commerce Enigma. The Antitrust Source. 1-10. 
405
  F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. V. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004); FTAIA, 15 U.S.C  §6a. 
406
 United States v. Hayter Oil CO., 51 F.3d 1265, 1273 (6th Cir. 1995). 
407
 United States v. SKW Metals & Alloys Inc., 195 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 1999). 
408
 United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 1999). 
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c. Germany: Calculation of the Relevant Turnover 
 
The relevant turnover is (generally) 10% of the domestic turnover achieved by the 
undertaking from the sale of the products or services connected with the 
infringement over the duration of the violation; it may be estimated.409  
 
The Bundeskartellamt applies § 38(1) GWB by analogy in order to calculate the 
relevant turnover, with the modification that sales between affiliated undertakings are 
included if they are connected with the infringement.410 § 38(1) GWB is the provision 
used for the calculation of turnover for purposes of merger control. It includes, by 
reference, the principles in § 277(1) of the Handelsgesetzbuch (Commercial Code, 
HGB). This provision states that turnover is the revenue from the sale or lease of 
products and goods that are typical for the usual activities of the corporation, and 
from services that are typical for the usual activities of the corporation, after the 
deduction of expenses and value-added tax. For financial institutions and insurance 
companies, § 38(4) GWB is applied by analogy.411 
 
Where the turnover to be expected in the ordinary course of events does not 
materialize “due to the nature of the infringement or an unforeseen course of 
development”, the turnover that would have been achieved in the ordinary course of 
events will be used.412 The Explanatory Notes give the example of a market-sharing 
cartel for a case where the “nature of the infringement” prevents the expected 
turnover from arising.413 As an example where an “unforeseen course of 
development” prevents the turnover from being achieved, the explanatory notes 
                                                     
409
  Paras 10-11, 15 of the German Guidelines.  
410
  Explanatory Note, Comment 4 accompanying para. 10 of the Guidelines. For the controversial 
question whether such “internal” or “captive” sales are to be considered under European Law, see 
the Flat Glass/Guardian case described in the National Report on the European Union. 
411
  Explanatory Note, Comment 4 accompanying para. 10 of the Guidelines. § 38(4) GWB provides 
(translation by the Bundeskartellamt):  
In the case of credit institutions, financial institutions and building and loan associations, the 
turnover shall be replaced by the total amount of the proceeds referred to in § 34 (2) sentence 
1 no. 1 point (a-e) of the Regulation on the Rendering of Accounts of Credit Institutions 
[Verordnung über die Rechnungslegung der Kreditinstitute] of 10 February 1992 (Federal Law 
Gazette [Bundesgesetzblatt] I p. 203), minus value added tax and other taxes assessed 
directly on the basis of such proceeds. In the case of insurance undertakings, the premium 
income in the last completed business year shall be relevant. Premium income shall be 
income from insurance and reinsurance business including the portions ceded for cover. 
412
  Para. 11, third sentence. 
413
  Example 1 in the explanatory note accompanying para. 11, third sentence, of the Guidelines. This 
example seems to assume that the undertaking to be fined was allocated a market (at least 
partially) outside the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
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adduce the example of collusive tendering that fails because the contract is awarded 
to a third party or the tendering process is abandoned.414  
 
d. United Kingdom: Calculation of the Relevant Turnover 
 
Relevant turnover is calculated after deducting sales rebates, VAT, and other taxes 
directly related to turnover. However, there is no need for the purposes of setting 
fines to proceed to a formal analysis of the relevant product market and the Courts 
have found sufficient for the OFT (CMA) “to be satisfied, on a reasonable and 
properly reasoned basis, of what is the relevant product market affected by the 
infringement415”. Indeed, as this was recognized by the English Courts, this is by 
nature a hypothetical test (assumed turnover, not real turnover) and it is not 
necessary for the turnover to have a connection with the infringement in question416.  
 
It is possible for the CMA to determine the turnover for the starting point by 
considering not only the relevant product market directly affected by the infringement 
but also the turnover in related products which may reasonably be considered to 
have been affected by the infringement. For instance, in Umbro the OFT included 
turnover in socks and shorts although the infringement only concerned shirts, under 
the justification that shirt prices had spill over effects on related products and they 
were sold together as a kit in the majority of cases417. 
 
As it is explained in the Guidelines, the CMA will base relevant turnover on figures 
from an undertaking’s audited accounts, although it is also acknowledged that in 
exceptional circumstances it might be appropriate to use a different figure as 
reflecting the true scale of an undertaking’s activities in the relevant market418. This 
is indeed the case where the remuneration for services supplied is based on 
commission fees. In these circumstances, the CMA will consider a number of factors, 
such as (i) whether the remuneration for the services is decided by the seller of the 
services or the client; (ii) whether the undertaking is purchasing inputs in order to 
supply a fresh product incorporating those inputs to its client; (iii) whether the person 
takes ownership of the goods and (iv) whether the person bears risks resulting from 
                                                     
414
  Example 2 in the explanatory note accompanying para. 11, third sentence, of the Guidelines. 
415
  Argos Limited v. Office of Fair Trading and JJB Sports plc v. Office of Fair Trading [2006] 
EWCA Civ 1318, para. 169, 170-173. See also Umbro Holdings Ltd v. OFT [2005] CAT 22, paras 
111-112; Quarmby Construction Company Limited & St James Securities Company Limited v. OFT, 
[2011] CAT 11, para. 160. 
416
  Umbro Holdings Ltd v. OFT [2005] CAT 22, paras 113-115. 
417
  Id. at para. 116. 
418
  OFT Guidelines (2012), para. 2.9. See Eden Brown Ltd and others v Office of Fair Trading [2011] 
CAT 8 (the Construction Recruitment Forum judgment), paras 44-59.   
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the operation of the business in question. Other particular circumstances may arise 
in the areas of credit, financial industries and insurance. In “relevant turnover is used 
to reflect the effective scale of activity of the undertaking and thus, where several 
undertakings are involved, to reflect the appropriate relationship between the 
penalties imposed on each of them” 419.  In other words, the CMA should be careful 
not to just look to turnover figures found in the undertaking’s audited accounts. It 
might be appropriate, additionally, to explore if there are more appropriate indicators 
of actual economic performance and activity of the business carried out by the 
undertaking in question. 
 
When enforcing articles 101 and 102 TFEU, the UK competition authorities take into 
account the effects in another Member State of the agreement or the unilateral 
conduct in question, hence considering turnover generated in another member State 
if the relevant geographic market is wider than the UK and it has the express 
consent of the relevant Member State or National Competition Authority for the 
particular case420. 
 
e. France: Calculation of the Relevant Sales 
 
Only (but all) sales realized in France are taken into account when the practices 
concern only France (see SG, §34). When the practices had an impact on the sales 
outside France, all the sales realized in the concerned foreign countries are taken 
into account421. 
When the defendant is a commercial agent or intermediary, the relevant reference is 
the amount of its commissions, not of the value of the sales made in the name of the 
principal422.  
The taxes are excluded. 
 
B. Determining the Basic Amount  
 
1. Gravity/Seriousness of the Infringement 
 
a. EU 
 
                                                     
419
 Eden Brown Limited v. OFT [2011] CAT 8, para. 44. 
420
  OFT Guidelines (2012), para. 2.10. 
421
 See for a market-share agreement between France and Germany, Decision N°12-D-09 of 13
th
 
March, 2012, esp. §779. Only the seriousness and the damage caused to the Economy 
established in France were taken into account. 
422
 Decision N°12-D-09 of 13
th
 March, 2012, esp. §§781 and 782. 
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Having calculated the value of sales, the gravity of the infringement will be assessed 
to determine the proportion of the value of sales to be considered in the setting of the 
fine. This proportion can, under the Guidelines, generally be set at up to 30 per cent 
of the value of sales.  
 
Factors determining this percentage include the “nature of the infringement, the 
combined market share of all undertakings concerned, the geographic scope, and 
whether the infringement has been implemented”.423 Beyond these factors, “all the 
relevant circumstances of the case” will be taken into account.424 
 
i. Nature of the Infringement 
 
Hardcore infringements, such as horizontal price fixing, market sharing and 
horizontal output limitations, are said to usually result in a percentage of the value of 
sales close to 30 per cent.425 However, despite this announcement the percentage in 
most cartel cases has only been set at between 15 and 20 per cent of the value of 
sales,426 with the decision in Marine Hoses being one of the few instances where the 
Commission went beyond this range and used a percentage of 25 per cent.427 
 
ii. Market Shares 
 
Market shares have a double role to play. First, the combined market shares of, for 
example, cartelists is an indication for a higher impact of the cartel on the market and 
undistorted competition. Secondly, the market share of the individual participants of 
an infringement used to serve as an indicator for a differentiation between the 
individual contributions of the participants.428 However, under the 2006 Fining 
                                                     
423
  Para. 22 of the 2006 EU Fining Guidelines. See also the factors mentioned in Judgment of the 
Court (Second Chamber), 8 December 2011, Case C-272/09 P, KME Germany v Commission 
[2011] ECR I-12789 paras 96-97; Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber), 11 July 2013, Case C-
444/11 P, Team Relocations v Commission [2013] ECR I-000 para. 100. 
424
  Para. 20 of the 2006 Fining Guidelines. 
425
  Ibid., para. 23. 
426
  See, e.g., Judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber), 14 May 2014, Case T-406/09, Donau 
Chemie v Commission [2014] ECR II-000, paras 26, 63 (noting that despite the Guidelines the 
percentage was set at only 17% and therefore closer to the middle of the range); Judgment of the 
Court, 11 July 2013, Case C-439/11 P, Ziegler SA v Commission, [2013] ECR I-000 at paras 117-
123 (noting that where the Commission set the percentage at 17% and accordingly “considerably 
below the upper limit of the scale ... for the most serious restrictions”, the addressee could not 
require a “particular explanation as to the choice of that percentage”); see also the parallel 
Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber), 11 July 2013, Case C-444/11 P, Team Relocations v 
Commission [2013] ECR I-000 paras 121-126. See also Khan, supra note 182, § 7-077. 
427
  Commission decision, 28 January 2009, Case COMP/39406 – Marine Hoses at recital 445.  
428
  See, e.g., Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) of 13 July 2011, Case T-38/07, Shell 
Petroleum v Commission [2011] ECR II-4383 para. 154 (“[B]y setting the starting amount of the 
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Guidelines, the market share will already directly affect the value of sales, so that an 
adjustment based on the market shares of the individual participants will usually not 
be indicated.429  
 
iii. Geographic scope 
 
The 2006 Guidelines mention the “geographic scope” as a factor in the determination 
of the gravity of the infringement. This is arguably a legacy from the 1998 Guidelines, 
where this factor was used in the categorization of an infringement as “minor”, 
“serious” or “very serious”.430 Under the 2006 Guidelines, the geographic scope will 
already be taken into account in the “value of sales”: a larger geographic scope will 
usually be automatically reflected in a higher value of sales.431 It is, however, 
possible that a comprehensive geographic coverage may take on a separate 
importance, for example because a global cartel may distort competition to a greater 
degree than is reflected in the (EEA-wide) value of sales. 
 
iv. Implementation 
 
Implementation of the infringement is not to be confused with an impact on the 
market. Neither the 2006 Guidelines nor the Court require the Commission to 
determine an impact on the market.432 The implementation of the infringement 
remains a factor to be considered for the determination of the gravity of the 
infringement under the 2006 Fining Guidelines, but this element is already fulfilled 
where, for example, a cartel agreement is acted upon, for example where an 
undertaking informs its employees or customers of (agreed) prices, or takes 
measures to supervise its own distributors’ or its competitors’ adherence to agreed 
prices.433 The enquiry into implementation does not entail an enquiry into actual 
effects on the market; even where an infringement is implemented, it is possible that 
there is no impact on the market.434 The Commission may additionally consider the 
actual effects of an infringement in the overall assessment, but is generally not 
                                                                                                                                                                     
fine at a higher level for those undertakings with a relatively larger market share than the others in 
the relevant market, the Commission took account of the actual influence of the undertaking on 
that market. That factor is the expression of the higher degree of responsibility of the undertakings 
with a relatively larger market share than the others in the relevant market for the damage caused 
to competition and, in the final analysis, to consumers by forming a secret cartel”).  
429
  Judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber), 14 May 2014, Case T-406/09, Donau Chemie v 
Commission [2014] ECR II-000, para. 106. 
430
  1998 Fining Guidelines Section 1.A.: Where the restriction affected “only a substantial but 
relatively limited part of the Community market”, this was an indication for a “minor” infringement; 
where the restriction had “effects in extensive areas of the common market”, this was an 
indication for a “serious” infringement. 
431
  See Khan, supra note 182, § 7-082. 
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obliged to do so, unless the undertaking can substantiate that there were no such 
effects on the market.435 Where the amount of gains improperly made as a result of 
the infringement is known, this will, under the 2006 Guidelines, be a reason to 
increase the fine.436  
 
b. US437 
 
As it was previously mentioned, only certain categories of antitrust offenses are 
subject to criminal penalties following the Sentencing Guidelines (for which there is 
“near universal agreement” that they can cause serious economic harm), such as 
horizontal price-fixing (including bid-rigging) and horizontal market allocation). For all 
other anticompetitive practices, other punitive and remedial tools, such as treble 
damages etc are available. Once the judge determines the volume of commerce and 
calculates the base fine (20%), the Organizational Guideline provides information on 
how to determine the firm’s final offense level by reference to some “culpability 
multipliers”.  
 
Under one of the special instructions in §2R1.1(d), the minimum multiplier must be at 
least 0.75, so the bottom of the Guidelines range will be at least 15% of the affected 
volume of commerce, although in most cases that will be higher. For antitrust 
offenses the culpability multipliers may vary between 0.75 and 4, thereby producing 
a total fine between 15 and 80% of the volume of commerce. The sentencing judge 
has to multiply the base fine amount by the minimum and maximum culpability 
multipliers to arrive at the fine range. The relevant “culpability multiplier” is derived 
from a table in the Guidelines Manual by reference to the organization’s “culpability 
score”438. For instance, a culpability score of 10 or more results in a minimum 
multiplier of 2.00 and a maximum multiplier of 4.00, while a lower culpability score of 
3 results in a minimum multiplier of 0.60 and a maximum multiplier of 1.20439. The 
maximum and minimum multipliers are then used to calculate the guideline fine 
                                                                                                                                                                     
432
  See Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 8 December 2011, Case C-272/09 P, KME 
Germany v Commission [2011] ECR I-12789 paras 29-36. 
433
  Judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber), 14 May 2014, Case T-406/09, Donau Chemie v 
Commission [2014] ECR II-000, paras 69-72.  
434
  Ibid. 
435
  Cf. ibid., paras 75-82; Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 8 December 2011, Case C-
272/09 P, KME Germany v Commission [2011] ECR I-12789 paras 29-36. 
436
  2006 EU Fining Guidelines, para. 31.  
437
 The developments draw partly on United States Sentencing Commission, Chapter Eight Fine 
Primer: Determining the Appropriate Fine Under the Organizational Guidelines (March 2013), 
available http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/primers/Primer_Organizational_Fines.pdf  
438
  USSG §8C2.6. 
439
  USSG §8C2.6. 
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range under §8C2.7. To find the organization’s culpability score, §8C2.5 instructs the 
judge to start with 5 and then add or subtract points based on the applicability of a 
number of factors set forth in that section. Hence, mitigating and aggravating 
circumstances are directly considered at the level of determining the guideline fine 
range, rather than as an adjustment to the base fine. Factors such as the duration of 
the infringement (and its effects) are in any case considered when examining the 
affected volume of commerce. In any case, no penalty can be less than 15% of the 
affected volume of commerce, no matter the culpability score that would otherwise 
apply. We will examine the culpability score, when we comment on mitigating and 
aggravating circumstances.  
 
The guideline fine range is determined by multiplying the base fine calculated under 
§8C2.4 by both the minimum multiplier calculated under §8C2.6, which yields the 
minimum of the guideline fine range, and by the maximum multiplier calculated under 
§8C2.6, which yields the maximum of the guideline fine range440. Courts may 
determine the appropriate fine amount between the minimum and maximum ranges 
resulting from application of the multiplier to the base fine. The court may depart up 
or down from the fine range due to various factors, including the risk presented by 
the offense to the integrity or continued existence of a market441, if the organization 
is a public entity442, or exceptional organizational culpability443. The policy statement 
at §8C2.8(a) instructs the sentencing court that, in determining the appropriate fine, 
the court must consider certain factors under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a) and 3572(a). 
These may include the following: (i) the defendant’s income, earning capacity, and 
financial resources, (ii) the burden that the fine will impose upon the defendant, any 
person who is financially dependent on the defendant relative to the burden that 
alternative punishments would impose, (iii) whether restitution is ordered or made 
and the amount of such restitution, (iv) the need to deprive the defendant of illegally 
obtained gains from the offense, (v) whether the defendant can pass on to 
consumers or other persons the expense of the fine, (vi) the size of the organization 
and any measure taken by the organization to discipline any officer, director, 
employee, or agent of the organization responsible for the offense and to prevent a 
recurrence of such an offense,  It is also mentioned that if, as a result of a conviction, 
the defendant has the obligation to make restitution to a victim of the offense, other 
than the United States, the court shall impose a fine or other monetary penalty only 
to the extent that such fine or penalty will not impair the ability of the defendant to 
                                                     
440
  USSG §8C2.7(a), (b). 
441
  USSG §8C4.5. 
442
 USSG §8C4.7. 
443
 USSG §8C4.11. 
199 
 
make restitution. An additional factor is whether the organization failed to have an 
effective compliance and ethics program at the time of the offense. The court may 
also consider the relative importance of any factor used to determine the fine range, 
so that a court is able to differentiate between cases that have the same offense 
level but differ in seriousness or between two cases with the same aggravating 
factors but where the factors vary in their intensity444. 
 
c. Germany 
 
Within the range between €5 (§ 17(1) OWiG) and the relevant upper limit as defined 
in paragraph 14 of the Guidelines, that is, the lower of (1) 10 per cent of the overall 
global turnover, or (2) 10 per cent of the relevant sales in Germany multiplied by a 
factor that depends on the overall global turnover, the Bundeskartellamt considers 
various criteria related to the offence itself and to the offender to determine the 
actual fine.  
 
Under the non-exhaustive list of examples in paragraph 16 of the Guidelines, 
offence-related criteria are:  
 
- the type and duration of the infringement,445  
- its qualitative effects (e.g. size of the geographic markets affected by the 
infringement, significance of the companies involved in the infringement on 
the markets affected),446  
- the importance of the markets (e.g. type of product affected by the 
infringement) and  
- the degree of organisation among the parties involved.  
 
Offender-related criteria are under the non-exhaustive list in the second bullet-point 
in paragraph 16 of the Guidelines:  
- the role of the company (undertaking?) within the cartel,  
- its position on the market affected,  
- specifics concerning the degree of value creation,  
                                                     
444
  USSG §8C2.8(b). 
445
  It should be noted that the duration would already appear to be included in the German 
Guideline’s definition of “relevant turnover”, so that it arguably cannot be taken into account in so 
far as it would lead to double counting. As to the type of infringement, the Guidelines further note 
that “[i]n the case of price-fixing and quota cartels, territorial and customer agreements and other 
similarly serious horizontal competition restraints, the fine will usually be set in the upper range.” 
446
  Again, one will have to avoid double counting: the size of the geographic market and the 
individual market share are generally already taken account of in the relevant turnover. The 
combined market share is likely to be of more relevance. 
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- the extent of intention/negligence,  
- previous infringements, and also 
- the company's (undertaking’s?) financial capacity. 
 
d. United Kingdom 
 
As it is explained in the CMA Guidelines (2012), the starting point, which is 
expressed as a percentage rate, will depend on the nature of the infringement. The 
more serious and widespread the infringement is, the higher the starting point is 
likely to be. The Guidelines list the following among the most serious infringements: 
price-fixing or market-sharing agreements and other cartel activities, but also serious 
infringements of the provisions on abuse of dominance position, such as predatory 
pricing447. The Guidelines apply a rate of up to 30% to an undertaking’s relevant 
turnover in order to reflect adequately the seriousness of the particular infringement 
and hence increase deterrence. It is also mentioned in the Guidelines that the CMA 
will use a starting point towards the upper end of the range for the most serious 
infringements of competition law, including hardcore cartels and “the most serious” 
abuses of dominant position448. This constitutes a significant change in comparison 
to the previous 2004 OFT Guidelines, in which the maximum starting point was 10%, 
with the result that financial penalties in UK competition law were significantly lower 
than those in the EU and other jurisdictions449. 
 
In determining the percentage rate, the CMA assesses the seriousness of the 
infringement, taking into account a number of (non-exhaustive) factors: 
 
- the nature of the product, 
- the structure of the market, 
- the market share(s) of the undertaking(s) involved in the infringement, 
- entry conditions and the effect on competitors and third parties 
                                                     
447
 OFT (CMA) Guidelines (2012), para. 2.4. For an example of predatory pricing as a serious 
infringement, see Aberdeen Journals Ltd v. Director General of Fair Trading (No2) [2003] CAT 11, 
para. 491. 
448
 OFT (CMA) Guidelines (2012), para. 2.5. 
449
 For a comparison, see OFT 1132, An assessment of discretionary penalties regimes (October 
2009), pp. 61-62 (noting that because of this lower maximum starting point UK fines were on 
average 65% lower than comparable EU fines when firms sales in the relevant market are 
between €50m and €170 m. The study also noted that the base fine as a proportion of firm sales 
in the relevant market started at 9.3% in the UK, while it was 21.5% in the EU and 20.0% in the 
US, after initial adjustments the average fine increasing to 12.1% in the UK, 26.5% in the EU and 
33% in the US). 
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- the need to deter other undertakings from engaging in such infringements in 
the future 
- the damage caused to consumers whether directly or indirectly will also be  
 
This assessment is made on a case-by-case basis for all types of infringement, 
taking into account “all the circumstances of the case”450. It was however made clear 
by the CAT that the profit or gain of the infringing party is not a relevant factor in 
fixing the penalty, as the CAT accepted that the penalty may be several times 
greater than the profit margin earned on the relevant products451. 
 
e. France 
 
The FCA takes into account the seriousness of the infringement, as well as the 
damages caused to the Economy. 
The seriousness of the infringement depends on (non-limitative list): 
- The nature of the competition restraint (systematic and the most important 
criteria); 
- Number of practices452; 
- The fact that a cartel is secret and intentional453; 
- The existence of a legal or factual monopoly454; 
- The fact that the offender was previously in charge of a legal monopoly455; 
- The existence of a monitoring of the cartel456; 
- The nature of the products457; 
- The legal framework458; 
- The existence of economic difficulties459; 
- An antitrust intent460; 
- The identity of the victims461; 
                                                     
450
  OFT (CMA) Guidelines (2012), para. 2.6. 
451
  Argos Ltd & Littlewoods Ltd v. OFT [2005] CAT 13 (judgment on penalty), para. 228. 
452
 Decision N°13-D-21 of 18
th
 December, 2013, esp. §536. 
453
 Decision N°12-D-09 of 13
th
 March, 2012, esp. §792. 
454
 Decision N°12-D-06 of 26
th
 January, 2012, esp. §232. 
455
 Decisions N°12-D-25 of 18
th
 December, 2012, esp. §679 ; N°13-D-20 of 17
th
 December, 2013, esp. 
§577. 
456
 Decisions N°12-D-09 of 13
th
 March, 2012, esp. §§795 and s. ; N°12-D-10 of 20
th
 March, 2012, esp. 
§252 (absence of measures of deterrence) ; N°13-D-12 of 28
th
 May, 2013, esp. §§916 and s. 
457
 Decision N°12-D-24 of 13
th
 December, 2012, esp. §§618 and 621. 
458
 Decision N°12-D-26 of 20
th
 December, 2012, esp. §§294-295. 
459
 Decision N°13-D-03 of 13
th
 February, 2013, esp. §328. 
460
 Decision N°13-D-06 of 28
th
 February, 2013, esp. §239 ; N°14-D-02 of 20
th
 February, 2014, esp. 
§360. For a notice sent by the competition authorities in order to alert the entities about the 
illegality of its behaviour: Decision N°13-D-03 of 13
th
 February, 2013, esp. §§ 419 and s. 
461
 Taking into account that infringements concern public resources: Decisions N°13-D-14 of 11
th
 
June, 2013, esp. §170 ; N°13-D-21 of 18
th
 December, 2013, esp. §533 (Public heath). 
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- ... 
However, a buying power of the victims is not relevant to mitigate the seriousness462. 
The damages caused to the Economy depend on (non-limitative list): 
- The value of the relevant market; 
- The combined market shares of the offenders463; 
- The impact of the practices on the market464; 
- The price elasticity of the demand465; 
- Barriers to entry466; 
- The duration of the infringement467; 
- Characteristics of the relevant economic sector468; 
- ... 
 
2. Duration 
 
a. EU 
 
Under the 2006 Fining Guidelines, the percentage of the value of sales determined 
in this way will be multiplied by the number of years of participation in the 
infringement,469 in contrast to the mere adjustment under the 1998 Fining 
Guidelines.470  
 
This is arguably the most important change from the 1998 Fining Guidelines.471 The 
General Court conceded that the way in which the duration is taken into account 
under the 2006 Fining Guidelines constituted “a fundamental change in methodology 
as to how the duration of a cartel is taken into consideration”, but it added that 
                                                     
462
 Decision N°12-D-27 of 20
th
 December, 2012, esp. §242. 
463
 Decision N°12-D-09 of 13
th
 March, 2012, esp. §801. 
464
 Decision N°12-D-06 of 26
th
 January, 2012, esp. §243 (price increase) and §250 (necessity to lunch 
a new tender).  
465
 Decisions N°12-D-06 of 26
th
 January, 2012, esp. §248 ; N°12-D-09 of 13
th
 March, 2012, esp. §810 
; N°12-D-10 of 20
th
 March, 2012, esp. §260. 
466
 Decisions N°12-D-06 of 26
th
 January, 2012, esp. §251; N°12-D-25 of 18
th
 December, 2012, esp. 
§694 ; N°14-D-02 of 20
th
 February, 2014, esp. §366. 
467
 Decision N°12-D-24 of 13
th
 December, 2012, esp. §§632 and 664. 
468
 Decision N°12-D-24 of 13
th
 December, 2012, esp. §§639 and s. 
469
  Fractions of an entire year will be considered in the following way: 0<fraction≤6 months will be 
counted as half a year, 6<fraction≤12 months will be counted as one year. Para. 24, second 
sentence, of the 2006 EU Fining Guidelines. The Commission has, however, used the actual 
number of months, rather than rounding them up in some cases. See Kerse & Khan, supra note 
182, § 7-087, quoting from Case COMP/39.258 – Airfreight at recital 1189 (currently there is no 
non-confidential version of this decision available). 
470
  As described above, the adjustment under the 1998 Guidelines was essentially 10% per year; 
under the 2006 Guidelines, the adjustment is 100% per year. 
471
  Cf. Wils, supra n.130 at 281.  
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“Article 23(3) of Regulation No 1/2003 does not, however, preclude such a 
development”; the General Court noted that while the French-language version of 
Regulation 1/2003 seems to accord higher weight to the gravity of the infringement 
than to its duration, the German- and English-language versions of the Regulation 
accord equal weight to gravity and duration.472 
 
b. US 
 
The duration is already taken into account in the affected volume of commerce, 
because it is the affected volume of commerce “over the entire duration” of the 
infringement that is relevant. 
 
c. Germany 
 
The duration is already taken into account in the relevant turnover, because it is the 
turnover “over the entire duration” of the infringement that is relevant.473  
 
d. UK 
 
The second step in setting financial penalties in the UK is the adjustment for 
duration. The Guidelines note that penalties for infringements which last for more 
than one year may be multiplied by not more than the number of years of the 
infringement. For agreements/collusive practices the duration commences from the 
date of the agreement rather than the date the agreement comes into effect474. 
 
e. France 
 
The duration of the infringement is taken into account through a multiplication by 
number of years: SG, §42: “The proportion set by the Autorité is applied, for the first 
full year of participation of each undertaking or entity at stake in the infringement, to 
the value of the sales made during the full accounting year of reference, and, for 
each of the following years, to half of this value. Beyond the last full year of 
                                                     
472
  Judgment of the General Court, 16 June 2011, Joined Cases T-204/08 and T-212/08, Team 
Relocations v Commission [2011] ECR II-3569 para. 109. On appeal, the Court of Justice 
considered the relevant ground of appeal to be partially inadmissible. Judgment of the Court 
(Third Chamber), 11 July 2013, Case C-444/11 P, Team Relocations v Commission [2013] ECR I-
000 paras 132-136. 
473
  This appears to be a difference to the European Guidelines, according to which the preceding 
financial year’s turnover is multiplied by the number of years, but in European practice, the 
Commission also uses the actual turnover data where they are available.  
474
 Umbro Holdings Ltd v. OFT [2005] CAT 22, para. 184. 
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participation in the infringement, the remaining duration is taken into account by the 
month, insofar as the elements in the case-file make it possible to do so”. 
When several infringements are found, the FCA can take into account the 
converging period of all the infringements475. However, the FCA can decide to 
impose several fines, one by infringement476. 
The FCA can take into account the duration of the antitrust effect, and not only the 
duration of the practices477. 
 
3. Additional amount (“entry fee”) 
 
a. EU 
 
In cases of hardcore infringements (and possibly beyond), a so-called “entry fee” of 
15-25 per cent of the value of sales will additionally be included in order to be able to 
fine these infringements even where they are detected prior to, or soon after, 
implementation.478 The Commission practice, sanctioned by the Court, frequently 
uses the same percentage factor for the entry fee as it does for the determination of 
the percentage of the value of sales to be taken into account.479 With regard to the 
hardcore restrictions enumerated in paragraph 25, the addition of the entry fee is 
automatic.480 
 
b. US 
 
As it was previously mentioned, a multiplier range of at least 0.75 is applied to 
antitrust offenses, no matter the culpability score, for deterrence purposes, leading to 
a fine of at least 15% of the affected volume of commerce in any circumstance. 
 
                                                     
475
 Decision N°12-D-25 of 18
th
 December, 2012, esp. §719 
476
 Decisions N°12-D-27 of 20
th
 December, 2012, esp. §219 ;  N°13-D-12 of 28
th
 May 2013, esp. 
§887. 
477
 Decision N°13-D-21 of 18
th
 December, 2013, esp. §628. 
478
  2006 Fining Guidelines, para. 25. 
479
  See, e.g., Judgment of the Court 11 July 2013, Case C-439/11 P, Ziegler SA v Commission 
[2013] ECR I-000 at paras 117-124, concluding, at para. 124, in relation to the “additional amount” 
(= the entry fee): “The General Court was therefore entitled to refer ... to its analysis of the 
reasons given for the percentage figure used to determine the basic amount of the fine.” Cf. 
Judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber), 14 May 2014, Case T-406/09, Donau Chemie v 
Commission [2014] ECR II-000 paras 8, 9, 25, 26, 63. 
480
  Judgment of the General Court, 16 June 2011, Joined Cases T-204/08 and T-212/08, Team 
Relocations v Commission [2011] ECR II-3569 para. 117, upheld in Judgment of the Court (Third 
Chamber), 11 July 2013, Case C-444/11 P, Team Relocations v Commission [2013] ECR I-000 
paras 140-141. 
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c. Germany 
 
The German Guidelines do not add an entry fee; however, they count any 
infringement lasting less than 12 months as having a duration of 12 months,481 which 
achieves a similar, albeit not identical effect. 
 
d. UK 
 
There is no entry fee. However, part years are treated as full years and where the 
total duration of an infringement is less than 12 months that duration is treated as a 
full year. In exceptional circumstances, the starting point may be decreased where 
the duration of the infringement is less than one year. Finally, if the infringement is 
more than one year, part years will be rounded up to the nearest quarter year, 
although in exceptional cases it will be possible to round up the part year to a full 
year482. 
 
e. France 
 
There is no entry fee. 
 
4. Adjustments for aggravating circumstances 
 
a. EU 
 
The adjustments for aggravating and mitigating circumstances are similar to the 
ones in the 1998 Guidelines.  
 
Aggravating factors are, in particular, recidivism, that is the continuation or repetition 
of “the same or a similar infringement” after a finding of an infringement; a refusal to 
cooperate or obstruction of investigations; the role as a leader or instigator; and any 
steps to coerce or retaliate against other undertakings. 
 
i. Recidivism 
 
Recidivism is said to be “the most commonly invoked aggravating factor”.483  
 
                                                     
481
  Para. 12 of the Guidelines. 
482
  OFT (CMA) Guidelines (2012), para. 2.12. 
483
  Khan, supra note 182, § 7-109. 
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One potentially significant difference to the 1998 Fining Guidelines is that under the 
2006 Fining Guidelines the increase for recidivism concerning “the same or a similar 
infringement” is now specified to be “up to 100%” of the basic amount “for each such 
infringement established”. In practice, the Commission appears more likely to 
impose an increase of approximately 50% where there is one such infringement, and 
30% of the basic amount for each such infringement where there is more than one, 
and 100% for four prior infringements.484  
 
It should be noted that the “same or similar infringement” is interpreted broadly. First, 
where the practice before the Court falls under Article 101 TFEU, any and all prior 
Article 101 TFEU infringements appear to be interpreted as being “the same or 
similar infringement”, and the same is true, mutatis mutandis, for Article 102 TFEU 
infringements.485 Second, the 2006 Fining Guidelines envisage taking account not 
only of previous cases in which the European Commission found an infringement, 
but also of cases in which national competition authorities made such a finding.  
 
It is controversial whether the absence of any time limitation for taking account of 
infringements in the distant past is problematic. Even quite old findings of 
infringements have been taken into account, at least where there was some personal 
continuity in the undertaking between the time of the prior infringement and the 
infringement in question.486 The Court has emphasized, however, that the lapse of 
time between the infringements may be taken into account in assessing the 
tendency to infringe competition law in each individual case, and that the principle of 
proportionality obliges the Commission and the Courts to consider this point.487  
                                                     
484
  Wils, W.P.J. (2012) Recidivism in EU Antitrust Enforcement: A Legal and Economic Analysis. 
World Competition. 35(1), 5; Khan, supra n.182, § 7-108. 
485
  Khan, supra n.182, § 7-101. 
486
  Wils, supra n.485 at 15-17 (discussing, inter alia, Judgment of the Court, 8 February 2007, Case 
C-3/06 P, Danone v Commission [2007] ECR I-1331, paras 37-39; Judgment of the Court 
(Second Chamber), 17 June 2010, Case C-413/08 P, Lafarge v Commission [2010]  ECR I-5361, 
paras 66-75). 
487
  See Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 17 June 2010, Case C-413/08 P, Lafarge v 
Commission [2010]  ECR I-5361, paras 69/70: 
  [T]he Court there [scil.: in Danone] emphasised that the Commission may, in each individual 
case, take into consideration the indicia which confirm an undertaking’s tendency to infringe 
competition rules, including, for example, the time that has elapsed between the 
infringements in question (Groupe Danone v Commission, paragraph 39). Moreover, the 
principle of proportionality requires that the time elapsed between the infringement in question 
and a previous breach of the competition rules be taken into account in assessing the 
undertaking’s tendency to infringe those rules. For the purposes of judical review of the 
Commission’s measures in matters of competition law, the General Court and, where 
appropriate, the Court of Justice may therefore be called upon to scrutinise whether the 
Commission has complied with that principle when it increased, for repeated infringement, the 
fine imposed, and, in particular, whether such increase was imposed in the light of, among 
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ii. Refusal to Cooperate or Obstruction of Investigations 
 
The 2006 Guidelines mention the refusal to cooperate and the obstruction of 
investigations as aggravating circumstances. It is alternatively possible to impose 
separate fines for procedural infringements of up to 1% of the relevant turnover 
under Article 23(1) Regulation 1/2003, and it has been argued with good reason that 
this is today the preferable approach with regard to refusals to cooperate or 
obstructions of investigations where they do not affect the gravity of the substantive 
infringement.488 The practice of increasing the basic amount of the substantive fine 
for such procedural infringements developed under Article 15(1) Regulation 17 of 
1962, which provided for a maximum fine of €5,000. The practice of increasing the 
substantive fine was arguably a circumvention of this clearly inadequate 
maximum.489 Since the maximum fine for procedural infringements has been 
increased to 1% of the overall turnover, this reason for treating procedural 
infringements as an aggravating factor in setting the substantive fine has 
disappeared. Nevertheless, the Court continues to allow the Commission to choose 
to consider procedural infringements as aggravating factors for the substantive fine 
instead of fining them separately.490  
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
other things, the time elapsed between the infringement in question and the previous breach 
of the competition rules. 
488
  Khan, supra n.182, §§ 7-031, 7-111. For an example of a procedural infringement that did have 
an impact on the gravity of the substantive infringement, see ibid., footnote 53 (SGL Carbon’s 
informing of its co-conspirators to continue the operation of the cartel). 
489
  But see Judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) 27 September 2012, Case T-357/06, 
Koninklijke Wegenbouw Stevin BV v Commission [2012] ECR II-000, paras 247-251 (upheld in 
Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 19 December 2013, Case 586/12 P, Koninklijke 
Wegenbouw Stevin BV v Commission [2013] ECR I-000), rejecting the accusation that the 
Guidelines’ use of obstruction as an aggravating circumstance intended the circumvention of the 
€5,000 limit. 
490
  Judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) 27 September 2012, Case T-357/06, Koninklijke 
Wegenbouw Stevin BV v Commission [2012] ECR II-000, paras 247-251 (upheld in Judgment of 
the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 19 December 2013, Case 586/12 P, Koninklijke Wegenbouw Stevin 
BV v Commission [2013] ECR I-000); Judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber), 24 
March 2011, Case T-384/06, IBP v Commission [2011] ECR II-1177 paras 109:  
The fact that Regulation No 1/2003 allows the Commission to impose a fine of a maximum of 
1% of an undertaking’s turnover for obstruction or for the supply of false or misleading 
information in response to a request for information, as an autonomous infringement, does 
not mean that it cannot be taken into account as an aggravating circumstance (see, to that 
effect, Case C‑308/04 P SGL Carbon v Commission [2006] ECR I‑5977, paragraph 64). 
However, if conduct is classified under one of those heads, it cannot at the same time be 
classified under the other. 
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A refusal to cooperate may, of course, only be considered as an aggravating factor 
where the undertaking is legally obliged to cooperate, and not where the rights of 
defence permit a refusal to cooperate.491 
 
iii. Leader, Instigator, Coercer 
 
The Guidelines also consider the role as “leader in, or instigator of, the infringement”, 
“steps taken to coerce other undertakings to participate” and “retaliatory measures 
taken against other undertakings” as aggravating circumstances. “Instigator” and 
“leader” refer to different concepts. Increases for either role or both roles have been 
in the region of 30-50 per cent.  
 
An “instigator” is an undertaking that initiates an infringement or encourages others 
to join it. As the General Court explained in Shell: 
 
[I]n order to be classified as an instigator of a cartel, an undertaking must 
have persuaded or encouraged other undertakings to establish the cartel or to 
join it. By contrast, it is not sufficient merely to have been a founding member 
of the cartel. That classification should be reserved to the undertaking which 
has taken the initiative, if such be the case, for example by suggesting to the 
other an opportunity for collusion or by attempting to persuade it to do so 
(BASF v Commission, paragraph 140 above, paragraph 321). The Courts of 
the European Union do not however require the Commission to have 
information regarding the development or the detailed planning of the cartel. 
Lastly, the Courts of the European Union have made it clear that instigation is 
concerned with the establishment or enlargement of a cartel (BASF v 
Commission, paragraph 140 above, paragraph 316), and it is therefore 
conceivable that several undertakings might simultaneously play a role of 
instigator within the same cartel.492 
 
A “leader” is an undertaking that is a “significant driving force”. As the General Court 
explained in more detail in Siemens:  
                                                     
491
  Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 28 June 2005, Joined Cases C-189/02 P, C-205/02 P 
and C-213/02 P, Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission [2005] ECR I-5425 paras 348-353 
(on the equivalent provision in the 1998 Fining Guidelines). 
492
  Judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber), 27 September 2012, Case T-343/06, Shell 
Petroleum & Others v Commission) [2012] ECR II-000 para. 155. The Commission had increased 
the basic amount by 50 per cent for SNV’s role as leader and instigator of the cartel. The General 
Court held that the role of SNV as instigator and leader was not sufficiently established. The 
application to appeal has been withdrawn, see Order of the President, 11 April 2013, Case C-585 
P.  
209 
 
According to the case‑law, in order to be classified as a ‘leader’ in a cartel, an 
undertaking must have been a significant driving force for the cartel (BASF v 
Commission, paragraph 311 above, paragraph 374, and Case T‑410/03 
Hoechst v Commission [2008] ECR II‑881, paragraph 423) and have borne 
individual and specific liability for the operation of the cartel (see, to that 
effect, BASF v Commission, paragraph 311 above, paragraph 300). That 
factor must be assessed in the light of the overall context of the case (see, to 
that effect, BASF v Commission, paragraph 311 above, paragraphs 299 and 
373). The classification as ‘leader’ has been established when the 
undertaking carried out the duties of coordinator within the cartel and, in 
particular, organised and staffed the secretariat responsible for the actual 
implementation of the cartel (Case T‑224/00 Archer Daniels Midland and 
Archer Daniels Midland Ingredients v Commission [2003] ECR II‑2597, 
‘ADM’, paragraphs 246 and 247), or when that undertaking played a central 
role in the actual operation of the cartel, for example by organising numerous 
meetings, by collecting and distributing information within the cartel, by taking 
responsibility to represent certain members within the cartel or most often 
formulating proposals relating to the operation of the cartel (see, to that effect, 
Joined Cases 96/82 to 102/82, 104/82, 105/82, 108/82 and 110/82 IAZ 
International Belgium and Others v Commission [1983] ECR 3369, 
paragraphs 57 and 58, and BASF v Commission, paragraph 311 above, 
paragraphs 404, 439 and 461).493 
 
Coercive or retaliatory conduct, in the form of economic pressure or even physical 
violence, has led to increases of some 30 per cent.494  
 
iv. Other aggravating factors  
 
                                                     
493
  Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) of 3 March 2011, Case T-110/07, Siemens AG 
v Commission [2011] ECR II-477 para. 337 (upheld in Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber), 
19 December 2013, Joined cases C-239/11 P, C-489/11 P and C-498/11 P, Siemens AG and 
others v Commission [2013] ECR I-000). 
494
  See, e.g., Commission Decision 2003/600/EC, 2 April 2003, Case COMP/C.38.279/F3, [2003] 
Official Journal L 209/12 – French Beef, recital 173; substantially upheld (the only modification 
was that the Court considered the exceptional circumstances of the mad cow crisis to justify a 
reduction of 70% instead of the 60% applied by the Commission) in Judgment of the Court of First 
Instance (First Chamber) of 13 December 2006, Joined cases T-217/03 and T-245/03, Fédération 
nationale de la coopération bétail et viande (FNCBV) and others v Commission [2006] ECR II-
4987, in particular paras 273-290, describing, inter alia, blockades of abattoirs by farmers and the 
attack on refridgerators; upheld in Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber), 18 December 2008, 
Joined Cases C-101/07 P and C-110/07 P, Coop de France bétail et viande and others v 
Commission [2008] ECR I-10193. 
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The list of aggravating factors in the 2006 Guidelines is not exhaustive. One of the 
more important “innominate” factors is the continuation of an infringement after the 
undertakings have been informed of investigations.495  
 
b. US496 
 
The US SG put forward a number of factors to determine the “culpability score” of 
the organization having committed the antitrust offense. Although these factors do 
not operate as aggravating and mitigating circumstances leading to the adjustment 
of the fine, but form inherent part of the calculation of the guidelines fine range, we 
will examine them briefly, by focusing here on the factors that add points to the 
culpability score (upwards adjustments), as opposed to those that led to a point 
reduction (downwards adjustment), which we will explore in the part on mitigating 
circumstances. 
 
i. Recidivism 
 
Recidivism in infringing antitrust, in particular by participating to cartels, has been an 
important concern for US antitrust scholarship. Ginsburg and Wright (2010), for 
instance, observed that, over just the past few decades, several companies were 
convicted more than once in the United States for engaging in cartel activity, 
suggesting that there is a problem with recidivism497. In contrast, other authors, 
Werden, Hammond & Barnett (2011) searched U.S. enforcement records for 
instances of cartel recidivism and found none at all since July 1999 when the first 
non-U.S. national was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for participation in 
international cartel activity, thus indicating the effectiveness of anti-cartel 
enforcement in the United States498.  
 
                                                     
495
  See ibid.: the undertakings continued their infringement in secret, after having promised to the 
Commission that the infringement would cease. The Commission applied an increase of 20 per 
cent with the approval of the CFI (recital 174 of the Commission Decision in French Beef, para. 
271 of the Judgment of the Court of First Instance in FNCBV). 
496
 The developments draw partly on United States Sentencing Commission, Chapter Eight Fine 
Primer: Determining the Appropriate Fine Under the Organizational Guidelines (March 2013), 
available at: 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/primers/Primer_Organizational_Fines.pdf.  
497
 Ginsburg, D.H., Wright, J.D. (Autumn 2010) Antitrust Sanctions. Competition Policy Int’l. 3, 15; See 
also Connor, J.M. (Autumn 2010) Recidivism Revealed: Private Int’l Cartels: 1990-2009. 
Competition Policy Int’l. 101. 
498
 Werden, G., Hammond, S.D., Barnett, B.A. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Antitrust Div. (Sept. 22, 2011) 
Recidivism Eliminated: Cartel Enforcement in the United States Since 1999. Address Before the 
Georgetown Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium, available at: 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/275388.pdf.  
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Notwithstanding which of the two theses is true, prior history of infringement is 
considered as a factor increasing upwards the culpability score. According to §8C2.5 
of the Sentencing Guidelines Manual: 
 
“If the organization (or separately managed line of business) committed any 
part of the instant offense less than 10 years after (A) a criminal adjudication 
based on similar misconduct; or (B) civil or administrative adjudication(s) 
based on two or more separate instances of similar misconduct, add 1 point; 
 
Or 
 
(2) If the organization (or separately managed line of business) committed any 
part of the instant offense less than 5 years after (A) a criminal adjudication 
based on similar misconduct; or (B) civil or administrative adjudication(s) 
based on two or more separate instances of similar misconduct, add 2 
points”499. 
 
ii. Refusal to Cooperate or Obstruction of Investigations 
 
Obstruction of justice constitutes the fourth aggravating factor that increases the 
culpability score500. Under this provision, if the organization wilfully obstructed or 
impeded, attempted to obstruct or impede, or aided, abetted or encouraged 
obstruction of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the 
instant offense, the court adds three points to the organization’s culpability score. 
This three-point enhancement is also applicable if the organization knew of such 
obstruction or impedance or attempted obstruction or impedance and failed to take 
reasonable steps to prevent it. 
 
Similarly, the third aggravating factor listed in the US SG increases the culpability 
score by one or two points if the commission of the instant offense violated a judicial 
order or injunction, or the organization violated a condition of probation501. 
 
iii. Participation of high-level or substantial authority personnel in 
the infringement 
 
                                                     
499
 USSG §8C2.5(c)(1)-(2). 
500
 USSG §8C2.5(e). 
501
 USSG §8C2.5(d)(1)-(2). 
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This aggravating factor concerns high-level or substantial authority personnel in 
organizations of varying sizes who participate in, condone, or are wilfully ignorant of 
criminal activity502. The organization’s culpability score is increased by between one 
and five points depending on the number of employees in the organization or unit of 
the organization and the involvement of individuals who are either within high-level 
personnel or substantial authority personnel. The commentary to the guidelines 
define the terms “high-level personnel” and “substantial authority personnel.” “High-
level personnel” means individuals who have substantial control over the 
organization or who have a substantial role in the making of policy within the 
organization, such as directors, executive officers, individuals in charge of sales, 
administration, or finance, and individuals with substantial ownership interests503. 
“Substantial authority personnel” means individuals who within the scope of their 
authority exercise a substantial measure of discretion in acting on behalf of an 
organization, such as plant managers, sales managers, individuals with authority to 
negotiate or set price levels, or individuals authorized to negotiate or approve 
significant contracts504. 
 
c. Germany 
 
The German Guidelines do not separately discuss aggravating circumstances. 
However, such circumstances would arguably be taken into account as “innominate” 
considerations under paragraph 16 of the 2013 Fining Guidelines. 
 
i. Recidivism 
 
With regard to recidivism, the Higher Regional Court Düsseldorf explained in 
Grauzement that the Court (in contrast to the Bundeskartellamt) had in previous 
cases not taken account of prior infringements of a similar nature, but indicated that, 
in principle, it would be willing to do so in the future.505  However, in contrast to the 
European Union, prior infringements can only be taken into account under restrictive 
time-limitations: § 153(6) of the Gewerbeordnung (Trade Regulations Act, GewO) 
prohibits taking account of infringements that have been entered into the 
Commercial Register but have expired.506 Infringements generally expire after 5 
                                                     
502
  USSG §8C2.5(b)(1)-(5). 
503
  USSG §8A1.2, comment. (n.3(B)). 
504
  USSG §8A1.2, comment. (n.3(C)). 
505
  OLG Düsseldorf, 26 June 2009, VI-2a Kart 2 - 6/08 OWi, 
http://www.justiz.nrw.de/nrwe/olgs/duesseldorf/j2009/VI_2a_Kart_2___6_08_OWiurteil20090626.
html, para. 409. 
506
  Ibid. 
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years, and are expunged one year thereafter.507 While European fines decisions are 
not entered into the register, the rules on expiry are applied by analogy.508  
 
ii. Refusal to Cooperate 
 
In general, this aspect will not be an aggravating factor under German law, because 
the accused is generally not required to contribute to its conviction (nemo tenetur se 
ipsum prodere); there is no general duty to cooperate as there is under Regulation 
1/2003 in the European Union. 
 
iii. Leader, instigator of the infringement  
 
This is taken into account as an offender-related criterion under para. 16 of the 
Fining Guidelines. 
 
d. UK 
 
The third step in the calculation of financial penalty is to increase the penalty based 
on aggravating factors. According to the CMA Guidelines, aggravating factors 
include the following: 
 
i. Recidivism 
 
Repeated infringements by the same undertaking or other undertakings in the same 
group may constitute an aggravating factor. The Guidance of the CMA clarifies that 
where the CMA, concurrent regulators or the European Commission have previously 
issued a decision relating to the same or similar infringements in the preceding 15 
years, this may result in the amount (following the application of steps 1 and 2) being 
increased y up to 100%. The prior infringements are taken into account only where 
they had an impact in the UK. According to the 2012 Guidance, infringements are 
the “same or similar” where they fall under the same provision of the CA98 or 
equivalent provision of the TFEU. For instance, an infringement decision under the 
Chapter I prohibition or Article 101 could be counted as a ‘same or similar’ 
infringement when assessing the penalty for another infringement of Chapter I or 
                                                     
507
  § 153(1) no 2, (5) GewO. 
508
  OLG Düsseldorf, 26 June 2009, VI-2a Kart 2 - 6/08 OWi, 
http://www.justiz.nrw.de/nrwe/olgs/duesseldorf/j2009/VI_2a_Kart_2___6_08_OWiurteil20090626.
html, para. 409. 
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Article 101. The actual amount of any such increase for recidivism will be determined 
on a case-by-case basis having regard to all relevant circumstances509.   
 
ii. Refusal to cooperate 
 
Persistent and repeated unreasonable behaviour that delays the CMA’s enforcement 
action constitutes since the adoption of the 2012 Guidance an aggravating factor. 
This includes repeatedly disrespecting CMA procedures’ time limits, for instance, for 
providing representations on confidentiality. However, as the Guidance notes, the full 
exercise of the party’s rights of defence will not be treated as unreasonable 
behaviour, which will certainly raise interesting questions in practice as to the 
distinction between a legitimate exercise of the right of defence and the need to 
ensure its protection and unreasonable behaviour in responding to onerous 
information requests. 
 
iii. Leader, instigator of the infringement  
 
This is generally taken into account510. 
 
iv. Other aggravating factors 
 
The Guidance lists some additional aggravating factors, such as the involvement of 
directors or senior management, retaliatory or other coercive measures taken 
against other undertakings aimed at ensuring the continuation of the infringement, 
continuing the infringement after the start of the investigation. 
 
e. France 
 
As illustrated by the Appendix 2, the most frequent aggravating circumstance taken 
into account is the size and economic power of the concerned undertaking and/or its 
group. 
 
i. Recidivism 
 
Recidivism (reiteration) is established when the four following conditions are met511: 
                                                     
509
 OFT (CMA) Guidelines (2012), para. 2.14. 
510
 Umbro Holdings Ltd v. OFT [2005] CAT 22 (judgment on penalty), paras. 39, 203. 
511
 SG, §51. Paris Court of appeal, 10th October, 2013, (challenging decision N°12-D-10 of 8
th
 
December, 2011 of 20
th
 March, 2012). 
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- The existence of a previous infringement has been found by the FCA before 
the termination of the practice at stake512; 
- The practice at stake and the previous one must be identical or similar; 
- The previous finding of infringement is definitive by the day the FCA adopts its 
decision; and 
- The period of time running from the prior finding infringement to the starting 
point of the practice at stake does not exceed 15 years (by principle)513. The 
shorter this period is, the most it can be considered as serious514. 
 
To be identical or similar, practices must have a same anticompetitive object or 
effect, as for instance foreclosure. Relevant markets can differ515.  
 
ii. Refusal to cooperate 
 
Under Article L. 450-8 of the French Commercial Code, refusal to cooperate is a 
criminal offence (up to 2 year imprisonment and a €300,000 fine). 
 
iii. Leader, instigator, coercer ... 
 
As before the European Commission, the role during the infringement has become 
an aggravating factor which is rarely taken into account516. 
 
5. Adjustments for mitigating circumstances 
 
a. EU 
 
Mitigating factors mentioned in the non-exhaustive list in paragraph 29 of the 2006 
Guidelines are the immediate termination of the infringement as soon as the 
Commission intervenes (this is not applicable to secret agreements or practices); the 
commission of the infringement based on mere negligence; substantially limited 
involvement in the infringement by avoiding the application of the offending 
agreement “by adopting competitive conduct in the market”;517 effective cooperation 
                                                     
512
 The practice at stake can have started before the previous finding of infringement: Decision N°12-
D-26 of 20
th
 December, 2012, esp. §311. 
513
 Decision N°12-D-24 of 13
th
 December, 2012, esp. §§677 and s. 
514
 Decision N°12-D-25 of 18
th
 December, 2012, esp. §753. 
515
 Decision N°12-D-24 of 13
th
 December, 2012, esp. §688. 
516
 But see Decisions N°13-D-12 of 28
th
 May, 2013, esp. §§956 and s. ; N°13-D-14 of 11
th
 June, 2013, 
esp. §181. 
517
  It should be noted that mere cheating on the cartel does generally not suffice to invoke this head 
of mitigating circumstances, unless this leads to the collapse of the cartel.  
216 
 
outside the scope of the Leniency Notice and beyond the undertaking’s legal 
obligation; and the authorization or encouragement by public authorities or by 
legislation.518  
 
One of the most controversial questions is whether the existence of an effective 
compliance scheme should be considered as a mitigating factor. Practitioners and 
some academics argue that such a fines discount programme would be an incentive 
to establish effective compliance schemes.519 The Commission and the Court have 
rejected such arguments, and argue that the benefits of an effective compliance 
scheme lie in its prevention of infringements.520  
 
b. US 
 
The guideline lists two mitigating factors that decrease the culpability score. The first 
allows the court to subtract three points from the organization’s culpability score if 
the organization had an effective compliance and ethics program in place at the time 
of the offense521. The concept of “effective compliance and ethics program is defined 
in length at §8B2.1 of the USSG522. This reduction should be denied, however, if the 
organization unreasonably delayed reporting the offense to the appropriate 
governmental authorities or under specified instances in which high-level or 
substantial authority personnel participated in, condoned, or were wilfully ignorant of 
the offense523. 
 
The second mitigating factor decreases the culpability score by five points if the 
organization self-reported the offense to the appropriate governmental authorities, 
fully cooperated in the investigation, and clearly demonstrated recognition and 
affirmative acceptance of responsibility for its conduct524. If the organization did not 
self-report, but fully cooperated in the investigation, and accepted responsibility for 
its conduct, the culpability score is reduced by two points525. Finally, if the 
                                                     
518
  For an example for this last mitigating circumstance, see the French Beef case, para. 176 of the 
Commission Decision). 
519
  See, e.g., Geradin, D. (2013) Antitrust Compliance Programmes & Optimal Antitrust Enforcement: 
A Reply to Wouter Wils. Journal of Antitrust Enforcement. 1(2) 325-346. 
520
  For a sustained argument against accepting evidence of effective compliance programmes as a 
mitigating factor, see Wils, W.P.J. (2013) Antitrust Compliance Programmes & Optimal Antitrust 
Enforcement. Journal of Antitrust Enforcement. 1(1) 52-81. 
521
 USSG §8C2.5(f)(1). 
522
 For the full text see, http://70.32.97.65/resources/statutes/Chapter-81.pdf pp. 512-517. 
523
  USSG §8C2.5(f)(2), (f)(3). The involvement of high-level or substantial authority personnel is not, 
however, an absolute bar to this reduction. 
524
 USSG §8C2.5(g)(1). 
525
  USSG §8C2.5(g)(2). 
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organization did not self-report or cooperate, but clearly demonstrated recognition 
and affirmative acceptance of responsibility for its conduct, the culpability score is 
reduced by one point526.  
 
c. Germany 
 
The German Guidelines do not separately discuss mitigating circumstances. 
However, such circumstances would arguably be taken into account as “innominate” 
considerations under paragraph 16. 
 
Cooperation may be a mitigating factor,527 and given that there is no general duty to 
cooperate under German law, it is easier than in European law to reach the 
threshold for cooperation that may be rewarded by a reduction in the fine. 
 
One aspect that has to be considered is a delay that infringes the right of the 
accused to a speedy trial.528 The fine is not reduced, but any delay is declared in the 
decision, and where this is appropriate, a proportion of the fine is deemed to have 
been executed.  
 
d. UK 
 
The 2012 Guidance includes as mitigating factors: 
 
(i) The role of the undertaking, for example, where the undertaking is acting 
under severe duress or pressure;  
(ii) Genuine uncertainty on the part of the undertaking as to whether the 
agreement or conduct constituted an infringement;  
(iii) Adequate steps having been taken with a view to ensuring compliance with 
articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the national equivalents (Chapter I and II of 
the Competition Act 1998).  The latter category may include compliance 
activities under specific circumstances. For instance, the Guidance notes that 
in principle compliance activities will be “neutral” and the CMA will consider 
carefully the evidence presented by the undertaking in order to assess if its 
                                                     
526
 USSG §8C2 5(g)(3). 
527
  OLG Düsseldorf, 26 June 2009, VI-2a Kart 2 - 6/08 OWi, 
http://www.justiz.nrw.de/nrwe/olgs/duesseldorf/j2009/VI_2a_Kart_2___6_08_OWiurteil20090626.
html, paras 414-420.  
528
  For the European Union, see Judgment of the Court, 26 November 2013, Case C-50/12 P, 
Kendrion v Commission [2013] ECR I-000 paras 77-107. 
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compliance activity “merits a discount from the penalty of up to 10%529. 
Hence, according to the Guidance the “mere existence” of compliance 
activities will not be considered as a mitigating factor, but in individual cases, 
“evidence of adequate steps having been taken to achieve a clear and 
unambiguous commitment to competition law compliance throughout the 
organization (from the top down) – together with appropriate steps relating to 
competition law risk identification, risk assessment, risk mitigation and review 
activities – will likely be treated as a mitigating factor”530. It is explained that 
“(t)he business will need to demonstrate that the steps taken were 
appropriate to the size of the business concerned and its overall level of 
competition risk”, as well as present evidence “on the steps it took to review it 
compliance activities, and change them as appropriate, in light of the events 
that led to the investigation at hand”531. However, in some “exceptional 
cases”, the CMA may treat compliance activities as an aggravating factor 
justifying an increase in the financial penalty, in particular for situations where 
compliance activities were used to conceal or facilitate an infringement, or to 
mislead the CMA during its investigation. 
(iv) Termination of the infringement as soon as the OFT intervenes. 
(v) Cooperation which enables the enforcement process to be concluded more 
effectively and/or speedily. The Guidance specifies that cooperation over and 
above respecting CMA’s time limits will be necessary but still not sufficient to 
merit a reduction at this step. Undertaking benefiting from the leniency 
programme will not receive an additional reduction in financial penalties under 
this head (since continuous and complete cooperation is a condition of 
leniency)532. 
 
Other mitigating factors include admission of liability533 and a public apology534 or 
some other action taken to compensate consumers535.  
 
e. France 
 
Since the FCA must take into account all the elements in the file, it can find 
mitigating circumstances without request from the undertaking. Nevertheless, some 
                                                     
529
 OFT (CMA) Guidelines (2012), para. 2.15, footnote 26. 
530
 Ibid. 
531
 Ibid. 
532
 See, e.g., Umbro Holdings Ltd v. OFT [2005] CAT 22 (judgment on penalty), para. 333. 
533
 Id. at paras 201 and 265. 
534
 Id. at para. 265. 
535
 Id. at paras 265 and 266. 
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mitigating circumstances need a demonstration by the concerned company when it 
is the only one to have relevant information (as inability to pay536). 
 
As abovementioned, the FCA takes into account the antitrust intent. 
 
As stated in the SG (§45), cheating from a cartel can be considered as a mitigating 
factor537. 
 
The existence of an effective compliance program is considered as a mitigating 
factor only when there is settlement. Indeed, in the French settlement procedure, the 
FCA enforces the effective application of the compliance program538. Nevertheless, 
in accordance with the Framework document of the FCA (§28), the Paris Court of 
appeal has ruled that an effective compliance program can be considered as a 
mitigating factor when, before the opening of the investigations, the concerned 
undertaking has (i) adopted its compliance program and (ii) put an end to the 
antitrust practices539.  
 
The legal framework can be considered as a mitigating factor540. . For instance, as 
mentioned in the FCA’s press release, “the progressive drop in ceiling rates for 
termination calls imposed by sector regulation created a transitional economic 
interest for operators to encourage their customers to make “on net” calls. In light of 
this, the FCA reduced the amount of the fines imposed on both companies by 
50%antitrust practices”541. 
 
The absence of illicit gain is not considered as a mitigating factor542. 
 
C. Specific increase for deterrence  
 
1. EU 
 
                                                     
536
 Decision N°12-D-25 of 18
th
 December, 2012, esp. §758.  
537
 See, for instance, Decision N°12-D-09 of 13
th
 March, 2012, esp. §§848 and s. 
538
 Decisions N°12-D-27 of 20
th
 December, 2012, esp. §327 ; N°13-D-12 of 28
th
 May, 2013, esp. §984 
(absence of mitigating factor in a “normal” procedure). Confirmed by Paris Court of appeal, 30
th
 
January, 2014 (challenging decision N°11-D-17 of 8
th
 December, 2011). See the 2012 framework-
document: 
http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/framework_document_compliance_10february2012.pdf
. 
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 Paris Court of Appeal, 10th October, 2013, (challenging decision N°12-D-10 of 20
th
 March, 2012). 
540
 Decision N°12-D-24 of 13
th
 December, 2012, esp. §705. 
541
 Ibid. 
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 Ibid., esp. §700. 
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The 2006 Fining Guidelines then add that the fine needs to have a sufficiently 
deterrent effect and that the fine derived by adjusting the basic amount by mitigating 
and aggravating factors may need to be increased for undertakings with a 
particularly large turnover relative to the value of sales (application of a so-called 
“multiplier” for specific deterrence).543  
 
The fine may also be increased to skim off the “amount of gains improperly made as 
a result of the infringement where it is possible to estimate that amount”.544  
 
2. US 
 
The penalty multipliers essentially take into account the objective of specific 
deterrence. 
 
3. Germany 
 
The total-turnover-based multiplier under paragraph 13 essentially serves the 
function of the specific increase for deterrence. However, it should be borne in mind 
that the product of multiplier and relevant turnover merely determines the maximum 
fine. 
 
In accordance with § 81(5) GWB, the Bundeskartellamt may impose a higher fine (or 
pursue separate proceedings under § 32 or § 34 GWB) to skim off the economic 
benefit derived from the offence.545  
 
4. UK 
 
The 2012 Guidance includes a fourth step in the setting of fines enabling the CMA to 
adjust for specific deterrence and proportionality. We will focus here on deterrence. 
For doing so, the CMA will examine appropriate indicators of the size and financial 
position of the undertaking, including where they are available, total turnover, profits, 
cash flow and industry margins, as well as any other relevant circumstances of the 
case, concerning the undertaking’s size and financial position at the time the penalty 
is being imposed, but also from the time of the infringement. According to the 
Guidance, the penalty figure resulting from steps 1 to 3 may be increased by the 
CMA to ensure that the penalty imposed will have a deterrence effect on the 
                                                     
543
 Para. 30 of the 2006 Fining Guidelines. 
544
 Para. 31 of the 2006 Fining Guidelines. 
545
  Para. 17 of the Guidelines. 
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undertaking in the future (specific deterrence)546. Such an increase will be limited to 
situations in which the undertaking has a significant proportion of its turnover outside 
the relevant market or where the CMA has evidence that the infringing undertaking 
has made or is likely to make an economic or financial benefit from the infringement 
that is above the level of penalty reached at the end of step 3547. The CMA may also 
account for any gain which might accrue to the undertaking in other product and 
geographic markets as well as the relevant market in question. This would be the 
case, for instance, of predation cases, where the relevant market may be very small 
but the act of predation provides the undertaking with a reputation for aggressive 
behaviour which may be used to its advantage in many other markets. This will also 
include the gain in another Member State, when the CMA implements Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU, provided that the CMA has the express consent of the relevant 
Member State or NCA in each particular case. The CMA will proceed to an 
adjustment of the penalty on a case by case basis for each individual infringing 
undertaking. This will be particularly the case when the undertaking has very low or 
zero turnover at the end of step 3, in which case the CMA may make significant 
adjustments to the amount of the penalty.  
 
5. France 
 
For undertakings with "large turnover, it is a very frequent aggravating factor (see 
hereafter Appendix 2). 
 
D. Statutory Maximum fine and Proportionality 
 
1. EU 
 
The fine derived by the basic amount, where applicable as adjusted and increased, 
will then be capped at the statutory limit of 10% of the total turnover in the preceding 
business year.548 Where an association is fined, the limit is 10% of the sum of the 
total turnover of each member that is active on the relevant market to which the 
infringement relates directly or indirectly.549  
 
                                                     
546
 OFT (CMA) Guidelines (2012), para. 2.17. 
547
  OFT (CMA) Guidelines (2012), para. 2.17 
548
  Article 23(2) Regulation 1/2003; paras 32 and 33 of the 2006 Fining Guidelines. 
549
  Article 23(2) Regulation 1/2003; paras 32 and 33 of the 2006 Fining Guidelines. See in particular 
Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber), 18 December 2008, Joined Cases C-101/07 P and C-
110/07 P (Coop de France bétail et viande and others v Commission) [2008] ECR I-10193. 
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Regarding the relevant “preceding business year”, the Court has recently reaffirmed 
in a case where the undertaking’s turnover had dropped significantly in the year 
before the adoption of the Commission Decision because the undertaking had sold 
off assets and converted them into cash, and the Commission had therefore not 
considered that year (2008) but instead the previous year (2007), that: 
 
15      In determining the preceding business year, the Commission must 
assess, in each specific case and in the light of both its context and the 
objectives pursued by the scheme of penalties created by the regulation, the 
intended impact on the undertaking in question, taking into account in 
particular a turnover which reflects the undertaking’s real economic situation 
during the period in which the infringement was committed (see Case C‑
76/06 P Britannia Alloys & Chemicals v Commission EU:C:2007:326, 
paragraph 25). 
16     The Court has observed in relation to the concept of the preceding 
business year, in paragraph 29 of Britannia Alloys & Chemicals v Commission 
(EU:C:2007:326), that, in certain situations, the turnover in question does not 
provide any useful indication as to the actual economic situation of the 
undertaking concerned and the appropriate level of fine to impose on that 
undertaking. 
17      In such a situation, and as the Court made clear in paragraph 30 of 
Britannia Alloys & Chemicals v Commission (EU:C:2007:326), the 
Commission is entitled to refer to another business year in order to be able to 
make a correct assessment of the financial resources of that undertaking and 
to ensure that the fine has a sufficient and proportionate deterrent effect.550  
 
2. US 
 
Under the Sherman Act (and the 2004 ACREPA amendments)551, the statutory 
maximum corporate fine is $100 million552. In addition, the Alternative Fines Statute, 
should the Antitrust Division choose this route, states: 
 
“If any person derives pecuniary gain from the offense, or if the offense results in 
pecuniary loss to a person other than the defendant, the defendant may be fined 
                                                     
550
  Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 15 May 2014, Case C-90/13 P (1. garantovaná v 
Commission) [2014] ECR I-000 paras 15-17. 
551
 Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act 2004 (“ACREPA)  §215(a) (15 U.S.C. § 1 
note). 
552
 One may remark the important increase of the statutory maximum of the Sherman Act from $5K in 
1890, to $50K in 1955, to $1 million in 1974, $10 million in 1990, $100 million in 2004. 
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not more than the greater of twice the gross gain or twice the gross loss, unless 
imposition of a fine under this subsection would unduly complicate or prolong the 
sentencing process”. 553 
 
Hence, in cases in which the Antitrust Division will seek a fine above the Sherman 
Act statutory maximum, it will allege the amount of gain or loss attributable to the 
entire cartel, thus twice the loss caused by the cartel rather than by the defendant. 
Specifically identifying twice the gain or twice the loss under 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) 
constitute “facts” that must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt554. It is 
also reminded that joint and several liability does not apply for the Alternative Fines 
Statute. Since 2005 the Antitrust Division has entered into a number of plea 
agreements in which the agreed fine exceeded the statutory maximum. 
 
3. Germany 
 
There is no statutory “cap” under German law; instead, the statutory limit of 10% of 
the undertaking’s annual worldwide turnover (or, if lower, 10 per cent of the relevant 
domestic turnover multiplied with the total global turnover based multiplier) defines 
the maximum fine. 
 
4. UK 
 
The UK financial penalties regime addresses proportionality and the maximum 
statutory fine as two different steps in the setting of fines. Proportionality is now 
assessed along with deterrence in the fourth step of the fine-setting process. Again, 
the CMA has regard to factors such as the size of the undertaking, its financial 
position and the nature of the infringement. According to the 2012 Guidance, 
penalties, even if they factor in deterrence, should not be “disproportionate or 
excessive having regard to the undertaking’s sixe and financial position and the 
nature of the infringement555. In addition to this necessary compromise between 
deterrence and proportionality, the CMA will address at the fourth step of the 
analysis if the overall penalty is appropriate in the round. It will do so by having 
regard again to the undertaking’s size and financial position and the nature of the 
                                                     
553
 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (d). 
554
 Southern Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012), 2351 n. 4, 2351-52 [6th amendment 
right to jury finding) for any fact (other than a prior conviction) that increases a criminal defendant’s 
maximum potential sentence]. 
555
 OFT (CMA) Guidelines (2012), para. 2.19. 
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infringement, but also on the impact of the undertaking’s infringing activity on 
competition556.  
 
The maximum penalty cannot exceed 10% of the worldwide turnover of the 
undertaking in its last business year, which is that preceding the date on which the 
decision of the CMA is taken or, if figures are not available for that business year, the 
one immediately preceding it557. This adjustment for the maximum penalty will be 
made after all the relevant adjustments have been made in steps 2 to 4 and also 
before any further adjustments in respect of leniency or settlement discounts under 
step 6558. If there is an infringement by an association of undertakings (for instance a 
trade association) relating to the activities of its members, the penalty should not 
exceed 10% of the sum of the worldwide turnover of each member of the association 
of undertakings active on the market affected by the infringement559. 
 
The Guidance also notes that if a penalty or fine has been imposed by the European 
Commission or by a court or other body in another Member State in respect of an 
agreement or conduct, the CMA “must take that penalty or fine into account when 
setting the amount of a penalty in relation to that agreement or conduct, according to 
Article 38(9) of the Competition Act 1998 in order to ensure that double jeopardy will 
be avoided. Hence, where an anti-competitive agreement or conduct is subject to 
proceedings resulting in a penalty or fine in another Member State, an undertaking 
will not be penalized again in the UK for the same anti-competitive effects560. 
 
5. France 
 
According Article L. 464-2 of the French Commercial Code, “the maximum amount of 
the penalty is €3 million. Where the infringer is an undertaking, the maximum 
account is 10% of the highest worldwide pre-tax turnover achieved during one of the 
accounting years closed since the accounting year prior to that in which the practices 
have taken place”. 
 
E. Leniency and Settlement Discounts 
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 OFT (CMA) Guidelines (2012), para. 2.20. 
557
  OFT (CMA) Guidelines (2012), para. 2.21. 
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1. EU 
 
The fine so determined may be reduced according to the Leniency Notice.561 The 
application of the 10 per cent turnover cap before any reductions under the Leniency 
Notice ensures that there remains a sufficient incentive to make use of the Leniency 
Programme.562 
 
Where the fined undertakings or associations comply with the settlement procedure, 
the fine (if applicable: after application of a leniency discount) will be reduced by 10 
per cent.563 
 
2. US 
 
The US was the first jurisdiction to develop wide-ranging leniency programmes in 
order to provide substantial incentives for cartel participants (companies and 
individuals) to report cartel activity to the Antitrust Division of the DOJ. Corporate 
leniency covers the corporation and all directors, officers, and employees of the 
corporation who admit their involvement in the illegal antitrust activity as part of the 
corporate confession, and assist the Antitrust Division throughout the investigation. 
The Antitrust Division grants leniency only to first qualifying application in order to 
attempt to create a race among cartel participants to report the antitrust offense.  
 
There are various types of leniency possibilities: type A corporate leniency when the 
Antitrust Division has not received information about the illegal activity from any 
other source or upon discovery, the corporation took prompt and effective action to 
terminate its participation, where possible, the corporation makes restitution to 
injured parties, it clearly is not the leader in or the originator of the illegal activity, 
                                                     
561
  2006 Fining Guidelines, para 34. 
562
  If the cap were applied after the leniency discount, cooperation might not be rewarded at all. For 
example, where a mono-product undertaking that is only active in the EEA has participated in a 5-
year hardcore cartel that covered the EEA, the basic amount could be, for example, 20 per cent of 
the value of sales multiplied by the duration of 5 years, i.e. 100 per cent of the value of sales, 
which, in the case of a mono-product undertaking active only in the EEA would at the same time 
be 100 per cent of the annual turnover. If this undertaking could expect a 50 per cent reduction 
under the Leniency Programme, but this reduction were applied before the cap, then the 
cooperation would not be rewarded at all: without cooperation, the fine would be capped at 10 per 
cent of the annual turnover; applying the reduction for cooperation would also lead to a cap at 10 
per cent of the annual turnover (50 per cent of 100 percent of the annual turnover would be 50 per 
cent of the annual turnover, which would also capped at the statutory 10 per cent threshold). 
Applying the leniency discount after capping results in a fine of only 5 per cent of the annual 
turnover. 
563
  Article 10a Regulation 773/2004, as amended by Regulation 622/2008 (supra note 218). This is 
not mentioned in the 2006 Fining Guidelines, because the Settlement Procedure was only 
introduced after their publication. 
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among other conditions. Type B leniency is awarded to the corporation that is the 
first to come forward and qualify for leniency with respect to the activity and the 
Antitrust Division does not have evidence against the company that is likely to result 
in a sustainable conviction and such cooperation advances the investigation of the 
Antitrust Division. Finally, “amnesty plus” provides a company that is too late to 
obtain leniency for one conspiracy, but has information on a second conspiracy, to 
obtain leniency for the second conspiracy.  
 
The Antitrust Division will also recommend a substantial reduction in the financial 
penalties for the first conspiracy to which the company participated. ACREPA also 
provides a limited leniency recipient’s liability to actual damages caused by the 
recipient’s wrongful acts as the leniency recipient is not liable for treble damages and 
is not jointly or severally liable. This benefit is dependent on the leniency recipient’s 
“satisfactory cooperation” with the private claimants. 
 
3. Germany 
 
The fine as determined by the 2013 Guidelines may be subject to further reductions 
on the basis of the leniency notice or the settlement notice.564 
 
4. UK 
 
The consideration for any reductions for leniency or for settlement agreement forms 
part of the sixth step in the fine-setting process. The CMA has published guidelines 
concerning applications for leniency and no-action in cartel cases565. Part 3 of the 
2012 Guidance on the setting of financial penalties summarizes the different types of 
leniency available and the criteria governing their award. 
 
The Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 in operation since on 1 April 2014 
also formalized the settlement procedure to simplify the process by which a company 
may admit infringing competition law in return for a reduced penalty (20% discount if 
settlement is before a Statement of Objections and 10% afterwards). This will 
                                                     
564
  Para. 18 of the Guidelines with the Leniency Notice (Notice no. 9/2006 of the Bundeskartellamt on 
the immunity from and reduction of fines in cartel cases - Leniency Programme - of 7 March 2006, 
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Leitlinien/Notice%20-
%20Leniency%20Guidelines.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=5) and the Settlement Notice (which 
is not translated into English; the German version is: Bundeskartellamt, Merkblatt - Das 
Settlement-Verfahren des Bundeskartellamtes in Bußgeldsachen, 23 December 2013, 
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/DE/Merkblätter/Merkblatt-
Settlement.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2).  
565
 OFT 1495 (CMA), (2013).  “Applications for leniency and no-action in cartel cases”  
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streamline the investigation procedure and provide greater predictability and 
consistency of process and outcomes. However, the use of settlement procedures 
will be at the CMA’s discretion. The proposals draw substantially on the European 
Commission’s well-established settlement procedure, which it has used successfully 
in several cartel investigations. 
 
5. France 
 
In accordance with Article L 464-2-IV of the French Commercial Code, the FCA has 
published guidelines regarding applications of the criteria and the procedure of its 
leniency program. The third and last version is dated March 2nd, 2009566. 
 
F. Inability to Pay 
 
1. EU 
 
The Guidelines go on to state (similarly to, but more elaborately than the 1998 
Guidelines) that  
 
[i]n exceptional cases, the Commission may, upon request, take account of 
the undertaking’s inability to pay in a specific social and economic context. It 
will not base any reduction granted for this reason in the fine on the mere 
finding of an adverse or loss-making financial situation. A reduction could be 
granted solely on the basis of objective evidence that the imposition of the fine 
as provided for in these Guidelines would irretrievably jeopardise the 
economic viability of the undertaking concerned and cause its assets to lose 
all their value.567  
 
First, it should be pointed out that the Grand Chamber in Dansk Rørindustri held, as 
quoted above, that there is no obligation on the Commission to take the inability to 
pay into account, because this would give an “unjustified competitive advantage to 
undertakings least well adapted to the market conditions”.568  
 
Accordingly, it was not easily predictable whether the Commission would take the 
inability to pay into account in any specific case. In particular in the course of the 
                                                     
566
 http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/cpro_clemence_uk_2_mars_2009.pdf. 
567
 Fining Guidelines, para 35. 
568
 C-213/02 P (Dansk Rørindustri and others v Commission) [2005] ECR I-5425 (in the context of the 
similar provision in the 1998 Fining Guidelines). 
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financial crisis after 2007 applications for a reduction under paragraph 35 of the 2006 
Guidelines increased. Additionally, post-decision requests for an ex post reduction or 
waiver of the fine were often addressed to the Commission.  
 
The Competition Commissioner and Vice-President of the Commission Joaquín 
Almunia and Janusz Lewandowski therefore published an “Information Notice” in 
2010 to clarify the Commission’s practice.569  
 
The Notice first registers its reservations against taking inability to pay (ITP) into 
account, based on (1) the possibly unequal treatment by taking ITP into account in 
the case of “those companies that are inefficient, badly managed or over-leveraged 
at the expense of well managed and financially prudent companies” ; (2) the 
resulting danger of  moral hazard, among other things by providing incentives for 
corporate restructuring; (3) the danger of inconsistency in the fining practice; (4) the 
diminution of the deterrent effect of fines.570 On the other hand, the Notice states that 
competitive companies and productive assets should not be driven out of the market 
by fines, a danger that is particularly high for “SMEs and/or mono-product 
companies”.571  
 
The Notice then elaborates on the interpretation of paragraph 35, stating that the 
financial situation of the company will be assessed on the basis of primarily the 
solvency and liquidity, as estimated by bankruptcy prediction models such as the 
Altman Z-score test, but also of profitability and capitalization.572 The indicators are 
assessed relying on historical data and projections for the future, especially with 
regard to cash flows.573  
 
The condition of the economic and social context are said to be “fulfilled relatively 
easily, e.g. during a sectoral or general economic crisis”; both a cyclical sectoral 
crisis and the general difficulty in getting access to capital and credit may suffice.574  
 
The Notice widens the scope of the ITP argument by replacing the 2006 Fining 
Guideline’s condition that the productive assets would “lose all their value” by the 
                                                     
569
  Information Note by Mr Joaquín Almunia, Vice-President of the Commission, and by Mr. Janusz 
Lewandowski, Member of the Commission, Inability to pay under paragraph 35 of the 2006 Fining 
Guidelines and payment conditions pre- and post-decision finding an infringement and imposing 
fines, SEC(2010) 737/2 of 12 June 2010. 
570
  Ibid., para. 4. 
571
  Ibid. 
572
  Ibid., para. 7. 
573
  Ibid.  
574
  Ibid., para. 8. 
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less strict condition that they would “lose ‘significantly’ their value”, which is already 
the case where the bankruptcy would lead “to the disappearance of the undertaking 
as a going concern”.575 
 
The consequence of a successful ITP application is either a reduction of the fine to 
be paid, or a relaxation in the conditions for payment, such as deferred payment by 
instalments. While the Notice recognizes that from a deterrence perspective it would 
be preferable to keep the nominal amount of the fine as determined by the 2006 
Fining Guidelines and only relax the conditions of payment, the Notice gives more 
weight to the consideration that such a relaxation of the payment conditions is less 
beneficial to the undertakings.576 Therefore, the Notice announces that in the future 
successful ITP applications will generally lead to reduction of the fine, and only 
exceptionally to a mere relaxation of the payment conditions, or – very exceptionally 
– to a combination of these two options.577  
 
The Notice further states that companies that appeal a fine should be able to choose 
freely between paying the fine provisionally or providing a valid bank guarantee.578 
 
Finally, the Notice explains the procedure for taking ITP concerns into account that 
arise subsequent to the adoption of the decision.579 In such a case, the College of 
Commissioners would have to partially or fully waive the fine.580 The exact procedure 
differs depending on the point in time when the financial distress develops.581 
 
2. US 
 
According to the US SG, the court must reduce the fine below that otherwise 
required by the guidelines to the extent that imposition of such fine would impair the 
organizations ability to make restitution to its victims582. The court may impose a fine 
below that otherwise required if the court finds that the organization is not able and, 
even with the use of a reasonable instalment schedule, is not likely to become able 
to pay the minimum fine required, provided that the reduction is not more than 
                                                     
575
  Ibid., para. 9.  
576
  Ibid., paras 11-12. 
577
  Ibid., para. 13. 
578
  Ibid., paras 14-16. 
579
  Ibid., paras 17-21. 
580
  Ibid. para. 19. 
581
  Ibid., paras 18, 20. 
582
  USSG §8C3.3(a). 
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necessary to avoid substantially jeopardizing the continued viability of the 
organization583. 
 
3. Germany 
 
Any inability to pay is taken into account in determining the financial capacity of the 
undertaking in the application of the offender-related criteria (§ 17(3) OWiG, 
paragraph 16, second bullet point).  
 
4. UK 
 
The Guidance recognizes that in exceptional circumstances, the CMA may reduce 
the penalty where the undertaking is unable to pay it because of its financial 
position584. This adjustment for financial hardship forms part of the sixth step of the 
fine-setting process. The 2004 Guidelines integrated its assessment in considering 
mitigating circumstances. In its Achilles judgment the CAT had agreed with the OFT 
submission that “the fact that a fine may result in a company going into liquidation 
and exiting the market is something that the OFT should take into account but is not 
necessarily a reason for reducing the fine”585. The CAT also refused to consider the 
argument put forward by Achilles that paying the fine would lead it to exit the market 
and that such exit will leave one market player with very significant power. According 
to the CAT, limiting fines on this basis will be extremely difficult, recognizing a margin 
of appreciation to the OFT on how to balance deterrence as against possible 
adverse effects on the market structure. 
 
5. France 
 
The FCA has published a questionnaire on the ability to pay of all entities (not only 
undertakings) in 2011586. Inability to pay is assessed at the group level587. 
Undertakings must provide the FCA with the information requested in this 
questionnaire: individual and consolidated (when applicable) financial statements for 
the last three years, a summary of the financial covenants concluded between the 
undertaking and its banks, the amount of banking credit lines available on the last 
day of each of the last three certified fiscal years, amount of the provisions for the 
                                                     
583
 USSG §8C3.3(b). 
584
 OFT (CMA) Guidelines (2012), para. 2.27. 
585
 Achilles Paper Group Ltd v. OFT [2006] CAT 24, paras 21-23, 42 and 43 referring to the position in 
EU law. 
586
 http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/questionnaire_itp_mai_2011_en.pdf. 
587
 Decision N°12-D-25 of 18
th
 December, 2012, esp. §762. 
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last closed fiscal year as well as for the ongoing fiscal year. Additional information is 
requested for foreign undertakings or for undertakings which do not resort to a 
statutory auditor.  
 
The questionnaire is not legally binding. However, the burden of proof is on the 
undertaking which asked for a reduction, therefore it is strongly recommended to 
provide the FCA with the information mentioned in the questionnaire. 
 
 
G. Deferred payment, Interest on Fines 
 
1. EU 
 
Where the Commission has imposed a fine, no interest will be due where the fine is 
(at least provisionally) paid by the deadline specified in the Decision.588 Once the 
deadline has passed, interest starts to accrue at the rate of 3.5 per cent above the 
interest rate applied by the European Central Bank to its main refinancing 
operations.589 Where a financial guarantee has been accepted by the accounting 
officer in lieu of provisional payment, the interest rate is only 1.5 per cent above the 
interest rate applied by the European Central Bank to its main refinancing 
operations.590 
 
The rate of 3.5 per cent above the interest rate applied by the European Central 
Bank to its main refinancing operations has been challenged as being above market 
rates; this could prevent addressees of fines decisions from seeking an effective 
judicial remedy. However, the Court has found the rate to be acceptable, reasoning 
that too low a rate would give an incentive to bring dilatory appeals merely to benefit 
from the interest collected, and that the rate was not so high as to deter addressees 
from seeking judicial recourse.591  
 
                                                     
588
  Article 78(3)(b) of the Commission Regulation (EC, EURATOM) No 2342/2002 of 23 December 
2002 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 
1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European 
Communities, [2002] Official Journal L 357/1, as amended. 
589
  Article 86(1), (2)(b) of Regulation 2342/2002.  
590
  Article 86(5) of Regulation 2342/2002. 
591
  Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Fifth Chamber), 8 October 2008, Case T-68/04 (SGL 
Carbon v Commission) [2008] ECR II-2511 paras 140-154 (pointing out that the case-law 
predating Regulation 2342/2002 even accepted interested as high as 13.75%), upheld in 
Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 12 November 2009, Case C-564/08 P (SGL Carbon 
AG v Commission) [2009] ECR I-191. 
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2. US 
 
The sentencing court must order immediate payment of the fine unless it finds that 
the organization is financially unable to make immediate payment or that such 
payment would pose an undue burden on the organization, in which case the court 
shall require full payment at the earliest possible date, either by setting a date certain 
or by establishing an instalment schedule592. In no event should the period provided 
for payment exceed five years. 
 
3. Germany 
 
§ 81(6) GWB, provides that a fine imposed on legal persons or partnerships starts to 
accrue interest two weeks after service of the fining decision, at a rate of 5% above 
the base interest rate. The legislator introduced this duty to pay interest in order to 
prevent the persons concerned from moving for court decisions solely in order to 
delay having to pay the fine.  
 
In 2011, the OLG Düsseldorf made a preliminary reference to the Federal 
Constitutional Court because it considered this provision to infringe the constitutional 
guarantee of equal treatment593 in three respects:  
 
(1) it discriminates between legal persons and partnerships on the one hand, and 
individuals and sole proprietors on the other hand;  
(2) it discriminates between fines in competition cases and other administrative 
fines, which do not accrue interest; and  
(3) it discriminates between fines imposed in the authority's decision, which 
automatically start to accrue interest, and fines imposed by the court.594  
 
The plaintiffs had also argued  
 
(4) that the accruing interest provided a disincentive to make use of the 
constitutional right595 to seek judicial recourse and  
(5) that the duty to pay interest before the decision had become final infringed the 
presumption of innocence.  
                                                     
592
  USSG §8C3.2(a) and (b). 
593
  Article 3(1) Grundgesetz (the German Constitution, GG. 
594
  Oberlandesgericht (Higher Regional Court, OLG) Düsseldorf, 24 May 2011, V-1 Kart 1/11 (OWi), 
WuW/E 3308, 3315–3320 – Zinsverpflichtung. 
595
  Article 19(4) GG. 
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In 2012, the German Federal Constitutional Court rejected all these arguments and 
held that § 81(6) GWB is constitutional.596 In particular, the differentiation between 
legal persons and partnerships on the one hand and natural persons and sole 
proprietors on the other hand was held to be justified because fines on the latter 
category were found to be considerably lower, so that the strategic incentive to 
appeal a decision to delay paying the fine did not exist to the same extent in these 
cases, whereas undertakings (and associations) have a much greater incentive to 
appeal for the strategic purpose of earning interest in the meantime.597 Nor was the 
provision a significant disincentive to lodge meritorious appeals; the rate of interest 
to be paid could potentially be earned on the capital market and was therefore not 
prohibitive, and where a defendant feared that it would not earn 5% above the base 
rate, it could avoid the duty to pay interest by paying the fine provisionally, subject to 
the outcome of the appeal.598 The Court also rejected the argument that the duty to 
pay interest infringed the presumption of innocence; after all, where the 
administrative decision does not become final, the duty to pay interest is eliminated 
as well.599 
 
4. UK 
 
Payment of the financial penalty is normally due up to three months from the date of 
their notice600. The CMA may also recover interest in respect of any amount 
outstanding, by virtue of the rules of civil procedure for recovery of a debt in the 
United Kingdom. Appeals by the undertaking which is the subject of the decision 
against the imposition, or the amount of a penalty will automatically suspend the 
effect of the penalty imposed. In those cases, although the requirement to pay the 
penalty will be suspended until the appeal is determined, under Rule 27 of the 
Competition Appeal Tribunal’s Rules, if it confirms or varies any penalty the CAT 
may, in addition, add interest on the penalty from the date no earlier than the date on 
which the application was made 601. 
 
                                                     
596
 Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court, BVerfG), 19 December 2012, 1 BvL 
18/11, WuW/E DE-R 3766 – Verzinsungspflicht, available at 
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/ls20121219_1bvl001811.html (in German). 
597
 Ibid., paras 43-62. For the rejection of the other alleged infringements of the equal treatment 
clause, see ibid., paras 63-67. 
598
 Ibid., paras 68-88. 
599
 Ibid., paras 89-91. 
600
 Section 37(1) Competition Act 1998 on recovery of penalties. 
601
 Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings Ltd v. Director general of Fair Trading, para 542; CAT Rules 2003, 
SI 2003/1372, rule 56. See also, Kier Group plc  v. OFT [2001] CAT 3, para. 343. 
234 
 
5. France 
 
According Article L.464-4 of the French Commercial Code, the fines imposed by the 
FCA “are recovered as State debts separate from taxes and state property”. Since 
2009, the FCA is empowered to ensure that the concerned undertakings comply with 
its decisions (previously, it was the Minister of Economy who was empowered). 
However concerning the payment of the fines, this is the Treasury Department which 
sends the fines companies a debit note mentioning when the payment must be done 
and the level of interest on fines. The fines companies may negotiate conditions of 
payment with the Treasury Department.  
 
An appeal before the Paris Court of appeal does not suspend the obligation to pay 
fines. This court can suspend the duty to pay when exceptional circumstances are 
met (risk for the undertaking to disappear). 
 
H. Corporate Restructuring 
 
1. EU 
 
Particular problems may arise from corporate restructuring. Where the infringing 
entity is transferred after the infringement has ceased, European law takes the 
position that, first, the transferring undertaking remains liable for the infringement, 
but second, where the transferring undertaking is left without substantial assets, the 
legal successor – understood as “the person who has become responsible for [the] 
operation” of “the combination of physical and human elements which contributed to 
the commission of the infringement”602 – may be liable.603  
 
2. US 
 
In general common law, successor liability typically applies when a company has 
acquired another company as a result of an actual merger or stock acquisition. For 
instance, the Tenth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Wilshire Oil Co. of Texas, 
the court refused to dismiss criminal charges against an acquiring entity for 
premerger conduct in a conspiracy to fix the price of asphalt sold to state highway 
departments, rejecting the acquiring company’s claim that it “unwittingly bought into 
an ongoing conspiracy”, and instead finding that the company “had ample 
                                                     
602
  Judgment of the Court of First Instance (First Chamber), 17 December 1991, Case T-6/89 
(Enichem Anic SpA v Commission) [1991] ECR II-1623 para. 237. 
603
  For details and references see Khan, N., supra note 182, §§ 7-009 - 7-016. 
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opportunity to detect and reject the illegal practices” prior to and after its assumption 
of control.604. Successor liability is usually not recognized if there is only a sale of the 
assets. Courts have consistently held that a purchaser of only assets takes the 
assets free and clear of any liability or debts605. Indeed, a different position would, 
according to certain courts, “allow every corporate entity concerned about potential 
antitrust liability to impose a collateral obstacle to such liability simply by removing its 
offending element, e.g., by creating a subsidiary”606. However, some exceptions exist 
where an asset sale could generate the same successor liability as a merger or 
acquisition. One exception occurs when the purchasing entity is merely a 
continuation of the existing business. The specific facts of each asset sale must be 
analyzed to determine if successor liability is applicable607. 
 
3. Germany 
 
The imposition of administrative fines on undertakings suffered a severe (to some 
extent temporary) setback, when the Federal Court of Justice held in 2011 that the 
legal successor of an undertaking whose managers committed administrative 
offences is not liable for the fine on the undertaking, unless there is “identity or near 
identity” between the predecessor undertaking whose managers committed the 
offence and the successor.608 This left a substantial loophole for undertakings to 
escape liability for competition law fines by restructuring.609 The Bundeskartellamt 
                                                     
604
 See, United States v. Wilshire Oil Co. of Texas, 427 F.2d 969, 974 (10th Cir. 1970). 
605
 See, United States v. Carter, 311 F.2d 934, 941 (6th Cir. 1963). 
606
 See, United States v. Ashland Oil, 537 F. Supp. 427, 432 (M.D. Tenn. 1988). 
607
 An additional issue may arise from the implementation of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 
which entitles a reorganized debtor to a “fresh start” and releases him from all claims that could 
have been asserted against it prior to the Bankruptcy Court's confirmation of the reorganized 
debtor's bankruptcy plan. For a recent analysis of this issue, see Salzman, H. and Reiss, W.V. 
(2013) The Case for Joint, Several Liability of Reorganized Debtors That Continue to Participate 
in Antitrust Conspiracies Post-Discharge (Bloomberg BNA, Nov. 4), available at 
http://www.bna.com/the-case-for-joint-several-liability-of-reorganized-debtors-that-continue-to-
participate-in-antitrust-conspiracies-post-discharge/  
608
  BGH, 10 Aug. 2011, KRB 55/10, WuW/E DE-R 3455 = NJW 2012, 164 – Versicherungsfusion. 
The insurer whose managers had infringed competition law was restructured by merging the 
company into another insurance company that was part of the same corporate group (see Konrad 
Ost, Die Regelung der Rechtsnachfolge und weitere Neuerungen im 
Kartellordnungswidrigkeitenrecht durch die 8. GWB-Novelle, in DAS DEUTSCHE KARTELLRECHT 
NACH DER GWB-NOVELLE 305, 309 (Florian Bien, ed., Baden-Baden: Nomos 2013)). The resulting 
successor took over 4% of the insurance policies of the predecessor, which made up 28% of the 
successor's portfolio of insurance policies, accounting for 45% of the predecessor's and 42% of 
the successor's gross premium income. The Bundeskartellamt imposed a fine on the successor 
undertaking. The Higher Regional Court denied the successor's liability for the fine, because the 
successor was neither identical nor nearly identical to the predecessor, and the Federal Court of 
Justice affirmed. 
609
  See the Bundeskartellamt’s opinion of 22 Jun. 2012 on the Government Bill for an 8th 
Amendment to the GWB, pp. 13–15, available at 
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wDeutsch/publikationen/Diskussionsbeitraege/Stellungnahmen.p
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even asked the European Commission to take over German cartel cases where they 
may affect trade between Member States (Article 11(6) Regulation (EC) 1/2003).610 
 
The 8th Amendment to the GWB did not completely eliminate this loophole, but 
narrowed the scope for circumvention considerably. § 30(2a) OWiG now provides 
that a fine may be imposed on a legal successor in certain cases, capped by the 
amount of the value added by legal succession. The legislative change took care of 
at least most of the opportunities for circumvention that have actually been used to 
date.611 However, the Bundeskartellamt and the European Commission have noted 
that this still leaves loopholes that can be used to circumvent the imposition of a fine, 
for example where the assets are disposed of by way of an asset deal.612 The 
legislator tried to plug this loophole by facilitating writs of attachment following the 
issuing of a fining decision.613 Apart from concerns about the practicality of such 
attachments, there is also the continuing danger of restructuring activities before the 
fines decision is issued.614 
 
4. UK 
 
According to the UK courts615, the undertaking is not liable for the illegal acts of its 
employees since competition rules impose liability only on the undertakings for the 
specific conduct. Therefore, the company is personally at fault and is not subject to 
vicarious liability. Hence, the cartelist may not pass on the fines it had suffered to the 
employees who had caused them (in breach of their duties to the employer) as this 
would allow the defendant to avoid the consequences of its own egregious 
behaviour. The UK courts should take into account the EU jurisprudence on this 
matter, in view of the obligation imposed under Section 60 of the Competition Act 
                                                                                                                                                                     
hp (in German), including, as an annex, the facsimile of a letter from Alexander Italianer of DG 
Comp to the President of the Bundeskartellamt. 
610
  See Kurgonaite, E. (2013) “Interview with Andreas Mundt”, ABA-Section of Antitrust 
Law/International Committee, International Antitrust Bulletin 1, 2, 3–4. 
611
  Ost, K. (2013) “Die Regelung der Rechtsnachfolge und weitere Neuerungen im 
Kartellordnungswidrigkeitenrecht durch die 8. GWB-Novelle“, in Bien,F.  (ed) Das deutsche 
Kartellrecht nach der GWB-Novelle, Baden-Baden: Nomos 2013, 305, 313. Yomere, A. (2013) 
“Die Novellierung des Kartellbußgeldverfahrens durch die 8. GWB-Novelle” WuW  1187, 1192-
1195., considers the new regime for legal succession to infringe the constitutional requirement of 
personal responsibility for (quasi) criminal conduct. 
612
  See the references supra note 609; see also Ost, K. supra note 611, at 311. 
613
  § 30(6) OWiG, which provides for the application of § 111d of the Strafprozessordnung (Criminal 
Procedure Code, StPO), substituting the authority’s administrative fines decision for the judgment 
usually required.  
614
  Ost, supra note 611, at 313-314. 
615
 See, for instance, Safeway and others v Twigger and others [2010] EWCA Civ 1472, para. 20 & 
23. 
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1998 to implement the Act in a manner which is consistent with the treatment of 
corresponding questions arising in EU Competition Law. 
 
5. France 
 
The transferable undertakings are liable. Please find hereafter in Appendix 2 the 
details of the reasoning of the FCA in its decisions when it applies the SG. 
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Table 11: A cross-jurisdictional study of the fine-setting process 
 
Issue EU US Germany UK France 
Institution in 
charge of 
setting the 
fine 
European 
Commissio
n, subject 
to 
unlimited 
judicial 
review 
(Art. 261, 
263 TFEU) 
Sentencing 
judges 
Bundeskartellamt (or, less 
importantly, Länder 
competition authorities); once 
the undertaking/association 
concerned raises a complaint, 
the Court becomes competent 
to set the fine based on a de 
novo appraisal of the facts 
after a full trial 
Competition 
and Markets 
Authority 
Autorité de la 
concurrence (French 
Competition 
Authority) 
Guidelines 
available? 
Yes (2006) Yes (1987), 
last revised 
2004 
Yes (2013) Yes (2012) Yes (2011) 
Guidelines 
binding to 
the 
sentencing 
or appellate 
courts 
No Yes (until 
2005); No 
(since 2005) 
No No No 
The 
Relevant 
Measure 
value of 
sales 
Affected 
turnover 
Upper limit of the fining range 
is determined by a mixture of 
relevant domestic turnover and 
Relevant 
turnover 
Value of sales 
239 
 
239 
 
overall global turnover; within 
that range, offence- and 
offender-related criteria 
determine the fine 
Entry fee 
(minimum 
fine) 
15-25% A multiplier 
range of at 
least 0.75 is 
applied to 
antitrust 
offenses, no 
matter the 
culpability 
score, for 
deterrence 
purposes, 
leading to a 
fine of at 
least 15% of 
the affected 
volume of 
commerce in 
any 
circumstance 
No separate entry fee, but 
where duration is less than a 
year, infringement will be 
deemed to have existed for 
one year  
No separate 
entry fee, but 
where 
duration is 
less than a 
year, 
infringement 
will be 
deemed to 
have existed 
for one year 
No 
Proportional No. No, but taken No, but taken into account in Yes Yes 
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ity of the 
fines as a 
separate 
step in the 
fine-setting 
process 
However, 
the cap at 
10% of the 
worldwide 
turnover is 
generally 
seen as a 
sufficient 
protection 
of the 
proportion
ality 
principle 
into account 
in the overall 
assessment 
the overall assessment 
Aggravating 
factors616 
     
Infringement 
committed 
intentionally  
Intentional 
infringeme
nt is taken 
to be the 
norm; 
where the 
undertakin
g proves 
Yes Intentional infringement is taken to be 
the norm; where there is only 
negligence, the fining range is halved  
No, but taken into 
account in the 
overall assessment 
Yes 
                                                     
616
 Indicate Yes or No, if possible. 
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241 
 
mere 
negligence
, this may 
be a 
mitigating 
factor 
Involvement 
of senior 
managemen
t  
Not 
mentioned 
explicitly in 
the GL, but 
aggravatin
g factors 
are non-
exhaustive
; meetings 
between 
senior 
manageme
nt was 
mentioned 
in 
determinati
on of 
leading 
Yes May be considered in the overall 
assessment 
Not explicitly Yes 
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role within 
the cartel 
(eg ADM) 
Leading role 
in the 
infringement 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Non-
cooperation  
Obstruction 
of the 
investigatio
n 
Yes Yes (separate fines or criminal sanctions 
for procedural infringements possible) 
Yes Yes 
Recidivism Yes Yes Yes (but generally only infringements 
within the previous five years can be 
taken into account) 
Yes Yes 
Size of firm Yes 
(deterrenc
e 
multiplier; 
10% of 
worldwide 
turnover 
cap) 
Yes Yes (in setting the multiplier for the 
relevant domestic turnover, and for 
the 10% of worldwide turnover 
maximum fine) 
Yes Yes 
Mitigating      
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factors 
Acceptance 
of 
responsibilit
y 
May be 
considered 
as 
cooperatio
n; may 
also lead 
to 
settlement 
under the 
Settlement 
Notice 
(10% 
reduction) 
Yes May be considered in the overall 
assessment; may also lead to 
settlement under the Settlement 
Notice (10% reduction) 
Yes Yes 
Compensati
on of injured 
parties 
Has been 
taken into 
account in 
some 
cases (eg 
Fine on 
ABB 
reduced in 
Pre-
Insulated 
No Has been taken into account in some 
cases 
Yes No 
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Pipes 
Cartel; 
Nintendo) 
Cooperation 
with the 
investigatio
n 
Yes (but 
only if it 
exceeds 
the general 
legal 
obligation 
to 
cooperate) 
Yes (but only if it 
exceeds the general 
legal obligation to 
cooperate) 
Yes Yes (but only if it 
exceeds the general 
legal obligation to 
cooperate) 
No 
Effective 
compliance 
programme 
No Under certain 
conditions 
No Under certain 
conditions 
Under certain 
conditions 
Minor role in 
the 
infringement 
Yes 
(mitigating 
factor if 
involveme
nt was 
substantiall
y limited; 
but a very 
strict 
standard is 
No Yes Not explicitly No 
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applied, 
mere 
cheating 
on the 
cartel does 
not suffice) 
Non-
implementat
ion 
(taken into 
account in 
determinin
g the 
relevant 
percentage 
of the 
value of 
sales) 
No Yes  No Yes 
Participation 
under 
duress, 
coercion 
sometimes 
considered
, but strict 
standard 
No sometimes considered, but strict 
standard 
Yes Yes 
Self-
reporting 
Yes (under 
Leniency 
Notice, or 
as 
cooperatio
Yes Yes (under Leniency Notice, or as 
cooperation outside of Leniency 
Notice in the overall assessment) 
No Yes (under Leniency 
Notice, or as 
cooperation outside 
of Leniency Notice in 
the overall 
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n outside 
of 
Leniency 
Notice as a 
mitigating 
factor) 
assessment 
Termination 
of the 
infringement 
as soon as 
investigatio
n started 
May be 
considered 
as 
mitigating 
circumstan
ce, but not 
usually in 
secret 
cartels. 
No May be considered in the overall 
assessment 
Yes No 
Uncertainty 
as to 
existence of 
an 
infringement  
Where the 
infringeme
nt is not 
proven to 
the 
relevant 
standard of 
proof, 
there will 
No Where the infringement is not proven 
to the relevant standard of proof, 
there will be no fine 
Yes Yes 
247 
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be no fine 
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Appendix 3: Financial Penalties in UK Competition Law 
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Fines 
imposed by 
the OFT Case  
OFT decision  Infringement  Level of Fine  Judicial 
scrutiny 
Access control 
& alarm 
systems 
6 December 2013 Chapter I: collusive 
bidding 
arrangements 
£53,310 total. 
 
 Cirrus 
Communicati
on Systems 
Ltd.: £0 
(leniency). 
 Glyn 
Jackson 
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Communicati
ons Ltd.: 
£35,700. 
 Peter 
O'Rourke 
Electrical 
Ltd.: 
£15,933. 
 Owens 
Installations 
Ltd.: £1,777 
(includes 
20% 
leniency 
discount). 
Distribution of 
Mercedes 
Benz 
commercial 
vehicles 
27 March 2013 Chapter I: price 
fixing and market 
division 
£5.4 million total 
fine. 
 
21 February 2013 
Settlement 
Agreement 
(Mercedes & 
dealers): 
 Mercedes-
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Benz UK Ltd, 
parent 
Daimler UK 
Ltd, and 
ultimate 
parent 
Daimler AG 
(Mercedes): 
£1,492,646. 
 Road Range 
Ltd.: 
£115,774. 
 Ciceley 
Commercials 
Ltd. and 
parent 
Ciceley Ltd. 
(Ciceley): 
£659,675. 
 Enza Motors 
Ltd., parent 
Enza 
Holdings Ltd. 
and ultimate 
parent Enza 
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Group Ltd. 
(Enza): 
£347,198. 
 Northside: 
£0 
(leniency). 
 
27 March 2013 
Settlement 
Agreement 
(Mercedes & 
commercial vehicle 
dealers): 
 Ciceley: 
£659,675, 
includes 
15% 
discount for 
settling 
(otherwise 
£776,088). 
 Enza: 
£347,198, 
includes a 
15% 
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discount for 
settling 
(otherwise 
£408,469). 
 Mercedes: 
£1,492,646, 
includes a 
15% 
discount for 
settling 
(otherwise 
£1,756,054). 
 Road Range: 
£115,774, 
includes a 
15% 
discount for 
settling 
(otherwise 
£136,204). 
 H&L 
Garages 
Ltd.: 
£242,076. 
 Northside: 
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617
 Case 1188/1/1/11, Tesco Stores Ltd. et al. v. OFT, [2012] CAT 31 (20 Dec.). 
£0 
(leniency). 
Airline 
passenger fuel 
surcharges 
19 April 2012  Chapter I: price 
fixing  
£58.5 million total 
fine imposed on 
British Airways with 
the other party to 
the infringement 
(Virgin Atlantic 
Airways) receiving 
immunity. 
 
Dairy products 10 August 2011 Chapter I: vertical 
price fixing 
£49.51 million total 
fine. 
 
Dairy Processors: 
 Arla: £0 
(leniency). 
 Dairy Crest: 
£7.14m  
(includes 
35% early 
resolution 
discount). 
 The Cheese 
Tesco appealed 
the OFT’s 
decision, and the 
CAT set aside 
portions of that 
judgment but 
requested 
additional 
information 
before reducing 
the fine.617 
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Company: 
£1.26m 
(includes 
35% early 
resolution 
discount). 
 McLelland: 
£1.66m 
(includes 
30% early 
resolution 
discount). 
 Wiseman: 
£3.20m 
(includes 
35% early 
resolution 
discount). 
 
Supermarkets: 
 Asda: 
£9.10m 
(includes 
35% early 
resolution 
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discount, 
10% 
leniency 
discount). 
 Safeway: 
£5.69m 
(includes 
35% early 
resolution 
discount). 
 Sainsbury’s: 
£11.04m 
(includes 
35% early 
resolution 
discount). 
 Tesco: 
£10.43m. 
Reckitt 
Benckiser  
13 April 2011  Chapter II: unfair 
commercial 
practices in relation 
to a patented 
medicine 
(withdrawing and 
£10.2 million total 
fine (resolution 
agreement) 
imposed on Reckitt 
Benckiser. 
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delisting drug from 
NHS prescription 
channel) 
Royal Bank of 
Scotland 
20 January 2011  Chapter I: pricing 
information 
exchange  
£28.59 million total 
fine imposed on 
Royal Bank of 
Scotland, with the 
other party to the 
infringement 
(Barclays) receiving 
immunity. 
 
 258 
 
                                                     
618
 Joined Cases No. 1160/1/1/10 et seq., Imperial Tobacco Group Plc et al. v. OFT, [2011] CAT 41 (12 Dec.). 
Tobacco 15 April 2010  Chapter I: vertical 
price fixing  
£225 million total 
fine. 
 
Manufacturers: 
 Imperial 
Tobacco: 
£112,332,49
5. 
 Gallaher: 
£50,379,754. 
 
Retailers: 
 Asda: 
£14,095,933. 
 The Co-
operative 
Group: 
£14,187,353. 
 First 
Quench: 
£2,456,528. 
 Morrisons: 
£8,624,201. 
The CAT upheld 
appeals brought 
by six parties 
(Imperial 
Tobacco, Co-
operative Group, 
Morrisons, 
Safeway, Asda, 
& Shell) and 
quashed the 
OFT’s decision 
concerning 
those parties.618 
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 Safeway: 
£10,909,366. 
 Sainsbury’s: 
£0. 
 Shell: 
£3,354,615. 
 Somerfield: 
£3,987,950. 
 T&S Stores 
(now One 
Stop Stores): 
£1,314,095. 
 TM Retail: 
£2,668,991. 
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619
 Joined Cases No. 1140/1/1/09 et seq., Eden Brown Ltd. et al. v. OFT, [2011] CAT 8 (1 Apr). 
Construction 
Recruitment  
29 September 2009  Chapter I: collective 
boycott & price 
fixing  
£173 million total 
fine before 
leniency. 
 
£39.27 million total 
fine after leniency. 
 
 A Warwick 
Associates 
Ltd.: £3303. 
 CDI 
AndersElite 
Ltd. (Parent: 
CDI Corp): 
£7,602,789 
(includes 
30% 
leniency). 
 Eden Brown 
Ltd.: 
£1,072,069 
(includes 
35% 
Fines reduced 
by CAT to £8.14 
million overall, 
specifically for 
three 
defendants:619 
 
 Eden 
Brown 
Ltd.: from 
£1,072,06
9 down to 
£477,750. 
 CDI 
AndersElit
e Ltd: 
from 
£7,602,78
9 down to 
£1,543,50
0. 
 Hays 
Specialist 
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leniency). 
 Fusion 
People Ltd.: 
£125,021 
(includes 
20% 
leniency). 
 Hays 
Specialist 
Recruitment 
Ltd. (Parent: 
Hays 
Specialist 
Recruitment 
(Holdings) 
Ltd.) 
(Ultimate 
Parent: Hays 
plc ): 
£30,359,129 
(includes 
30% 
leniency). 
 Henry 
Recruitment 
Recruitme
nt Ltd: 
from 
£30,359,1
29 down 
to 
£5,880,00
0. 
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Ltd.: 
£108,043 
(includes 
25% 
leniency). 
 Beresford 
Blake 
Thomas Ltd. 
& Hill 
McGlynn & 
Associates 
Ltd.: £0 
(100% 
leniency). 
Bid rigging in 
the English 
construction 
industry  
21 September 2009  Chapter I: bid 
rigging (cover 
pricing)  
£194.1 million fine 
before leniency. 
 
£129.2 million fine 
after leniency. The 
highest individual 
penalty, 
£17,894,438, was 
(1) Fines 
reduced 
by CAT 
overall to 
£63.9 
million, 
specificall
y for six 
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620
 See Appendix for chart of individual fines. 
621
 Joined Cases No. 1114/1/1/09 et seq., Kier Group Plc et al. v. OFT, [2011] CAT 3 (11 Mar.). 
imposed on Kier 
Regional Ltd.620 
defendant
s:621 
 
 Kier 
Group 
Plc: down 
to 
£1,700,00
0 from 
£17.9m. 
 Ballast 
Nedam 
N.V.: 
reduced 
from 
£8,333,11
6 to 
£534,375. 
 Bowmer 
and 
Kirkland 
Ltd.: 
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reduced 
from 
£7,574,73
6 to 
£1,524,00
0. 
 Corringwa
y 
Conclusio
ns plc: 
reduced 
from 
£769,592 
to 
£119,344. 
 Thomas 
Vale 
Holdings 
Ltd.: 
reduced 
from 
£1,020,47
3 to 
£171,000. 
 John Sisk 
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622
 Case 1124/1/1/09, North Midland Construction Plc v. OFT, [2011] CAT 14 (27 Apr.). 
& Son 
Ltd.: 
reduced 
from 
£6,191,62
7 to 
£356,250. 
 
(2) CAT 
reduced 
£1.5m 
fine on 
North 
Midland 
Constructi
on to 
£300,000.
622 
 
(3) CAT 
reduced 
joint & 
several 
 266 
 
                                                     
623
 Joined Cases 1115/1/1/09 et seq., Crest Nicholson Plc et al. v. OFT, [2011] CAT 10 (15 Apr.). 
liability 
between 
Crest 
Nicholson 
& ISG 
Pearce 
for 
infringem
ent 75 
from 
£5,188,84
6 to 
£950,000.
623 
 
(4) CAT 
reduced 
joint and 
several 
liability on 
Quarmby 
Constructi
on & St. 
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624
 Case 1120/1/1/09, Quarmby Construction Co. Ltd. & St. James Securities Holdings Ltd. v. OFT, [2011] CAT 11 (15 Apr.). 
625
 Joined Cases 1128/1/1/09 et seq., GAJ Construction Ltd. et al. v. OFT, [2011] CAT 9 (15 Apr.). 
James 
Securities 
Holdings 
for 
Infringem
ents 6, 
214, and 
233 from 
£881,749 
to 
£213,750.
624 
 
(5) CAT 
further 
reduced 
the 
following 
fines:625 
 
 Francis 
Constructi
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on for 
infringem
ents 69, 
208, and 
234: from 
£530,238 
to 
£169,575. 
 GAJ 
Constructi
on for 
infringem
ent 174: 
from 
£109,683 
was 
varied to 
£42,750. 
 Allenbuild 
Ltd. for 
Infringem
ents 39, 
137, and 
204: from 
£3,547,93
 269 
 
1 to 
£926,250. 
 Robert 
Woodhea
d Ltd. for 
Infringem
ents 46, 
78, and 
178: from 
£411,595 
to 
£151,725. 
 J H 
Hallam 
Ltd. for 
Infringem
ents 95, 
96, and 
183: from 
£359,588 
to 
£99,000. 
 Hobson & 
Porter 
Ltd. for 
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Infringem
ents 230, 
236, and 
238: from 
£547,507 
to 
£123,750. 
 
(6) CAT 
reduced 
joint and 
several 
liability on 
Durkan 
Holdings, 
Durkan, & 
Concentr
a from 
£6,720,55
1 to 
£789,000 
for 
Infringem
ent 135 
and 
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626
 Case 1121/1/1/09, Durkan Holdings Ltd. et al. v. CAT, [2011] CAT 6 (22 Mar.). 
627
 Case No. 1099/1/2/08, National Grid Plc v. GEMA, [2009] CAT 14 (29 Apr.). 
628
 National grid plc v. Gas & Electricity Markets Authority, [2009] CAT 14 and on appeal, National Grid plc and Gas and Electricity Markets Authority [2010] 
EWCA Civ 114).  
£1,647,00
0 for 
Infringem
ent 
240.626 
Ofgem 
(National Grid) 
21 February 2008 Chapter II: Abuse of 
a dominant position 
Ofgem fined 
National Grid £41.6 
million. 
Fine reduced by 
CAT to £30.0 
million (highest 
ever penalty in 
UK for abuse of 
dominance).627  
Court of Appeal 
further reduced 
fine to £15.0 
million.628 
British Airways 1 August 2007  Chapter I: price 
fixing and 
information 
exchange  
£121.5 million total 
fine imposed on 
British Airways, with 
the other party to 
the infringement 
(Virgin Atlantic) 
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629
 The price-fixing participants were: Ampleforth College, Bedford School, Benenden School, Bradfield College, Bromsgrove School, Bryanston School, 
Canford School, Charterhouse School, Cheltenham College, Cheltenham Ladies College, Clifton College, Cranleigh School, Dauntsey's School, Downe 
House School, Eastbourne College, Epsom College, Eton College, Gresham's School, Haileybury, Harrow School, King's School Canterbury, Lancing 
College, Malvern College, Marlborough College, Millfield School, Mill Hill School, Oakham School, Oundle School, Radley College, Repton School, Royal 
Hospital School, Rugby School, St Edward's School, Oxford, St Leonards-Mayfield School, Sedbergh School, Sevenoaks School, Sherborne School, 
Shrewsbury School, Stowe School, Strathallan School, Tonbridge School, Truro School, Uppingham School, Wellington College, Wells Cathedral School, 
Westminster School, Winchester College, Woldingham School, Worth School and Wycombe Abbey. 
receiving immunity. 
Schools: fee 
information 
exchange 
21 November 2006 Chapter I: 
exchange of 
information on 
future fees 
£489,000 total fine 
before leniency. 
 
£467,500 total fine, 
£10,000 per school, 
after leniency.629  
 
The OFT granted 
leniency to the 
following schools: 
Eton College (50 
per cent), 
Winchester College 
(50 per cent), 
Sevenoaks School 
(45 per cent), 
Benenden School 
(30 per cent), 
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Cheltenham Ladies' 
College (30 per 
cent) and Malvern 
College (20 per 
cent). 
English Welsh 
& Scottish 
Railway Ltd. 
17 November 2006 Chapter II: 
exclusionary & 
discriminatory 
behaviour 
£4.1 million total 
fine on EWS 
(includes 35% 
discount for early 
resolution). 
 
Aluminium 
spacer bars 
29 June 2006 Chapter I: price-
fixing, market 
allocation, non-
compete clauses 
£1.384 million total 
fine before 
leniency. 
 
£898,470 total fine 
after leniency. 
 
 EWS 
(Manufacturi
ng) Ltd.: 
£490,050. 
 Thermoseal 
Group Ltd.: 
£380,700, 
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reduced to 
£228,420 by 
leniency. 
 Double 
Quick 
Supplyline 
Ltd.: 
£180,000. 
 Ulmke 
Metals Ltd.: 
(£333,300, 
reduced to 
£0 by 
leniency). 
Stock check 
pads 
4 April 2006 Chapter I: price-
fixing & market 
allocation 
£2.184 million total 
fine before 
leniency. 
 
£168,318 total fine 
after leniency. 
 
 BemroseBoo
th Ltd.: 
£1,888,600 
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reduced to 
£0 by 
leniency. 
 Achilles 
Paper Group 
Ltd.: 
£255,697.50 
reduced to 
£127,848.75 
by leniency. 
 4imprint 
Group PLC: 
£40,470. 
Collusive 
tendering for 
car park 
23 February 2006 Chapter I: price-
fixing 
£1.852 million total 
fine before 
leniency. 
 
£1.557 million total 
fine after leniency. 
 
 Anglo 
Asphalt 
Company 
Ltd.: one 
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infringement, 
£2,865 
penalty, 
reduced to 
£2,005 by 
leniency. 
 Asphaltic 
Contracts 
Ltd.: three 
infringement
s amounting 
to £22,255 
penalty. 
 Briggs 
Roofing & 
Cladding 
Ltd.: five 
infringement
s amounting 
to £328,264 
penalty, 
reduced to 
£0 by 
leniency. 
 Cambridge 
 277 
 
Asphalte Co. 
Ltd.: five 
infringement
s amounting 
to £71,699 
penalty, 
reduced to 
£53,774 by 
leniency. 
 Coverite 
Ltd.: one 
infringement, 
£104,498 
penalty. 
 Durable 
Contracts 
Limited: two 
infringement
s, amounting 
to £47,221 
penalty. 
 Holme 
Asphalt: two 
infringement
s, amounting 
 278 
 
to £6,453 
penalty. 
 Makers UK 
Ltd.: one 
infringement, 
£526,500 
penalty. 
 Pirie Group 
Ltd., one 
infringement, 
£6,743 
penalty 
reduced to 
£3,034 by 
leniency. 
 Prater Ltd., 
two 
infringement
s, amounting 
to £270,432 
penalty. 
 Rio Asphalt 
& Paving Co. 
Ltd.: two 
infringement
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s, amounting 
to £12,113 
penalty, 
reduced to 
£9,085 by 
leniency. 
 Rock 
Asphalte 
Ltd.: 17 
infringement
s, amounting 
to £852,253 
penalty, 
reduced to 
£511,351 by 
leniency. 
 WG Walker 
& Co. Ltd.: 
one 
infringement, 
£1,570 
penalty, 
reduced to 
£863 by 
leniency. 
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Collusive 
tendering for 
roofing 
contracts 
12 July 2005 Chapter I: price-
fixing & bid-rigging 
£238,576 total fine 
before leniency. 
 
£138,515 total fine 
after leniency. 
 
 Pirie: £0 total 
fine, reduced 
from £85,774 
because of 
leniency. 
 Walker: 
£41,907 total 
fine, reduced 
from £76,194 
because of 
leniency. 
 Advanced 
Roofing 
Systems 
Ltd.: £1,963 
total fine. 
 Brolly: 
£22,239 total 
fine. 
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 Bonnington: 
£45,187 total 
fine. 
 McKay: 
£27,219 total 
fine. 
Collusive 
tendering for 
mastic asphalt 
flat-roofing 
contracts 
8 April 2005 Chapter I: price-
fixing & bid-rigging 
£231,445 total fine 
before leniency. 
 
£87,353 total fine 
after leniency. 
 
 Briggs: £0 
total fine, 
reduced from 
£57,120 
because of 
leniency. 
 Pirie: 
£51,693 total 
fine, reduced 
from 
£114,873 
because of 
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leniency. 
 Walker: 
£16,415 total 
fine, reduced 
from £29,845 
because of 
leniency. 
 Lenaghen: 
£19,245 total 
fine, reduced 
from £29,607 
because of 
leniency. 
Collusive 
tendering for 
felt & single 
ply flat-roofing 
contracts 
8 April 2005 Chapter I: price-
fixing, bid-rigging, 
market allocation 
£598,223 total fine 
before leniency. 
 
£471,029 total fine 
after leniency. 
 
 Briggs: £0 
total fine, 
reduced from 
£88,956 
because of 
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leniency. 
 Dufell: 
£74,624 total 
fine. 
 Hodgson & 
Allon: 
£74,151 total 
fine. 
 Hylton: 
£47,700 total 
fine, reduced 
from £73,385 
because of 
leniency. 
 Kelsey: 
£262,000 
total fine. 
 Roofclad: 
£12,554 total 
fine, reduced 
from £25,107 
because of 
leniency. 
 Single Ply: 
£0 total fine. 
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630
 Case No. 1048/1/1/05, Double Quick Supplyline Ltd. v. OFT, consent order of 19 May 2005. 
UOP 
Ltd./Ukae Ltd. 
(Desiccants) 
9 November 2004 Chapter I: price-
fixing. 
£2.433 million total 
fine before 
leniency. 
 
£1.707 million total 
fine after leniency. 
 
 UOP Ltd.: 
£1,232,000 
total fine, 
which 
includes 
20% 
discount off 
£1,540,000 
due to 
leniency. 
 UKae Ltd.: 
£0 total fine, 
reduced from 
£278,000 
because of 
leniency. 
CAT reduced 
overall fine to 
£1.635m.630 
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 Thermoseal 
Supplies 
Ltd.: 
£139,000 
total fine, 
which 
includes a 
50% 
discount off 
£279,000 
due to 
leniency. 
 Double 
Quick 
Supplyline 
Ltd.: 
£109,000 
total fine. 
 Double 
Glazing 
Supplies 
Group Plc.: 
£227,000 
total fine. 
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631
 Case No. 1033/1/1/04, Richard W. Price Ltd. v. OFT, [2005] CAT 5 (24 Feb.). 
West Midlands 
roofing 
contractors 
17 March 2004 Chapter I: price-
fixing & bid-rigging 
£971,186 total fine 
before leniency. 
 
£297,625 total fine 
after leniency. 
 
 Apex: 
£35,922.80 
total fine. 
 Briggs: £0 
total fine 
after 100% 
leniency. 
 Brindley: 
£55,540.80 
total fine. 
 General 
Asphalte: 
£63,192.86 
total fine. 
 Howard 
Evans: 
£35,510.25 
CAT reduced the 
overall fine to 
£288,625 by 
lowering the 
penalty imposed 
on Price from 
£18,000 to 
£9,000.631 
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total fine, 
after 50% 
leniency 
(£71,020.50 
original fine). 
 Price: 
£18,000.00 
total fine. 
 Redbrook: 
£17,802.90 
total fine. 
 Rio: 
£45,049.68 
total fine. 
 Solihull: 
£26,606.25 
total fine. 
Hasbro II 2 December 2003 Chapter I: price-
fixing 
£38.25 million total 
fine before 
leniency. 
 
£22.66 million total 
fine after leniency. 
 
CAT reduced 
overall fine to 
£19.50 million, 
including the fine 
of Argos from 
£17.28 million to 
£15 million, and 
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632
 Joined Cases 1014/1/1/03 et seq., Argos Ltd. & Littlewoods Ltd. v. OFT, [2005] CAT 13 (29 Apr.). 
633
 Joined Cases 1019/1/1/03 et seq., Umbro Holdings Ltd. v. OFT, [2005] CAT 22 (19 May). 
 Hasbro UK 
Ltd. paid £0 
in total fines 
because of 
100% 
leniency, 
reduced from 
£15.59 
million. 
 Argos Ltd. 
paid £17.28 
million in 
total fines. 
 Littlewoods 
Ltd. paid 
£5.37 million 
in total fines. 
the fine of 
Littlewoods from 
£5.37 million to 
£4.5 million.632 
Replica 
Football Kits 
1 August 2003 Chapter I: price-
fixing. 
£18.668 million total 
fine before 
leniency. 
 
£18.627 million total 
CAT reduced 
overall fine to 
£15.49m, 
including:633 
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fine after leniency. 
 
 Manchester 
United Plc. 
paid 
£1.652m in 
total fines. 
 Football 
Assoc. Ltd. 
paid 
£0.158m in 
total fines, 
which 
included a 
20% 
reduction 
from 
£0.198m due 
to leniency. 
 Umbro 
Holdings Ltd. 
paid 
£6.641m in 
total fines. 
 Allsports Ltd. 
 For 
Umbro, 
from 
£6.641 
million to 
£5.3 
million. 
 For MU, 
from 
£1.652 
million to 
£1.5 
million. 
 For JJB 
Sports, 
from 
£8.373 
million to 
£6.7 
million. 
 
For the first time, 
CAT increased 
the fine for 
Allsports from 
 290 
 
paid 
£1.350m in 
total fines. 
 Blacks 
Leisure 
Group Plc. 
paid 
£0.197m in 
total fines. 
 JJB Sports 
Plc. paid 
£8.373m in 
total fines. 
 Sports 
Soccer Ltd. 
paid 
£0.123m in 
total fines. 
 The John 
David Group 
Plc. paid 
£0.073m in 
total fines. 
 Florence 
Clothiers 
£1.35 million to 
£1.42 million. 
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(Scotland) 
Ltd. 
(previously 
“Sports 
Connection”) 
paid 
£0.020m in 
total fines, 
which 
included a 
25% 
reduction 
from 
£0.027m due 
to leniency. 
 Sportsetail 
Ltd. 
benefited 
from 100% 
leniency and 
thus paid £0 
in total fines, 
reduced from 
£0.004m. 
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634
 Case No. 1016/1/1/03, Genzyme Ltd. v. OFT, [2004] CAT 4 (11 Mar.). 
635
 The ten distributors were: Lewison Ltd., A.B. Gee of Ripley Ltd., Sellicks (Plymouth) Ltd., George Clapperton & Son Ltd., J A Magson Ltd., L B Group Ltd., 
Newswell Ltd., Williams of Swansea Ltd., Youngsters Ltd., & Esdevium Games Ltd. 
Genzyme Ltd. 27 March 2003 Chapter II: tying & 
margin squeeze. 
£6.8m total fine on 
Genzyme. 
CAT reduced 
overall fine on 
Genzyme from 
£6,809,598 to 
£3.0m.634 
Hasbro I 6 December 2002 Chapter I: price-
fixing. 
£9 million total fine 
before leniency. 
 
£4.95m total fine 
levied on Hasbro 
UK Ltd. after 
leniency. 
 
The OFT refrained 
from levying any 
fines on the 10 
distributors635 also 
party to the price-
fixing arrangement 
because Hasbro 
had taken the 
initiative in setting 
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636
 Case No. 1009/1/1/02, Aberdeen Journals v. OFT, [2003] CAT 11 (23 June). 
prices and because 
the distributors 
were in 
substantially 
weaker market 
positions. 
Aberdeen 
Journals Ltd. 
16 September 2002 Chapter II: 
predation 
£1.328m total fine 
on Aberdeen. 
CAT reduced 
overall fine on 
Aberdeen from 
£1,328,040 to 
£1.0m.636 
John Bruce 
Ltd., Fleet 
Parts Ltd., & 
Truck and 
Trailer 
Components 
17 May 2002 Chapter I: price-
fixing 
£33,737 total fine. 
 
 John Bruce 
(UK) Ltd. 
paid 3% of 
its relevant 
turnover in 
fines (exact 
amount 
redacted), 
after 
receiving a 
 
 294 
 
10% 
reduction 
due to full 
cooperation, 
10% for not 
disputing the 
facts, and 
20% due to 
remedial 
action taken.  
 Fleet Parts 
Ltd. paid 
5.6% of its 
relevant 
turnover 
(exact 
amount 
redacted), 
after 
receiving a 
10% 
reduction 
due to full 
cooperation, 
10% for not 
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disputing the 
facts, and 
another 10% 
for swift 
remedial 
action. 
 Truck & 
Trailer 
Components 
paid 24% of 
its relevant 
turnover 
(exact 
amount 
redacted). 
Arriva plc & 
First Group plc 
5 February 2002 Chapter I: market 
allocation 
£203,632 total fine 
after leniency. 
 
Prior to leniency 
applied, OFT levied 
fine of £318,175 on 
Arriva and 
£529,852 on First 
Group, for a total of 
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637
 Case No. 1001/1/1/01, Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings Ltd. v. Director General of Fair Trading, [2002] CAT 1 (15 Jan.). 
£848,027.  After 
leniency applied, 
OFT levied fine of 
£203,632 on Arriva 
and nothing (£0) on 
First Group. 
Napp 
Pharmaceutica
l Holding Ltd. 
5 April 2001 Chapter II: 
exclusionary 
discounts & 
exploitative prices 
£3.21m total fine 
imposed on Napp. 
CAT reduced 
overall fine from 
£3.21 to 
£2.2m.637 
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DECISIONS WITH APPLICATION OF THE 2011 SG 
DECIS
ION 
(N° 
and 
date) 
UNDERTAKI
NGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVIT
Y 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplica
tion 
factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
11-D-
17 
 
12-8-
2011 
UNILEVER 
CARTEL 
Particul
arly 
grave 
Certain 
20% 
 
5Y,9M,12D
638 (3,37) 
198.830.
000 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +25% 
N/A 
100% 0 
CONFIR
MED 
(Paris, 
30th June, 
2014) 
HENKEL 
5Y,9M,12D 
(3,37) 
107.031.
000 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +15% 
25% 
92.310.0
00 
PROCTER & 
GAMBLE 
5Y,9M,12D 
(3,37) 
240.240.
560 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +25% 
20% 
240.240.
000 
COLGATE 
PALMOLIVE 
4Y,10M, 
12D (2,91) 
36.216.0
00 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
15% 
35.400.0
00 
                                                     
638
 Y=YEAR ; M=MONTH ; D=DAY. 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° 
and 
date) 
UNDERTAKI
NGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVIT
Y 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplica
tion 
factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
group: +15% 
11-D-
19 
 
12-15-
2011 
KONTIKI RPM Grave 
Very 
low 
9% 
4Y,2M 
(2,58) 
13.467.6
00 
Mono-product 
firm and 
strong 
decrease of its 
turnover: -
90% 
N/A 
N/A 
1.340.00
0 
CONFIR
MED 
(Paris, 
16th May, 
2013) 
12-D-
02 
 
01-12-
2012 
GEFIL 
(professional 
organization) 
CARTEL 
(price 
coordinatio
n through a 
professional 
organizatio
n) 
Grave 
Very 
low 
9% 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
15.000 
CONFIR
MED 
(Paris, 6th 
June, 
2013) 
ARC ESSOR 
1Y,11M 
(1,45) 
27.125 
Partial inability 
to pay 
8.500 
ASSAI 
11M 
(1) 
832 N/A 800 
DELOITTE 
CONSEIL 
5Y,10M 
(3,41) 
340.966 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
510.000 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° 
and 
date) 
UNDERTAKI
NGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVIT
Y 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplica
tion 
factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
group: +50% 
HOTELS 
ACTION 
CONSEILS 
3Y,6M 
(2,25) 
82.398 
Mono-product 
firm:-70% 
24.700 
MAITRES 
DU REVE 
5Y,7M 
(3,29) 
94.673 
Mono-product 
firm:-70% 
N/A 
28.400 
MEDIEVAL 
3Y,6M 
(2,25) 
63.620 
Partial inability 
to pay 
12.000 
MERIMEE 
CONSEILS 
5Y,10M 
(3,41) 
60.653 
Mono-product 
firm:-70% 
Partial inability 
to pay 
2.600 
PHILIPPE 
CAPARROS 
DEVELOPP
EMENT 
5Y,10M 
(3,41) 
27.634 
Mono-product 
firm:-70% 
8.000 
PROMOTOU 4Y,11M 8.294 Mono-product 800 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° 
and 
date) 
UNDERTAKI
NGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVIT
Y 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplica
tion 
factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
R 
CONSULTA
NTS 
(2,95) firm:-70% 
SOMIVAL 
5Y,9M 
(3,37) 
49.918 N/A 49.900 
12-D-
06 
 
01-26-
2012 
EXPLOITATI
ON DES 
CARRIERES 
CARTEL 
AND 
ABUSE OF 
COLLECTI
VE 
DOMINANT 
POSITION 
(FORCLOS
URE 
EFFECT) 
Particul
arly 
grave 
Certain, 
but 
limited 
to a 
small 
territory 
16% 
17Y,8M 
(9,33) 
150.999 
N/A 20% 
N/A 
120.790 
NO 
APPEAL 
ALLEN-
MAHE 
17Y,8M 
(9,33) 
111.901 89.520 
ATELIER 
FER 
17Y,8M 
(9,33) 
73.239 58.590 
GUIBERT 
FRERES 
17Y,8M 
(9,33) 
119.149 95.310 
SOCIETE 
SAINT-
PIERRAISE 
13% 
(only 
1 
5Y,3M 
(3,12) 
21.499 17.190 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° 
and 
date) 
UNDERTAKI
NGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVIT
Y 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplica
tion 
factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
DE 
TRANSPOR
T 
antitru
st 
practic
e) 
12-D-
09 
 
03-13-
2012 
AXIANE 
MEUNERIE 
CARTEL 
 
(Market 
share 
between 
French and 
German 
producers) 
Particul
arly 
grave 
Signific
ant 
19% 
5Y,11M 
(3,45) 
19.927.2
00 
 
N/A N/A 19.927.0
00 
PENDING 
APPEAL 
BACH 
MUHLE 
5Y,11M 
(3,45) 
36.708 Leader :+10% 
N/A N/A 
40.000 
BINDEWALD 
KUPFERMU
LHE 
4Y,7M 
(2,79) 
2.891.69
5 
Maverick : -
10% 
N/A N/A 
2.602.00
0 
BLIESMUHL
E 
6Y,1M 
(3,54) 
1.929.68
9 
N/A N/A N/A 1.929.00
0 
FLECHTORF
ER MUHLE 
WALTER 
THONEBE 
6Y,1M 
(3,54) 
4.510.45
5 
N/A N/A N/A 
4.510.00
0 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° 
and 
date) 
UNDERTAKI
NGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVIT
Y 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplica
tion 
factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
FRANCE 
FARINE 
6Y,1M 
(3,54) 
7.541.19
1 
Leader :+10% 
N/A N/A 8.295.00
0 
FRIESSING
ER MUHLE 
6Y,1M 
(3,54) 
11.770.5
00 
 
N/A N/A 11.770.0
00 
GRANDS 
MOULINS 
DE PARIS 
4Y,8M 
(2,83) 
11.834.2
39 
 
N/A N/A 
11.834.0
00 
GRANDS 
MOULINS 
DE 
STRASBOU
RG 
5Y,11M 
(3,45) 
11.635.1
25 
Partial inability 
to pay: -15% 
N/A N/A 
9.890.00
0 
HEYL et 
GRAIN 
MILLERS 
6Y,1M 
(3,54) 2.564.62
3 
N/A 10% N/A 
1.564.00
0 
HEYL 
6Y,1M 
(3,54) 
N/A N/A 
487.000 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° 
and 
date) 
UNDERTAKI
NGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVIT
Y 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplica
tion 
factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
MILLS 
UNITED 
HOVESTAD 
& 
MUNSTERM
ANN & 
GRAIN 
MILLERS 
6Y,1M 
(3,54) 
6.602.91
4 
N/A 10% N/A 
4.028.00
0 
MILLS 
UNITED 
HOVESTAD 
& 
MUNSTERM
ANN 
6Y,1M 
(3,54) 
N/A N/A 
1.254.00
0 
SAALEMUH
LE 
ALSLEBEN 
8M 
0,66 
297.699 
N/A N/A N/A 
297.000 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° 
and 
date) 
UNDERTAKI
NGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVIT
Y 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplica
tion 
factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
VK MUHLEN 
4Y,8M 
(2,83) 
17.110.6
89 
N/A N/A N/A 17.110.0
00 
WILH 
WERHAHN 
   
4Y,6M 
(2,75) 
16.667.7
50 
N/A N/A 
100% 0 
AXIANE 
MEUNERIE 
CARTEL 
 
(French 
market) 
Particul
arly 
grave  
(but less 
than the 
other 
cartel, 
since it 
was not 
secret) 
Signific
ant 
17% 
46Y 
(13) 
44.032.0
40 
N/A N/A N/A 44.032.0
00 
EUROMILL 
NORD & 
NUTRIXO 
46Y 
(13) 35.205.3
00 
N/A N/A N/A 
14.435.0
00 
EUROMILL 
NORD 
46Y 
(13) 
N/A N/A N/A 20.770.0
00 
GRANDS 
MOULINS 
DE PARIS & 
NUTRIXO 
42Y,4M 
(12,62) 24.605.5
92 
N/A N/A N/A 
10.392.0
00 
GRANDS 
MOULINS 
42Y,4M 
(12,62) 
N/A N/A N/A 14.213.0
00 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° 
and 
date) 
UNDERTAKI
NGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVIT
Y 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplica
tion 
factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
DE PARIS 
GRANDS 
MOULINS 
STORIONE 
& NUTRIXO 
16% 
(only 
one 
cartel) 
10Y 
(5,5) 
95.920 
N/A N/A N/A 
95.000 
GRANDS 
MOULINS 
DE 
STRASBOU
RG 
17% 
45Y,7M 
(12,95) 
22.274.7
77 
Partial inability 
to pay: -15% 
N/A N/A 
18.930.0
00 
MINOTERIE
S CANTIN 
32Y,6M 
(11,64) 
23.622.9
14 
N/A N/A N/A 23.622.0
00 
MOULINS 
SOUFFLET 
16% 
(only 
one 
cartel) 
8Y 
(4,5) 
393.120 
N/A N/A N/A 
393.000 
12-D- NESTLE RPM and Grave Low [5- 4Y 18.576.0 Size and 18% N/A 19.040.0 CONFIR
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DECIS
ION 
(N° 
and 
date) 
UNDERTAKI
NGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVIT
Y 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplica
tion 
factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
10 
 
03-20-
2012 
EXCLUSIVI
TY 
CLAUSES 
10%] 
Confid
ential 
(3) 00 economic 
power of the 
group: +25% 
00 MED 
(Paris, 
10th 
October, 
2013) 
ROYAL 
CANIN 
10.102.0
00 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +15% 
 
Recidivism: 
+25% 
20% N/A 
11.618.0
00 
HILL’S PET 
NUTRITION 
& 
COLGATE-
PALMOLIVE 
None 
[3-7%] 
Confid
ential 
4.056.00
0 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +15% 
N/A N/A 
4.664.00
0 
12-D-
24 
ORANGE & 
FRANCE 
ABUSE OF 
DOMINANT 
Grave Certain 5% 
3Y 
(2) 
142.326.
000 
Size and 
economic 
N/A N/A 117.419.
000 
PENDING 
APPEAL 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° 
and 
date) 
UNDERTAKI
NGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVIT
Y 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplica
tion 
factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
 
12-13-
2012 
TELECOM POSITION 
(Price 
discriminati
on : 
foreclosure 
effect) 
power of the 
group: +10% 
 
Recidivism: 
+50% 
 
Legal context:  
-50% 
SFR 
119.470.
000 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +10% 
 
Legal context:  
-50% 
N/A N/A 
65.708.0
00 
12-D-
25 
SNCF 
ABUSE OF 
DOMINANT 
Grave Certain 6% 
From 
1Y,10M to 
48.195.0
00 
Size and 
economic 
N/A N/A 60.966.0
00 
PENDING 
APPEAL 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° 
and 
date) 
UNDERTAKI
NGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVIT
Y 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplica
tion 
factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
 
12-18-
2012 
POSITION 
(Abusive 
use of 
confidential 
information 
regarding 
competitors
, restraint to 
access to 
essential 
facilities, 
predatory 
prices) 
4Y,7M 
(1,75) 
power of the 
group: +15% 
 
Recidivism: 
+10% 
12-D-
27 
 
12-20-
FNAC Price fixing 
Grave 
(not 
secret 
practice
Low 12% 
4Y,9M 
(2,87) 
3.383.04
4 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +15% 
10% N/A 
3.501.00
0 
NO 
APPEAL 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° 
and 
date) 
UNDERTAKI
NGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVIT
Y 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplica
tion 
factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
2012 
FNAC & 
FRANCE 
BILLET 
s) 
1.519.91
8 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +15% 
10% N/A 
1.573.00
0 
TICKETNET 
1.073.79
5 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +15% 
20% N/A 
987.000 
FNAC 
Boycott 
Particul
arly 
grave 
Low 13% 
1Y,11M 
1,45) 
1.851.63
7 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +15% 
10% N/A 
1.916.00
0 
FNAC & 
FRANCE 
BILLET 
831.895 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +15% 
10% N/A 
861.000 
TICKETNET 587.719 Size and 20% N/A 540.000 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° 
and 
date) 
UNDERTAKI
NGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVIT
Y 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplica
tion 
factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
economic 
power of the 
group: +15% 
13-D-
03 
 
02-13-
2013 
ABERA 
CARTEL 
(Concerted 
limitation of 
the 
production 
in order to 
decrease 
the buying 
prices) 
Particul
arly 
grave 
by 
nature 
(but 
effective
ly, less 
grave 
due to 
the 
economi
c 
difficulti
Low 16% 
3M 
(0,25) 
1.316.74
2 
Mono-product 
firm:-50% 
N/A N/A 
592.533 
PENDING 
APPEAL 
BERNARD 
1.398.08
3 
Mono-product 
firm:-50% 
18% N/A 
573.213 
GAD & 
FINANCIER
E DU 
FOREST 
1.485.25
4 
Mono-product 
firm:-60% 
N/A N/A 
250.000 
GROUPE 
BIGARD 
3.648.39
1 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +10% 
18% N/A 
1.339.69
8 
SOCOPA 
VIANDES & 
1.948.09
0 
Size and 
economic 
18% N/A 1.757.17
7 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° 
and 
date) 
UNDERTAKI
NGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVIT
Y 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplica
tion 
factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
GROUPE 
BIGARD 
es of 
the 
sector) 
power of the 
group: +10% 
FRENCH 
MEAT 
ASSOCIATI
ON 
CARTEL  
(Purchase 
price fixing) 
Very 
grave 
by 
nature 
 
(but 
very 
short 
duration
) 
Very 
low 
N/A 2D 
3.000 
N/A 10% N/A 
2.700 
FEDERATIO
N DES 
ACHETEUR
S AU 
CADRAN 
3.000 
N/A 10% N/A 
2.700 
BERNARD 5.000 N/A 18% N/A 4.100 
COOPERL 
ARC-
ATLANTIQU
E 
5.000 
N/A  N/A 
5.000 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° 
and 
date) 
UNDERTAKI
NGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVIT
Y 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplica
tion 
factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
ABERA 3.000 N/A 10% N/A 2.700 
AIM 
GROUPE & 
HAIM 
3.000 
N/A 18% N/A 
2.460 
GAD & 
FINANCIER
E DU 
FOREST 
7.000 
N/A 10% N/A 
6.300 
GROUPE 
BIGARD 
7.000 
N/A 18% N/A 
5.740 
KERMENE 7.000 N/A  N/A 7.000 
FRENCH 
MEAT 
ASSOCIATI
ON 
Price fixing 
Particul
arly 
grave 
Very 
low 
N/A  12.000 N/A 
10% N/A 
10.800 
COOPERL 
ARC-
CARTEL 
(Price fixing 
Particul
arly 
Very 
low 
15% 
2M 
(1) 
12.081 
Size and 
economic 
10% N/A 
13.288 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° 
and 
date) 
UNDERTAKI
NGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVIT
Y 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplica
tion 
factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
ATLANTIQU
E 
and market 
allocution) 
grave power of the 
group: +10% 
GAD & 
FINANCIER
E DU 
FOREST 
3.048 
Mono-product 
firm:-60% 
10% N/A 
1.097 
13-D-
06 
 
02-28-
2013 
CONSEIL 
SUPERIEUR 
DE 
L’ORDRE 
DES 
EXPERTS-
COMPTABL
ES 
ABUSE OF 
DOMINANT 
POSITION 
(Exclusivity 
clauses,...) 
Very 
grave 
Certain 7% 
7Y,5M 
(4,2) 
1.617.02
4 
Legal 
maximum 
limited to 
1.500.000 for 
non-
undertakings 
which face a 
simplified 
procedure. 
Use of moral 
authority 
22% 
N/A 77.220 
PENDING 
APPEAL 
EXPERT 
COMPTABL
E MEDIA 
N/A 
1.170.00
0 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° 
and 
date) 
UNDERTAKI
NGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVIT
Y 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplica
tion 
factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
ASSOCIATI
ON 
(professional 
order):+10% 
13-D-
09 
 
04-17-
2013 
EIFFAGE 
CARTEL 
(Bid-
rigging) 
Particul
arly 
grave 
Moderat
e 
1% of 
the 
Frenc
h 
turnon
ver 
N/A 
647.568 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +15%  
 
Recidivism: 
+30% 
N/A N/A 740.000 
NO 
APPEAL 
EIFFAGE 
CONSTRUC
TION 
N/A N/A 
220.000 
VILMOR 
CONSTRUC
TION 
65.445 
Partial inability 
to pay 
N/A N/A 
5.000 
13-D-
11 
 
05-14-
2013 
SANOFI 
ABUSE OF 
DOMINANT 
POSITION 
(Denigratio
n) 
Particul
arly 
grave 
Effectiv
e 
13% N/A 
27.080.0
12 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +50% 
N/A N/A 
40.600.0
00 
PENDING 
APPEAL 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° 
and 
date) 
UNDERTAKI
NGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVIT
Y 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplica
tion 
factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
13-D-
12 
 
05-28-
2013 
BRENNTAG 
& DBML 
CARTEL 
 
(Major part 
of France 
concerned) 
Particul
arly 
grave 
Certain 20% 
7Y,5M 
(4,2) 
48.194.3
70 
Instigator: 
+15% 
 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +15%  
N/A 
25% 
47.802.7
89 
PENDING 
APPEAL 
DBML 
(Liability 
as 
previous 
Brenntag
’ parent 
company
) 
Limited to the 
period of 
control  
N/A N/A 
5.311.42
2 
CALDIC EST 
4Y,11M 
(2,95) 
1.668.79
6 
N/A 
20% 
N/A 
1.335.03
6 
SOLVADIS 5Y,9M 13.430.4 N/A N/A 100% 0 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° 
and 
date) 
UNDERTAKI
NGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVIT
Y 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplica
tion 
factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
(3,37) 20 
UNIVAR 
6Y,8M 
(3,83) 
19.412.3
55 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +15%  
 
15% 
20% 
15.180.4
61 
GEA 
GROUP 
 
(Liability 
as 
previous 
Solvadis’ 
parent 
company
) 
Limited to the 
period of 
control 
20% 
N/A 
9.405.27
9 
BRENNTAG 
CARTEL 
 
(One client 
concerned) 
Particul
arly 
grave 
Certain 20% 
7Y,1M 
(4,04) 
62.216 
Leader :+15%  
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
N/A 
100% 0 
 318 
 
DECIS
ION 
(N° 
and 
date) 
UNDERTAKI
NGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVIT
Y 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplica
tion 
factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
group: +15% 
DBML 
(Liability 
as 
previous 
Brenntag
’ parent 
company
) 
Limited to the 
period of 
control 
N/A 
N/A 50.916 
CHEMCO 36.603 
Partial inability 
to pay:-73% 
N/A N/A 
10.000 
13-D-
14 
 
06-11-
2013 
CONSEIL 
REGIONAL 
DES 
VETERINAIR
ES 
D’ALSACE 
CARTEL  
 
(through 
professional 
orders) 
Particul
arly 
grave 
Moderat
e 
N/A (based on the 
amount of the 
resources of the 
CRVA) 
20.000 
Use of moral 
authority 
(professional 
order) and 
leader:+25% 
N/A N/A 
25.000 NO 
APPEAL 
SYNDICAT N/A (based on the 5.000 N/A N/A N/A 5.000 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° 
and 
date) 
UNDERTAKI
NGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVIT
Y 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplica
tion 
factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
NATIONAL 
DES 
VETERINAIR
ES 
D’EXERCIC
E LIBERAL 
(BAS-RHIN) 
amount of the 
resources of the 
SYNDICATE) 
SYNDICAT 
DEPARTEM
ENTAL DES 
VETERINAIR
ES 
D’EXERCIC
E LIBERAL 
(HAUT-
RHIN) 
N/A (based on the 
amount of the 
resources of the 
SYNDICATE) 
1.000 
N/A N/A N/A 
1.000 
13-D- EDF ABUSE OF Particul Moderat 11% 1Y,5M 5.255.15 Size and N/A N/A 9.853.42 PENDING 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° 
and 
date) 
UNDERTAKI
NGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVIT
Y 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplica
tion 
factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
20 
 
12-17-
2013 
DOMINANT 
POSITION 
(favoritism 
of a 
subsidiary 
by an 
undertaking 
in charge of 
a Service of 
General 
Economic 
Interest)  
arly 
grave 
e (1,2) 8 economic 
power of the 
group: +50% 
 
Recidivism: 
+25% 
0 APPEAL 
Grave 
Very 
low 
3% 
11M 
(0,91) 
1.968.01
5 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +50% 
 
Recidivism: 
+25% 
N/A N/A 
3.690.02
7 
13-D-
21 
 
12-18-
SCHERING-
PLOUGH & 
FINANCIER
E MSD & 
ABUSE OF 
DOMINANT 
POSITION 
(Denigratio
Particul
arly 
grave 
High 14% 
1Y 
(1) 
12.806.6
40 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +50% 
20% 
N/A 
15.367.0
00 
PENDING 
APPEAL 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° 
and 
date) 
UNDERTAKI
NGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVIT
Y 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplica
tion 
factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
2013 MERCK n of a 
competitive 
product and 
loyalty 
rebates) 
 
SCHERING-
PLOUGH & 
FINANCIER
E MSD & 
MERCK 
CONCERT
ED 
PRACTICE
S 
(Application 
of the ADP) 
Particul
arly 
grave 
Taken 
into 
account 
for the 
ADP 
4% 
2M,4D 
(0,16) 
345.245 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +50% 
20% 
N/A 414.000 
RECKITT 212.125 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +50% 
20% 
N/A 318.000 
14-D-
02 
 
EDITION 
PHILIPPE 
AMAURY 
ABUSE OF 
DOMINANT 
POSITION 
Grave 
Effectiv
e 
9% 
9M 
(0,75) 
8.786.74
5 
Partial inability 
to pay:-60% 
N/A N/A 
3.514.00
0 
PENDING 
APPEAL 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° 
and 
date) 
UNDERTAKI
NGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVIT
Y 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplica
tion 
factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
02-20-
2014 
(Predatory 
practices) 
 
  
 323 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 5: Corporate compliance as a mitigating circumstance 
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Enhancing compliance: Can compliance programmes contribute to effective enforcement? Should there be a bonus for 
compliance programmes? 
 
Corporate compliance refers to the organisational measures taken by companies in order to achieve the degree of compliance 
desired. In the context of competition law, compliance programmes can be defined as: 
 
‘A set of measures adopted within a company or corporate group to inform, educate and instruct its personnel about the antitrust 
prohibitions […] and the company’s or group’s policy regarding respect for these prohibitions, and to control or monitor respect 
for these prohibitions or this policy. Antitrust compliance programmes are thus a type of organizational control system aimed at 
standardizing staff behaviour, specifically within the domain of antitrust compliance’.639 
 
After providing an overview of existing national approaches to compliance programmes, this section will analyse the contribution of 
corporate compliance to the enforcement objectives of prevention and detection of anti-competitive collusive practices. The specific 
option of rewarding compliance programmes in the context of antitrust infringement will be then discussed.  
 
1. Overview of different national approaches to compliance 
 
Many competition authorities engage with compliance programmes, through soft law instruments. A first set of tools are designed to 
provide practical guidance to companies on how to achieve compliance.640 Some competition authorities give further detailed 
guidance: among the existing initiatives, some agencies tailor guidance to SMEs (the UK641) or to specific sectors (the 
                                                     
639
 Wils, W.P.J (2013) “Antitrust Compliance Programmes & Optimal Antitrust Enforcement”, Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 1, 52-81, 52. 
640
 See for example ‘Materials & guidance on compliance programs’ available at  
 http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/working-groups/current/cartel/awareness/business.aspx. 
641
 OFT ‘Quick Guide on Competition Law Compliance’ (2009) available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/competition-act-and-cartels/competition-law-
compliance/quick-guide/#.U3YFSCi1aTI  
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Netherlands642); some provide a template or framework based on which companies can establish their compliance programmes 
(Canada643, Japan644 and Australia645); and also others engage in direct support to the implementation of compliance measures 
(Japan646). Certification and standardisation of an existing compliance programme that meet particular criteria is available in Brazil 
and South Korea647. In addition, the willingness of competition authorities to engage with corporate compliance translates in 
resources being spent in understanding the drivers of compliance (France, the UK, Australia) 648, or in engaging in advocacy and 
outreach aimed at changing social and business norms towards a culture of compliance (Brazil)649. Some authorities even 
acknowledge that corporate compliance is a key component or asset of their enforcement system (France, Australia).650   
 
Competition authorities seem more reluctant to integrate compliance programmes in the hard law dimension of their enforcement 
systems. The European Commission affirmed that compliance programmes cannot constitute a mitigating factor in the context of a 
                                                     
642
 Eg. Insurance sector and home care industry. International Chamber of Commerce (2011) “Promoting Antitrust Compliance: the various approaches of 
national antitrust” 5. 
643
 http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/vwapj/CorporateCompliancePrograms-sept-2010-e.pdf/$FILE/CorporateCompliancePrograms-sept-
2010-e.pdf 
644
 International Chamber of Commerce (2011) “Promoting Antitrust Compliance: the various approaches of national antitrust”.  
645
 http://www.accc.gov.au/business/business-rights-protections/implementing-a-compliance-program#download-the-templates 
646
 Active coordination with the Fair Trade Institute (an affiliate of the Japan Competition authority) which helps 
companies establish and implement compliance programmes. International Chamber of Commerce (2011) “Promoting Antitrust Compliance: the various 
approaches of national antitrust”. 
647
 International Chamber of Commerce (2011) “Promoting Antitrust Compliance: the various approaches of national antitrust” 3. 
648
 Europe Economics(2008), “Etat des lieux et perspectives  des programmes de conformité, Une étude réalisée pour le  Conseil de la concurrence” 
http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/etudecompliance_oct08.pdf; OFT report (2010) “The Drivers of Compliance and Non-compliance with 
Competition Law”, Australia has observed a three phase evolution and the fact that a company rarely reverts to non-compliance once it has progressed to 
the third phase. (International Chamber of Commerce) 3.  
649
 “Annual report on Competition Policy in Developments in Brazil” (2012), submitted to the OECD 
http://search.oecd.org/officialdocuments/displaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/AR%282013%2919&docLanguage=En 
650
 Australia: compliance is regarded as an "important component of the ACCC's integrated suite of compliance tools" 
France: the Autorité described compliance as an "asset" for antitrust authorities. International Chamber of Commerce (2011) “Promoting Antitrust 
Compliance: the various approaches of national antitrust” 4.  
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conviction.651 The US Department of Justice also refuses to consider compliance programmes in antitrust infringements.652 Only a 
few competition authorities give credit to compliance programmes in the context of a litigation or investigation, granting a maximum 
of a 10% reduction in fine. In most cases, compliance programmes are taken into consideration, in relation to measures 
implemented after the infringement (post-factum), typically set up in response to an investigation (Netherlands653, Italy654, 
France655). In the UK, in contrast, companies may benefit for a 10% reduction in fine for having effective compliance measures 
before (or soon after) the infringement (ante factum).656 In addition, undertakings to implement a compliance programme can be 
required in the enforcement stage (Canada657, South Africa658, Australia659).  In contrast some anti-corruption laws of the same 
jurisdictions open the possibility for companies to be relieved from anti-corruption completely, on ground related to compliance 
programmes.660 
 
                                                     
651
 J. Almunia, Vice President of the European Commission responsible for Competition Policy, “A successful compliance programme brings its own reward. 
The main reward for a successful compliance programme is not getting involved in unlawful behaviour. Instead, a company involved in a cartel should not 
expect a reward from us for setting up a compliance programme, because that would be a failed programme by definition.” SPEECH/11/268, 14 April 2011. 
652
 According to the US Sentencing Guidelines, the US may consider compliance programmes as a mitigating factor in the context of corporate crimes. 
However, the conditions attached to it almost exclude this possibility for antitrust violations. In addition, the Antitrust Division seems to clearly exclude the 
consideration of compliance programmes in the context of antitrust: ‘[T]he Antitrust Division has established a firm policy, understood in the business 
community, that, credit should not be given at the charging stage for a compliance program.’ Murphy, J.E. (2013) “Making the Sentencing Guidelines 
Message Complete” available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Meetings_and_Rulemaking/Public_Comment/20130801/Public_Comment_Murphy_Proposed_Priorities.pdf 
653
 International Chamber of Commerce (2011) 3. 
654
 http://www.mwe.com/Italys-Competition-Chair-and-Minister-of-Justice-Confirm-That-ad-hoc-Compliance-Programs-Will-Continue-to-be-Considered-as-a-
Mitigating-Factor-10-28-2013/  
655
 France : Autorité de la Concurrence, (2012) “Document-cadre du 10 février 2012 sur les programmes de conformité aux règles de concurrence” para 31.  
656
 The OFT (2012) “OFT's guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty” para 2.15;  
657
 http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03280.html#footnote3b  
658
 See for example http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/AttachedFiles/MyDocuments/CC-Pioneer-Foods30Nov2010.pdf 
659
 Section 87B of the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974: the Australian Competition authority can accept formal administrative undertakings, which may 
include compliance programme obligations.  
660
 See for example the UK:  Section 7 (2) of the UK Bribery Act; US: The Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice and the Enforcement Division of 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, ‘A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’ (2012) 53. 
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Figure 2: Summary of existing soft and hard law national approaches661 
 
2. Rewarding compliance programmes in the light of sanctions optimality662 
 
A very important element of the effectiveness of sanctions is the perceived probability that an illegal act is detected. A threat of 
prison sentence or high pecuniary sanction deters the wrongdoing only if detection can be expected. Rewarding compliance 
programmes in a manner that induce companies to prevent and detect illegal behaviour internally, can improve the probability of 
                                                     
661
 This chart summarises the existing corporate compliance tools used by countries under examination, based on information available in F. Thépot, “A Study 
of Corporate Compliance” (forthcoming) and International Chamber of commerce. The proportions are only indicative and do not reflect any trend beyond 
the countries that are mentioned here.  
662
 The following developments are inspired from F. Thépot, “A Study of Corporate Compliance” (forthcoming). 
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detection. 663 A first value of compliance programmes to the enforcement policy stems from the informational advantage of 
companies over agencies.  
 
Giving credit to compliance programmes can improve the effectiveness of corporate liability regime, especially in cases where 
companies have neither the incentives nor the means to address such issue internally.  Corporate liability, in the absence of 
individual penalties, imposes sanction on shareholders and not on the responsible individuals. A company can seek to mitigate the 
risk that individuals expose the company to liability and, some argue, have a natural incentive to implement a compliance 
programme. 664 However, corporate liability does not automatically induce the adoption of internal compliance measures.665 Firstly, 
the incentive to adopt compliance programmes may be mitigated by ‘perverse’ effects of a strict corporate liability. A company may 
fear that implementing internal measures to prevent and detect the wrongdoing of their employees increases the probability of 
detection.666 Weighing the costs and benefits of implementing a compliance programme, a company may decide not to incur any of 
those costs if they expect that the costs of detection are higher than the expected benefit of detecting the crime internally.  
 
Second, companies may not have ‘effective methods of preventing individuals from committing acts that impose huge liabilities on 
them’.667 Companies can set up effective methods, but at a certain cost. The extent to which a company is capable of monitoring 
their employees adequately depends on the quality of internal mechanisms such as corporate governance. Corporate governance 
schemes that fail to reach the objectives for which they have been designed, are not likely to be highly effective in preventing 
individuals from committing illegal acts either.  
 
In the presence of individual sanctions, compliance programmes have potentially a greater outreach on company’s employees than 
when they are not personally liable. A senior executive may pay greater attention to a compliance training if pecuniary or prison 
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sanctions are part of the non-compliance risk. Therefore, compliance programmes may yield much greater value to the company. 
Competition authorities should leverage the potential of greater value that compliance programmes constitute to companies, in 
giving more importance to internal prevention and detection. Competition authorities, facing the issue of cartel detection, would then 
benefit from the informational advantage companies have on their managers and employees. 
 
Compliance programmes could then enhance the effectiveness of leniency if it enables companies to better monitor and collect 
information relevant to a leniency application. A company that is better able to prevent and detect an infringement internally is also 
equipped with better tools to constitute a leniency application. In addition, it can help the company detect earlier the infringement 
than the other cartel members.668 
 
3. The key foundations of an effective compliance programme 
 
Corporate compliance is a matter of degree and resources allocated to achieving compliance. More than the mere training sessions 
delivered to employees, a compliance programme encompasses all types of compliance efforts and processes taken by a 
company.  
 
A first essential foundation of an effective corporate compliance lies in the culture embedded from the top of the hierarchy. The 
OFT describes how clear and unambiguous commitment by senior management serves the purpose of setting the high compliance 
standard throughout the firm.669 Such core commitment needs to be written and strongly communicated within the company. To 
ensure that senior management’s commitment is supported by a real awareness of the organisation of compliance, board members 
need to be part of the compliance effort.  
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Communication constitutes another key dimension of compliance programmes. Communicating a strong message of compliance 
throughout the organisation involves holding training sessions to teach employees and senior executives, compliance risks and 
procedures, especially those presenting exposure with competitors. In addition to delivering educational training about competition 
law, compliance programmes need to motivate the employees, so as to raise the compliance awareness within the company. 
Therefore, compliance needs to work hand in hand with communication so as to ‘impact emotionally’ and avoid training fatigue.  
 
Related to the communication dimension, the organisation of compliance needs to be structured around an ‘ambassador’ of 
competition law compliance. With sufficient degree of responsibility, this person, either as part of legal services or compliance 
department needs to have room to advocate the compliance with competition law. The issue of competition compliance cannot be 
diluted and given a lower level of priority compared to other areas of business. Especially true for large companies, the need for a 
‘compliance ambassador’ also stands for smaller companies that can hand the compliance responsibility to someone particularly 
sensitive to such issue.  
 
Effective corporate compliance entails procedures of prevention, detection and response670. To do so, procedures to monitor risky 
business activities or that provide legal advice need to be clearly established. In addition, the eventuality of an infringement needs 
to be addressed, for example by anonymous alert systems, and credible sanctioning schemes.671  
 
4. The verifiability of compliance programmes 
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 Which may involve sophisticated technique such as screenings. Abrantes-Metz, R. Bajari, P.  and Murphy, J.E (2010). “Enhancing Compliance Programs 
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Most of the debate about compliance programmes crystallises around the verifiability of the quality of compliance programme. 
Some argue that the inherent difficulty to evaluate a compliance effort may create perverse incentives: companies would then adopt 
‘cosmetic’ compliance programmes to ensure a reduction in the level of fine.672 As a result, infringing competition law would 
become less costly. This argument may be rejected on grounds similar to those advocating the use of leniency programmes. The 
fine eventually imposed no longer matches the gravity of the infringement, in order to stimulate the level of detection. Therefore, the 
competition authority operates a trade-off between reducing the potential deterrent effect of fines, at the benefit of an increased 
level of detection. Rewarding compliance efforts entails a reduced level of fine, at the benefit of increased level of internal 
prevention and detection.  
 
Based on the foundations of effective compliance programmes, tangible elements can be required by competition authorities to 
demonstrate that appropriate compliance effort can be rewarded. To attest that there is a core commitment to competition 
compliance, competition authorities could require evidence that compliance is being discussed regularly at board meetings and that 
senior management attended training. The authority may also want to verify that there is a board member responsible for 
compliance, and the frequency at which the compliance unit reports to the board. The communication dimension of an effective 
compliance lies in internal communication and training material: the availability of a code of conduct, adopted internally and also in 
relation with business partners is part of compliance communication. In addition, evidence of mention of the compliance in top 
executives speeches or other internal communication, as well as the involvement of communication department in compliance can 
attest of an effective communication of compliance. The actual implementation of compliance can be evidenced with training 
attendance records, the percentage of good results achieved. In particular, competition authorities can request proof that senior 
executives, sales managers or high risk positions attended training, and whether or not they can get disciplined if they do not 
attend.  Companies can also demonstrate that clear procedures are in place, in hiring employees - human resources can indicate 
that their employee have no past history of antitrust infringement- and in monitoring risky business areas – such as trade 
association meetings. In addition, the availability of sanctioning procedures and a history of sanction cases are signs that 
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compliance comprises wider range of procedures than training sessions. The availability of corporate compliance audit reports 
signals a willingness to continually adapt the compliance programme.  
 
5. Conclusion on rewarding compliance programmes 
 
Based on the elements outlined, the validity of compliance efforts seems verifiable. However such process, which needs to be 
undertaken by trained agency staff, involves gathering and checking a large amount of evidence that is not costless. In addition, 
such inquiry may interfere with a company’s internal affairs and may concern sensitive information. Therefore, competition 
authorities may choose to give credit to compliance programmes, but only in the context of an investigation.673 Because it holds 
informational advantage over the competition authorities, the burden of proof should in any case lie with the company. Upon 
cooperation and sufficient evidence of adequate compliance’s efforts, one may consider allowing a company to benefit from a 
reduction in the level of fine, assessed on a case-by-case basis. One could consider rewarding commitment by a company to 
introduce or improve an existing compliance programme. However, in the light of optimal penalty policy, the reward, if any, should 
not just focus on post-infringement compliance programmes. The objective is to encourage the implementation of compliance effort 
ex ante. Ex post consideration of compliance may undermine the impact such reward is designed to have on prevention of cartels 
in the first place.   
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